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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This dissertation is a political study of human rights abuse and human rights promotion 
in 1990s Cambodia. It locates human rights concepts within power relations of 
international intervention, political competition and organised resistance. Human rights 
are conceptualised as a contested ideological phenomenon, while human rights abuse is 
viewed as a political strategy pursued by a power-maximising political elite to reproduce 
their power. 
This analysis attempts to offer a conceptual framework which avoids the challenge of 
the cultural relativist critique. Viewing rights as a political resource renders the 
question of their connection to human nature or universal morality redundant. The 
arguments of cultural relativists in Asia are examined only to illuminate the contested 
nature of the concept of human rights and to demonstrate that possession of power 
permits ideological control of the concept within a particular culture. International 
organisations and local elites may engage in competition for such control. 
As a case study of the political use of human rights in Cambodia, this dissertation also 
attempts to contribute to the scholarship on international interventions and of political 
competition in war-torn societies. Cambodia has long been the target of intervention by 
regional, colonial and superpowers. In the 1990s, world powers arranged one final and 
far-reaching intervention, to take place under the auspices of the United Nations 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), intended to set in motion a process of 
liberalisation and democratisation within the country and to restore full sovereignty to 
the Cambodian government. 
The ideological and theoretical background to this intervention are discussed in Chapter 
Two. UNTAC's mandate and operation are analysed in Chapter Three. UNTAC is 
viewed not as a monolithic expression of international will but as a complex agency, 
comprised of `components' whose tasks and ideals conflicted with one another. One 
lesson to be drawn from UNTAC's experience of human rights promotion is that 
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although humanitarian concerns may provide political impetus for international 
intervention, these are rapidly replaced, once intervention has begun, by more traditional 
foreign policy interests. A second lesson learned reflected the fact that the term `human 
rights', as used both by representatives of outside powers and the Cambodian parties in 
negotiating the terms of the Paris Peace Agreements, was ideologically coded and, 
consequently, understood differently by different parties. As a result, agreement 
achieved on human rights issues in Paris provided an inadequate basis for promoting 
human rights in Cambodia. 
The second part of the dissertation assesses the implications of this intervention for 
human rights in Cambodia. It charts the evolution of discourses of power and rights in 
two national domains: that of the Cambodian government and state apparatus; and that 
of the Cambodian human rights organisations which form part of what UNTAC called 
`civil society'. The power resources harnessed by political parties and Cambodian 
human rights NGOs to promote their respective imaginings of appropriate state-society 
relationships are analysed. 
A political perspective on human rights entails that these should not be seen primarily as 
the bundle of minimum goods described in the Universal Declaration. `Human rights' is 
a coded term which in itself forms a potent ideological power resource. It is used to 
confer or to undermine legitimacy; to mobilise active resistance to, or to encourage 
passive acceptance of, a political event or structure; to justify the donation or 
withholding of international aid. Within the Cambodian human rights movement, it is 
argued, `human rights' is conflated both with both traditional moral values and with the 
concerns of the international community, in order to beckon both the authority of 
Cambodian religion and tradition, and the financial and protective power of 
international support. 
This analytical model generates pragmatic conclusions, highlighting the practical limits 
constraining international intervention to promote human rights. Much of the literature 
on sovereignty and intervention sees the current international regime as a transitional 
one. Sovereignty is no longer sacrosanct, but intervention remains subject to the 
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shifting interests of the great powers. In spite of some trends towards cosmopolitanism 
in world affairs, international structures which could guarantee enforcement of human 
rights norms are undeveloped. Consequently, the most effective human rights 
safeguards are locally created and policed. 
International intervention, even when intended to promote human rights, can sometimes 
be deleterious to the development of predictable and culturally embedded human rights 
safeguards. Transition periods, particularly, raise practical problems as lines of 
authority and responsibility, already poorly developed in this area, become more blurred. 
Uncertainty may confer advantage on human rights activists vis-ä-vis an abusive state 
apparatus. The threat of international exposure, censure and intervention may deter and 
protect. Equally, such uncertainty may allow an abusive state apparatus to take 
advantage of unclear division of responsibilities between in-country and international 
human rights movements. Consequently, local protection for human rights, it is argued, 
is best served by international respect for sovereignty and indigenous promotion of a 
discourse of resistance supplemented by transnational solidarity. 
In Cambodia, uncertainty in international-local relations has benefited the Cambodian 
state-apparatus. Arguably, Cambodian human rights NGOs view international donors as 
patrons of the kind that are familiar in Cambodian politics, a role which the international 
community has proved unable to fill. Consequently, strategies are adopted which do not 
contribute creatively to the empowerment of the grass-roots and NGOs have shown a 
reluctance to search for new political formations. International intervention in 
Cambodia has added a new resource into a familiar political economy of power, giving 
rise to an unprecedented period of pluralism and ideological openness, but the dominant 
economy of power remains arguably incompatible with sustained pluralism and respect 
for human rights. 
The Cambodian Case Study 
The case examined is that of the Kingdom of Cambodia in 1995/6, three years after a 
UN-sponsored election which was linked to the formation of a new government and 
promulgation of a new constitution. This period was unusual in Cambodian history 
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since it was a period in which two important, and opposed, political parties co-existed, 
in competition with one another, in the royal capital of Phnom Penh. The sketch of the 
situation that follows draw on a variety of works on Cambodia, particularly Milton 
Osborne's Power and Politics in Cambodia and David Chandler's A History of 
Cambodia. ' A more detailed analysis of human rights in Cambodia in historical 
perspective is offered in Chapter Four. 
The Royal Government between 1993 and 1997 was formally led by the Front Uni 
National pour un Cambodge Independant, Neutre, Pacifique et Cooperatif (Funcinpec), 
the party of First Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh, which won the 1993 
elections with 45 per cent of the vote. This party was closely connected, through 
Ranariddh, to his father, Norodom Sihanouk, the newly reinstated Cambodian king. 
The importance of Sihanouk, both as King and as a political personality, is indicated in 
the analysis offered in Chapter Four, of human rights in the 1950s and 1960s, an era 
when Sihanouk dominated Cambodian politics. 
The second major political force in Phnom Penh in 1995/6 was the Cambodian People's 
Party (CPP), led by Second Prime Minister Hun Sen. The CPP is the successor to the 
Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP), which originated in the 
Kampuchean National United Front for the National Salvation (KNUFNS). The 
KNUFNS took power in January 1979, at the end of Cambodia's so-called `Decade of 
Destruction' with significant assistance from the People's Army of Viet Nam (PAVN). 
The KPRP/CPP governed Cambodia until 1991, with the assistance of Vietnamese and 
Soviet bloc advisors and Vietnamese troops, mostly under conditions of western 
embargo. During this period, administrative and some public service systems were 
rebuilt, and agricultural and some cultural activity revived. 
Control of 85 per cent of Cambodian territory from 1979 until the signing of the Paris 
Agreements in 1991 allowed the KPRP/CPP to build party, military and state apparata 
'Milton Osborne, Power and Politics in Cambodia (Camberwell: Longman. 1973); David P. Chandler, .4 
History of Cambodia, 2nd ed. (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1993). 
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which penetrated to the village level of Cambodian society. Official appointments were 
political, with employees expected to display active loyalty to the party in the conduct of 
their duties. As the state apparatus monopolised the supply of many goods and services, 
in the context of a state-directed, internationally embargoed economy, party and state 
structures came to resemble patron-client systems for the distribution of benefit to 
supporters. 
The network of personal loyalties which link the CPP and the state bureaucracy, which 
developed between 1979-89, persisted into the 1990s. The nature of this system in the 
post-UNTAC era, and the potential for human rights abuse implicit in it, is analysed in 
Chapters Five and Six. 
Throughout the 1980s, the armies of Funcinpec and the CPP fought for control of 
Cambodia in a bloody civil war. Partnering Funcinpec in the `resistance movement' 
were two other political parties descended from the two regimes of the 1970s, the 
Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) and the Party of Democratic 
Kampuchea (PDK). The KPNLF represented the political descendants of the US- 
backed Khmer Republic, formed after Sihanouk was overthrown by a parliamentary 
coup in 1970. Under the Khmer Republic, Cambodia entered the Second Indochina 
War, and was invaded and heavily bombarded by American forces. The Khmer 
Republic was defeated in 1975 by the PDK, also known as the Khmers Rouges, 
'` a 
communist insurgent force which had allied with Sihanouk following his ousting, and 
which was backed by the North Vietnamese. 
2The `Khmer Rouge' are identified and characterised in scholarly and vernacular terms in a variety of 
ways. This dissertation views the Khmer Rouge as Cambodian interviewees viewed them, as a mythical 
force or concept, a vague threatening force, or, sometimes, as estranged brothers, rather than as a political 
party with a platform. This study does not seek to portray them or their policies historically. 
Consequently, I employ the term `Khmer Rouge' to reflect the ideological construction of this party in 
government controlled areas. Where I refer to specific actions by the Party of Democratic Kampuchea, as 
a signatory to the Paris Accords, I refer to them as the PDK. I refer to the 1975-9 government as DK. 
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The history of Democratic Kampuchea (DK), or `Pol Pot time', from 1975 to 1979, is 
well known for the scale of the atrocities that took place. Between one and two million 
died and social, cultural, political and economic upheaval was severe. This dissertation 
does not focus on the atrocities committed under the DK, or on human rights abuse in 
areas under Khmer Rouge control in the present. It discusses the Khmer Rouge only 
insofar as discourse about them, and about the legacy of their rule, impinged on human 
rights thinking and action in the government-controlled areas of Cambodia in 1995/6. 
During the 1980s, Funcinpec, the KPNLF and the PDK, now allied in a Coalition 
Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) were sustained by aid from, 
particularly, China and Thailand on Cambodia's western border. Hundreds of thousands 
of Khmers fleeing Cambodia were placed in border refugee camps there, a few 
administered by the United Nations Border Relief Operation (UNBRO), most 
administered by one of the three parties which together mounted the military resistance 
to the Vietnamese-backed PR-K. 
The CGDK was recognised by Western and Non-Aligned nations throughout the 1980s 
as the rightful government of Cambodia, occupying Cambodia's seat at the United 
Nations for a decade. Funcinpec, the PDK, the KPNLF and the CPP were the four 
Cambodian signatories to the Paris Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Solution to 
the Conflict in Cambodia. 
In 1995/6, Funcinpec and the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party, a party formed from 
the KPNLF in order to contest the elections, partnered the CPP in a coalition 
government created by means of the UN-organised 1993 election, the culmination of the 
largest international peacekeeping operation ever mounted. A constitutional monarchy 
which formally embraced liberal democratic principles was created. The governing 
coalition was established via a power-sharing agreement brokered after the election. By 
early 1996 this agreement was crumbling as Funcinpec were frustrated in efforts to use 
their electoral mandate to penetrate CPP power networks within the state administration. 
A new political competitor appeared in 1995, with the launch of the Khmer Nation Party 
(KNP), led by former Funcinpec parliamentarian Sam Rainsy. Rainsy had been 
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Minister of Economics and Finance in the Royal Government, but lost his portfolio in 
1995 after strongly criticising the alleged corruption of the two prime ministers, 
Ranariddh and Hun Sen. He was subsequently ejected from both Funcinpec and the 
National Assembly. 
Other features of the 1995/6 political landscape were the existence of a flourishing and 
spirited Khmer-language press corps; human rights and other non-governmental 
associations; a rapidly expanding Buddhist monkhood; and the offices of a range of 
international NGOs, UN agencies and bilateral and multilateral aid organisations. This 
non-governmental sector is surveyed, and their attitudes to human rights discourse and 
promotion assessed, in Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine. 
The political arena contained a plurality of ideologies, interests and structures. This is 
exceptional in Cambodian politics, which has been characterised since independence by 
the repression of all forms of opposition. Many of the political struggles which took 
place during the period of the field research represented attempts, particularly by the 
CPP power structure, at restoring monopoly of historically essential resources of power 
following the political opening sponsored by UNTAC. 
Methodology 
Examining human rights in a context emphasising the uses of political power 
necessitated gathering evidence regarding conceptions of human rights; strategies for 
promoting human rights; and perceptions of the power relationships between the three 
elements of the theoretical model: state apparatus, local non-governmental sector and 
international community. The material used in this analysis comes from three major 
sources. The most important source of data was a programme of 90 interviews 
conducted between January and September 1996. Interviewees can be divided into 
three groups in line with the model: officials of the Cambodian state apparatus; 
members of the Cambodian non-governmental sector; and representatives of 
international organisations engaged in Cambodia. 
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It is a significant limitation of this study that the concept of human rights held by the 
`ordinary Cambodian' does not emerge here. In focusing on organised political clusters 
and the interrelationships between them, this study excludes the 85 per cent of 
Cambodians who live in the rural areas, engaging in subsistence agriculture. 
Arguably, this limitation reflects the realities of Cambodian politics. This dissertation 
focuses on concepts held by key players in a hierarchical power structure. In doing so, it 
follows orientations of power found within Cambodian political society, where 
ideological initiatives within organisations were observed to be transmitted downwards, 
from policy makers in Phnom Penh to provincial workers in the countryside. The 
concern with international intervention has reinforced this orientation as international 
power is, arguably, channelled through hierarchical structures within both governmental 
and non-governmental sectors. 
Most international efforts at human rights promotion in Cambodia are channelled 
through local NGOs. UNTAC's human rights component worked actively to create and 
train a movement which could assume the component's tasks of human rights education, 
monitoring and investigation, after UNTAC's departure. Locating this study at the 
nexus between the international community, the Cambodian NGO movement and the 
state apparatus, required identification of individuals who operated on the cusp between 
these three organisational spheres. At this level, a three-way negotiation over the 
principle of human rights takes place. 
A different negotiation takes place at the village level, where local representatives of the 
`human rights movement', local authorities and villagers employ the concept of human 
rights with different aims and constraints in mind. This study primarily addresses the 
first level, although the conception of human rights at this level is to a great extent 
derived from participants' understanding of what takes place in the villages. 
Consequently, the discussion offered here provides only part of the picture. Future 
studies must look in detail at human rights discourse and practice at the village level. 
A range of interviewees from the Cambodian non-governmental sector were selected 
with reference to their position vis-ä-vis international community and state apparatus. 
8 
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The response of individuals to the contrasting ideological currents emanating from these 
power clusters varies according to a multitude of factors. A significant constraint in 
presenting the findings of the research was imposed by the vulnerability of the 
individuals studied to government repression. This vulnerability significantly worsened 
over the period of the field research and declined further in 1997, when a coup by Hun 
Sen prompted the flight of many political opponents of the CPP, including a number of 
individuals interviewed for this study, into exile. Some of these individuals have since 
returned to Cambodia under UN protection. 
In presenting the views of these individuals regarding human rights issues, direct 
quotations of comments made by interviewees have been employed. Some indication is 
made of the positions of the authors of such comments, but detailed examinations of the 
backgrounds of the individuals speaking is precluded by guarantees of confidentiality 
and concern that individuals should not be identified from the details given. This 
imposes significant constraints on the degree of nuance that can be offered in examining 
the different orientations of different organisations and individuals. 
In consequence, this study does not attempt to connect conceptions of human rights with 
personal characteristics or experiences of individuals. Rather, an attempt is made to 
identify common conceptions which indicate the birth of a unified human rights 
discourse in Cambodia, emerging from the complexity of international reactions within 
interacting influences of international intervention, governmental activity and local 
experience. Delineating the broad outlines of this discourse is all that is possible, given 
the need for confidentiality. Arguably, the deteriorating political situation in Cambodia 
renders a discussion of this discourse imperative. 
Interviewees were selected with reference to two criteria; firstly, they were selected from 
groups which had been identified by UNTAC as potentially key agents for promotion of 
human rights. Secondly they were selected as leading figures in organisations which 
interact with the state apparatus, or the international community, or both. Appendix 
One lists the organisations studied and describes the sample that they represent. 
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A strategy of qualitative interviewing was adopted to gain insight into the categories and 
definitions considered appropriate by interviewees for use in human rights discourse. 
My interview strategy was to intervene as infrequently as possible in the train of thought 
of interviewees. My interview schedule, attached as Appendix Three, was designed to 
raise topics for the interviewee to interpret and enlarge upon. The major advantage of 
this strategy was that a large quantity of material was obtained, while minimising 
interviewer bias by giving interviewees less opportunity to gauge my reactions to their 
comments. I observed that encouraging interviewees to talk about their own priorities 
also encouraged them to speak more freely on what is, in Cambodia, a very politically 
sensitive subject. 
One anticipated disadvantage of this method was the problem of establishing whether 
interviewees spoke about subjects they considered important, or adhered to subjects they 
considered "safe". I found that, after some initial reserve, most interviewees spoke 
frankly on subjects of great "danger" as the interview proceeded and rapport developed. 
Sometimes, I was asked not to tape record these sections of interviews. Because of this, 
I stopped using tape recordings halfway through the research period, and relied on hand- 
written notes made contemporaneously. 
Access to members of the Cambodian government proved problematic. This was in part 
due to the atmosphere of political tension that prevailed throughout the period of 
interviewing. While all of those who agreed to be interviewed appeared confident in the 
interview situation, others approached appeared suspicious of my motives and refused to 
participate. The sample of governmental representatives, particularly from the CPP, is 
thus smaller than planned. 
It is supplemented by evidence from the second source of material: a survey over a one- 
month period of six Khmer-language newspapers, including two pro-CPP daily 
newspapers Koh Santepheap and Reasmei Kampuchea. Articles from these two 
newspapers supplement interview material in providing evidence for CPP use of the 
concept of human rights within its own economy of power. Additional evidence is 
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supplied in speeches delivered by the two prime ministers during the period of the 
fieldwork. 
A third element of the fieldwork was observation of events, including the launch of the 
KNP on 11 November 1995; the arrival of the Dhammayietra peace march in Phnom 
Penh on 2 June 1996; a variety of training seminars and meetings of non-governmental 
organisations; and the trial of Chan Ratana on 28 June 1996. Observation of these 
events supplements the reading of speeches and newspaper reports and analysis of 
interviewee responses as coded references to underlying conceptions of meaning. The 
witnessing of key events also provided an opportunity to verify my identification of 
individuals as key players. 
Much of the fieldwork required a knowledge of the Khmer language. In conducting 
interviews, I made increasing use of Khmer as the fieldwork progressed, although if the 
interviewee was fluent in English, inter views were conducted in English. As a number 
of directors of human rights NGOs were returnees from the US or Australia, many of 
them spoke English very well. In conducting interviews in Khmer, I made use of 
interpreters to discuss the meaning of unfamiliar words or concepts. Translations of 
interviews were produced by this collaborative effort. No obvious differences were 
noted in the spread of results between interviews conducted in Khmer and interviews 
conducted in English. Given that the aim of this dissertation is not to produce a 
linguistic analysis of particular concepts or terms, but to analyse political influences and 
impacts, language problems are not considered to be unduly limiting. It should also be 
noted in this respect that much of the discussion of human rights in Cambodia has been 
prompted by international intervention; part of this intervention comprised the 
translation of human rights terminology and law into the Khmer language, a process in 
which Khmer human rights activists have been heavily involved. 
During the period of the fieldwork, I discussed the content of Khmer-language 
newspaper articles with Cambodian informants, but the translations offered here are 
mine alone. Because of this, I adhere more closely to a literal translation of the Khmer 
11 
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in translations of newspapers, while accounts of the statement of interviewees are 
translated more colloquially. 
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Chapter 2: Human Rights, Culture and Intervention: A Theoretical 
Overview 
Universality of Human Rights Norms 
The universality of human rights norms constitutes a fundamental part of the appeal and 
utility of the concept of human rights in liberal philosophy. Western definitions of 
human rights have emphasised universality as a central feature, since the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. One of the first human rights manifestos, the American 
Declaration of Independence, famously begins: 
We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal... 
while the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares: 
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are 
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in 
a spirit of brotherhood. 
Article 2 of the Declaration states that all human beings, de facto, possess human rights 
by virtue of their humanity, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status. ` 
Seventeenth and eighteenth-century theorists regarded the universality of human rights 
as `self-evident', a matter of natural law and divine will. Similarly, the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights does not attempt any justification of rights. It declares as 
a statement of fact that: 
... recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights 
of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice 
and peace in the world... 
'United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly 
resolution 217 A(III) of 10 December 1948) Art. I. 
2 UDHR Art. 2. 
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and that: 
... the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of 
speech and belief and freedom from want and fear has been proclaimed as 
the highest aspiration of the common people... 3 
Jan Martensen, discussing the preamble to the Universal'Declaration argues: 
the universality and continuing relevance of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in a vastly changed world is not due to its legal style or 
precision nor to the expertise of its authors. Rather the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights is relevant today because it reflects profound 
truths about human nature and the requirements of human dignity. 
To buttress claims of universality, modem philosophers attempt to find universal values 
in which human rights can be grounded. Maurice Cranston derives human rights from 
human nature, from "claim[s] which everyone naturally makes", "aversions... so 
universally and so intensely felt that we speak of them as natural", or "paramount 
wish[es]" that "demand from others their most unfailing respect. "5 The right to life, 
Cranston believes, is one such paramount wish: 
man has a natural desire to survive, a natural impulse to defend himself from 
death and injury... To say that man has a right to life is to convert that 
demand into a kind of moral imperative, that is, to impose on all men a 
reciprocal duty to abstain from injuring their neighbours. 6 
Ronald Dworkin bases his conception of human rights on what he calls "the vague but 
powerful idea of human dignity" which supposes: 
that there are ways of treating a man that are inconsistent with recognising 
him as a full member of the human community, and holds that such 
treatment is profoundly unjust. 
To this he adds the idea of political equality which: 
3UDHR Preamble. 
4Jan Martensen, "The Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights 
Programme, " The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Commentary, eds. Asbjorn Eide et al. 
(Oslo: Scandinavian UP, 1992) 21. 
5Maurice Cranston, What Are Human Rights? (London: Bodley Head, 1973) 25. 
6Cranston 25. 
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supposes that the weaker members of a political community are entitled to 
the same concern and respect of their government as the more powerful 
members have secured for themselves, so that if some men have freedom of 
decision whatever the effect on the general good, then all men must have the 
same freedom. 7 
Cranston and Dworkin appeal to different rationale for universality, but both put this 
feature at the centre of their definitions of human rights. 
Cultural relativism emerged as a critique of such universality. In 1947, the executive 
board of the American Anthropological Association delivered a statement to the 
Commission on Human Rights at the United Nations, which argued that a bill of human 
rights "must take into full account the individual as a member of the social group of 
which he is a part" on the grounds that, in the case of every individual, 
from the moment of his birth not only his behaviour, but his very thought, 
his hopes, aspirations the moral values which direct his action and justify 
and give meaning to his life in his own eyes and those of his fellows, are 
shaped by the body of custom of the group of which he becomes a member. 8 
The statement listed three principles regarded as "essential in drawing up a Bill of 
Human Rights": 
1. The individual realises his personality through his culture, hence respect 
for individual differences entails a respect for cultural differences; 
2. Respect for differences between cultures is validated by the scientific fact 
that no technique for qualitatively evaluating cultures has been discovered; 
3. Standards and values are relative to the culture from which they derive so 
that any attempt to formulate postulates that grow out of the beliefs or moral 
codes of one culture must to that extent detract from the applicability of any 
Declaration of Human Rights to mankind as a whole. 
The Board maintained, "Man is free only when he lives as his society defines 
7Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977) 198. 
8American Anthropological Association Executive Board, "Statement on Human Rights, " American 
Anthropologist 49 (1947): 539/540. 
9AAA 541/542. 
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freedom. "10 
This critique. posits culture as an intervening variable which renders establishment of a 
global-local nexus to promote human rights problematic. Although many universalists 
view cultural difference as overlying common human values, and cultural relativists do 
not exclude the possibility of the same values appearing, de facto, in all cultures, the 
critique prevents external contributions when members of the same culture disagree 
with one another. It prevents authoritative criticism from outside. 
The question of the relationship between culture and rights can be addressed, although 
not resolved, through theoretical examination of culturally relative meanings invested in 
concepts crucial to an understanding of rights. Views of the individual have been a 
particular target for this kind of philosophical human rights debate. Bhikhu Parekh 
addresses the diversity of norms of individuation in various cultures, arguing that 
"individuation is ... a matter of social convention". 
" Individuals in Ancient Athens 
were seen as a "man taken together with his land and political rights"; in the Middle 
Ages, "a craftsman's tools... were just as much an integral part of him as his hands and 
feet. " In modem times, 
For the Hindus the caste into which a person is born is not an accident but a 
result of his or her actions in a previous life. It is an integral part of the 
person's identity and determines his or her rights and duties as well as the 
value of the person's life. The Chinese view of the family as an indissoluble 
organism linking ancestors and descendants into a living union gives rise to 
a highly complex conception of the individual. 
For the liberal, Parekh argues, the individual is "an essentially self-contained and 
solitary being encapsulated in, and unambiguously marked off from the `outside' world 
by his or her body". 12 
Different definitions of the individual give rise to different definitions of "freedom, 
1°AAA 543. 
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equality, rights, property, justice, loyalty, power and authority". 13 Parekh finds that 
liberal individuals "seek to run their lives themselves, to make their own choices, to 
form their own beliefs and judgements, to take nothing for granted or as given" - thus 
they prize autonomy and are suspicious of "deep and powerful" emotions, which are 
"not fully comprehensible to reason or easily brought under its control", preferring 
social relations governed by "the relatively cold and distant principle of mutual respect", 
and thus preserve autonomy. 14 
Consequently, 
The [liberal] individual's central moral concern is two fold, to maintain his 
or her personal independence and autonomy and to live peacefully with 
others by respecting theirs. '5 
This moral concern gives rise to the use of rights to govern relationships. 
Relativists frequently argue that non-liberal cultures reverse the liberal priority of 
individual over community. African writing, according to Issa Shivji:: 
emphasises ... that African traditional society is based on a collectivity (community) rather than on an individual. And therefore the notion of 
individual rights is foreign to African ethnophilosophy. 16 
Similarly, Legesse holds: 
[A] critical difference between African and Western traditions concerns the 
importance of the human individual. In the liberal democracies of the 
western world, the ultimate repository of rights is the human person. The 
individual is held in a virtually sacralised position. There is a perpetual, and 
in our view, obsessive concern with the dignity of the individual, his worth, 




16Issa G. Shivji, The Concept of Human Rights in Africa (London: CODESRIA Book Series, 1989) 23. 
'7Asmarom Legesse, "Human Rights in African Political Culture, " The Moral Imperatives of Human 
Rights: A World Cultural Survey, ed. Kenneth W. Thompson (Washington D. C.: University Press of 
America, 1980) 120, qtd in Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (London: 
Cornell UP, 1989) 57/58. 
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In Asia, Bilahari Kausikan contrasts "the individualistic ethos of the West" with Asian 
communitarian traditions and "consensus-seeking" with "adversarial" relations between 
"individual, society and state". 18 Kausikan believes that Asian challenges to authority, 
such as those seen in China in 1989 and Thailand in 1992, are concerned less with 
individual rights than with group concerns such as "good governance: effective, efficient 
and honest administrations able to provide security and basic needs with good 
opportunities for an improved standard of living". 19 
These critiques contrast the priorities and values of non-liberal communities with the 
priorities and values forming the liberal ideological context within which human rights 
are frequently promoted. Insofar as these priorities and values can be discovered 
empirically they can inform the debate over the appropriateness of promoting particular 
rights in particular cultural contexts. 
Neil Stammers views power as a key contextual variable which varies from culture to 
culture: "ideas and practices with respect to human rights can only be understood once 
their relation to particular forms and dimensions of power is fully grasped. "20 This 
dissertation concurs with this thesis, and employs a model of the structure of power 
relations existing in societies to offer an analysis of both human rights promotion and 
human rights abuse as political, rather than moral, phenomena. 
Analysis of culturally relative concepts of power inform this approach, permitting a 
culturally specific critique of human rights abuses as phenomena which prevent the 
fulfilment of claims viewed locally as vital. Promotion of respect for human rights, in 
itself a form of power exercise, can be analysed in terms of impact on relations of 
domination in society. Analysis of power strategies adopted by different political 
clusters within society provides a framework within which the reaction to and political 
impact of human rights promotion can be analysed. Susan Mendus, who asserts that the 
18Bilahari Kausikan, "Asia's Different Standard, " Foreign Policy 92 (1993): 36. 
19Kausikan 37. 
20Neil Stammers, "A Critique of Social Approaches to Human Rights, " Human Rights Quarterly 17 
(1995): 488. 
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philosophical problems in grounding human rights need not detract from the political 
utility of the human rights project, has suggested: 
We should begin, not with a theoretical anxiety about the nature and origin 
of rights, but rather with a political question about what protection rights can 
afford us. 21 
Locating rights in a culturally specific power context permits a greater understanding of 
culturally specific forms of oppression and abuse, and of the most appropriate means of 
ameliorating these. The study of human rights abuse as a political phenomenon also 
offers practical guidance for international action on human rights. This supposition 
underlies this study. 
Different cultural concepts of power alter the expectations of government, and 
conceptions of what governments should and should not be permitted to do. 
Consequently, different expectations as to the place of the individual in society obtain. 
For human rights to be a useful concept in non-liberal cultures requires that the term 
encompass different cultural views of the functions and attributes of both individuals 
and governments. Arguably, projection of liberal cultural concepts onto power structures 
which operate differently may be ineffective or counterproductive. 
It is frequently argued that culturally relative views of power inhere in the different 
weightings given to individual freedom and state protection in different societies. 
Liberals often view freedom and protection as trade-offs, because of the dual perception 
of state institutions in liberal thought. Liberal theorists see state institutions at once as 
the guarantor of and major threat to the security of the individual. David Held defines 
institutions of state as 
the burden individuals have to bear to secure their own objectives and it is 
also the basis upon which it is possible to safeguard their claim to equal 
rights and liberties 22 
A liberal view of state institutions, Held maintains, is that of a "key site of power in the 
21Susan Mendus, "Human rights in political theory, " Political Studies 43 (1995), Special issue: 17. 
David Held, "Sites of Power, Problems of Democracy, " Alternatives 19 (1994): 221. 
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community' . 23 While state institutions monopolise power "in order to provide a secure 
basis upon which trade, commerce and family life can prosper", 
liberals recognised that they had accepted a force that could and frequently 
did deprive citizens of political and social freedoms. Although liberals 
affirmed the necessity of the state to govern and regulate society, they also 
came to conceive of civil and political rights as essential for the regulation 
of this regulator. 24 
In liberal human rights discourse, the aspect of institutions of state as a threat to freedom 
and autonomy is considered to be of paramount importance. Asian leaders frequently 
suggest that, in their societies, the protective aspect of state institutions is central. This 
position is frequently put forward in debates over the Crime Prevention Acts of 
Malaysia and Singapore, which allow detention of suspected criminals without trial. 
The `Singapore School'25 argues that the threat posed by relaxing safeguards against 
arbitrary arrest and detention is of a lesser order than the threat posed by failing to 
secure incarceration of criminals. 
An additional aspect to this debate is the use of Internal Security Acts in both Malaysia 
and Singapore to detain peaceful opposition activists. Here the protective role of state 
institutions extends beyond the protection of individuals from crime. The security 
provided is the security of a particular social and political order. The debate centres on 
a choice between a society where individuals enjoy freedom to pursue a diversity of 
political goals which challenge the political order and generate political conflict; and a 
society where government defines national political goals which are then protected from 
potentially conflictual and divisive challenges. Opting for security means opting for a 
stable political order as opposed to individual freedom from interference by state 
personnel in connection with political activities. The Singapore School asserts that 
23He1d 224. 
24Held 224. 
The "Singapore School", as characterised by Eric Jones, comprises former Singaporean prime minister 
Lee Kuan Yew, Singaporean Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Bilahari Kausikan, and diplomat 
Kishore Mahbubani, Jones, "Asia's fate: a response to the Singapore school, " National Interest 35 (1994): 
18-28. 
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Singaporeans prefer security. 
A further element in this debate concerns economic development. Many Asian 
governments consider that the economic success of the NICs has been due to the 
imposition by strong institutions of states of the particular type of order considered 
necessary for encouraging economic investment. Individual freedoms are rightly 
subordinate to community aspirations for economic growth, it is argued. Emphasis of 
community protection and aspiration at the expense of individual rights can be derived 
from a prioritising of community over individual. A role for state institutions in 
creating the correct social, political and economic relationships required to encourage 
investment is comparable to the role of pre-modern Asian elites in harnessing 
supernatural forces in the pursuit of worldly prosperity. 
The central concern is that individual human rights are incompatible with social order 
and stability. Kausikan pointed in 1993 to the "post-Marcos Philippines - which 
combines what is probably the most democratic constitution and political institutions in 
South-east Asia with mismanagement, lawlessness and the worst economic record in 
ASEAN" to indicate that civil liberties and political rights are not conducive to the 
political security that underlies physical and economic security. This is because 
individual freedom in a climate of economic underdevelopment gives rise to conflicts 
that cannot easily be managed within the framework of national or community stability. 
According to Kausikan, "poverty, insecurity and instability breed human rights abuses, 
while wealth creates the stability of Western societies. s26 He denies the liberal claim 
that human rights have a stabilising influence, arising from the close connection 
between tyranny and rebellion. 
Both these assertions may be true, or so this dissertation argues, but in different 
circumstances. Denial of certain goods which are vital to the maintenance of culturally 
significant norms and relationships causes social and political instability since it disrupts 
means of peacefully reconciling disputes according to accepted criteria. This connection 
26Kausikan 35. 
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is made in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states: 
... it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last 
resort, to rebellion against tyrann' and oppression, that human rights should 
be protected by the rule of law..? 
The right to rebel, found in many Southeast Asian cultures also reflects this. 
Liberal human rights are not necessarily anti-power, but represent a particular way of 
exercising power, consonant with the values and conceptions of liberal culture. This 
form of power can prove highly stabilising where it strengthens or complements 
important cultural devices for mediation. It can appear as an irrelevance if it does not. 
Where it disrupts familiar and significant cultural formations without providing an 
effective substitute, it can be destabilising. 
In this dissertation, empirical evidence will be presented from the case study of 
Cambodia to show that disruption in cultural formations by war and invasion, as well as 
by the peace process, has contributed to widespread human rights abuse in the country. 
It will also suggest that certain human rights concepts have been adapted by a local 
NGO movement in such a way as to bolster, rather than replace, traditional dispute 
resolution mechanisms in the interests of stability. Internationally guaranteed pluralism, 
on the other hand, has generated conflicts which cannot be resolved peacefully via 
existing mechanisms, and result in violence. 
This argument is important in that it demonstrates the working of a practical solution to 
the cultural relativist problem. In proposing that no list of rights could provide a 
legitimate standard of criticism against which to judge other cultures, the cultural 
relativist argument is counterintuitive. It offers no basis for policy recommendations in 
the face of bloodbaths and atrocities. While theorists from both North and South write 
about cultural differences in conceptions of rights, the individual and society, almost all 
retain the qualification that some regimes are simply unacceptable. 
27UDHR Preamble. 
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Lucien Pye, in a classic study of power in Southeast Asia, denies that the greater 
communitarianism of Asian societies, and lower incidence of open criticism, necessarily 
implies authoritarianism, within the context of Asian perceptions of power. He argues, 
"A reverence for individualism can blind Westerners to the fact that Asians can find 
satisfaction and security in knowing that their social fabric is firm and that they have the 
blessings of belonging to some larger and coherent community. " But he precedes this 
comment with the qualifying statement, "Many Asian regimes have unquestionably been 
obnoxiously authoritarian" . 28 
Parekh rejects the universalisability of liberalism; yet he adds, "it is, of course, true that 
some traditional societies have grossly outrageous practices and customs which 
obviously need to be changed, preferably by internal and when necessary by a 
judiciously applied external pressure". 29 Parekh argues that these societies should not 
be condemned for failing to introduce liberal democracy "as long as their forms of 
government are acceptable to their people and meet the basic conditions of good 
government. "30 
Such comments raise the question at the heart of the cultural relativist problem: if the 
moral judgements of outsiders cannot with validity be applied to a particular state's 
practices, what can be done to aid those suffering from abuse? Despite philosophical 
objections to the universality of human rights, a consensus remains in the literature, 
among all but extreme cultural relativists, that some actions taken by some governments 
are acknowledged, by people inside the country and outside it, to be wrong. The purpose 
of human rights is to set a universal standard through which criticism of such 
governmental wrongdoing can be articulated and around which support for victims can 
be organised. Politicians, activists and philosophers from many different cultures admit 
the need for such a standard. 
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Grounding human rights in cultural values is important from a political, rather than a 
philosophical standpoint. Sensitivity to culturally-determined ascriptions of meaning to 
both human rights abuse and human rights promotion not only assists, in many cases, in 
judging when abuse is taking place, but also in predicting the outcome of interventions. 
Culture, Power and Human Rights 
The nature of power in Cambodia is discussed in later chapters of this dissertation. It is 
important to note that assessment of cultural perceptions requires awareness that 
cultures are not static but constantly changing. Within a given state, subcultures exist 
which challenge the dominant culture. If they succeed in bringing about change, they 
themselves will come to dominate. National politics can be seen as a site of perpetual 
struggle between dominant cultures and subcultures. 
Ann-Belinda Preis argues that attempts by outsiders to `translate' human rights norms 
mechanistically from one culture to another, will be unsuccessful, because of ongoing 
contestation of culturally ascribed meaning. She argues 
When culture is... viewed as an externalised impediment to the struggle 
towards human rights, rather than as an integral part of the struggle itself, we 
are prevented from seeing the various contradictions, inconsistencies, and 
disagreements as culture - and perhaps the culture of human rights itself. 
31 
Analysis of the connection between culture and power can inform understanding of 
cultural cross-currents in the local situation and the likely impact of intervention and 
promotion of human rights on different groups. An actor-oriented approach to empirical 
study can 
enlarge the understanding of the contemporary, globalised conditions of 
cultural complexity in which human rights enter as both a defining and a 
defined set of values. One way to begin is to identify more yielding ways of 
exploring how, when, and why human rights become attributed with 
meaning in various contexts, including how they are put to work in the 
everyday life of men and women. In short we need to come to grips with 
31Ann-Belinda Preis, "Human Rights as Cultural Practice: An Anthropological Critique, " Human Rights 
Quarterly 18 (1996): 295. 
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human rights as a "cultural practice" 32 
Culture is variously defined in the literature. Frequently, it is seen as an ideational 
system aimed at integrating the orientations and aspirations of all people in society, 
giving rise to a collective consciousness or consensus based on a shared world view, or 
accepted norms. 
Culture provides a context within which individuals ascribe meaning to phenomena, 
particularly actions of others, providing a framework within which social relationships 
are governed. The structuralist school views culture as arising from the impact of 
particular environments on a universal set of normative human cognitive processes. 
Emile Durkheim, studying culture in industrial societies, defined culture as a set of 
processes which provide a binding force for society in the context of increasing 
differentiation of labour and consequent fragmentation. Durkheim argued that: 
wherever an authority with power to govern is established its first and 
foremost function is to ensure respect for beliefs, traditions and collective 
practices - namely, to defend the common consciousness from all its 
enemies, from within as well as without. It thus becomes the symbol of that 
consciousness, in everybody's eyes its living expression. 33 
Durkheim viewed this as a positive development, achieving order from potential chaos. 
Marxists see such cultural formation as oppressive, as it is based on the relationship of 
different classes to the means of production and consequently arises from economic 
exploitation. Culture is viewed as ideology: a programme of beliefs about the world 
which is necessarily distorted by relations to the material base of society. 
A key aspect of cultural norms is that they impose limits on the ability of members of 
both dominant and subordinate classes to conceive of alternatives to the existing order. 
Consequently, they promote rule by consent, rather than rule by coercion. This is 
achieved through various social systems, such as education and religion. The myth that 
the norms of the dominant class are `neutral' maintains the illusion of freedom while 
32Preis 310. 
33Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society, trans. W. D. Halls (London: Macmillan, 1984) 42. 
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ensuring that their dominance is maintained through conferring legitimacy on the 
dominant culture and stigmatising or rendering inconceivable subordinate cultures. 
The idea that the dominance of a particular culture in society is connected with power 
relations within that society need not be problematic for human rights promotion, if it is 
recognised that this is the case in all societies. The critique of the Singaporean School 
suggests that human rights are anti-power devices which promote selfish and anarchic 
freedoms. Yet power is exercised in liberal cultures; it is merely disguised. Durkheim 
views power as having positive characteristics in creating a meaningful context for 
individual action. Marxism-Leninism, also, views power exercised through a 
`dictatorship of the proletariat' as positive. Liberalism, which promotes the values of 
freedom and autonomy as uniquely important, requires that power be exercised covertly. 
Steven Lukes' essay on Power, A Radical View, describes the exercise of disguised 
power in liberal societies. For Likes, the study of power in Western political 
philosophy, has taken three dimensions. The one-dimensional view of power restricts 
the empirical measurement of power to measurement of outcomes of observable 
conflicts. A two-dimensional study includes within its parameters the phenomenon of 
"non-decision-making"- that is, of acting, or failing to act, in such a way as to prevent 
an opponent's grievance from appearing on the political agenda. A three-dimensional 
characterisation of power recognises that it is: 
the supreme and most insidious exercise 
whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, 
cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the 
existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no 
alternative to it, or because they see it as natural or unchangeable, or because 
they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial 34 
According to Lukes, there need be no actual conflict for power to be exercised; all that 
is needed is a latent conflict which "consists in a contradiction between the interests of 
those exercising power and the real interests of those they exclude. "3S Lukes suggests 
3' Steven Lukes, Power, A Radical View (London: Macmillan, 1974) 25. 
35Lukes 24/25. 
of power to prevent people, to 
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that such latent conflicts may be observed empirically, through comparison of people's 
wants with "what they would want and prefer, were they able to make the choice" 36 
This prescription resembles the arguments of universalists in support of interventionary 
cross-cultural activity on human rights grounds. These arguments assume that citizens 
of liberal democratic societies are alone free of cultural `mystification'. If we are to 
respect the principle that "respect for differences between cultures is validated by the 
scientific fact that no technique for qualitatively evaluating cultures has been 
discovered", 37 it is necessary to avoid assuming that liberals possess superior capacity 
for insight. It is necessary to accept the possibility that human rights which protect 
certain aspects of the individual's activities are similarly a cultural device which 
promotes consent within societies where dominant classes observably hold and 
reproduce their privileged status, and where economic equality is absent. 
Political theory offers various explanations of how consent to domination is achieved. 
Means of eliciting consent are viewed here as exercise of `covert power'. William 
Connolly posits a continuum of modes of power - "manipulation, coercion, anticipatory 
surrender, deterrence, force, and conditioning" 38 Manipulation and conditioning are 
covert. Connolly argues that covert power is preferred by elites because 
to acknowledge power over others is to implicate oneself in responsibility 
for certain events and to put oneself in a position where justification for the 
limits placed on others is expected. 39 
A number of further elaborations of `covert power' will be used to inform the discussion 
of the Cambodian case in subsequent chapters. The discussion will not be bounded by a 
theoretical meta-narrative; rather concepts from the literature will be applied insofar as 
they aid understanding of the empirical data drawn from the Cambodian case study. 
36Lukes 33. 
37AAA 541. 
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The relationship between covert and overt power has been viewed as the relationship 
between superstructure and structure. Superstructural activities promote a hegemony 
which covertly compels consent and voluntarism, produced by intellectual domination 
by Church and `civil society' - "a stratum of administrators, etc., scholars and scientists, 
theorists, non-ecclesiastical philosophers, etc. "40 which 
operates without `sanctions' or compulsory `obligations', but nevertheless 
exerts a collective pressure and obtains objective results in the form of an 
evolution of customs, ways of thinking and acting, morality, etc 4' 
Institutions of state also operate "to raise the great mass of the population to a particular 
cultural and moral level, " using agencies such as the school and the law court as "the 
apparatus of the political and cultural hegemony of the ruling classes". 2 
This analysis is useful in that it underscores the mythical character of the liberal ideal of 
freedom from government . While the use of force by institutions of state 
is limited by 
human rights norms in liberal societies, nevertheless this critique suggests that power is 
perpetually exercised to maintain specific relations of economic production and political 
domination. Ideas of freedom constitute ideological resources of power exploited to 
mobilise support, but underlying these is a hidden power which disciplines those who 
deviate from accepted agendas. Human rights can be viewed as an ideological resource 
and as part of a concrete political economy of power which serves the dominant class by 
supporting capitalist relations of production and excluding alternatives. 
A similar account of covert power exercised by stable societal institutions is implicit in 
the concept of habitus. Superstructural arrangements of customs, rituals and taboos in 
pre-capitalist economies are "capable of objectively ensuring the reproduction of the 
established order by its own motion", disguising power by means of instituting 43 
40Gmmsci, "The Intellectuals, " Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci eds. and trans. 
Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (Lawrence and Wishart: London, 1971) 7. 
41Gramsci, "State and Civil Society, " Hoare and Nowell Smith 242. 
42Gramsci, "State and Civil Society" 258. 
43Pierre Bourdieu, "Structure, Habitus, Power. Basis for a Theory of Symbolic Power, " 
CulturelPower/History, A Reader in Contemporary Social History eds. Nicholas B. Dirks, Geoff Eley and 
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discourses which are perceived as self-evident by reason of their unanimity. A 
particular relation of classes is internalised by their members linking power inextricably 
with cultural norms: 
Because the subjective necessity and self-evidence of the common-sense 
world are validated by the objective consensus on the sense of the world, 
what is essential goes without saying because it comes without saying: the 
tradition is silent, not least about itself as a tradition.. 44 
Hidden power has also been viewed as a physical coercion masked by superstructural 
activities. Foucault's conception of "discipline" describes the inculcation of habits and 
attitudes which render the individual not only docile but efficient and productive. 
Constant and anonymous supervision monitors responses. This pervasive scrutiny, 
operating with reference to a detailed corpus of rankings and measurements, allows the 
immediate correction of infinitesimal deviances from the norm, optimum or average, 
providing "a guarantee of the submission of forces and bodies". 45 These guarantees 
underpin the stable workings of democratic sovereignty: 
The juridical systems - and this applies both to their codification and to their 
theorisation - have enabled sovereignty to be democratised through the 
constitution of a public right articulated upon collective sovereignty, while 
at the same time this democratisation of sovereignty was fundamentally 
determined by and grounded in mechanisms of disciplinary coercion. 46 
In analysing the nature of power in Cambodian politics, two concepts, borrowed from 
Foucauldian analysis, are employed - namely, resources and economies of power. 
Superstructural/ideological or structural/technological abilities available to power- 
holders, arising from Cambodian culture, society or economy, will be termed "resources 
of power". The power system as a whole - the rationale by which power is produced, 
distributed and exercised by means of ideological and technological resources - is 
termed the "economy of power". 
Sherry B. Ortner (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1994) 184. 
44Bourdieu 162-163. 
"Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, the Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin, 
1991) 222. 
46Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures" Dirks, Eley and Ortner 218/219. 
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Within an economy of power, some actions by rulers may be aimed at the practical 
objective of removing rivals and crushing dissent, and mobilising supporters to 
participate actively in reproduction of their power. These are displays of overt power, 
and include human rights abuse. Other activities may be aimed at institutionalising 
consent among the population and consolidating hegemonic, or covert power. This 
form of power may include commitment to human rights standards by a government. 
Tracing the uses of these different forms of power will provide a prognosis for the 
promotion of human rights in Cambodia. 
Where there are no unified discourses or stable superstructural organisations in society, 
exercise of overt power is likely. Alternatively, overt power against certain groups 
identified as enemies, or in pursuit of a goal such as economic development, may itself 
institute a unifying and legitimising discourse of power. If the institution of such a 
legitimising discourse elicits the consent of a sufficient section of the population, 
practices may offend liberal sensitivities but the outcome is likely to be stable, and 
political and economic practices regular. Where overt power is used to replace consent, 
without generating support through institution of its own discourse, violence is likely to 
spiral into increasingly widespread repression, and social breakdown may be the 
outcome. In this situation, promotion of human rights may in theory assist in instituting 
a new discourse within which governance can be framed. 7 
The Role of the State Apparatus 
The key institution for exercising power in the modem nation is the state apparatus. 
Ashis Nandy describes the evolution of the state apparatus in the South towards 
monopolisation of both force and national cultural power resources. He argues that this 
effort at monopolisation is predicated on a widespread view in former colonies that the 
modem state represented a more efficient instrument for the projection of power than 
anything that had evolved in the pre-colonial South. Nandy writes: 
47The question of whether international action may be successfully taken is dependent on different 
variables, discussed later in this chapter. 
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indigenous intellectuals and political activists confronting the colonial 
power found in the idea of the nation-state the clue to the West's economic 
success and political dominance. 8 
As a result, newly independent countries attempted to develop strong state institutions, 
playing a central role in society as "the harbinger and main instrument of social change". 
This change was to be effected by modernisation - the adoption of secular government, 
and scientific rationalism and advanced technology in development. 
These newly assumed functions naturally made the modem nation-state 
suspicious of all cultural differences, not on grounds of racial or ethnic 
prejudice, but on the ground that such differences intervened between the 
`liberated' individual and the republican state and interfered with the more 
professional aspects of statecraft. 9 
Nandy defines what he calls `nation-building' -a process designed to make local 
peoples more amenable to and available for development - as a key function of state 
institutions and "a polite term for the cultural and ideological homogenisation of a 
country's population". 50 He sees the guardianship of culture by institutions of state as 
destructive to the variety and spontaneity of cultural traditions, as state institutions 
define themselves as neutral arbiters. The state is portrayed as: 
a repository of cultural values even though, in reality, each sought to equate 
these values with a territorial concept of nationality that militated against the 
sl subtler meanings of the idea of culture 
State-promoted culture is crude and static in character, yet in facilitating mobilisation of 
national power, it is an important product of the state-building process. Huntington saw 
this process as furthering the development of political institutions of state which could 
`socialise' politicians into the discourse of national politics. Where this does not occur 
the result is "a shortage of political community and of effective, authoritative, legitimate 
48Ashis Nandy. "State". The Development Dictionary, a Guide to Knowledge as Power, ed. Wolfgang 
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government' . 52 The modernising process integrates the citizenry into the new, single 
and state-led political and economic culture, inculcating them with new national cultural 
values to facilitate the often painful process of economic change. 53 
According to modernisation theory, the growth, institutionalisation and `nation- 
building' function of the modem state is the best means for maximising individual 
security and productivity within a paradigm of liberal democratic freedom. Joseph 
Camilleri argues that modernity comprises: 
growth of codified knowledge as a way of controlling the physical 
environment; political centralization accompanied by the development of 
highly specialised bureaucracies, continuous increases in economic 
production and productivity; rapid rates of technological change; and 
introduction of social and cultural mechanisms desired to achieve the 
necessary psychological adjustment to these processes. 5 
The key relationships of modernity bind the concept of the state both to the territory and 
to the people who live within it. The task of state institutions is to consolidate control 
/ over territory, and to transform the people living within it into self-conscious citizens of 
the state. 55 Citizenship is thus the central relationship in the formation of the state 
system. 
Citizenship ... provides the critical link between the geopolitical 
formation 
of the nation state with the polity that comprises it. Citizenship is a form of 
social contract, made unique by its equal applicability to the vast majority of 
individuals by reason of birth. For the contract to work, however, requires 
first and foremost that people identify with the state as a legitimate entity, 
52Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (London: Yale UP, 1968) 2. 
53 Joseph Camilleri argues that education, culture, industry and the increasing role of the state apparatus 
were products of modernisation which "facilitated the convergence of cultural and political experience" 
necessary to create a meaningful entity at the level of the nation [Joseph A. Camilleri, "Rethinking 
Sovereignty in a Shrinking, Fragmented World, " Contending State Sovereignties: Redefining Political 
Community, eds. R. B. J. Walker and Saul Mendlovitz 20]. 
54Camilleri 26. 
55Ruggie describes the importance of territoriality in the development of states and their institutions as a 
unified centre to which the diverse individuals within the territory owed primary allegiance. This replaced 
the pre-modem system whereby the individual was located in a variety of feudal and religious 
jurisdictions within which "no univocal notion of citizenship could serve as a universal encompassing the 
many political relationships" [John Gerard Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity 
in International Relations, " International Organization 47 (Winter 1993): 108]. 
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because from this recognition stem both the justification for demanding 
rights and the grounds for a willingness to fulfil obligations. 56 
This theory implies that newly-forming states in the South must establish new loyalties, 
replacing primordial ties of kinship or ethnicity, often greatly strengthened by colonial 
rule. State-building constitutes legitimate authority within the territory as the rational 
means of governance. Citizenship integrates the individual into the nation by means of 
drawing the individual into continuous learned relationships with other citizens and the 
institutions of state. 
Citizenship is essential for the possession of rights, guaranteed by both the institutions 
of state and by the idea of the state as an entity. Certain civic duties accompany, but are 
subordinate to, these rights, the primary of which is to obey the law. Citizenship is also 
a functional relationship which makes the citizen available to the state and its 
institutions. Through his citizenship, the individual contributes his economic 
productivity. Through his disciplined consent to the exercise of power by state 
institutions in pursuit of culturally and politically determined goals, he forms the 
legitimising consensus by which exercise of power via state institutions is made 
possible. Through his participation in national discourse, he maintains the idea of the 
state. 
Concomitant with citizenship is nationalism. Nationalism represents the cultural 
embedding of the secular citizenship relationship within primordial and internalised 
political relationships. It subordinates all other relationships, of religion, language, 
ethnicity and kin, to the relationship between individual and state, and promotes the 
process whereby international linkages between individuals or peoples are repudiated, 
enhancing the authority of state institutions. By means of promotion of nationalist 
sentiment, the choice of the state as the particular level of cultural and ideological 
organisation of peoples has been enforced against both more wide-ranging and more 
localised alternatives. According to David Stem : 
56Alan Fowler, "Non-Governmental Organizations as Agents of Democratization: An African 
Perspective, " Journal of International Development 5 (1993): 335. 
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The notion of state sovereignty presupposes that the place of politics is pre- 
eminently the state. In our day, the state has become the primary focus of the 
political and its sovereign authority has overwhelmingly displaced other 
sites of action 57 
In the late twentieth century, other sites of action are reasserting themselves. Of 
particular relevance to the issue of human rights is the thrust of globalisation. 
Transnational politics embraces regional bloc politics, international organisations and 
international law. It also includes formations and networks created by grass-roots 
movements which exhibit cross-border solidarity, challenging the convention generated 
by the Westphalian system of state sovereignty, that citizenship is prior to 
humanitarianism. 8 
Sovereignty and Cultural Diversity 
While states homogenise internally, they also protect their internal cultural 
distinctiveness from global homogenisation. Classical realist interpretations of 
international relations rest on this presupposition. They describe a model of 
homogenous and equal states which recognise no higher authority. Each state engages 
in what Daniel Philpott calls "the endless competition between armies and economies"59 
in Machiavellian efforts to preserve, at a minimum, its own existence in the face of 
attempted foreign expansionism, and, maximally, to expand its own power to its furthest 
possible territorial extent. In such a world, the ascription of "supreme legitimate 
authority within a territory"60 to each state by all other states, regardless of their 
particular internal circumstances, is the defining rule of the international regime. It 
represents a reciprocal acknowledgement by states of one another's unique authority 
within their own territories. 
57David S. Stem, "State Sovereignty: The Politics of Identity and the Place of the Political, " Perspectives 
on Third World Sovereignty, The Postmodern Paradox, eds. Mark E. Denham and Mark Owen Lombardi 
(London: Macmillan, 1996) 28. 
58R. J. B. Walker and Saul H. Mendlovitz, "Interrogating State Sovereignty, " Walker and Mendlovitz 5. 
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Sovereignty has evolved as "a practice that serves to identify the character, location and 
legitimacy of political authority, including the authority to judge what is 
authoritative". 1 It recognises the culturally embedded nature of authority, where 
authority is viewed as "the capacity for reasoned elaboration on communally valid 
values", 62 values which may or may not be universal. The assumption that sovereignty 
is authoritative implies that outsiders have no right to intervene in a domestic situation. 
The normative ascription of authority to institutions of state prevents outsiders from 
claiming that their intervention is a `just' one. Empirical lack of universally 
authoritative values entails that a right to `just' intervention would inevitably be subject 
to the moral definitions of the most powerful. This proposition is "especially dangerous 
given the crusade mentality of the typical superpower", 63 a mentality which brings 
superpowers into conflict with nationalists defending culturally particular moral 
systems. Sovereignty preserves difference because it preserves the moral autonomy of 
small states vis-ä-vis powerful states, offering a "resolution of the claims of universality 
and particularity at the level of the state". 64 
Cosmopolitanism and Universality 
Ideals of `cosmopolitanism' challenge the ability of the sovereign state to encompass the 
manifold relationships available to the individual in the current world in the light of 
changing conditions. Familiar forms of international relations are also challenged. Held 
describes cosmopolitanism as: 
the beginning of the creation of a new international democratic culture and 
spirit - one set off from the partisan claims of the nation-state. Such 
developments might take years, if not decades, to become entrenched. But 
1989-91 has shown that political change can take place at an extraordinary 
61R. J. B. Walker, "Space/Time/Sovereignty, " Denham and Lombardi 25. 
62Carl J. Friedrich, Tradition and Authority (London: Macmillan, 1972) 61. 
63 Caroline Thomas, "The Pragmatic Case Against Intervention, " Political Theory, International Relations 
and the Ethics of Intervention, eds. Ian Forbes and Mark Hoffman (London: Macmillan, 1993) 92. 
64R. B. J. Walker, "Sovereignty, Identity, Community: Reflections on the Horizons of Contemporary 
Political Practice, " Walker and Mendlovitz 165. 
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speed, itself no doubt partially a result of the process of globalization. 65 
A trend towards replacing the system of sovereign states with a new cosmopolitan 
system would have a particular impact on human rights promotion, since traditionally 
the state, via its institutions, has been seen as the appropriate respondent to the claims 
conferred by human rights norms. The relationship of citizenship confers rights, since it 
creates an entity, in the state and its institutions, from whom guarantees can be 
demanded. However, the inevitability of attachment of rights to the state-society 
relationship has been questioned. A 'p6sitive theory of rights' posits: 
if we could aid somebody who has a positive right at no comparable cost to 
ourselves then we are responsible for the consequences of that failure to aid. 
We are causing the deaths of people whose lives we could have saved at no 
comparable cost to our own. 66 
A positive view of rights confers a moral justification for intervention on the grounds of 
"our responsibility to [the needs of] people in other societies" 67 Institutions of state, 
which are justified, on a rights-based political theory, through the function of human 
rights protection, have in such a case failed, and the state cannot claim sovereignty in 
the context of such failure. 68 For cosmopolitanism to replace citizenship in conferring 
and guaranteeing rights requires two developments. Firstly, it requires universal 
agreement on what, exactly, "our responsibility to people in other societies" involves - 
in other words, universal acceptance of a particular human rights code. Secondly, it 
requires the creation of an international jurisdiction, comparable to the state in domestic 
politics, which can organise such interventions. Such a jurisdiction does not as yet exist 
in international society, although in the immediate post-war period, a number of 
suggestions were put forward for transforming the UN into a much more active and 
interventionist organisation. The Cambodian intervention was portentous in this regard, 
but global movement ceased, arguably, with the failures of United Nations missions in 
65David Held, "Democracy: From City States to a Cosmopolitan Order? " Political Studies 15 (1992), 
Special issue: 37. 
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Somalia and Bosnia. If the presumption of states that their sovereign rights will be 
respected has been challenged, as yet no other entities possess institutions which can 
offer international guarantees to individuals as world citizens regarding respect for their 
human rights. 
Theorists recognise that sovereignty has always been a contested principle, continually 
"rewritten" by international actions. Interventions, Cynthia Weber argues: 
participate in the production and re-stabilization of concepts like the state 
and sovereignty. Intervening states offer justifications for their actions to a 
supposed international community and couch their justifications in terms of 
acting on behalf of the sovereign authority in the target state... Determining 
what is legitimately within the domain of a state's sovereign authority and 
what lies beyond it produces a particular historically and temporally situated 
state with specific competencies. 69 
In three different phases of twentieth century American interventions, she argues: 
the intervening power was constituted as one community of judgement 
about the true meanings of sovereignty and intervention and the true location 
of sovereign authority.... Within a logic of representation, discourses of truth 
(sovereignty) legitimate uses of power (disciplinary acts of intervention). 
However dispersed, power refers to truth. 70 
Examinations of the impact of human rights issue networks reveal that states 
themselves, in reacting to human rights pressures, have rewritten their own sovereign 
authority and de facto legitimised the intervention of issue networks into the state- 
society relationship. 71 Sovereignty continues to be contested and rewritten through the 
interaction between various cosmopolitan movements and states. Intervention, rather 
than acting seamlessly to secure rights to all world citizens, occurs in a context of 
conflicting loyalties to nationalist, subnational and transnational movements. 
Frequently, intervention clearly reflects the priorities and interests of the intervenor 
69Cynthia Weber, Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention the State and Symbolic Exchange, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1995) 125. 
70Weber 123/124. 
71 Kathryn Sikkink, "Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America, " 
International Organization 47 (1993): 411-441. 
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rather than a universally grounded moral authority. 
Cosmopolitanism can be seen in two ways in the current international context. It may 
represent an organic change in the `natural' level of the political community in the light 
of economic globalisation, breakthroughs in information technology, and a concomitant 
constituting of a true, humanitarian `international community'. Alternatively, it may be 
conceived as a new, disguised form of international intervention by the powerful into 
the affairs of the weak. Intervention prompted by `cosmopolitan' ideals and 
intervention prompted by self-interest currently go hand in hand. 
Viewed empirically, international interventions, particularly complex ones such as that 
embodied by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, are likely to 
encompass and respond to a range of different interests, viewpoints and agendas. 
Cosmopolitan idealism and self-interested promotion of particular economic, cultural 
and political agendas will constitute motivating factors. The impact overall on a target 
state is likely to be highly contingent on the internal power dynamics of the intervening 
body and the domestic response to this. 
A cosmopolitan ideal for interventionary practice, entitled An Agenda for Peace, which 
formulated the concept of "post-conflict peacebuilding" was prepared for the Security 
Council by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992, entitled An Agenda 
for Peace. This concept is explored here because the timing and authorship of the 
Agenda connect it directly to the UNTAC operation; as such it impinged directly onto 
perceptions of UNTAC and the international community's responsibilities in Cambodia. 
In 1995/6, interviewees in Cambodia were found to be optimistic regarding the 
possibility of cosmopolitan intervention to secure their rights in a context where the 
state apparatus was perceived to be abusive. The relationship between the Cambodian 
human rights movement and the international community is discussed in detail in 
Chapters Seven and Nine of this dissertation. To put the Cambodian views discussed 
later into the context of international views of post-Cold War intervention, the concept 
of `peace-building' is briefly discussed. 
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Peace-building and Rights 
Boutros-Ghali's Agenda for Peace can be seen as a blueprint for exercise of 
international authority, based on common values, which are identified with the UN 
Organisation and the ideological agenda of the Charter: 
In these past months a conviction has grown, among nations large and small, 
that an opportunity has been regained to achieve the great objectives of the 
Charter -a United Nations capable of maintaining international peace and 
security, of securing justice and human rights and of promoting, in the 
words of the Charter, "social progress and better standards of life in larger 
freedom". This opportunity must not be squandered. The Organisation 
must never again be crippled as it was in the era that has now passed. 72 
Boutros-Ghali saw the end of the Cold War as providing an opportunity for a new form 
of international intervention, which could tackle the causes of war - namely, injustice, 
lack of democracy and underdevelopment. In referring to the `great objectives of the 
Charter', Boutros-Ghali, in this document, frames the new goals of the United Nations 
in the liberal democratic ideology which underlay the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, discussed earlier in this chapter. 
In the early 1990s, interest, particularly in the US, focused on making international 
relations authoritative, through promotion of a core consensus of values, such as peace, 
democracy and human rights. These three goods were seen as linked, as the Kantian 
doctrine of perpetual peace between liberal democracies was re-examined. 73 Promotion 
of democracy was held to promote openness and predictability in foreign policy making, 
enabling states to accommodate one another more easily without recourse to military 
force. It was assumed by some that if consulted, citizens will almost always vote 
against war. The `inevitable competition of states' could be rendered `harmless', 
according to Stanley Hoffman, by two `fundamental liberal `revolutions": national 
nBoutros Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace. Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace- 
Keeping, " An Agenda for Peace 1995,2nd ed. (New York: United Nations, 1995) 39. 
73Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics, " American Political Science Review, 80 (1986): 1151- 
1163; Daniele Archibughi, "Immanuel Kant, Cosmopolitan Law and Peace, " European Journal of 
International Relations, 1 (1995): 429-456; Stanley Hoffman, "The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism, " 
Foreign Policy 98 (1995): 159-177. 
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revolutions to create accountable governments in every nation-state; and an international 
revolution to create a `world public opinion' and a "transnational economic society... 
linking people across borders". 74 
Some western policy makers echoed this view in 1993. Boutros-Ghali wrote, 
"Democracies almost never fight each other. Democratization supports the cause of 
peace"; 75 while US Secretary of State Warren Christopher commented, "Democratic 
nations are far less likely to go to war with each other and far more likely to respect 
international law. 9276 Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans wrote in 1994: 
In-country peace-building is a long-term preventive strategy that focuses on 
potential causes of insecurity; ... It seeks to encourage equitable economic development, to enhance human rights broadly defined and to facilitate good 
governance. These goals should be pursued not only for their own sakes, 
but also because making progress toward them contributes powerfully to 
national and international security. 77 
The concept of `peace-building' emerged from this posited connection between 
democracy and peace. Peace-building involves the application of technocratic expertise 
to building institutions and systems of government in order to encourage 
democratisation and consequent consensus to support international action in pursuit of 
these goals: 
There is a new requirement for technical assistance which the United 
Nations has an obligation to develop and provide when requested: support 
for the transformation of deficient national structures and capabilities, and 
for the strengthening of new democratic institutions.... There is an obvious 
connection between democratic practices - such as the rule of law and 
transparency in decision-making - and the achievement of true peace and 
security in any new and stable political order. These elements of good 
governance need to be promoted at all levels of international and national 
political communities. 78 
74 Hoffman 161. 
75Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace: One Year Later, " Orbis 37 (1993): 329. 
76Warren Christopher, "America's Leadership, America's Opportunity, " Foreign Policy 98 (1995): 10. 
77Gareth Evans, "Co-operative Security and Intra-State Conflict, " Foreign Policy 96 (1994): 111. 
7RBoutros-Ghali, "Agenda" 62. Boutros-Ghali's "Agenda" for the United Nations is paralleled by agendas 
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The technocratic orientation of this strategy is underlined by the posited importance of 
`fact-finding' as a basis for `appropriate preventive action'. Fact-finding requires the 
employment of "civilian political officers, human rights monitors, electoral officials, 
refugee and humanitarian aid specialists and police [who] play as central a role as the 
military"79 in peacekeeping and -building by means of the application of specialist 
knowledge. 80 Facts facilitate supervision of international convergence towards 
authoritative international norms. They increase certainty in the international 
environment. They provide the basis for the technocratic action that, by nature of its 
hegemonic depoliticisation, lends authority to intervention while formally respecting 
state political sovereignty. States are drawn into "confidence building measures... 
systematic exchange of military missions, formation of regional or subregional risk 
reduction centres, arrangements for the free flow of information, including the 
monitoring of regional arms agreements". 1 
Constructing systems for fact-finding complements Boutros-Ghali's plans for applying 
diplomatic, economic, judicial (via the World Court) and political as well as military 
pressure to various phases of conflicts, creating a comprehensive, and hence more 
effective and efficient, network of power, based on minute mutual surveillance. The 
put forward for US foreign policy. For example, Theodore Sorenson concurs in advocating a role for US 
professional experts giving instruction in: 
how to build a truly free legislature, an independent judiciary, a restrained police authority, a system 
of responsible local governments and a civilian-controlled defence force... In addition to free political 
institutions, free economic institutions must also be in place to make economic assistance meaningful. 
From agriculture to banking, to transportation and energy... the need for technical and practical 
advice from the US and others is enormous in these nations, north and south, making their way to 
freedom (Theodore Sorenson, "Rethinking National Security, " Foreign Affairs 69.3 (1990): 17]. 
79Boutros-Ghali, "Agenda" 60 
"Sorenson argues, similarly that post-Cold War US National Security Council meetings should be 
attended by experts from 
Commerce, Agriculture, the US Trade Representative's Office, the Environmental Protection Agency, 
the Council of Economic Advisers, and non-governmental organisations as well. The State 
Department will need to devote more attention to its stepchildren in USIA, AID, NED, the Peace 
Corps and other multilateral diplomatic and financial organisations. The CIA will need to find more 
experts on Germany and Japan as well as the Soviet Union on Islamic fundamentalism as well as 
Marxism-Leninism, on industrial as well as military espionage, and on oilfield as well as battlefield 
defence [Sorenson 17]. 
81Boutros-Ghali, "Agenda" 47. 
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covert nature of this power, exercised through international institutions, increases its 
legitimacy and authority. Ideological convergence promoted by normalisation of 
domestic procedures creates an authoritative basis for further legitimate exercise of 
international power. Boutros-Ghali writes: 
The authority of the United Nations system to act in [the field of building 
democratic institutions] would rest on the consensus that social peace is as 
important as strategic or political peace. 82 
Institutionalisation of legitimacy and legitimisation of institutions feed into one another 
to give rise to increasing stability based on growing consensus. The manufacture of 
legitimate authority requires an international cultural homogenisation, prompted, it is 
envisaged, by standardisation of domestic political institutions. 83 
The impact of such intervention on power relations and conflict resolution within a 
sovereign state is the focus of this discussion of the Cambodian case. The primary 
concern of state-building is to create, within national territory, a single, unifying 
ideological and structural framework within which the activities of individuals take 
place and to mobilise the loyalties of individuals to this framework. Post-conflict 
peacebuilding creates a role for international technical expertise in developing the 
structures crucial to this framework: 
structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of 
confidence and well-being among people..... these may include disarming 
the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and 
possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training 
support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to 
protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions 
and promoting formal and informal process of political participation. 84 
International experts take control of these tasks to exert a normalising discipline: 
In a country ruined by war, resumption of such activities may initially have 
to be entrusted to, or at least co-ordinated by, a multifunctional peace- 
82Boutros-Ghali, "Agenda" 62. 
83See Robert A. Scalapino, "Asia and the United States: The Challenges Ahead, " Foreign Affairs 69.1 
(1989/90): 104. 
84 Boutros-Ghali "Agenda" 61. 
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keeping operation, but as that operation succeeds in restoring normal 
conditions, the programmes, funds, offices and agencies can re-establish 
themselves and gradually take over responsibility from the peace-keepers, 
with the resident co-ordinator in due course assuming the co-ordination 
functions temporarily entrusted to the special representative of the Secretary 
General 85 
The ideals and strategies of peace-building were influential in some international 
interpretations of the Paris Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Solution to the 
Conflict in Cambodia, and, to a lesser extent, on its implementation. These 
interpretations and the implementation of the Paris Agreements are discussed in the next 
chapter. Post-UNTAC international intervention in Cambodia also reflects the 
strategies put forward in the Agenda for Peace in the attention paid to setting up `civil 
society' organisations and funding projects to enhance processes of debate and 
accountability within government. 86 It has also, it is argued in Chapter Nine, shaped the 
continuing expectations of international support, expressed by individuals interviewed 
for this study. 
Yet it is argued that the Cambodian case study has also illustrated the limitations of the 
ideas outlined in The Agenda for Peace. The most important of these limitations is the 
limitation imposed by the lack of consensus in the international community, and 
particularly the Security Council, regarding the desirability of such far-reaching 
interventions which significantly rewrite the meaning of sovereignty. The response of 
many Asian governments, including China, a permanent member of the Security 
Council, to international human rights interventions has been negative, frequently 
making use of an ideology of cultural difference in Asian values, as described in the 
discussion of the Singapore School's stance on human rights issues. 
83Boutros-Ghali "Agenda" 20/21. 
86 The nature of international aid to `civil society', including human rights NGOs is discussed in detail in 
Chapter Seven. International projects to promote debate and accountability in government include Asia 
Foundation projects to provide international expertise in drafting of laws, the setting up of a parliamentary 
library and the creation of a Cambodian Hansard [16, personal interview, 10 Oct. 1995, Phnom Penh. To 
preserve confidentiality international human rights promoters interviewed for the present study are 
identified by the letter `I' and a number]. 
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Such responses have limited the extent to which the strategies outlined in the Agenda 
for Peace could be used to promote human rights, particularly following UN lack of 
success in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia. International consensus on the 
desirability of the UNTAC operation was prompted, arguably, by pragmatic economic 
concerns; yet in Cambodia the effectiveness of the strategies outlined in the Agenda is 
also in doubt. 
Given that pragmatic concerns are more important than ideals in prompting international 
intervention, projected time-scales for interventionary exercises are important. Long- 
term engagement is affected by shifts in the international political and economic 
climate. `World public opinion', which Hoffman views as essential for sustaining 
intervention, is insufficiently developed to counter national interest arguments, once 
economic imperatives cease to be important, or begin to conflict, with continued 
intervention. 
As yet, cosmopolitanism is only a force in the international relations of states insofar as 
cosmopolitan policies can be presented as advantageous or inexpensive to the citizens of 
the Security Council members and other great powers. The attitudes of American and 
Japanese citizens are crucial to the implementation of a cosmopolitan regime. 87 Despite 
the growth of organisations like Amnesty International, the depth of understanding of, 
and consistency of commitment to, international humanitarianism on the part of these 
citizens remains in large part subordinate to local concerns. Humanitarianism on the 
part of American and Japanese citizens is also subject to the discourse of imposed by 
power structures in their own society. 
Hoffman's second revolution, which would create a world public opinion supporting 
international policing of a liberal democratic order, is imperfectly completed. There is 
no international unitary political discourse. Even in the most information-rich countries, 
87See Tony Evans, "Hegemony, Domestic Politics, and the Prospect of Universal Human Rights, " 
Diplomacy and Statecraft 6 (1995): 616-644; Peter F. Cowhey, "Domestic Institutions and the Credibility 
of International Commitments: Japan and the United States, " International Organization 47 (1993): 299- 
326. 
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knowledge about the internal politics of distant nations is not widely disseminated. All 
national medias, including those operating in democratic countries, give truncated 
versions of events, biased strongly according to prevailing ideas of `newsworthiness' . 
These promote sensationalism in reporting, and polemical moralism in editorialising. 
Dependence on populism and reader accessibility to sell copies leads editors towards 
simplistic stances which pander to local cultural norms and partisan interests. 88 Direct 
transnational contacts remain patchy for the majority of world citizens. 
In view of the fluctuations in international great power consensus and political will, 
post-conflict peacebuilding does not imply open-ended international engagement, 
raising the question of "the timing and modalities of the departure of the peace-keeping 
operation and the transfer of its peace-building functions to others" 89 The policy for 
reasserting the centrality and valuation of the state-citizen relationship following 
intervention is not clearly defined in the Agenda for Peace. It is argued in Chapter Nine 
of this dissertation that in 1995/6, Cambodia faced a situation in which structures had 
been developed which remained reliant on international support; yet international will to 
provide the support desired by the Cambodian staff of these structures was increasingly 
in doubt. 
One problem in achieving restoration of sovereignty following such intervention arises 
from the fact that the various interventions and demands implicit in peace-building will 
"Jay S. Ovsiovitch, "News Coverage of Human Rights, " Political Research Quarterly 46 (1993): 671- 
689. Ovsiovitch surveyed coverage of human rights in the New York Times, Time Magazine and CBS 
Evening News over a ten-year period from 1978-1989. He found that "newsworthiness is defined in part 
by societal values and expectations of the way the world operates" and that news coverage "is incomplete, 
thus skewing the public's perception of human rights around the world [685]". See also Edward Herman 
and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: the Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1988). Gwyn Prins suggests that military intervention in Bosnia, prompted by public 
response to media images rather than great power interest, resulted in a "trickle intervention [which] 
occurred in spasms". He characterises this as "the worst sort of intervention possible". ["Global Security 
and Military Intervention, " Security Dialogue 27 (1996): 7-16]. An anonymous contributor to Human 
Rights Quarterly also pointed out that western concerns over human rights and `ethnic cleansing' delayed 
the achievement of a peace settlement in the former Yugoslavia. The contributor sees a lesson for the 
human rights community in the fact that "Thousands of people are dead who should have been alive - 
because moralists were in quest of the perfect peace". [Anonymous, "Human Rights in Peace 
Negotiations, " Human Rights Quarterly 18 (1996): 249-258]. 
89Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, " An Agenda for Peace 1995 20. 
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inevitably advantage some groups within the target state at the expense of others. Some 
local groups will see greater advantage in continued international engagement. Others 
will prefer a swift move back to national sovereignty. Some groups will continue to 
invest their loyalty in international allies, militating against the orientation of loyalties 
primarily towards the state itself. Global-local alliances will introduce instability due to 
continual fluctuations of interest in the policies of great powers and international 
organisations, responding to the swings and `compassion fatigues' of `world opinion', in 
a still-competitive sovereign state system. 
If sovereignty is to be restored, in an environment of peace and respect for human rights, 
a single, national framework for dispute resolution must be created. By providing 
alternative sites of political activity within the territory, through the existence of 
international mediators and agencies, the presence of international peace-builders 
intervenes in the relationship between citizens and institutions of state. This may be 
exploited from within the target state. As described, international political will is likely 
to be uncertain when compared to that of local protagonists to a dispute. `World 
opinion' is likely to waver according to events, and to be based on a limited or biased 
understanding of the history and nature of the problem. International peace-builders 
will be faced with attempts by elite groups to enlist them as an ally against competitors. 
Alternatively, intervenors may find local parties uniting against them in a nationalist 
response. It is argued in Chapters Three and Nine of this dissertation that international 
intervenors, and the material and protective power they bestow on local clients, have 
been drawn into the divisions within the Cambodian polity. 
Building authoritative institutions that are immediately effective requires basing them 
on local cultural values. These values lend authority to technocratic solutions, and must 
supplement professional expertise to create structures which possess political utility and 
durability. The task of endowing political structures with political and cultural value is 
not well suited to a standing international task force. In the Cambodian case, local 
counterparts have been funded by international intervenors to attempt the task of 
introducing a valued human rights discourse into the Cambodian polity. The approaches 
employed by the Cambodian organisations involved is discussed in Chapters Eight and 
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Nine of this study. 
The fundamental and long-term problem, which contributes to all these potential 
difficulties, is the problem of how international technocrats can carry out their duties 
with authority, while at the same time strengthening the authority of the state institutions 
whose authority they are, for the present, overriding; and then effect a handover of 
authority back again when the international community wishes to reduce its direct 
governing role. In war-torn, deeply divided, underdeveloped countries, the chances of 
successful implementation of such a task must be minimal within the time-frame that 
`world opinion' and the political will of international governments and organisations 
allows. In Cambodia, from 1993 to 1997, it is argued, international will proved in many 
instances inadequate to counteract the efforts of Cambodian power-holders to combat 
human rights promotion, using familiar power resources, including human rights abuse. 
Yet international intervention has created new political forces in the Cambodian polity 
and has altered political outcomes significantly. 
The impact of international peace-building in Cambodia will be examined within a 
three-dimensional political framework of relations between state, international 
community, and a Cambodian `human rights movement'. It is argued that the 
Cambodian case study provides evidence for the contradictions between peace-building 
and state-building outlined above. It is also argued that analysis of human rights 
promotion in Cambodia within a framework of international-state-local power relations 
allows greater understanding of the contingent, Cambodian understanding and practice 
of human rights that has emerged from international intervention. The international 
community has employed Cambodians to attempt the task of endowing human rights 
norms with cultural value. Analysis of this task in a context of power and culture 
reveals a process not of replicating Western ideals but of negotiating a flexible metaphor 
for domination and resistance, embedded in the particularity of relationships between 
the global, the state and the local. 
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A critical analysis of UNTAC's operation, and its long-term effects on Cambodian 
politics, reveals the practical implications of current uncertainty regarding the relative 
claims of sovereignty and human rights. UNTAC can be viewed in two ways. As an 
attempt to reconcile conflicting ideologies of intervention and sovereignty while 
implementing internationally desired policies, it succeeded to an extent. It facilitated 
the emergence of an internationally recognised Cambodian government and limited the 
scale of civil war in the country. Partisan military aid flows to Cold War proxies largely 
ceased and were replaced by co-ordinated international economic and technical aid 
designed to support regional economic integration. UNTAC repatriated refugees and 
created a domestic structure of human rights watchdog organisations. Subsequently, 
UNTAC departed leaving the future of Cambodia in the hands of the Cambodian 
government. The United Nations presented these achievements as promoting both 
humanitarianism and stability, benefiting the Khmer people and the Southeast Asian 
region, as well as strengthening the international regime of sovereign states. All these 
achievements suited the immediate interests of neighbouring and great powers. ' 
Viewed as an exercise in liberal democratic cosmopolitanism, UNTAC was less 
successful. Limits to international power and political will became obvious during the 
mission, particularly concerning issues which did not directly affect external powers. 
Human rights policies exemplified this. When faced with conflicts between reinforcing 
human rights principles, and securing short term operational necessities, UNTAC chose 
the latter course of action. In a complex operational setting, cosmopolitan ideals were 
subordinated to the disengagement goals of external powers. 
'Superpower and regional interests of realpolitilc and their evolution from 1979, are described in: Kishore 
Mahbubani, "The Kampuchean Problem: A Southeast Asian Perspective, " Foreign Affairs 62.2 (1983/4): 
407-425; Chang Pao-min, "Kampuchean Conflict - The Continuing Stalemate, " Asian Survey 27 (1987): 
748-764; Charles MacGregor, "The Sino-Vietnamese Relationship and the Soviet Union, " Adelphi Paper 
232 (1988); Keith Richburg, "Back to Vietnam, " Foreign Affairs, 70.4 (1991): 111-131; James A. Baker 
III, "America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community, " Foreign Affairs 70.5 (1991): 1- 
18; Laura J. Summers, "Cambodia: The Prospects for a UN-Controlled Solution, " Asian Review 5 
(1991): 43-7 1; Surin Maisrikrod, "Thailand's Policy Dilemmas Towards Indochina, " Contemporary 
South East Asia 14 (1992): 282-300. 
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The extent to which UNTAC's mandate can be characterised as a peace-building, rather 
than a traditional peace-keeping operation, is unclear. Arguably, three interpretations of 
the peace process existed. The Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of 
the Cambodia Conflict contained some elements which appeared to place human rights 
principles above sovereignty, thus reflecting the new era heralded by the Agenda for 
Peace three months later. While the main thrust of the Agreements was to effect a 
withdrawal of foreign forces, cease-fire, and installation of a new regime, many 
participants in, and observers of, the peace process believed in the existence of a moral 
agenda. 
The original Australian peace proposal of February 1990 did not mention long term 
human rights concerns, but aimed to use democratic elections to restore sovereignty: 
(1) to achieve conditions in which Cambodian people can freely, secure 
from intimidation or coercion, choose their own leaders and determine their 
own future, by free and fair elections; and 
(2) achieve a reconstructed Cambodia with internationally guaranteed 
sovereignty, independence and neutrality. 2 
The final Paris Agreements awarded responsibilities for human rights promotion to the 
Cambodian government and citizens3 and, significantly, to the external signatories, who 
were required: 
to promote and encourage respect for and observance of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in Cambodia as embodied in the relevant 
international instruments and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations 
General Assembly, in order, in particular, to prevent the recurrence of 
human rights abuses. 4 
No time limit is placed on this oversight. It is stipulated that "after the end of the 
transitional period, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights should continue 
2Australian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cambodia: An Australian Peace Proposal (Canberra: Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1990) 1. 
; Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, 23 October 1991, Paris, 
Art. 15. 
°Comprehensive Art. 15. 
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to monitor closely the human rights situation in Cambodia", 5 including, possibly, by 
means of a Special Rapporteur reporting annually to the UN. These provisions are 
restated in the Agreement concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial 
Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality and National Unity of Cambodia, with the further 
stipulation that: 
In the event of serious violations of human rights in Cambodia [the 
signatories] will call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to 
take such other steps as are appropriate for the prevention and suppression 
of such violations in accordance with the relevant international instruments. 6 
These provisions provide a legal basis for continued oversight and intervention to 
protect human rights, even while reaffirming Cambodian sovereignty. Sovereignty and 
human rights are delinked, shifting human rights into the sphere of international concern 
and foreshadowing the cosmopolitanism of the Agenda for Peace. The Paris 
Agreements render human rights in Cambodia a legitimate continuing subject of world 
attention and, if necessary, action. The accords also dictated human rights and liberal 
democratic provisions for inclusion in a new Cambodian constitution. ? 
UNTAC's human rights mandate comprised checks and balances designed to oversee, 
and demand accountability from, the Cambodian existing administrative structures. 
UNTAC was required to: 
make provision for: 
a) The development and implementation of a programme of human rights 
education to promote respect for and understanding of human rights; 
b) General human rights oversight during the transitional period; 
c) The investigation of human rights complaints and, where appropriate, 
corrective action. 8 
The Human Rights Component pointed out that these measures were to be taken "in 
context of a ... traditional peacekeeping operation, without clearly defined enforcement 
5Comprehensive Art. 17. 
6Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality 
and National Unity of Cambodia, 23 October 1991, Paris, Art. 5. 
7Principles for a New Constitution for Cambodia, 23 October 1991, Paris, §2. 
8Comprehensive Annex 1, Section E. 
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powers' .9 This meant that local co-operation with UNTAC directives was voluntary, 
reflecting, arguably, a caution that was later abandoned in Somalia. This caution led, in 
the execution as well as in the framing of the mandate, to reliance on strategies of 
persuasion, international pressure and limited threats - for example, to fine candidates or 
remove their names from the ballot paper - to constrain particular activities of the 
Cambodian parties. Constraints were aimed particularly at protecting those groups in 
society who played an active role in the election - political party activists, newly- 
forming human rights organisations, newspapers, intellectual organisations, and voters. 
In this respect, human rights provisions focused on validation of the electoral process. 
Boutros-Ghali interpreted UNTAC's human rights role as "to encourage" the 
Cambodians themselves, who "clearly have the obligation to promote and protect 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cambodia". 10 He stipulated that UNTAC 
"would... expect to... encourage the establishment of indigenous human rights 
associations" and "may also wish to associate indigenous human rights monitoring 
groups with its [investigations and provision of redress for abuse], with the agreement of 
the parties concerned". " 
Boutros-Ghali argued that, "the development and dissemination of a human rights 
education programme is foreseen as the cornerstone of UNTAC's activities in fostering 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms". 12 This accords with his view that 
"Cambodians must fully understand both the content and the significance of those rights 
and freedoms in order to be in a position to know when and how to protect them 
properly". 13 He added that human rights education must be "culturally sensitive", yet 
this refers to methods of transmission rather than content. Regarding the content of 
9 UNTAC Human Rights Component, "Final Report, " unpublished report, September 1993,10. 
10Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia Containing his Proposed 
Implementation Plan for UNTAC including Administrative and Financial Aspects, " UN Document 
S/23613,19 February 1992, §9. 
11Boutros-Ghali, "Implementation" § 13; § 19. 
'2Boutros-Ghali, "Implementation" § 12. 
13Boutros-Ghali, "Implementation" § 12 
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human rights education, he prescribes emphasis on 
particular themes... notably relating to the exercise of rights in an electoral 
environment, the existence of mechanisms for remedial action, rights 
relating to protection of the person and other rights enshrined in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. '4 
This prescription finely locates human rights within the context of UN activity and the 
holding of elections. Focus on use of `mechanisms for remedial action', which were to 
operate through UN oversight of the civil administration, put the United Nations in 
control of strategies of resistance to oppression. The mandate for such oversight stated: 
If the Secretary-General's Special Representative deems it necessary, 
UNTAC, in consultation with the SNC15, will undertake investigations of 
complaints and allegations regarding actions by the existing administrative 
structures in Cambodia... UNTAC will also be empowered to undertake 
such investigation on its own initiative. UNTAC will take, when necessary, 
appropriate corrective steps. 16 
"The exercise of general human rights oversight in all of the existing administrative 
structures in Cambodia" 17 was also intended to prevent human rights abuse. Activities 
in this field included the production of `special guidelines' and `codes of conduct' for 
civil servants and law enforcement and judicial officers. 18 UNTAC staff would 
supervise and train these staff as part of its mandate to directly control "all 
administrative agencies, bodies and offices acting in the field of foreign affairs, national 
defence, finance, public security and information" in order "to ensure strict neutrality". 19 
Oversight was explicitly linked to the holding of elections. ° 
Heder and Ledgerwood in 1996 focus on the limitations of the mandate, arguing that 
t4Boutros-Ghali, "Implementation" § 14. 
15The SNC was the Supreme National Council, a committee chaired by Sihanouk including representatives 
of the four Cambodian signatories, created as a repository of Cambodian sovereignty during the transition. 
16Comprehensive Annex 1, Section B, §6. 
17Boutros-Ghali, "Implementation" § 16. 
BBoutros-Ghali, "Implementation" § 17. 
19Comprehensive Annex 1, Section B, § 1. 
20Agencies, bodies and offices to be controlled were those identified as able to "directly influence the 
outcome of elections. " Comprehensive Annex 1, Section B, §2. 
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while fulfilling the Agreements required the implementation of a democratic transition, 
"consolidation of liberal democracy" was not a high priority. Despite the incorporation 
of requirements that the new Cambodian constitution contain provisions safeguarding 
liberal democracy and pluralism, it was left to Cambodians to "integrate this 
commitment with the political, military, social, economic, cultural and diplomatic 
realities facing Cambodia once UNTAC was gone". 21 
This account, along with that given in Boutros-Ghali's implementation plan, reflects 
pragmatic priorities employed by UNTAC in implementing a complex operation. Yet 
international excitement surrounding the UNTAC operation stemmed in large part from 
the early 1990s international context in which liberal democracy was perceived as 
triumphant. 
The Human Rights Component, along with many observers of the process, arguably 
viewed the mandate as incorporating policies for democratic consolidation. The Human 
Rights Component's final report criticises a failure to foresee "a need for a radical 
overhaul of existing state institutions [and]... to urgently rebuild or build new structures 
of government. " The Component points out that the mandate did not provide for 
"peacebuilding" activities, which the Component viewed as "clearly... necessary" for 
"the success of human rights efforts in the future". 22 
Arguably, this criticism of the mandate reflects an expansive reading of the aims of the 
peace process. The focus on institutional reform and the long-term outlook suggests a 
concern with the democratic consolidation that Heder and Ledgerwood argue was not 
envisaged by the Agreements. The Component viewed its task as beginning a long-term 
process of cultural reform to be followed up by various forms of international 
"assistance" after a sovereign government had been reinstalled. This task was viewed as 
consonant with the control and oversight mandates of the Civil Administration, Civil 
21Steve Heder and Judy Ledgerwood, "The Politics of Violence: An Introduction, " Propaganda, Politics 
and Violence in Cambodia, Democratic Transition under United Nations Peace-Keeping, " eds. Heder 
and Ledgerwood (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1996) 15. 
Human Rights Component 9/10. 
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Police, Electoral and Human Rights Components. Exercises of powers of control, 
primarily intended to prevent the parties from using `unfair' means to distort the 
democratic electoral process, could leave a long-term legacy in the form of models of 
exemplary conduct. 
From this perspective, the task of ensuring that "the policies and practices of the past 
shall never be allowed to return", 23 required promotion of a liberal democratic culture 
within which future policies and practices could be framed, criticised, and, if necessary, 
punished. In 1992, Yasushi Akashi, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, 
described UNTAC's role as "to act as a facilitator for the peace process and as a catalyst 
for the political and structural reform of democracyi24 suggesting the accords were 
intended to have a long-term democratising effect on the country. 
The distinction between a view of UNTAC as a democratising force, and the more 
pragmatic view of Heder and Ledgerwood represents, arguably, the distinction between 
the intervention as presented to the Western and Cambodian public, and the intervention 
as implemented in Cambodia. This distinction reflects the difference between 
cosmopolitan ideal and pragmatic reality in an operational context in which a series of 
major problems threatened to derail the peace process. 
A third reading of the peace process conflates the issue of democracy and human rights 
with `genocide' and opposition to the PDK. The preamble to the Paris Agreements 
recognised: 
that Cambodia's tragic recent history requires special measures to assure 
protection of human rights, and the non-return to the policies and practices 
of the past. 5 
This was read as a specific, although euphemistic, reference to the DK regime. 
For some commentators, UNTAC and the peace process represented an atonement for 
23Comprehensive Art. 15. 
24Yasushi Akashi, "To Build a New Country, The Task of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, " 
Harvard International Review (Winter 1992/3): 69. 
uComprehensive, Preamble. 
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the amoral 1980s policy of diplomatic support for the PDK, as a member of the CGDK. 
The US had participated in this policy, by supporting the claim of the CGDK to 
Cambodia's UN seat, and by acquiescing to Thai and Chinese military aid flows to the 
PDK army, the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK). In 1990, US 
Congressman Stephen J. Solarz, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Asian and 
Pacific Affairs since 1981, characterised this support and tacit acquiescence as "an act 
of complete moral cynicism" and portrayed the Cambodian question as "primarily... 
moral and humanitarian", 26 reflecting post-Cold War reorientations. For Solarz, a 
negotiated solution was imperative as the Vietnamese withdrawal had left "the world to 
face ... an armed and revitalised 
Khmer Rouge". 7 He commented: 
If the international community truly believes that humane treatment of the 
defenceless is a norm that should be applied wherever possible, it must act 
now and to the utter limits of its capacity to block a new round of genocide 
in Cambodia... Cambodians have suffered too long because of the moral 
cynicism of others. We degrade our own values if we unnecessarily permit 
28 them to suffer any longer. 
Richburg also reports that the US Congress was critical of the inclusion of PDK in the 
peace process, reflecting a decisive swing in attitudes as the Soviet presence in 
Southeast Asia weakened. 29 
Similar political reorientations took place in Europe, Southeast Asia and within the UN 
itself, where the CGDK occupied Cambodia's seat. On 1 June 1991, the EC and 
ASEAN stated "the return of the genocide regime must be rendered impossible". 0 On 
23 August a UN Human Rights Subcommittee passed a resolution inviting all parties to 
"take all the necessary measures to prevent a situation likely to create a risk for the 
31 Cambodian people of new crimes against humanity" 
16Stephen J. Solarz, "Cambodia and the International Community, " Foreign Affairs airs 69.2(1990): 99-115. 
27Solarz 103. 
28Solarz 115. 
29Keith Richburg, "Back to Vietnam, " Foreign Affairs 70.4 (1991): 121. 
30SPK (Cambodian News Agency), 6 June 1991. Qtd by Raoul Jennar, "The Cambodian Gamble, " unpub. 
report, European Far Eastern Research Centre, Sept. 1991,6. 
31UN Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Resolution 1991/8 
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Many commentators decried the non-exclusion of the PDK from the peace process, 
viewing their participation as incompatible with peace and democracy. The Cambodian 
Documentation Commission's David Hawk wrote to Raoul Jennar: 
I share your dismay that there is no exclusion of those most responsible for 
terrible crimes against humanity or disablements against the political 
movement that carried out the genocide -a situation which represents the 
failure of what my Cambodian colleagues and western associates 
specialising in law, human rights and Cambodia scholarship and I have 
worked for a decade to achieve 32 
Jennar, consultant for the NGO Forum on Cambodia, commented that, the West "failed 
in a moral and legal obligation concerning those historically responsible for genocide", 
arguing that the West missed an opportunity to discuss "a containment" of PDK leaders 
in spring 1991 when "Peking was prepared to discuss a few names". Jennar argued: 
As long as Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Mok, Pauk, Bit are not 
neutralized, the Khmer Rouge will constitute the greatest threat to the life of 
the Cambodians 33 
Emphasis on the `containment' and `neutralisation' of individuals by great powers 
ignores the reality of support for the PDK in Cambodia, viewing them only as an 
outgrowth of Chinese military aid. Continued historic interventions in Cambodia and a 
conviction that external intervention is responsible for Cambodian problems, 34 arguably, 
led to the widespread assumption that Cambodians themselves are helpless while a 
solution can be found and implemented by the international community. 
Akashi, also, commented, "UNTAC's strength is derived from the unanimous support 
Situation in Cambodia, 23 August 1991. Qtd by Jennar, "Gamble" 17. 
32David Hawk, letter to Raoul Jennar, 23 January 1991. 
33Raoul Jennar, "Cambodian Chronicles IV: Success and Firmness in Tokyo, Deadlock in Phnom Penh, " 
unpub. report, European Far Eastern Research Centre, Sept. 1992,8. 
34See Penny Edwards "Imaging the Other in Cambodian Nationalist Discourse Before and During the 
UNTAC Period, " Heder and Ledgerwood, Propaganda 62. Edwards describes how both Cambodian 
elites and Westerners have laid the blame for the past two decades of destruction in Cambodia at the door 
of intervention. She argues that this political strategy is used within Cambodia to undermine the 
legitimacy of political opponents, create scapegoats for social and economic problems, to reinforce elite 
political structures by distracting attention from their weaknesses, and, importantly, to disempower the 
ordinary Cambodian. 
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of the international community", 35 but it is significant that this strength of external 
consensus could not be used as a power resource within the country. The ability of 
former regional and superpower patrons to control former clients declined drastically 
after foreign arms deliveries ended. Withdrawal of the PDK from the peace process, 
despite appeals from Thailand and China, demonstrated this. 6 UNTAC quickly found 
that the Cambodian parties had significantly different interests from their former 
international supporters, and significantly different interpretations of the peace 
agreements. 
Despite heavy emphasis in some circles on the question of genocide, the agreements 
contained no practical provisions to defend the process against large-scale atrocities or 
massacres. A key power cluster which interpreted the human rights terms of the accords 
as protection against the return of the PDK was the Phnom Penh Government which had 
continually raised this question during the negotiating process. Throughout the 1980s, 
the Phnom Penh government refused to negotiate with "the Pol Pot clique", branding 
them a threat to the survival of the Khmer nation. Boutros-Ghali comments that at the 
first Paris Conference on Cambodia in 1989: 
The two primary stumbling-blocks were the formula for power-sharing 
among the four factions during a transitional period ..., and the future 
participation of the Party of Democratic Kampuchea. 37 
Jennar describes how the Phnom Penh government - the State of Cambodia (SoC) - 
declared their "first priority" was "concrete and precise measures" to prevent the "return 
to power of the authors of genocide". Such measures were to include the trial of PDK 
35Akashi "To Build... " 69. 
36TH a letter to Boutros-Ghali concerning attempts to secure DK compliance, Akashi listed a number of 
member states who may be able to exert influence over the DK including Thailand - "They can obviously 
do a lot by cutting of its ties with the DK" - and China - "China still enjoys the confidence of DK, 
although its large influence is probably diminishing since the cessation of its military assistance to the 
DK. " He also mentioned Indonesia, Japan, the US, and France, adding "We need to work with all these 
countries if pressure on DK is to be kept. It is particularly important that the ASEAN countries are with 
us, rather than argue for an unspecified "Asian approach" [Yasushi Akashi, letter to the Secretary- 
General, 27 July 1992, repr. in United Nations, The United Nations and Cambodia, 1991-1995 (New 
York: United Nations, 1995) 207]. Despite the efforts of these countries, DK compliance was not 
achieved. 
37Boutros-Ghali, "Introduction, " UN and Cambodia 7. 
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leaders or a ban on "any party claiming to stem from the DK". 38 Eventually, the SoC 
gave way on this issue in return for preservation of its administrative structure and 30 
per cent of its military forces. 
The issue of `genocide' resurfaced continually during UNTAC's deployment. Penny 
Edwards notes that, while in the West the word is synonymous with the Khmer Rouge: 
[t]he term entered Cambodian political parlance years before Pol Pot came 
to power. In a report to the UN in 1967, Sihanouk accused South Vietnam 
of committing genocide against Khmer. Lon Nol's republican rags of 1970- 
1975 are replete with references to a Vietnamese genocide of Cambodia. 
Genocide, as read by many Cambodians, is understood in a specific cultural 
context as meaning the destruction of the Khmer race. 39 
While SoC propaganda resembled the fears of Western commentators, genocide was 
used as a propaganda weapon by the SoC's opponents, including the PDK themselves. 
Edwards describes how "all four parties based their call for votes or to boycott the 
election on the claim that they alone were the key to the survival of Cambodia" citing 
the threat of the "Vietnamised `sham' of the CPP", in the case of the BLDP, Funcinpec 
and the PDK, or "`genocidal Pol Pot clique' and its Funcinpec and BLDP proxies" in 
the case of the CPP. She comments: 
Straddling ideological differences among the parties was the uniformity of a 
central campaign theme: if it falls into the wrong hands, Cambodia will 
disappear. 40 
The parties also sought support for their positions from the UN. Hun Sen (CPP), Khieu 
Samphan (PDK), and Son Sann (BLDP), all wrote to Boutros-Ghali on the issue. Hun 
Sen's letter reflected an attitude familiar in the West, condemning PDK cease-fire 
violations as "call[ing] into question not only the organization of the forthcoming 
38Jennar "Gamble" 7. 
39Edwards 57. 
40Edwards 58. The fear of Vietnamese `annexation' or `swallowing up' of Cambodia has a long history. 
Edwards traces it back to racial stereotyping by French colonialists, Ramses Amer to the victory of the 
Thai-backed branch of the royal family over the Vietnamese-backed branch in pre-colonial times. Amer, 
"The Ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia: a Minority at Risk? " Contemporary Southeast Asian Studies 16 
(1994): 210-241. A detailed account of this phenomenon is found in Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy, the 
War After the War. A History of Indochina since the Fall of Saigon, (New York: Collier Books, 1986). 
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elections which the Party of Democratic Kampuchea-Khmer Rouge is already rejecting, 
but also the very life of the Khmer nation and people" and requesting that the UN take 
"appropriate measures" invoking "if necessary" Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter. 41 
The central platform of the former resistance parties is less familiar to Western publics. 
Basic to their political stance was the view that the CPP owed a debt of gratitude to 
Vietnam and would allow Vietnamese forces and settlers to swallow Cambodia up as a 
result. Foreign forces, as described by the ex-resistance parties, included both 
Vietnamese military and ordinary ethnic Vietnamese settlers, some of whose roots in 
Cambodia dated back to the Sihanouk era. The PDK withdrew from the peace process 
on the stated grounds that UNTAC had failed to ensure withdrawal of Vietnamese 
troops from Cambodia, and had not given sufficient power to the Supreme National 
Council (SNC). 
Heder and Ledgerwood argue that international negotiators had "attempted to blur the 
Vietnamese issues42 in their search for a political settlement. The framework document 
produced by the UN Security Council, which formed the basis of negotiations at the 
Paris Conference, charged UNTAC with verifying the "withdrawal from Cambodia of 
all categories of foreign forces, advisors and military personnel . 43 Heder and 
Ledgerwood point out that the term all categories could be viewed as including 
"everyone covered by the PDK definition" 44 The Paris Agreements "reproduced the 
ambiguities of the earlier documents, which masked fundamental conflicts and 
differences on major issues". 45 
41Hun Sen, Letter to the Secretary-General, 5 January 1993, UN and Cambodia 249. Chapter VII permits 
the Security Council to authorise use of force against a state which poses a threat to international peace 
and security. Hun Sen is suggesting that the UN use force against the PDK, to protect the elections and 
the existence of the Cambodian nation. 
42Heder and Ledgerwood, "Introduction" 11. 
43Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, UN Document 
A/45/472-S/21689,31 August 1990 § 15 (qtd. by Heder and Ledgerwood, "Introduction" 11). 
"Heder and Ledgerwood, "Introduction" 11. 
45Heder and Ledgerwood, "Introduction" 12. 
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When the plan was implemented, differences in definition led to a breakdown over what 
was, for the former resistance parties, an essential feature of the war and, consequently, 
the'peace - the status of Vietnamese soldiers, settlers, and migrant workers who, they 
believed, threatened the Khmer nation. Khieu Samphan wrote to Boutros-Ghali: 
Our sole objective is to ensure a complete withdrawal of all categories of 
foreign forces from Cambodia so that peace and independence could be 
restored and national reconciliation could be realised. 46 
He argued that UNTAC had been ineffective in verifying this withdrawal and was "out 
of touch with the Cambodian reality notwithstanding its goodwill". That reality, as 
Khieu Samphan described it, was that: 
foreign forces in various form - soldiers, advisers and experts - still remain 
in Cambodia in disguise as soldiers of the Phnom Penh party or civilian 
`advisers' or `experts' working in the administrative structure of that regime 
or civilians merged with the Vietnamese settlers or ordinary persons living 
in the countryside and the cities. Therefore, measures taken in the military 
aspect alone would not be sufficient and effective. 7 
This stance was supported by BLDP leader Son Sann. He wrote 
since 1979, the so-called Vietnamese settlers have entered Cambodia in a 
great number, freely, without passport or visa, following on the Vietnamese 
invading troops. Since the signing of the Paris Agreement, those illegal 
Vietnamese settlers continue to arrive freely, to grab fertile lands, trades and 
jobs in town, fishing in our great Lakes, management of our rubber 
plantations... Most of them are demobilized Vietnamese soldiers, they are 
young and armed... A great many of them hold Cambodian identity cards 
and would have the possibility to vote in Cambodia... The presence of about 
one million Vietnamese is very badly accepted by the Cambodian people. 48 
This issue was related to that of the status of the SNC vis-a-vis the SoC. The SoC was 
viewed by the resistance parties as an illegitimate, Vietnamese creation, and a threat to 
the nation. It was therefore essential that powers be devolved to the SNC, to protect 
Khmers. Khieu Samphan wrote to Boutros-Ghali that the `spirit' and `aims' of the Paris 
46Khieu Samphan, letter to the Secretary-General, 29 September 1992, repr. in United Nations, UN and 
Cambodia 223. 
47Khieu Samphan, Letter 223. 
48Son Sann, Contribution to the Search for a Solution to the Deadlock in the Implementation of the Paris 
Agreements, 30 September 1992, repr. in United Nations, UN and Cambodia 224. 
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Agreements required that extra `measures' should be taken to enable the SNC to fulfil 
its role as ' the unique legitimate body and source of authority in Cambodia'. These 
measures included moves to "enable the existing administrative structures of the four 
Cambodian parties to function free from the directives and policies of any `government', 
which must no longer exist ever since the signing of the Paris Agreements" 49 Such 
measures included the `depoliticization' of the SoC political framework, including the 
ministries, People's Assembly, Council of Ministers, and presidency so that: 
There will be therefore no Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers, 
Ministers, Vice Ministers, President and other attributes of the State or 
Government. Along with those measures, it is necessary that within the 
existing administrative structures and the police forces of all the Cambodian 
parties, Consultative Committees of the SNC be set up 5° 
The Paris Agreements had stipulated that `existing administrative structures' should 
remain in place. Samphan's proposal takes advantage of what Heder and Ledgerwood 
call the `blurring' of issues used during negotiations in order to achieve agreement. The 
euphemism `existing administrative structures' was employed in the Agreements in 
response to the fact that both SoC and CGDK regarded themselves as the only 
legitimate government of Cambodia, and refused to lend credibility to their opponents 
by referring to them as such. In this proposal, the PDK redefine the diplomatic language 
of the Agreements to suit their own purpose, using `existing administrative structures' to 
refer to the lower ranks of the bureaucracy and police, who must be freed from 
`governments, ' who are denied the legitimacy of this appellation by means of inverted 
commas. 
Samphan's stance on this issue was again supported by Son Sann: 
The Cambodian people will be reassured only when all powers are held by 
the SNC with the agreement of UNTAC sl 
Akashi reported, 
49Proposal of the Party of Democratic Kampuchea, 12 July 1992, repr. in United Nations, UN and 
Cambodia 200. 
SOProposal of the PDK 200-20 1. 
s'Son Sann 225. 
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... our care to present a new protocol, enhancing the importance of SNC, 
seems to have somewhat pleased DK.... At the same time, we have taken a 
firm line that no body can tinker with the Paris Agreement and that "the 
existing administrative structures", including the Phnom Penh 
administration has to function if complete chaos is to be avoided. 52 
Akashi views the Phnom Penh government as essential to pragmatic operational needs, 
while acknowledging the party political importance of the SoC bureaucratic structure in 
his characterisation of the PDK proposals as an attempted "crippling blow to the Phnom 
Penh regime". The proposals would allow DK "to improve its political and military 
power to such an extent that the other parties will be place at a distinctive disadvantage 
when UNTAC leaves" S3 Pragmatism, and concern to balance the different strengths of 
the parties, informs UNTAC's approach. 
A similar cost-benefit calculus may be seen in the muted UNTAC response to ethnically 
motivated massacres of Vietnamese in Cambodia. Despite intense SoC and 
international concern over genocide perpetrated by the PDK against Khmers, these 
attacks, which approximated acts of genocide, met with little local or international 
response. 
UNTAC's Human Rights Component reported that 116 ethnic Vietnamese were killed, 
87 injured and 11 abducted between July 1992 and August 1993.4 UNTAC 
investigations concluded that NADK troops were responsible, yet anti-UNTAC 
propaganda put out by the PDK arguably prevented UNTAC from taking action. Nayan 
Chanda reported that UNTAC was identified by the PDK as "bad and evil people", 
collaborating with "the yuon aggressori55 to engineer an SoC victory. The PDK 
challenged the UN to show its neutrality by "virtually cleansing Cambodia of all ethnic 
Vietnamese". Chanda reported 
52Yasushi Akashi, Letter to the Secretary-General., 27 July 1992, repr. in United Nations, UN and 
Cambodia 206. 
53Akashi, Letter 206. 
54Human Rights Component 31. 
55 For a discussion of the usage and origins of the word `Yuon' for `Vietnamese', see Serge Thion, "On 
Some Cambodian Words, " Watching Cambodia (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1993) 30-35. 
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specialists fear that by wrapping their anti-Vietnam tirade in anti-Western 
xenophobia, the Khmer Rouge may have hit upon a political winner. The 
enemy is not just the Vietnamese but also the `colonialist' UNTAC. 56 
Boutros-Ghali reported to the UN that in March 1993, 
UNTAC has no special responsibility under the Paris Agreements for 
foreign residents or immigrants and considers that these questions are long- 
term matters that can be resolved only by discussions between the future 
Government of Cambodia and the Government of Vietnam. 57 
UNTAC's response fell short of its mandate to create an environment in which respect 
for human rights would be ensured in that only minimal efforts were made to protect the 
physical security of the ethnic Vietnamese. Boutros-Ghali claimed that resources were 
insufficient, but significantly, also explained, 
There was also the consideration of the PDK's perspective on the situation; 
their participation in the election was not ruled out, and UNTAC would only 
jeopardize the chances of the PDK's joining the process by appearing to 
make exceptions to the mandate on the behalf of ethnic Vietnamese S8 
As a `compromise', UNTAC did `monitor the movements of fleeing Vietnamese' and 
attempted to `ensure that local authorities assumed their responsibility to protect' them, 
but this latter effort was unsuccessful. The SoC "only reluctantly committed civilian 
police forces to [their] protection" while "the other factions ... stated publicly that these 
people had no claim on Cambodian citizenship and should be deported to Vietnam" 59 
According to Jamie Metzl, "Special Representative Akashi even rejected suggestions 
that he should visit ethnic Vietnamese victims of racially motivated attacks in the 
Phnom Penh hospital" for fear of feeding "Khmer Rouge propaganda which accused 
UNTAC of delivering Cambodia to the Vietnamese". 60 UNTAC allowed pragmatic 
considerations to impede action in a clear-cut case of large-scale human rights abuse, 
56Nayan Chanda, "Wounds of History, " FEER 30 July 1992,14. 
s'Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia, " UN Document S/25719,3 May 1990 §48. 
58Boutros-Ghali, "Introduction" 42. 
59Boutros-Ghali, "Introduction" 42. 
60Jamie Frederic Metzl, "The Many Faces of UNTAC: A Review Article, " Contemporary Southeast Asia 
17 (1995): 91. 
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and was not prepared to risk its popularity for the sake of human rights principles 
These issues exemplify a recurring feature of the human rights aspect of the UN 
intervention in Cambodia. Definitions of the terms of the Agreements were stretched to 
their limits as each side attempted to interpret the accords to benefit their own position 
in the new political context. Common understandings and assumptions did not exist. 
"Neutrality" was consequently non-existent, and principled action could only be 
understood within the cost-benefit calculations of the four parties. Consequently, such 
action was perennially subject to hostile interpretation, and quickly abandoned by 
UNTAC frustrating attempts by the Human Rights Component to promote a culture of 
democratic accountability. Pragmatism was preferred to principle. 
S. N. Sangmpam uses the concept of `overpoliticisation' to analyse the Cambodian peace 
process. 61 He describes an overpoliticised state as displaying five characteristics. These 
are the use of `dvert compulsion' in politics; fluidity of state power and insecurity of 
state power-holders; political participation and competition taking place outside 
established institutions; use of open violence and confrontation; and lack of 
compromise over outcomes of competition resulting in a low rate of successful conflict 
resolution.. -. 
Many of these symptoms flow from fundamental features of the Cambodian polity 
which are radically incompatible with liberal democratic competition. One such 
problem lay in notions of sovereignty and nationhood which in the Cambodian context 
were constructed so as to prevent compromise and promote violence. Edwards, Heder, 
Ledgerwood and Kate Frieson refer to the question of "Khmerness" and "otherness" in 
Khmer politics, in their analyses of UNTAC's intervention 62 The parties to the conflict 
each attempted to equate themselves with notions of sovereignty/ the state/ the people, 
61S. N. Sangmpam, "The Overpoliticised State and International Politics: Nicaragua, Haiti, Cambodia and 
Togo, " Third World Quarterly 16 (1995), 619-641. 
62 Edwards 60; Heder and Ledgerwood, "Introduction" 23; Judy Ledgerwood refers to the "rhetoric of 
fording and purging enemies" in her "Patterns of CPP Political Repression and Violence during the 
UNTAC Period, " Heder and Ledgerwood, Propaganda 131; Frieson describes the branding of resistance 
party members as thieves and genocidalists, in "The Politics of Getting the Vote in Cambodia, " Heder and 
Ledgerwood, Propaganda 194-195. 
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and portrayed their enemies as traitors/ invaders/ threats to the national welfare. The 
ideological construction of `enemies within' was at the root of many human rights 
abuses in a state which lacked a secular notion of the juridical rights-bearing citizen. 
Both cosmopolitan and traditional peace-keeping interpretations of the Paris 
Agreements centre on creation of a unitary territorial government with some domestic 
legitimacy -a sovereign state. While, as Weber describes, sovereignty on an 
international level is created by international agreement to recognise ("writing the 
state"63), legitimation of sovereignty at home is more problematic. It requires the 
creation of a meaningful and authoritative unity out of the diversity of population within 
the territory. 
In Cambodia, the attempt to unite four different and, in part, mutually exclusive 
concepts of the Cambodian nation into one sovereign government by means of invented 
devices, such as the Supreme National Council, the general election and the 
constitution, did not lead to any swift resolution of the issue. Each party attempted to 
define these devices in such a way as to promote their own interests and retard the 
interests of their rivals. 
The `focal point 64 of the Cambodian project was the general election, designed to award 
decisive sovereignty to one or other party via the mandate of the people. 65 For such a 
mandate to be meaningful, in liberal democratic ideology, the election had to be `free 
and fair' and held within a "neutral political environment" 66 
63Weber 1-10. 
64Boutros-Ghali, "Introduction" 12. 
65The Peace Agreements also brought back Cambodia's traditional sovereign, the King, and it is 
significant in the context of a search for a domestically meaningful sovereign unity, that on several 
occasions during the implementation of the accords, at points when it appeared that the holding of multi- 
party parliamentary elections might be too problematic, that a new plan to hold a presidential election in 
which Sihanouk would stand unchallenged, was seriously considered. See Boutros-Ghali "Report of the 
Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council resolution 783 (1992) on the Cambodia 
Peace Process, " UN Document S/24800,15 November 1992, §21; Security Council resolution 792 
(1992), 30 November 1992, §3. 
"Comprehensive Art. 12. 
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To create this environment, the Supreme National Council, which embodied Cambodian 
sovereignty during the transitional period, delegated to UNTAC 
an unprecedented level of involvement in a country's official activities 
during a peace-keeping operation.... the United Nations was to exercise 
direct supervision or control over those of the SoC's administrative 
agencies, bodies and offices which could directly influence the outcome of 
the elections... The Special Representative of the Secretary-General was to 
have the right of unrestricted access to all administrative operations and 
information, as well as the right to reassign or dismiss officials should the 
need arise. 67 
The neutral political environment was intended to substitute for a national democratic 
consensus on acceptable modes of political competition. UNTAC would police the 
cease-fire, civil administration and election campaign to prevent `unfair' advantages 
from arising. This was frequently described as a `balancing' operation. Boutros-Ghali 
describes the pre-election phase as: 
a complicated and delicate balancing act among the various components of 
UNTAC and between the Cambodian politicians themselves. 8 
Akashi also describes "a delicate balance" between the SNC, UNTAC and the 
administrative structures. 9 
Balancing between parties was essentially needed to keep all of them on board. PDK 
and SoC participation was vital to end the war between their armies. The non- 
communist Funcinpec and BLDP were required to facilitate Western recognition of the 
process. Balancing the combined strength of PDK and SoC was essential to give the 
weaker parties an opportunity to campaign; balancing their interests vis-ä-vis one 
another was necessary to prevent their disaffection in the light of deep divisions between 
them. In the human rights field, balancing also required protecting and empowering 
citizens vis-ä-vis the parties. Although many commentators focused on the human 
rights record of the DK, the SoC government had also been responsible for human rights 
67Boutros-Ghali, "Introduction" 13. 
68Boutros-Ghali, "Introduction" 28. 
69Akashi "To Build... " 34. 
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abuse since 1979 70 
This balancing act to create a "neutral political environment", arose from two problems: 
the absence of an accepted definition of `fair' behaviour, and the problem of motivating 
parties to continue to participate in the face of likely defeat. `Fair' political competition 
can be defined as competition according to rules accepted by both sides. No such rules 
existed in Cambodia. Each party played by its own rules, and linked these rules with the 
survival of the nation, through an electoral platform which emphasised the dangers 
represented by opponents. 
It was not possible for the PDK or the CPP to accept publicly the prospect of defeat by 
the other, since each campaigned on its ability to protect the nation from the other. The 
Phnom Penh regime's major claim to legitimacy was its overthrow of Pol Pot, 
consistently presented as a bogey-man in government propaganda since 1979 in an 
attempt to win domestic support 71 Meanwhile, anti-Vietnamese propaganda put out by 
the PDK boosted their popularity. n The intractable nature of Cambodia's civil war was 
due, in large part, to this rift between the two communist parties. Their mutual 
accusations - that the SoC regime were puppets of the "Race exterminating aggressor 
Vietnamese bandits"; that Pol Pot was "head of the gang of butchers"73 - go to the heart 
of Khmer nationhood, and therefore neither could recognise the other as a legitimate 
adversary. There could be no democratic debate between them, since in terms of their 
respective ideologies, to engage in debate with the other would be treason. Campaigning 
700ne account of abuses of judicial process which took place under the SoC can be found in Lawyers 
Committee for Human Rights, Cambodia, the Justice System and Violations of Human Rights (New York: 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1992). Reports of forced conscription and forced labour for the 
K2 project can be found in the EN reports. Both UNTAC's Human Rights Component's Final Report 
(Phnom Penh: UNTAC, September 1993) and Amnesty International's report from the early UNTAC 
period indicate that abusive methods were routinely used by police and prison officers under the SoC. See 
Amnesty International, State of Cambodia: Human Rights Developments, 1 October 1991 to 31 January 
1992 (London: Amnesty International, 1992). 
7'See Frieson "Politics" 192-196. 
See Frieson "Politics" 184; and Edwards 64. 
73fti% SM f31j''! 
WC1 
nd 11f%S f6"1 RJ17ýý' . These epithets are taken from 
a 1991 glossary of terms used on Khmer language radio since the 1970s, JPRS Report, East Asia, 
Southeast Asia, Cambodia. Khmer-English Glossary, JPRS-SEA-91-022,17 Sept. 1991 (Springfield: US 
Dept. of Commerce, 1991), 154-155. 
67 
Chapter 3: UNTAC in Cambodia 
as equals represented acknowledgement of the other's legitimate claim - such an 
acknowledgement would have been disastrous for their own legitimacy. 
The relationship between CPP and the other former resistance parties, Funcinpec and 
BLDP, was similar, because of the CPP's need to justify the long war against these 
parties, and to neutralise the stigma attached to its own record by the anti-Vietnamese 
rhetoric of the opposition. During the election campaign, the CPP concentrated its 
propaganda on identifying these groups with the Khmer Rouge. David Ashley describes 
a page from a CPP Youth movement member's exercise book, found in Ek Phnom 
district of Battambang, which claimed, "Funcinpec is one of the three strategic measures 
of the enemy in our Cambodia today with the aim of serving their fundamental ploy, that 
is to bring Pol Pot... back to power over our people once more". 4 Meanwhile, the 
BLDP and PDK ran campaigns aimed at identifying the CPP with the Vietnamese. 
Just as there could be no pluralist consensus regarding the right of parties to exist and 
compete, so there could be no democratic consensus over the value of peaceful political 
competition. In the atmosphere described, the very survival of the nation was considered 
to be at stake. For each party, the means by which victory was achieved - by military, 
terrorist, or peaceful democratic activities - was important only insofar as it was 
effective. 
This situation is incompatible with the restoration of sovereignty or the creation of a 
`neutral political environment for free and fair elections'. Both these concepts 
presuppose that certain fundamental national questions have been resolved. Questions 
such as, "Who is a Cambodian? ", had to be answered before `the Cambodian people' 
could decide on the future of their nation. Yet agreement was not reached on this 
question with the result that it dominated the election. 
Heder and Ledgerwood describe the problems inherent in the nationality question. The 
territorial residence requirements put forward by the United Nations "opened up the 
74David Ashley, "The Nature and Causes of Human Rights Violations in Battambang Province, " Heder 
and Ledgerwood, Propaganda 168. 
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possibility of non-Khmer, noncitizens, and nonnationals, including chun-cheat [ethnic] 
Vietnamese and Chinese voting in the election". This represented a "new imagining of 
communities [that] denied that political and civil rights derived from Khmer custom and 
culture... Many ordinary Cambodians... found it distressing or at least extraordinary". 75 
In the realm of civil and political rights, conflicting conceptions of the context of 
political competition - for example, the question of who is entitled to vote - politicised 
human rights. In addition to massacres of Vietnamese, the election campaign 
engendered political killings, intimidation and `dirty tricks' to promote a climate of fear. 
Boutros-Ghali reported in January 1993: 
One of UNTAC's most important tasks is the creation and maintenance of a 
neutral political environment conducive to the holding of free and fair 
elections.... [S]uch an environment does not yet exist. A spate of violent 
incidents over the last few months has heightened a sense of insecurity 
among Cambodians.... 
He placed these threats in three categories: politically motivated attacks on party offices 
and staff; ethnically motivated attacks on Vietnamese; and killings with no particular 
motivation which contributed to a climate of fear. 76 
A similar categorisation is employed in Table 3.1, which shows statistics reported by the 
NGO Resource Project for the month of April 1993, midway through the election 
campaign. This data examplifies the climate of fear in which the less militarised 
opposition parties operated. Of particular concern in this respect is the 89 attacks on the 
offices of these parties, in which, commonly, grenades were thrown into the buildings or 
bullets sprayed at the windows. Of 113 deaths reported, 34 were party activists, 12 from 
Funcinpec. Most of the 82 civilians killed were ethnic Vietnamese. 
73Heder and Ledgerwood, "Introduction" 24. 
76Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Third Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC, " UN Document 
S/25154,25 January 1993, §94-95. 
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Table 3.1: Statistics of Violent Attacks during April 1993'7 
A. Attacks on Persons: 
Target Perpetrator Number of Number of Number of 
Deaths Injuries Abductions 
Funcinpec CPAF/SoC 5 1 - 
Activists 
Activists from CPAF/SoC 2: 1 LDP/1 BLDP 
Other Parties 
All Political Unidentified 7 Funcinpec 9 Funcinpec - 
Activists 
2 other 
SoC NADK 17 (Civilians and 4 - 
Police) 
Civilians NADK 62 137 31 
Civilians Unidentified 20 32 - 
B. Attacks on Political Offices: 
Target Number of Attacks 
Funcinpec 59: SoC/CPAF definitely involved in 12, allegations of SoC 
involvement in more. 
BLDP 13: SoC officers involved in'several' 
Other Political Parties 17. 
These categories of abuse, and especially the attacks on party offices, are significant in 
that they represent violent outgrowths of the propaganda and power systems of the 
Cambodian parties. The attacks on ethnic Vietnamese stem from efforts of resistance 
parties to employ anti-Vietnamese rhetoric and to promote the idea of a Cambodian 
nation based on ethnicity, as ideological power resources. Politically motivated attacks 
which spread a climate of fear and intimidation emerge from the importance of 
7NGO Resource Project, Daily Report, unpub. report, 11 May 1993. 
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protection and control, particularly in the economy of power of the SoC/CPP. 
Frieson refers to Funcinpec's campaigning activities as "the CPP's worst nightmare, an 
opposition party infiltrating its territory". 8 She and Ledgerwood both describe a 
genuine inability on the part of CPP officials to accept peaceful opposition activities as 
legitimate. 79 The CPP constructed peaceful opposition as disloyalty and subversion; 
acts of political violence and intimidation demonstrated continued CPP control and 
ability to punish within its territory. 
Meanwhile CPP propaganda aligned CPP power with UNTAC. Frieson describes how 
SoC/CPP propaganda activities "were intended to confuse the division of authority 
between SoC and UNTAC in the public's mind". 80 During the process of voter 
registration, SoC plans to use government offices, instead of schools, as registration 
sites for voters demonstrated "a clear intention to exercise as much control over the 
election as possible" 81 
Summers reports that PDK proposals to `depoliticise' the SoC administration were 
intended 
to inform Cambodian voters that the Hun Sen-led SoC administration could 
no longer beckon Vietnamese power and could no longer command the 
status, respect or deference which is associated with state power in Khmer 
culture. 82 
The SoC attempted to co-opt UNTAC power into its own power system while 
continuing to exercise violence independently. Heder and Ledgerwood interpret the 
SoC message to voters: 
The real authority in Cambodia is SoC; we, not UNTAC, control things and 
78Frieson "Politics" 197. 
79Ledgerwood describes SoC police security reports which detailed "Violations of the Paris Agreements" 
under two headings: "Armed", comprising reports of NADK military activities; and "Unarmed", covering 
peaceful opposition political party activities [Ledgerwood, "Patterns" 124]. See also Frieson "Politics" 
194. 
SOFrieson "Politics" 189. 
81Frieson "Politics" 189. 
82Laura Summers, "Cambodia: The Prospects for a UN-Controlled Solution, " Asian Review 5 (1991): 47. 
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protect you. 83 
This monopolisation of political action within its territory arises from a conception of 
power as `overt compulsion', in Sangmpam's terminology, commonly employed in 
Cambodian politics. Power is not seen as a negative attribute, to be disguised as 
`freedom' and `choice'. It is seen as the capacity to protect and sustain, in the face of 
destructive forces. This conception informs both the widespread fears of Cambodia's 
demise if the `wrong' party is allowed to take power, and the concern of power holders 
to redemonstrate their strength when challenged. 
Heder and Ledgerwood argue: 
The cross-linkages between loyalties to political networks and the 
dehumanising labelling that pushed people beyond the realm of 
"Khmerness" - thereby making them expendable - form the circle of logic 
that runs through the propaganda, politics and violence of the UNTAC 
period. 84 
These `political networks' are networks for power distribution, or political economies of 
power. Political economies of power in Cambodia differ significantly from those in the 
modern liberal democratic states described by Gramsci and Foucault. As Sangmpam 
describes, power is exercised by individuals acting outside the constraints of political 
institutions. It is heightened by displaying ability to prevail. Frequently it is associated 
with visible trappings of wealth and equipment. Ledgerwood comments on Cambodian 
perceptions of UNTAC's poor performance in arresting human rights abusers: 
[D]isjuncture between UNTAC's outward signs of power - its obvious 
wealth, cars, helicopters and so on - and its seeming impotence in such cases 
was mystifying to many Cambodians. 85 
The need to be observably in control, particularly through the retention of loyal 
bureaucratic and military apparata, in order to attract support and the propaganda of 
protection against mortal threats to the Khmer as a nation from dehumanised `others' 
83Heder and Ledgerwood, "Introduction" 32. 
84Heder and Ledgerwood, "Introduction" 26. 
BSLedgerwood, ' Patterns" 126. 
72 
Chapter 3: UNTA C in Cambodia 
were the twin elements undermining human rights and democratic competition. The 
former element required that the SoC should be seen to control the peace process. The 
latter justified any means, including violence, by which this was achieved. 
UNTAC was unable to resolve issues of overpoliticisation because UNTAC itself 
became a contested concept. Instead of providing a framework within which political 
competition was carried out, UNTAC became a power resource, the target of 
competition between the parties. The SoC was able to portray its co-operation with 
UNTAC as a sign of UNTAC support, leading "many Cambodians [to be] sceptical of 
UNTAC's oft-proclaimed political neutrality". 86 Sangmpam writes: 
the contradictorily accommodating stand of foreign power results not from 
what they do or fail to do but from the ability of overpoliticised third world 
states, regardless of their size, strength and level of dependence, to impose 
an accommodating posture on foreign actors as they pursue their interests. 7 
Through the size of its deployment and the extent of its activities, the UN attempted to 
substitute itself for a truly neutral political environment. UNTAC interpreted the 
mandate to provide the framework for control. It possessed the power to take sanctions 
against actions it defined as contrary to UNTAC-given norms. Through its own internal 
cohesion of purpose, it attempted to impose the necessary consensus to enable transfer 
of power by means of elections. This attempt led to the creation of a peacekeeping force 
which was "unprecedented"88 in size and in the scope of the expertise employed. 
UNTAC comprised 15,500 troops and 6,000 civilians in "a $1.7 billion effort that 
reached out to nearly every district in every province in the country". 89 
The size and complexity of UNTAC also reflected the desire to intervene at the sub- 
state level, dealing directly with the Cambodian people in order to find a solution to the 
conflict. UNTAC's relationship with ordinary Cambodians was envisaged in the 
mandate which called for extensive interaction with Cambodian citizens in training 
86Heder and Ledgerwood, "Introduction" 32. 
87Sangmpam 620. 
88Boutros-Ghali, "Introduction" 5. 
89Boutros-Ghali, "Introduction" 54. 
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activities. The partisan attitudes of the parties made it essential that UNTAC give their 
own, `neutral', version of electoral arrangements and human rights direct to the people 
themselves. Use was made of a variety of methods of communication: training sessions 
held nation-wide; distribution of leaflets, badges, T-shirts and videos; songs recorded by 
Cambodian singers; cultural shows; competitions and `Human Rights Days'. By 
September 1993, the Human Rights Component estimated, 90,000 Cambodians had 
been trained in human rights courses and in addition "countless thousands of 
Cambodians were exposed to human rights `teachings' through the media" 90 
UNTAC was supposed to reach deep into the Cambodian polity to get its message 
across. A factor considered crucial to the success of the elections was the popularity of 
UNTAC radio, launched in November 1992 after the withdrawal of the PDK from the 
peace process, to "take UNTAC's message into every part of Cambodia 24 hours a 
day... to counter anti-UNTAC propaganda from DK radio". 91 
Successful voter education policies such as these eventually ensured an extremely high 
voter tum-out rate of 88.9 per cent. In part this was due to SoC encouragement of voters 
to go and vote, but Frieson reports that many voters arrived at the polling stations in 
SoC trucks and then voted for Funcinpec. This confidence to vote against SoC 
demonstrated UNTAC's success in assuring Cambodians that their ballots were 
genuinely secret in an atmosphere in which rumours of `spying' at the polling stations 
were rife. 
While UNTAC was able to hold a successful election, it did not have the ability to 
impose a framework of liberal democratic meaning on the peace process, and had little 
impact on the economy of power underlying human rights abuse. UNTAC radio 
propaganda represented a relatively limited response to the reach of the various 
mechanisms of intimidation of the two most heavily armed parties - PDK and SoC. 
UNTAC controllers did not penetrate these two administrative structures. There was 
90Human Rights Component 48. 
91Australia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Cambodia: Next Steps. Australian Paper Dated 16 September 
1992, " repr. in United Nations, UN and Cambodia 209/210. 
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little evidence that state officials were responding to the example set by UNTAC, or to 
92 UNTAC directives 
Crucially for human rights, UNTAC failed to end the civil war and demilitarise the 
country; the climate of impunity for armed abusers persisted. 93 A major reason for this 
was UNTAC's increasing reliance on the SoC, once the PDK left the peace process. 
UNTAC found this constrained its freedom to manoeuvre. Lack of success in 
preventing and remedying human rights abuse was a combined result of inability to 
control, and concessions made to, SoC. SoC was able increasingly to channel UNTAC 
power; UNTAC could bypass SoC only by such means as Radio UNTAC. 
Boutros-Ghali had commented that certain "essential conditions" would have to be met 
for the Agreements to be implemented successfully; among them 
the full co-operation of the four Cambodian factions and all other concerned 
parties, full freedom of movement and communications ... 
94 
Yet the parties, rather than co-operating with UNTAC's `neutral' implementation of the 
plan, attempted to co-opt UNTAC into their own electoral strategies, or to redefine the 
mandate to deny UNTAC the ability to act. Areas of non-co-operation frequently 
corresponded to key areas of political strength. Boutros-Ghali observes: 
initially criticised as being unfairly restrictive of the Phnom Penh 
Government, ... the oversight of civil administration] provision turned out 
to be nearly impossible to achieve because of language problems, lack of 
enforcement measures, and inadequate experience on the part of UNTAC 
personnel with the kind of bureaucratic structures and procedures employed 
by the SoC. 95 
SoC ability to draw UNTAC into its own economy of power was deleterious for human 
rights oversight. The Human Rights Component reported that failure adequately to 
92For a detailed account of UNTAC's failure to control the state bureaucracy, see Michael Doyle, UN 
Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate (New York: International Peace Academy 
Occasional Paper, 1995). 
93See Boutros-Ghali, "Introduction. " 
94Boutros-Ghali, "Introduction" 14. 
95Boutros-Ghali, "Introduction" 55. 
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control SoC ministries, and obstructive SoC attitudes towards the arrest of official 
personnel, combined with UNTAC's lack of enforcement capability, undermined its 
efforts. 
For example, SoC frequently refused to investigate human rights abuse committed by 
members of its own administrative structure, perpetuating the climate of fear in 
Cambodia. An example was the case of Ung Sami, governor of Battambang, who was 
alleged to have been involved in a series of attacks against opposition parties in the 
province. When his removal from office was mooted, the Phnom Penh Post reported, 
an SoC spokesman declared 
If UNTAC insists on removing him it will have to remove Prime Minister 
Hun Sen and the SoC won't co-operate with UNTAC any more. 6 
No action was taken against Ung Sami, despite an internal UNTAC report which 
detailed threats allegedly made by him to "attack with rockets a house rented to the 
Funcinpec party". Subsequently, the house was attacked and party workers were 
injured. The reports concluded that Ung Sami was "literally and figuratively laughing in 
the face of UNTAC". 97 
In the face of such intransigence, UNTAC had two options; it was entitled by the Paris 
Agreements to "all powers necessary to ensure the implementation of this agreement"98 
and could have used this provision to take upon itself the power to arrest human rights 
violators without reference to the SoC. Alternatively, it could continue in attempts to 
persuade the SoC to take action itself. The Human Rights Component describes how an 
Action Cell, formed to consider these options, decided on the latter course. The 
Component described this course of action, which "uniformly ended in failure", as 
"founded upon [a]... misconception of the control function of UNTAC... ", reflecting the 
Component's cosmopolitan reading of the mandate. 99 
96PPP, 15-28 Jan. 1993,6. 
97PPP, 12-25 Feb. 1993,3. 
"Comprehensive, Annex 1, Section A, § 1. 
"Human Rights Component 41. 
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Conflict between the Human Rights Component and other components was inevitable in 
the light of differing analyses of UNTAC's human rights role. The Human Rights 
Component stated that "state structures and institutions were such that they required a 
radical reorientation if they were to come into line with the democratic aspirations of the 
Paris Peace Agreement". 100 These democratic aspirations were viewed by the 
Component as going beyond the immediate demands of the election, encompassing the 
creation of long-term human rights safeguards and the eventual transformation of 
Cambodian culture by means of "strengthening democracy". toi 
The Human Rights Component viewed this as a technical task, regarding human rights 
abuse as a function of "the absence of institutions and structures capable of governing in 
accordance with international human rights standards", including "the inability of 
legitimate state authorities to prevent continuing and increasing violence", "the 
complete absence of a functioning legal system", and the "singular lack... of the basic 
institutions and processes upon which respect for human rights fundamentally depends 
[including]... a free press,... a broadly educated professional class, and indigenous non- 
governmental organizations able and willing to promote the interests of civil society". 102 
The Human Rights Component argued that Cambodia was a state in which "(v)acuums 
in political authority, the immediacy of humanitarian needs, and the absence of viable 
local partners would compel the United Nations... to undertake an even more intrusive 
and far-reaching role". 103 
Difficulties experienced in building such structures were identified by the Human Rights 
Component as arising from two major sources. The first was caused by constraints and 
delays in the deployment of staff and resources for the component. The second issued 
from the constraints of a peacekeeping mandate, which lacked an "enforcement 
philosophy" and caused "inevitable compromises imposed by the mission's diplomatic 
10°Human Rights Component 10. 
1°'Human Rights Component 65. 
102Human Rights Component 69; 70; 9. 
103Human Rights Component, 10. 
77 
Chapter 3: UNTAC in Cambodia 
efforts to ensure that all parties co-operated with UNTAC in the transitional period". 104 
In focusing on the building of new structures and agencies, the Component failed to 
recognise the likelihood that they would become as politicised as existing structures 
given the Cambodian economy of power. The Component targets the political will of 
UNTAC's leaders and backers for criticism, offering no critical analysis of the causes of 
human rights abuse or the function of human rights in a non-liberal democratic economy 
of power. 
For example, the Human Rights Component saw reform of the court system as a "major 
aim,,, '°5 and attempted to "introduce the notion of the independence of the judiciary into 
the legal system". 106 Consequently, UNTAC introduced a `transitional criminal law' 
and launched a programme of court monitoring which involved "human rights officers 
meeting court officials and judges to discuss the scheduling of trials and other 
applications concerning prisoners' cases, and attending at the court to monitor hearings 
when they took place". 107 
This programme met with varied success. The Human Rights Component reports that 
judges were able to `improve the efficiency of their courts' in some provinces, yet 
attempts to hold hearings for 73 untried detainees held in Phnom Penh prisons were 
unsuccessful: "The promised trials did not take place and the prisons again became 
overcrowded within a few months". 108 The Component's approach was unsuccessful in 
addressing the politicisation of the courts, which caused delays in holding trials. 
Where UNTAC was able to arrest human rights abusers, 
it was obvious that such offenses would not be prosecuted by state- 
appointed prosecutors. These prosecutors faced not only the threat of 
interference, but also physical danger should they seek to institute penal 
104Human Rights Component 72. 
'°5Human Rights Component 14. 
106Human Rights Component 16. 
107Human Rights Component 17. 
108Human Rights Component 21. 
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action against the will of the relevant existing administrative structure. '09 
In response to this problem, a Special Prosecutor's office was established in January 
1993, to try cases of alleged human rights abusers arrested by UNTAC. This was also 
unsuccessful. The Special Prosecutor issued sixteen arrest warrants, and four arrests 
were made. Two of these prisoners subsequently escaped, but a special UNTAC prison 
was built for the remaining two detainees, due to the fact that existing Cambodian 
prisons were below international standards. 
The Human Rights Component hoped to try the cases in the Cambodian courts, hoping 
"by the public nature of such prosecutions [to] play a role in altering the legal and 
official `culture' of the courts of the existing administrative structures". "' Courts 
refused to hear the cases, on the instructions of the SoC Ministry of Justice. 
The politicisation of the SoC prevented the building of `neutral' structures envisaged by 
the Human Rights Component, without resort to `enforcement'. The Component, and 
international NGOs, including Human Rights Watch/Asia, 111 criticised UNTAC for 
subordinating human rights issues to the pragmatic necessity of maintaining minimal co- 
operation from the SoC. Both on the issue of arrest of SoC officials, and the issue of 
gaining access to and compliance from PDK existing administrative structures, the 
question of using force to pursue objectives against the wishes of these political parties 
was debated. Consensus could not be found among the international community, which 
hesitated to convert political problems into military ones. 
On the issue of PDK non-compliance, UNTAC responded by ending the demobilisation 
of the armed forces of the other three parties. This represented a significant departure 
from the aims of the peace process and reflected a decision to abandon the aims of 
demilitarisation rather than to improve, or to be seen to improve, PDK comparative 
109Human Rights Component 43. 
i 10Human Rights Component 46. 
"See "Cambodia: Human Rights Before and After the Election, " Human Rights Watch/Asia Bulletin 
5.10 (1993); "An Exchange on Human Rights and Peace-Keeping in Cambodia, " Human Rights Watch/ 
Asia Bulletin 5.14 (1993). 
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advantage, or to risk UN troops being drawn into protecting the election and new 
government from NADK attacks. This decision rendered it increasingly unlikely that 
SoC human rights violations could be restrained. SoC co-operation became necessary 
not only for holding the election but also for defending both the polls and the new 
government. 
Use of the SoC to marginalise the PDK entailed that the environment surrounding the 
election was significantly less `neutral', and more biased towards the SoC, than 
intended. SoC bureaucratic procedures and human rights abuses went largely 
unchecked. No new culture of governance was inserted into the CPP administrative 
framework, and elections did not remove its leaders from power. 
The experience in Cambodia prefigured UN experiences in Somalia and Bosnia in 
demonstrating that `New World Order' ideology was based on an erroneous assumption 
that civil war combatants could be pressured into conformity by international 
`community' demands, without need for force, in the same way as most individuals can. 
In Cambodia, the parties responded only minimally to international community pressure. 
UNTAC was forced to submit, in many major respects, to the mutually incompatible 
interpretations of the situation made by the parties. Michael Doyle and Nishkala 
Suntharalingam point out: 
as soon as the UN begins its investment of money, personnel and prestige, 
then the bargaining relationship alters its balance. The larger the UN 
investment 
... the greater is the independent UN interest in success and the 
greater the influence of the parties becomes. ' 12 
Non-co-operation by the parties was compounded by UNTAC's lack of understanding, 
at least initially, of the political economy of power used by the existing administrative 
structures. Because power was a function of personal relationships, it was not easily 
controlled by UNTAC monitors. Ledgerwood describes the inability of UNTAC to 
uncover any documentary evidence of organised human rights abuse by the CPP, despite 
unannounced raids on CPP offices: 
112Michael W. Doyle and Nishkala Suntharalingam, "The UN in Cambodia: Lessons for Complex 
Peacekeeping, " International Peacekeeping 1.2 (1994), 142. 
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The documents yielded no `smoking gun'. No document contained a direct 
order from on high to kill nor reported from below the carrying out of a 
political assassination. Perhaps such orders or reports were not found 
because they were never made and the deaths that occurred were `excesses', 
made possible by the circumstances of but not ordered by the system. 113 
Arguably, the political economy of power which sustains the CPP is decentralised in 
that at each level of the party and state hierarchy, individuals dispose of their own power 
in their own interests. Decisions to respond violently to political competition are 
decentralised also. This proposition is discussed in detail in Chapters Five and Six. It is 
argued that UNTAC's failure to understand the economy of power at work within the 
existing administrative structure led to inability to address the causes of violence. The 
Human Rights Component employed technocratic solutions in an attempt to restructure 
Cambodian political ideology, in line with the theories put forward by the Agenda for 
Peace. It is argued that they failed; the structures and codes created have since been 
either co-opted or marginalised. 
The result of this lack of success was that the overarching context of the election was 
one of continued violent action and inflammatory wrangling over the right to define and 
represent the unified, sovereign state, rather than peaceful political debate within pre- 
defined, national limits. Continued national division was expressed through the 
withdrawal of PDK from the peace process and the massacre of ethnic Vietnamese; 
through SoC terrorist activities against opposition party activists and continued military 
activities against the PDK; and through Funcinpec's monopolisation of the cultural 
symbolism of the monarch, who symbolised nationhood and culture in the eyes of many 
Khmers. For the electorate, this monarchical representation of the nation was the most 
attractive, and Funcinpec won the election. 114 
Power was not transferred peacefully, as the defeated SoC threatened to launch a 
secession bid in the eastern provinces of the country. Fearing chaos and bloodshed and 
113Ledgerwood, "Patterns" 129. 
114 Frieson "Politics" 201. Frieson comments, "Convincing people that a vote for Funcinpec was a vote for 
Sihanouk was a winning move for the party. Sihanouk's return to Cambodia in 1991 was interpreted by 
many Cambodians as having a religious significance". 
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concerned about the ability of Funcinpec to organise an effective government without 
significant CPP administrative and military support, in the face of continued DK 
military action, Sihanouk brokered a compromise. With UNTAC backing, a coalition 
government was formed, comprised of Funcinpec, the CPP, the BLDP, and the smaller 
Moulinaka party. 
The incorporation of all elected deputies into the governing coalition meant that there 
was no opposition in the national assembly, an admission of the absence of pluralism in 
Cambodian politics. A power sharing agreement was designed to recognise the reality 
that the power resources of the CPP - loyalties within the bureaucracy, military and 
police - were not about to be passed to Funcinpec on the basis of its electoral victory. It 
was hoped that the experience of sharing power would contribute to a more consensual 
environment over the course of the first term of the Royal Government. 
Evidence emerging from fieldwork in 1995/6 suggests that incorporation of all these 
groups into government did not resolve the problem of finding a satisfactory and 
inclusive definitional framework for the national political community. 
UNTAC's attempt to transfer inter-party competition from military to the political arena 
was only partially successful. The PDK withdrew from the political arena altogether and 
resumed its military tactics. The difference between pre-UNTAC and post-UNTAC 
eras, in this regard, was the transfer of international recognition away from the PDK, so 
that the resistance became an insurrection. This remains the case, even following PDK 
support of Ranariddh after his ouster by troops loyal to Hun Sen in July 1997. In terms 
of the third reading of human rights provisions in the Paris Agreements, described 
above, this could be viewed as a success. 
UNTAC's Human Rights Component claimed successes in promoting human rights 
discourse, in the legal, civil and educational fields. The inclusion of human rights 
safeguards in UNTAC legal codes and the new constitution, and the accession by the 
SNC to several human rights treaties, the establishment of indigenous human rights 
associations, and the widespread interest in human rights education were seen by the 
component as major steps taken in human rights promotion. 
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UNTAC also left a changed political landscape. A multi-party political society existed 
in Phnom Penh. The precedent of multi-party elections had been tentatively established. 
Most crucially, UNTAC had reduced the intangible climate of fear. One former UNTAC 
Human Rights Component official described the change in detail: 
UNTAC had a tremendous effect at the level of morale... Cambodia was a 
closed society where people could be shot and killed and no-one cared. But 
suddenly everyone was watching - criticism came from outside. People felt 
powerless - for example, if they saw the police beating someone, they 
couldn't intervene. But foreigners could - they had the backing of 
UNTAC... Nobody can get Cambodia back to 1991. If you compare how 
Cambodians talk now with their silence before the elections... We had four 
meetings with [Cambodian counterparts]. During the first three meetings 
none of the Cambodians spoke. At the fourth meeting, one stood up and 
said, "How do I know these people aren't spies? " That sense of surveillance 
has gone. The power of the Ministry of the Interior has decreased! 15 
Associated with this opening of society was the development of what UNTAC called a 
`civil society' - organised expressions of public will, operating independently of the 
government, fed by "an improvement in the economic well-being of at least some 
segments of society ... The unprecedented growth of contacts with foreigners and the 
huge increase in the availability of new information and ideas" led to the "undermin[ing 
ofj the social and political controls which previously existed". 116 
These aspects of UNTAC's mission were presented as contributing to Cambodia's long 
term rehabilitation as a democratic and peaceful state. The impact of these 
organisations, and the national response to them, are assessed in Chapters Seven, Eight 
and Nine of this dissertation. 
11517. personal interview, 16 July 1996. Phnom Penh. 
116 Human Rights Component 68. 
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Chapter 4: A Historical Perspective on Human Rights in 
Cambodia 
Locating human rights in Cambodia in a historical perspective requires establishment of 
an appropriate `base-line', in view of the continual reinventions of Cambodia which 
have occurred throughout history. Here, the Sihanouk era, from independence in 1953 
to the establishment of a republic in 1970 by a right-wing coup d'etat, is posited as a 
suitable reference point from which to begin examining later events, since it represents 
the only recent period of Cambodian self-rule in peacetime. 
Assessing the human rights situation in the Sihanouk era requires analysis of data 
generated at a time when human rights discourse was less common in political studies 
than the language of nationalism or of economic oppression. While evidence is 
available from the Sihanouk era regarding the ability of members of the Cambodian 
intellectual stratum to exercise political rights and freedoms, the lack of data pertaining 
to the relationship between officialdom and the peasantry prevents characterisation of 
the human rights situation in the country as a whole, until the time of the DK regime. 
David Chandler and Ben Kiernan point out: 
The historiography of Kampuchea in the years since 1970 is hampered by ... 
the shortage of `base-line' economic and social studies - to say nothing of 
reliable statistics dealing with earlier periods. We know a good deal, for 
example, about `politics at the top' in the Sihanouk era...; but how did the 
economic and social changes that swept over Kampuchea in these years 
affect the majority of its people? .... We know very little about 
local-level 
politics or about networks of patronage in the countryside... ' 
Milton Osborne points out that contemporary commentaries on the Sihanouk era were 
frequently distorted by the ideological concerns of scholars writing in the 1960s. He 
argues: 
For those who were critical of American policies.., the Prince and his 
1 David P. Chandler and Ben Kiernan, "Introduction, " Revolution and its Aftermath in Kampuchea: Eight 
Essays, eds. Chandler and Kiernan, Monograph Series No. 25 (New Haven: Yale University South East 
Asian Studies, 1983), 6. 
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policies were frequently portrayed as wise and courageous. Those who 
wrote from a pro-American bias were frequently unready or unable to 
comprehend the complexities of the Cambodian political scene and 
unwilling to accept his justifications of Cambodia's foreign policy. 2 
Osborne adds that in the 1960s, circumstances within Cambodia 
rendered rigorous field research into domestic politics difficult, if not 
impossible.... While foreign scholars were not banned from Cambodia, there 
were implicit, and effective, restrictions upon the nature of the research 
which could be pursued in Cambodia and the range of subjects which could 
be examined. 3 
The historical literature on Cambodia also strongly reflects, arguably, different degrees 
of hindsight. Osborne, in his Politics and Power in Cambodia, states explicitly that "the 
coup of 18 March 1970 offers a new perspective from which to examine Cambodian 
affairs". He comments: 
Sihanouk's overthrow has not changed the events of the past. It has made 
observers aware of points of significance that, in large part, were either 
ignored or insufficiently understood previously. 4 
The overthrow of Sihanouk by members of the Cambodian elite allowed a reassessment 
of the position of intellectuals in the Sihanouk era. Similarly, the DK era offered a new 
perspective which encouraged scholars to look again at the position of the peasantry 
under Sihanouk, to determine origins of and explanations for the upheavals and 
atrocities which occurred from 1975 to 1979. Accounts of the Sihanouk era given by 
Cambodian interviewees in the 1990s, are also filtered through ideological 
reorientations connected to Sihanouk's present political role and represent application of 
hindsight to an era which many in Cambodia are too young to remember. 
Reviewing the historical literature to provide a background for a study of human rights 
2 Milton Osborne, Politics and Power in Cambodia, The Sihanouk Years (Camberwell: Longman, 1973) 
2. Similar reflections on the ideological objectives of western researchers studying the DK era are found 
in Gavan McCormack, "The Kampuchean Revolution 1975-1978: The Problem of Knowing the Truth", 
Journal of Contemporary Asia 10 (1980): 75-118; Michael Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982 (Boston: 
Southend Press, 1984). 
Osborne 4. 
4 Osborne 1. 
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in Cambodia entails a further rewriting of Cambodia's history, to refocus on 
relationships between individuals and the state apparatus. Oral histories, gathered by 
Kate Frieson, of the period from 1970 to 19755 offer valuable insights into the attitudes 
of peasants towards the political changes which were taking place, and the economic 
and social conditions in which they lived, yet the concern of this work, too, is to 
understand attitudes to revolutionary ideology. Peasant memories of their situation as 
presented by Frieson are not specifically framed in terms of human rights or human 
rights abuse. Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights draws links 
between revolutionary potential and human rights abuse7, extrapolating from this 
historical literature to establish the human rights conditions of the average peasant in the 
Sihanouk era provides conclusions which must be viewed with caution, in view of the 
contrasting ideological concerns of human rights activists and socialist revolutionaries. 
While some observations may be advanced regarding themes which remain of concern 
to human rights activists in Cambodia today, the historical record is largely bereft of the 
language of human rights especially in relation to violence and economic conditions. 
Injustice is frequently couched in terms of economic exploitation or class oppression, 
reflecting Gavan McCormack's assessment that in 1975: 
Alternative formulas for national salvation and social transformation in the 
direction of justice and equality were lacking. Sihanoukism's claims to 
legitimacy because of its line on the national question were contradicted by 
its blindness on the social questions which had become an integral part of 
the national movement. As of 1975, there were no other organisations, no 
other programmes, for Kampuchea than the Khmer Rouge. 
Human rights discourse has become significant in international politics only with the 
growth of organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, and 
the post Cold War reorientation of great power politics in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. It is recognised that in viewing the problems within Cambodia, especially those 
S Kate G. Frieson, The Impact of Revolution on Cambodian Peasants: 1970-1975, PhD Dissertation, 
Monash University, 1992 (Ann Arbor. UMI Dissertation Services, 1994). 
6 Frieson discusses the methodological problem of testing the accuracy of memories, given the problem of 
hindsight, on pages 5-7. 
7 UDHR Preamble. 
8 McCormack 78. 
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of the Cambodian peasantry, in the 1960s as problems of human rights, this chapter 
analyses Cambodian history from a position of hindsight and imposes the scholarly and 
ideological concerns of the 1990s onto an era in which human rights discourse was not 
yet established. 
Yet an outline of the power structures which existed in the Sihanouk era provide an 
important background to the assessment of human rights in Cambodia in the 1990s, 
which is the concern of this study, because it permits greater insight into the forms of 
political power used in Cambodia in the 1990s. In providing an outline of the historical 
context, the emphasis here is upon aspects of the Sihanouk era which inform issues of 
power considered later in this study. 
Studies of the Sihanouk era reflect an enduring feature of Cambodian political study, 
namely the division of Cambodian society into the largely urban elite and educated 
class, and the rural masses which comprised, in the 1960s as now, 85 to 90 per cent of 
the population. May Ebihara viewed Cambodian society in 1959 as composed of three 
strata. The `elite group' was composed of the royal family, aristocracy, high-ranking 
officials in governmental and religious organisation and very wealthy businessmen. The 
`lowest group' was composed of `the rural peasantry, craftsmen, fishermen, etc. as well 
as unskilled labourers in the city who are often little removed from their rural origins". 
An `intermediate' group, of "businessmen, merchants, professionals (teachers, doctors 
etc. ), white-collar workers in commercial offices etc. " also existed .9 
Participation in national political debate during the Sihanouk era was largely confined to 
members of the first and third groups, while the peasantry remained on the whole 
passive observers. Consequently, and in view of divisions between political society and 
the "grass roots" drawn in later chapters of this study, the present discussion is divided 
into an assessment of, firstly, the political rights of urban intellectuals and the 
subordination of these rights to the Sihanoukist ideology of `Buddhist Socialism'; and 
secondly, an examination of the evidence pertaining to the condition of the peasantry 
I May Ebihara, Svay, A Khmer Village in Cambodia, unpub PhD diss., Columbia University, 1968. 
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vis-ä-vis the state apparatus under the Sihanouk regime. A complete account of the 
history of Cambodia in the 1950s and 1960s is not attempted. 
Political Rights In Sihanouk's Cambodia 
In the earliest days of Sihanouk's reign, before independence was achieved in 1953, an 
ideology of democracy and political freedom can be discerned in the political demands 
of sections of the Cambodian elite and intellectual strata. Chandler notes that in 1946, 
Sihanouk's input into the drafting of a Cambodian constitution was vital in securing a 
precedent for electoral democracy and political freedoms in Cambodian politics. 
According to Chandler, Sihanouk rejected French plans for a constitution which 
"emphasised the allegedly absolute powers of the king and provided for an advisory 
national assembly chosen under a two-tiered electoral system that gave limited suffrage 
to male members of the elite". 10 He proposed instead the election of a constitutional 
assembly, elected by universal male suffrage, to consult with the King in the drafting of 
a new constitution. Chandler points out, 
This second amendment cleared the way for an unprecedented set of decrees 
that guaranteed freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and the 
establishment of political parties, whose candidates could then compete for 
election, again by universal male suffrage, to the consultative body. I l 
Chandler views these developments as engendering a shift in the power balance in 
Cambodia "away from the king and his protectors toward a larger, more unpredictable 
segment of the population". 12 
Osborne sees Sihanouk's proposals as emerging from the influence of a progressive 
group of "young elite Cambodians", recently returned from studies in France, led by 
Prince Sisowath Yuthevong. 13 Yuthevong's prominence as a spokesman for progressive 
elite opinion continued from his formation of the Democratic Party in 1946 until his 
10 Chandler The Tragedy of Cambodian History, Politics, War, and Revolution since 1945 (New Haven: 
Yale UP, 1991) 29. 
11 Chandler Tragedy 29. 
12 Chandler Tragedy 29. 
13 Osborne 42. 
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early death in 1947. The Democratic Party was the most significant and successful 
political party to emerge in the period of political pluralism that followed the 
promulgation of the constitution. It dominated electoral politics in Cambodia until 
1952. 
The nature of the Democratic Party is significant in illustrating the division between the 
urban intellectual strata and the peasantry in Cambodia. Chandler characterises the 
Democratic Party's appeal as arising from their demands for "independence and 
democracy" and their "attacks on nepotism and corruption". 14 Vickery views the 
Democratic platform as comprising "the achievement of a European-type parliamentary 
system with a maximum of democratic rights". 15 These ideological tenets were 
attractive to young, educated, urban Khmers. 
Yet the style of campaigning of the Democratic Party suggests that their ideological 
commitment to democracy, which was the source of their appeal amongst the urban 
intellectual stratum, was not supported by their organisational strategy within the 
villages. Rather than attempting to win the ideological support of villagers through 
propagation of their ideas, the Democrats exploited the traditional respect accorded to 
members of the religious establishment to attract votes, and maintained networks of 
support within the lower levels of the state apparatus, in order to prevent other parties 
from gaining access to the electorate. Thus Chandler writes that the Democrats: 
took care to nominate candidates who commanded widespread local support, 
often choosing former monks or achar, whereas its leaders were drawn from 
Cambodia's elite. 16 
In his History of Cambodia, Chandler states that the Democratic victory in 1946 
revealed the popularity of the Democratic Party among Cambodian authority 
figures who were in a position to "deliver the vote". In this election, as in 
others over the next twenty years or so, many peasants voted as they were 
14 Chandler Tragedy 36; 38. 
15 Michael Vickery, "Looking Back at Cambodia, " Ben Kiernan and Chantou Boua (eds) Peasants and 
Politics in Kampuchea, 1941-1981 (London: Zed Press, 1982) 91. 
16 Chandler Tragedy 31-32. 
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told to vote by people whom they habitually obeyed. 17 
Of vital importance to the power base of the Democrats was their popularity within the 
civil service. The party maintained provincial and district committees within the state 
apparatus, which "often dominated the local state administration which was used to 
mobilise support and block activities by rival parties". 18 
According to Steve Heder: 
The Democrat Party's stance on the issues were crucial to its ability to win 
over, organise and utilise the civil service for the party's electoral purposes, 
and this in turn was crucial to its ability to get out and win the vote. 9 
The Democratic Party's platform indicates the existence of a section of the elite, 
particularly young returning scholars, who aspired to democracy and political freedom. 
Yet its victory at the polls was achieved through exploitation of networks of local 
administrative control, rather than through fostering democratic values of political 
pluralism within the villages. It is significant that the Democrats were unable 
successfully to pursue their ideological aspirations in the years that followed. 
Despite opposition from the French colonial authorities and the conservative elite 
grouping, the Democratic Party won 50 of the 67 assembly seats in the 1946 elections, a 
victory which Chandler attributes to their "organisational skills, the idealism of their 
leaders, and their links with 1945"20 -a reference to the nationalist movement led by 
Son Ngoc Thanh which briefly took over the administration of the country following the 
Japanese internment of the French authorities in March of that year. 
Yet by 1955 the power of the Democrats had turned to impotence, in the face of an 
increasingly politically active monarch who used his appeal amongst the peasantry to 
undercut the political base of the Democrats. In the constitutional assembly formed 
after the 1946 elections, the Democrats argued for strict constitutional limits to 
17 ChandlerA History of Cambodia, 2nd ed. (Chiang Mai: Silkworm, 1993) 175. 
1$ Steve Heder, "A Lesson in Power: The Rise and Fall of the Democrats" PPP 30 Jan. -12 Feb. 1998,11. 
19 Heder "The Democrats" 11. 
20 Chandler Tragedy 31. 
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monarchical power. Osborne states that a conservative grouping of elite interests, 
associated with the powerful Prince Monireth, were strong enough to maintain "as a 
constitutional fact that `All powers emanate from the King (Art. 21) "', 21 although he 
adds that it was the King's symbolic, rather than legal, position which allowed 
Sihanouk, six years later, to concentrate power in his own hands 22 
Following the promulgation of the constitution, an informal coalition of political forces 
including the French colonial authorities, conservative parties in the assembly and, to an 
extent, the King, combined to manufacture and exploit scandals which caused the 
downfall and defection of a number of Democratic deputies in the assembly. Economic 
troubles, and particularly a decline in revenues from taxation, exacerbated by a 
deteriorating security situation in the countryside where insurgents known as the Khmer 
Issarak (Free Khmer) were demanding independence and challenging, militarily, French 
control, caused a succession of governmental crises which weakened the power of the 
national assembly as a whole. 
Confrontations took place between the assembly and the executive, partly because the 
government was not constitutionally required to be formed from sitting members of the 
dominant parliamentary party, and partly because continued French control placed limits 
on governmental activity, encouraging attempts by deputies to impede the orderly 
procedures of government as the only available means of exercising power. 23 
Difficulties in forming and sustaining governments were exemplified by. the fall of two 
governments, in August 1948 and January 1949, and the dissolution by Sihanouk of the 
National Assembly in September 1949 when another confrontation loomed. The 
government operated without reference to the Assembly until September 1951, when 
new elections were held, this time with the participation of the returned influential 
nationalist Son Ngoc Thanh. 
The Democratic Party, including Son Ngoc Thanh, won the 1951 elections, and moved, 
21 Osborne 45. 
22 Osborne 45. 
23 Chandler History 177. 
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under Thanh's influence, to take up a more assertive stance on independence, a stance 
reflected in the publication of the newspaper Khmer Krauk (Cambodians Awake! ) 
which was closed by the French after only a month of publication in February 1952. 
Shortly afterwards, Son Ngoc Thanh fled to the maquis to join the Khmer Issarak. 
Polarisation over the question of independence, splintering of the party, and the arrest by 
the Democratic Prime Minister Huy Kanthoul of a former Prime Minister, Yem 
Sambaur, who enjoyed a close relationship with Sihanouk, led the King to dismiss the 
government and assembly and to assume full emergency powers in June 1952 with the 
full support of French administrators and troops. 
Osborne comments that "the most significant aspect of these years is found in the extent 
to which the sterility of the parliamentary system established under the Constitution was 
revealed" 24 The lack of a forum within which to operate between 1949 and 1951, and 
again from 1952, weakened the Democratic Party. The events of these years also 
illustrated the weakness of the national assembly and the impotence of the electoral 
mandate as a resource of power, in the face of opposition from the French military and 
colonial administration which was allied with conservative elite Cambodian interests 
throughout the 1946-1954 period. 
Between June 1952 and November 1953, Sihanouk achieved a number of major 
successes, particularly independence from the French, who by this time faced bleak 
military prospects in neighbouring Vietnam and whose control of Cambodia was 
undermined by Sihanouk's non-co-operation during the so-called `Royal Crusade for 
Independence'. In achieving independence, Sihanouk was able to assume the mantle of 
nationalism which had previously belonged to the Democrats, through their association 
with Yuthevong and the `independent' government of 1945. In doing so, he won the 
support of many former Democrats in the civil service; a thorough purge of the lower 
ranks of the bureaucracy in 1953 further weakened the Democratic organisational base, 
cutting off their former control of the electorate. 
24 Osborne 47. 
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Chandler and Osborne agree that Sihanouk was able to take advantage of the weakness 
of both the national assembly, as an institution of state, and the Democrats as a party, 
because of the symbolic power attached to his position as Monarch. This power was 
heightened by the victory of his Royal Crusade for Independence, and supplemented by 
the personal popularity he cultivated among the peasantry. These factors, along with the 
support of conservative families within the Cambodian elite, enabled Sihanouk to 
exploit the constitutional provision that "all powers emanate from the King". 
In February 1955, a referendum was held to determine the level of popular approval for 
Sihanouk's assumption of emergency powers in 1952. Official figures showed a 99 per 
cent approval rating for Sihanouk. Proposals put forward by Sihanouk soon afterward 
for constitutional changes that would invest the King with greater powers over 
government and assembly met with wide criticism among the political elite. 
Abandoning this plan, and, arguably, seeking a means to exercise power which would 
bypass the often critical, non-royal and Francophone elite, Sihanouk abdicated, 
employing his popularity as demonstrated in the referendum, so as to be able to lead 
both the government and assembly as prime minister, rather than preside as 
constitutional monarch. 
From 1955, following Sihanouk's abdication, the symbolic power of the monarchy was 
organised through the movement of the Sangkum Reastr Niyum and the ideology of 
Buddhist Socialism. After the creation of the Sangkum in 1955, human rights discourse 
became a subordinate discourse in Cambodian ideology. Increasingly, during the 1960s, 
Cambodian politics became defined by competition between the socialist ideology 
espoused by radical intellectuals of the underground CPK, and Buddhist Socialism as 
espoused by the Sangkum. For the urban intellectual stratum, repression of political 
rights increased over the next 15 years, alienating students, business, interests, 
journalists and technocrats, and heightening the appeal of the communist movement, as 
the only viable opposition movement. 
From this point onwards, historical studies emphasise the conservative nature of 
Cambodian politics, especially the marginalisation of prominent liberal and progressive 
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intellectuals, and the reassertion of `traditional' relationships between rulers and ruled. 
A closer examination of the Sangkum, and its ideology of Buddhist Socialism, lends 
insights into the nature of monarchical power in Cambodia, and the incompatibility 
between this form of power and the existence of pluralist political party competition. 
The Sangkum was formed as a vehicle through which Sihanouk's popularity with the 
peasantry could be organised. Rather than taking the form of a political party, the 
Sangkum was "to be a national organisation flexible enough to accommodate a wide 
range of political opinions' . 25 It was equated with loyalty to Sihanouk, the throne and 
the state. A number of minor parties, such as the Liberal Party, were disbanded, their 
members joining the Sangkum. Significant numbers of former Democrats also joined, 
leaving only a weakened Democratic Party and the left-wing Pracheachon (People's) 
party to contest the September 1955 elections. In those elections, the Sangkum gained 
all the seats in the national assembly and more than 80 per cent of the vote, to the 
Democrats' 12 per cent and Pracheachon's 4 per cent. 
The dominance of the Sangkum at the polls did not prevent the emergence of divisions 
within the political elite in Phnom Penh, for the movement embodied `left', `right' and 
centrist tendencies, but it allowed these divisions to be subordinated to the question of 
national leadership. Political crises occurred, but were transformed into tests of loyalty 
to the throne or to Prince Sihanouk, rather than prompting debate over policy. 
This is exemplified in Sihanouk's handling of the so-called `Bangkok Plot' of 1959, in 
which the Cambodian government received information that a former advisor to the 
King, Sam Sary and Siem Reap governor Dap Chhuon, in collaboration with the exiled 
Son Ngoc Thanh and Thai personalities, were planning to overthrow the regime with 
American backing. This crisis was resolved, not by addressing the concerns of these 
disaffected members of the elite or by permitting discussion of policy, in order to 
provide stable and legal channels through which a plurality of opinions could be 
mediated, but by calling a referendum in October 1959 which offered Cambodians a 
25 Osborne 58. 
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putative choice between Sihanouk, Son Ngoc Thanh and communism. 
The issues discussed in the campaign were couched in foreign policy terms, with 
Sihanouk associated with neutralism, Son Ngoc Thanh with `pro-SEATOism' and 
communism with the international communist movement. Voting was organised by 
offering a choice to predominantly illiterate voters between a photograph of Sihanouk, a 
photograph of Son Ngoc Thanh, or a red card to represent communism, suggesting that 
personalities were uppermost in the campaign surrounding the vote26 
The presentation of Sihanouk himself as the focus of the Sangkum movement combined 
with the ideology of Buddhist Socialism to marginalise meaningful political debate. 
Chandler characterises Sihanouk's ideology of Buddhist Socialism as the expression of 
the alleged "consensus between rulers and ruled that had allowed Angkor to flourish". 
Chandler argues, 
A society mobilised to perpetuate the status quo was what he had in mind. 
His Khmer or Buddhist socialism was based on an idealistic reading of 
Cambodia's social relations. To make it work, Sihanouk counted on the 
deference of ordinary people and the good will of more fortunate Khmers 27 
Buddhist Socialism represented the use of traditional legitimacy to mobilise support for 
hierarchical and heavily personalised political power formations. This legitimacy 
emerged from the cultural triad of monarchy, religion and rural tradition. 28 Sihanouk 
claimed that "the inaugurators of socialism were the Kings of Angkor themselves", and 
that "Buddhism is today our most precious guide in the working out of our socialism, 
from the moral and philosophical point of view". Rural society, in Sihanouk's view, 
was "the most healthy foundation for our people ... [and] the most egalitarian and 
democratic society it is possible to be. "29 
Girling suggests that the ideology rested on three major assumptions, which combined 
26 Osborne 67. 
27 Chandler Tragedy 87. 
28 J. L. S. Girling, Cambodia and the Sihanouk Myths, Occasional Paper No. 7 (Singapore: ISEAS, 1971), 
26. 
29 "Considerations sur le socialisme khmer", inspired by Sihanouk, 1961, quoted in Girling The Sihanouk 
Myths 26. 
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to render debate and dissent inconceivable within the Cambodian polity. The first 
assumption posited the `harmonising' role of the state which "does not impose, but 
guides and advises"; the second posited the leadership of Sihanouk, whose `exceptional' 
prestige and abilities obviated the need for authoritarian measures; the third posited the 
`solidarity of all social classes' within the Sangkum which caused people to make 
"voluntary efforts for the service of the Khmer community and nation. "30 
Girling writes: 
[The Cambodian] state of harmony was supposedly based on the support of 
the masses, infusing their strength into new democratic institutions suited to 
the nature of the country, which in turn served as links between the people 
and the Prince, President of the Sangkum and Head of State, at the summit 
of the pyramid. 31 
Girling adds that this `union of people and prince' was `reminiscent of the cosmic 
harmony which the Kings of Angkor sought to achieve'. It was "deemed so obviously 
in the real interest of all Cambodians that the Prince could not believe or refused to 
accept that any serious opposition or criticism could be genuinely Cambodian in 
origin. "32 
The supposed Angkorean consensus rested on a hierarchical cosmology, similar to that 
described by Mikael Gravers in his discussion of power in Burma: 
to gain and retain power, the king had to administrate his absolutist 
monarchy in accordance with Buddhistic cosmology and ethics which 
dictate a number of attributes. He must be a dhammaraja and rule in 
accordance with dhamma and ten royal attributes. The king's most 
important task was to protect Buddhism, to ensure welfare and prosperity 
and to show charity. Peace, prosperity and the absence of natural 
catastrophes depended upon the laity and monks being content with their lot. 
Harmony in the university provided the laity with the possibility of 
accumulating religious merit 33 
30 "Considerations", quoted in Girling, The Sihanouk Myths, 26. The characterisation offered is Girling's. 
31 Girling The Sihanouk Myths 4. 
32 Girling The Sihanouk Myths 4. 
33 Mikael Gravers, Nationalism as Political Paranoia in Burma, an Essay on the Historical Practice of 
Power, NIAS Reports No. 11 (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 1993), 21. 
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Similar notions of power are set out by Lucien Pye in his examination of classical 
Southeast Asian societies. Pye argues that people in these societies "saw all 
governmental activities as dedicated to achieving harmony with the supernatural" . 
3a 
Cosmic order was seen as a prerequisite for the protection of society; earthly pursuits 
were of little significance compared to the great supernatural forces to which society 
was prey. Power was not a commodity to be wielded by either government or people. 
Rather it issued from the alignment of the individual, society, the ruler, and the 
supernatural and the nature of this alignment determined whether or not the effects of 
power were good or bad. The purpose of government was to ensure the proper relation 
between the different cosmological levels: 
The consensus was that those who ruled should devote all their time and 
energies to performing acts which would ward off evil spirits and help good 
spirits to triumph. Everyone should co-operate in supporting the rituals 
because the community as a whole, and not just the elite, had a stake in the 
35 cosmic order. 
The result, as these societies developed over time, was a political culture in which 
tolerance of dissenting opinion was subordinated to the importance of achieving 
consensus for the good of the community: 
Those with power tended to conceive of themselves as embodying the 
collectivity, defending a consensus, rather than representing particular 
interests. People tried to avoid adopting partisan positions on public `issues' 
but instead they generally preferred the techniques of intrigue and 
personalised tactical manoeuvring, which were more compatible with 
conflict in stable hierarchical arrangements 36 
Sihanoukist Buddhist Socialism posited the centrality of the position of Sihanouk 
himself, as the embodiment, interpreter and guarantor of popular aspiration, viewed as a 
political consensus. In his person, Sihanouk embodied the safety, solidarity and 
development of the nation. The ideology rested on an idealised theory of Angkorean 
state-society relationships. The extent to which it had any real connection to pre- 
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colonial Cambodian `tradition' is unclear. 37 
For the urban intellectual class, the promulgation of Buddhist Socialism, and the 
increasing attacks, through the 1960s, on critics of Sihanouk, represented the creation of 
an increasingly constricting political environment. Yet, arguably, the ideology of 
Buddhist Socialism dovetailed sufficiently with the notions of power of ordinary 
Cambodians that Sihanouk's increasingly personal rule offered "non-material returns to 
the general welfare"38 and prevented, for a time, a political breakdown ensuing from a 
deteriorating economy and ideological polarisation within the elite. 
According to Vickery: 
For most of the Cambodian peasantry, a monarch was essential to the well- 
being of the country and even to the maintenance of Buddhism. Any king, 
properly enthroned and who maintained the traditional rituals would have 
served the purpose... but Sihanouk went beyond this and attempted to 
39 become a popular sovereign. 
Sihanoukist `populism' is described in a highly sympathetic 1964 account. This account 
emphasised Sihanouk's personal intervention in government at different levels, in line 
with his attempts to mobilise personal support and to embody popular will: 
The personal attention of Sihanouk is in many ways the hallmark of the 
changes that are taking place in Cambodia today. An inveterate overseer 
and campaigner, Sihanouk interests himself in and has first-hand knowledge 
of nearly everything that goes on in the country .., 
40 
This account also points to Sihanouk's central role in making government policy and 
propagating national ideology: 
Sihanouk today habitually behaves as if he were campaigning for a national 
election. His campaigning serves two purposes. He wins support for his 
policies - consent is the operative word in his concept of democracy - and he 
educates his people politically. They come to understand Cambodia's 
problems and Sihanouk's solutions for them. Perhaps no Head of State has 
37See Osborne 13-18. 
33Vickery "Looking Back... " 102. 
39Vickery "Looking Back... " 102/103. 
40John P. Armstrong, Sihanouk Speaks, (New York: Walker and Co, 1964), 18. 
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worked harder to inform his people and win their consent. And certainly 
none has ever given so large a proportion of his people the opportunity to 
see him in person. 4' 
Electoral mobilisation is used to provide an illusion of participation which obviates the 
need for authoritarian measures, while at the same time preventing meaningful 
participation in debate and discussion. Analysing the institutional form of Sangkum 
democracy, Girling comments that it was `different from what is commonly understood 
by democracy' in that: 
Rule by the majority was not at all Sihanouk's objective, firstly because the 
people were not `ready' to decide, and secondly, because he himself 
`incarnated' their will. Instead the rituals and slogans of democracy were 
intended by an appeal to the emotions, to reinforce popular loyalties to the 
nation, to encourage elements of solidarity and to inculcate faith in the 
leader. 42 
Democratic process was required to mobilise and educate the people, rather than to 
encourage debate among them. Popular support, displayed through the results of 
referendums and elections, strengthened the bond between the people and the monarch, 
without encouraging popular participation in setting ideological and political agendas. 
Armstrong's account also points to the socialising effect of the idealised deferential 
relationship between people and monarch: 
Sihanouk's relationship to the Cambodian people is characteristically 
paternal. He speaks to them openly and frankly of his personal feelings and 
... problems. 
He calls them his children and they look upon him as their 
43 father. 
By combining the ideology of Buddhist Socialism with populist campaigning and the 
creation of the Sangkum as a political vehicle through which patronage could be 
distributed, in the form of administrative offices and candidacies, 4 and loyalties 
regularly organised into expressions of public support, Sihanouk created a means to 
"Armstrong 20. 
42Girling The Sihanouk Myths 3. 
43Armstrong 21. 
'Until 1966, all Sangkum electoral candidates were selected by Sihanouk. He ended this practice in 
1966, "probably motivated by accusations of abuse of personal power" [Leon Boramy and Malcolm 
Caldwell, "Cambodia" Peace Press 6.3/4 (1970): 11] 
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marginalise elite dissent and opposition. Within this ideological framework, there was 
little room for a conception of individual human rights or of pluralist political debate. 
Provided his populist campaigns were sufficient to mobilise significant support for his 
policies, mass repression was unnecessary. As economic conditions worsened through 
the 1960s, this ceased to be the case and abuse of rights took place on a grand scale, 
particularly against critics on the left. 
In terms of political rights, the marginalisation of elite critics increasingly took the form 
of active repression. Although disempowered by the existence of the Sangkum, 
dissenters still existed, both on the right and, increasingly, on the left. Dissent was 
aggravated during the 1960s by a deteriorating economy, a series of scandals, and the 
discontent of increasing numbers of educated youth who resented the lack of career 
opportunities open to them. Concerned to maintain a consensus supporting his rule, 
Sihanouk sought to dampen dissent by equating respect for the Cambodian monarchy 
and his own foreign policies of neutrality with the survival of the Khmer nation, under 
threat from increasing conflict in Laos and Vietnam. Leifer comments that through the 
Sangkum: 
Sihanouk sought to embrace the factions in Cambodian political life in order 
to achieve a sense of national union at a time when the country could no 
longer afford internal cleavages 45 
Increasingly, in Sihanoukist newspapers and journals, the Cambodian nation was 
portrayed as in danger of immediate engulfment by neighbouring countries. An 
ideology which placed political consensus, cosmological harmony, and neutralism in 
foreign policy at the centre of political life, and equated them with the survival of the 
Khmer nation, prompted harsh measures to be taken against opponents who were 
viewed as betraying the office of the King, the harmony of social relations and the future 
of the nation. Political rights were increasingly abused, and dissenters on the left were 
either marginalised within the government or persecuted. 
According to Kiernan: 
45Michael Leifer, "Me Cambodian Opposition', Asian Survey 2.2(1962): 12. 
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[Sihanouk] saw the kingdom in terms of the Sangkum. In speeches during 
those years, he frequently divided Khmers into those who were pro- 
Sangkum and those `agents' of other countries who wished to sell Cambodia 
to their `foreign masters'. Theoretically there was no room for left and right 
in his interpretation of Cambodian politics, and revolutionaries and 
reactionaries alike received similar treatment from him 46 
The marginalisation and repression of the Phnom Penh elite caused increasing 
disaffection as both the economic and security situation declined in Cambodia in the 
1960s. 
Sihanouk's energetic efforts to expand the education system had created a pool of 
intellectuals who could find no place within the constraints of the regime. The return 
from France of dozens of left-wing intellectuals, including Saloth Sar (later known as 
Pol Pot), Khieu Samphan, and Hou Yuon, contributed to the range of ideological 
dissidence among the elite, and also increased Sihanouk's perception of the threat to his 
position and his policies. Leifer argues that it was in response to the perception of the 
increased disaffection of the elite youth that Sihanouk formed his Royal Khmer Socialist 
Youth organisation, designed to channel the energies and loyalties of "our young 
intellectuals most of whom have become so-called `progressives' and do nothing but 
criticise their elders" and who "want to torpedo our present regime and replace it with 
communism" 47 
Repression against dissenters increased steadily in scale and brutality throughout the 
1960s, taking the form of the arrest and execution of `traitors' (mostly associated with 
the exiled Son Ngoc Thanh) and the harassment by the police and military of those 
whose loyalties were suspect. Debate and criticism of policies became increasingly 
dangerous. Summers reports: 
As economic and social conditions of life in the country worsened, defence 
of state prerogative led to generalised official surveillance, restriction of 
contacts with foreigners, censorship of the press, and legal prosecution for 
'Ben Kiernan, The Samlaut Rebellion and its Aftermath, the Origins of Cambodia's Liberation 
Movement Part II, Working Paper No. 5 (Melbourne: Monash, n. d. ) 9. 
47Speech by Sihanouk at the National Congress 1961. Quoted by Leifer "The Cambodian Opposition" 13; 
14. 
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real or contrived offences. Unknown numbers of people lived in fear of 
their lives. Some fled to the maquis while others `disappeared' altogether. 
Amidst rumours of widespread assassinations and national economic 
collapse, those imprisoned within the logic of monarch still waited for the 
`established power' to sort out the chaos then reigning. 
Intellectuals accused of dissidence were forced to flee to the maquis where the CPK was 
active, setting up revolutionary cells. Frieson reports: 
Educated Cambodians joined the resistance movement due to intellectual 
restlessness and their disdain for [Sihanouk's] rule. During the Sihanouk 
era, teachers, journalists and other intellectuals who opposed the monarchy 
were subject to harassment by the police and army. They criticised 
corruption at all levels of the administration and the lack of intellectual 
freedom which they argued was required for political and social 
development 49 
By 1967, Kiernan claims, 
the situation was one of near complete estrangement of the urbanised elite in 
Phnom Penh and elsewhere, with radicals and educated youth opposing 
Sihanouk from the left, while in the rural areas, where grievances were 
comparatively few, his popularity remained as yet unchallenged. 50 
Political polarisation after the 1966 elections, in which right-wing Sangkum members 
took most of the seats in the Assembly, combined with a declining economy and 
increased complaints about `corruption'. When the Samlaut Rebellion, the only major 
peasant rebellion of Sihanouk's reign, 5' broke out in 1967, near Battambang, Sihanouk 
responded with further repression of the left. Marginalisation of left-wing 
parliamentarians, the last of whom fled to the maquis in 1967 after being threatened 
with trial by Sihanouk during a radio broadcast, represented the end of "any possibility 
48Laura Summers, "Translator's Introduction, " Khieu Samphan, Cambodia's Economy and Industrial 
Development, doctoral thesis, Paris, 1959, trans. Laura Summers, Data Paper No. 111 (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Southeast Asia Program, 1979) 1. 
49Frieson Revolution 43/44. 
SOKiernan Samlaut Part 15. 
$'According to Kiernan, at the height of the rebellion, ten thousand peasants left their homes and took to 
the forest [Samlaut Part II 18], although Frieson comments, "It is not known how many of these peasants 
left voluntarily or were forced to march into the jungle on the heels of Red Khmer soldiers" [Revolution 
37]. 
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for reform of Sihanouk's state. 52 
Through this response Sihanouk manifested the extent to which he viewed human rights 
and rule of law as subordinate to his ideal of social harmony engendered by 
subservience to the will of the Prince: 
The Prince insisted in June 1968 that he was above the Constitution and that 
he had the right to order massive executions without being accountable to 
rules of procedure. Deputies who tried to defend the rights of citizens to be 
judged in court before condemnation were themselves threatened with 
summary execution. " 
According to Leon and Caldwell: 
A general assault on the left ensued, and resulted in the arrest and execution 
of many people known for progressive views, mostly school-teachers and 
university professors, and of many others who were simply outspoken in 
their criticism of the government. The exact number of victims is not 
known but it is generally agreed that the figure ran as high as hundreds, if 
not thousands 54 
Through pursuing an ideology of populism combined with significant reliance on the 
symbolism associated with his position as former monarch, Sihanouk was able to 
maintain a power base which allowed him, for fifteen years, to repress savagely elite and 
intellectual dissent and effectively to deny political and civil rights to the increasing 
numbers of educated Cambodians. The parliamentary coup against Sihanouk in 1970, 
supported by a wide spectrum of elite and urban interests, was symptomatic of the 
frustration engendered by the administrative arrangements Sihanouk instituted. Some 
months later, a Khmer Republic was proclaimed. 
Elite responses to the coup, as expressed in contemporary Khmer newspapers, used the 
language of nationalism and the language of rights and freedoms to criticise, 
retrospectively, Sihanouk's policies, giving an insight into the frustration and fear these 
policies engendered amongst the urban strata. For example, one contemporary account 
52Summers "Introduction" 20. 
53Girling The Sihanouk Myths 4. 
54Leon and Caldwell 13. 
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which conflated nationalism and political freedoms read as follows: 
Of what use was our patriotism and our support for national polices when 
Prince Sihanouk claimed a monopoly on love for the country and took 
charge of everything himself. And when anyone dared to say anything, they 
were uselessly accused of being Red, Blue, Yellow or whatever. This is 
why most of us simply stopped talking, or having any opinions at all. 
Everyone thought mostly about how they could keep themselves out of 
trouble. It was in this horrible way that the Sihanouk regime succeeded in 
suppressing Cambodia's national dynamism. 55 
A more strictly rights-based critique indicates the extent to which civil, as well as 
political, rights of the elite were abused: 
Politics is a dangerous occupation. Some political activists are rotting away 
in jail cells, imprisoned for many years without being sentenced. Others 
have died of torture there while awaiting their time in court. Others have 
been sentenced to 10 years, 20 years, or life after irregular trials. And yet 
others, finally, have been assassinated or tortured to death in secret by killers 
unknown for all eternity. 56 
Arguably, the Sihanouk era can be divided into two parts. In the early years, political 
freedoms among the urban strata allowed the existence of competing political parties. 
Yet the power of these parties was constrained by their inability or unwillingness to 
appeal through ideology to a power base of rural support; and through the constraints on 
Cambodian politics imposed by the alliance between French colonial power and 
conservative elite interests. 
As French colonial power weakened, Sihanouk entered the political arena more 
forcefully, claiming the mantle of independence hero and campaigning actively to 
mobilise peasant support. The ideology of Buddhist Socialism, based on an idealised 
view of Cambodia's past glories, was used to legitimise Sihanouk's marginalisation of 
the intellectual strata in Phnom Penh. Through association of the alleged Prince-peasant 
consensus with the Khmer nation, Sihanouk was able to construct all dissidence as 
"Nuon Khoeun, "Cambodia, Our Motherland, Lives! " Nokor Thom, 22 Mar. 1970, trans. Laura Summers 
and Ong Thong Hoeung. 
56Nuon Khoeun, "Prison and Democracy, " Khmer Ekereach, 24 Feb. 1971, trans. Laura Summers and 
Ong Thong Hoeung. 
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foreign interference or treason. This opened the way for massive abuses of political 
rights, as the economy declined and the pool of disaffected educated youth grew. These 
abuses, arguably, led to the overthrow of Sihanouk by a group of the right-wing elite in 
1970. 
Although the Republic initially proclaimed political freedoms for the elite, its birth 
coincided with the Cambodia's entry into the Second Indochina War. The militarisation 
and displacement of society which followed quickly submerged concerns over political 
rights. These concerns resurfaced only rarely in Cambodian political discourse during 
the next twenty years. 
The Human Rights Situation in the Countryside 
The relationship between the peasantry and Sihanouk is frequently described as one of 
passive but whole-hearted support by the peasants for the man they perceived as a'god- 
kings S7 Such analyses suggest that the ideology of Buddhist Socialism concurred with 
the peasants' view of their situation; or at least, that no alternative discourse was 
available, prior to the spread of communist ideology, within which peasant grievances 
could be articulated. 
Girling argues that Sihanouk's political institutions "were widely accepted for more than 
a decade, since they provided emotional satisfaction; and because they were believed in 
- or because no alternative could be conceived of - they were a reality at that time" . 
58 
Oral histories collected by Frieson from rural Cambodians tend to support this view; 
Frieson views lack of state penetration into the countryside, economic `egalitarianism' 
in rural society, and passive rural "subservience to the centuries old monarchy... 
spiritually legitimised through the Buddhist religion" as the three major obstacles to 
CPK recruitment campaigns into the 1970s 59 
$7Osborne 79; Chandler Tragedy 89; Frieson 30; Kiernan "Introduction" Peasants and Politics 16, and 
"Resisting the French: the Khmer Issarak" Peasants and Politics 132. 
S$Girling The Sihanouk Myths 3. 
39Frieson Revolution 15. 
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Evidence of the nature of state-society relationships in the context of one Cambodian 
village in 1959/60 is available from the work of May Ebihara, one of the few 
anthropologists to carry out fieldwork in rural Cambodia. Ebihara describes the political 
status of the hamlet of West Sobay, part of the village of Sobay, as follows: 
The hamlet has a degree of political autonomy within Sobay because of its 
unofficial system of authority, which grants two `big' men some measure of 
power to oversee hamlet affairs. In addition informal mechanisms of social 
control, such as gossip and ostracism, do more to keep people in line than 
recourse to police or law courts. (Indeed, villagers tend to shun the latter) 60 
Ebihara describes these `big men' as "having exceptionally `good character', sound 
judgement and strong personalities" and as being "accorded special prestige and some 
authority in hamlet affairs". 61 The village of Sobay itself has an elected headman and is 
part of a subdistrict, 62 which also has an elected chief. Ebihara reports villagers consult 
the subdistrict chief 
for many legal-administrative concerns: to report births and deaths, to obtain 
marriage or divorce certificates, to obtain bills of sale for important items of 
property, to have serious disputes adjudicated, and so on. 63 
Beyond this level of government, Ebihara reports that "the formal political structure 
does little to stimulate extravillage contacts". The next layer of local government - the 
level of district administration - is visited `infrequently' by villagers. Ebihara writes: 
this is due partly to the fact that most matters concerning villagers are 
handled by the subdistrict chief and partly because the district chief and his 
aides - professional bureaucrats assigned to their posts by the central 
government - are considered impersonal aloof, socially superior individuals 
whom villagers hesitate to approach. By contrast, the subdistrict chief is a 
fellow peasant elected to his position by the villagers themselves. 
The district chief was considered "a `big person' (neak thorn) demanding respect and 
60May Ebihara, "Intervillage, Intertown and Village-City Relations in Cambodia, " Annals of the New 
York Academy of Sciences (1971): 370. 
61Ebihara "Intervillage" 360/1. 
626 Subdistricts' (khum) are more commonly translated in Cambodia today as `communes'. 
63Ebihara "Intervillage" 364. 
64Ebihara "Intervillage" 366. 
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distance'. 5 Consequently, the district office is consulted "only for matters that cannot 
be resolved at the subdistrict level, just as various offices of the national government in 
Phnom Penh are visited only as the last and final resort for very serious concerns". 66 
Ebihara sums up the position of the peasantry vis-ä-vis the institutions of state as 
follows: 
the interaction between the central government and the village as mediated 
through the various regional officials is primarily a one-way road. The 
government sends down policies, programmes, propaganda, and laws, while 
little more than taxes and vital statistics pass upwards. 67 
Yet in their political, as well as economic and ritual, contacts with the local subdistrict, 
Ebihara reports that the villagers of Sobay enjoy "frequent and easy interaction' . 68 
Ebihara's characterisation concurs with Frieson's view of Cambodian villages in the 
1960s as `autarkic'. Frieson argues: 
The autarkic quality in village Cambodia permitted extensive personal 
freedom.... This notion of personal freedom was repeatedly raised by 
informants of their descriptions of village life in Cambodia. Typical 
statements made by former rice farmers were: "We worked at whatever we 
wanted; We worked a little or a lot as we liked; We were happy to work this 
way because we didn't have anyone telling us what to do. " Indeed this 
individual freedom... began as soon as labour obligations had been fulfilled; 
it was a widely enjoyed aspect of rural life. 69 
For rice farmers who owned or controlled their own land, at least, constraints on 
activities were minimal. Vickery comments that village and family organisation in 
Cambodia, compared to China, Vietnam or India, was `extremely weak'. Consequently, 
Corporate discipline over the individuals by extended families or by village 
organisation was weak, and once a person had fulfilled his obligations to the 
state - as a tax or corvee - there was little constraint in his activities. It is 
thus likely that a paradoxical situation of great anarchic individual freedom 
65Ebibara Svay 512. 
66Ebihara "Intervillage" 366. 
67Ebihara Svay 527. 
68Ebihara "Intervillage" 364. 
69Frieson Revolution 23. 
107 
Chapter 4: A Historical Perspective 
prevailed in a society in which there was no formal freedom at all. 0 
Both Ebihara's and Frieson's accounts suggest that contacts with officialdom were 
avoided, but not frequent enough to be disruptive. Frieson comments, "Village autarky 
made Khmer peasants suspicious of outsiders, especially urbanites and officials whose 
officiousness often upset their sensibilities' . 71 The fact that officials were seen as 
`outsiders' and `urbanites' suggests that there was little sense within the village of 
pervasive threat or surveillance from the state authorities. Ebihara's description 
suggests that in Sobay, at least, the village and subdistrict chiefs were seen as fellow 
peasants rather than powerful bureaucrats. The fact that they were elected suggests a 
measure of accountability. 
Kiernan argues that the replacement of elected village headmen by state appointees in 
1968 was a source of grievance among the peasantry: 
This represented a significant development in rural administrative repression 
by Phnom Penh. It was no doubt resented by many peasants who cherished, 
for sound enough reasons, the traditional autonomy of village affairs 72 
A further formal layer of peasant representation consisted of the election of National 
Assembly representatives. Yet Ebihara reported in 1959 that the regional delegate to the 
National Assembly for the village of Svay was "a vague and remote figure who is 
supported because he has Sihanouk's endorsement" 73 
This view of personal freedom within the village, of village interaction with the lowest 
levels of government and of relative independence from higher levels contrasts with a 
view expressed by a Khmer republican newspaper in 1971: 
From the time we are born, each Khmer, whether born into an intellectual or 
peasant family, is taught how to be afraid, and to fear everything. Fear of 
gecko, fear of crocodiles, fear of wolves, fear of ghosts, fear of older 
brother, fear of young brother, fear of grandfather, fear of aunts, fear of 
mama, fear of papa, fear of teachers, of officials, of Ministers, fear of Kings 
70Vickery Cambodia 1975-198213. 
71 Frieson Revolution 22. 
n Kiernan Samlaut Part 1113. 
73 Ebihara Svay 537. 
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and princes, fear of going to prison, fear of dying and fear of not being able 
to be reborn as a human being. The biography of every Khmer from his 
birth to his death, is a chronicle of fear and cowardice 74 
In this account, the author attempts to undermine the unconscious, cosmological 
thinking underlying Khmer perceptions of their own position, positing `fear' as an 
imposed, cultural factor rather than a natural part of life. Though born and reared in 
rural society, the author of this commentary was addressing elite newspaper readers. 
The difference between his characterisation of rural life as circumscribed by `fear', and 
the `freedom' described by the informants participating in Frieson's study, may reflect 
differences in the way `freedom' was conceptualised between rural villagers and the 
urban elite. Many of the fears cited above may have been viewed as self-evident and 
unavoidable dangers by rural villagers rather than intrusions of political power into the 
liberty of the individual. 
Equally, the difference between Ebihara's description of village life in 1959, and this 
1971 characterisation, may be explained by a deteriorating situation in Cambodia 
through the 1960s, which impinged upon the countryside as well as the town. A 
significant cause of grievance in the late 1960s, viewed as a major factor in the sparking 
of the Samlaut Rebellion of 1967/8 was the use of the military in 1967 for `ramassage' - 
the collection of rice from the peasants for the state purchasing and marketing system. 
Characterising discontent in the Samlaut district, Kiernan writes: 
Much discontent was engendered by corruption of officials, high prices and 
the increasing assertion of central control over the livelihood of the people 
in an area where landlordism was already common; and on top of this, a 
well-organised and determined government `ramassage', enforced by 
military pressure on the cultivators... 5 
Rice requisitioning in a subsistence agricultural economy entails serious economic 
hardship for the peasantry. This account suggests that intrusion by the authorities, and 
particularly the military, into the political economy of peasant life was a relatively new 
74 Nuon Khoeun in a commentary entitled "Politics is... " Khmer Ekereach, 10 Aug. 1971, trans. Laura 
Summers, Nuon Khoeun, Ong Thong Hoeung. 
75 Kiernan Samlaut Part 131. My emphasis. 
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phenomenon at the end of the 1960s, although nation-wide military activities to hunt 
down former Viet Minh had occurred in the early 1950s. A further cause of the Samlaut 
Rebellion was local land confiscation, again a serious abuse in a subsistence economy, 
to make way for the development of fruit plantations. 6 Frieson reports: 
Poor peasants were helpless when faced with investors who paid officials in 
the Department of Property Licenses to obtain land titles. When bulldozers 
arrived to clear the land of its former owners and prepare for the 
development of plantations, peasants in the area became irate and killed the 
bulldozer driver. 7 
It is not clear that such grievances were widespread in earlier years. Ebihara's and 
Frieson's accounts suggest that lack of state penetration into the rural areas, throughout 
most of Sihanouk's reign, entailed that peasant-official contacts, though exploitative 
when they took place, were sufficiently rare to constitute a minor factor in peasant 
political awareness. While the peasantry in Sihanouk's Cambodia arguably possessed 
few means of exercising political power, either at the macro or the micro level, it is 
difficult to come to any conclusions regarding peasant perceptions of the impact of 
officialdom on their lives. The historical evidence available suggests that peasants may 
have found contact with district officials disruptive to their day-to-day life; but it is 
difficult to find evidence which suggests that the peasantry perceived themselves as 
under pervasive attack from an exploitative official class. Indeed, the historical record 
suggests rather that contacts between the peasantry and state or provincial officials were 
infrequent, at least until the late 1960s. 
Where contact did occur, such as in San-laut District, these incidents demonstrated to 
peasants their lack of political power, and resulted in rebellion. It is not clear whether in 
other areas, or in earlier years, such events were sufficiently common to inform a more 
generalised peasant dissatisfaction with the political arrangements which disempowered 
them. 
The populism of Sihanouk was a significant factor legitimising administrative 
76 Kiernan Samlaut Part 140. 
77 Frieson Revolution 37. 
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arrangements. Frieson observes that, following Sihanouk's overthrow in 1970, his 
"popularity was seen as a wedge that could be driven between the population and Lon 
Nor' because: 
Peasants were accustomed to obeying Sihanouk, whereas they had no 
respect for Lon Nol, whose propaganda was inept, carried out by urbanites 
or corrupt officials 78 
This view suggests that peasants, arguably, perceived Sihanouk, not as a distant 
symbolic figure, but as a real and immediate authority. The hierarchy of state officials 
existing between Sihanouk and the peasantry may have been, in the eyes of the peasants, 
ephemeral and of lesser impact on everyday life than the well-publicised activities of 
Sihanouk himself. Ebihara comments: 
Political conflicts and parties do exist in Cambodia, but they are usually 
almost exclusively a phenomenon of the urban elite and intelligentsia and 
Svay's inhabitants know nothing of them. So far as the villagers are 
concerned, there is only Norodom Sihanouk, the nation's leader and the 
monarchy with which he is identified. 79 
She adds that, although villagers `sometimes grumble' about `arrogant or dishonest 
officials whom they may have encountered' Sihanouk himself was accorded `loyalty, 
affection and respect' 80 In her view: 
it is evident that village political opinion mirrors national government (i. e. 
Sihanouk's) policies... Now that Cambodia has become stabilised under the 
firm control of Sihanouk it is not likely that diverse political attitudes and 
loyalties will appear among the general populace unless his power wanes. 81 
Through his position, Sihanouk may have been able to dispel discontent engendered by 
the abuses of those below him in the state apparatus. This view is supported by 
evidence of peasants attempting to take grievances directly to Sihanouk. Kiernan 
comments that at the outbreak of the Samlaut Rebellion: 
Two delegates were apparently elected and sent to bring [grievances 
78 Frieson Revolution 75. 
79 Ebihara Svay 543/544. 
80 Ebihara Svay 545. 
81 Ebihara Svay 551/552. 
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regarding forced evictions of peasants in the district] to Sihanouk's 
attention, but were intercepted and `liquidated' by agents of Lon Nol. 82 
Again, Sihanouk is depicted as a figure who can be called upon to intervene on the side 
of the peasants. Although the state apparatus prevented the delegates from reaching 
Sihanouk, following the uprising Sihanouk visited Samlaut, distributed gifts among the 
peasants and removed the military commander for being `too severe' and the provincial 
governor for `corruption'. 83 
Formal opportunities for the presentation of grievances to the King were provided by the 
National Congresses, biennial events attended by `thousands, many coming from distant 
provinces' which were important as `a forum for airing grievances and promoting 
particular policies'. 4 Osborne notes that to a 
'great extent the Congresses were 'stage- 
managed' affairs and `not opportunities for the mass of the population to exert political 
power'. 5 Yet they may have worked well in dissipating grievances by providing an 
appearance of governmental concern and action to resolve complaints. Ebihara writes 
that both national elections and National Congresses served an important socialisation 
purpose in that 
the villager is made to think that his vote is meaningful (although in fact all 
he usually does is to rubber stamp what Sihanouk advocates) and thus comes 
to feel that he has at least a minimal voice in government. 86 
National mobilisations of rural support not only provided Sihanouk with a power base to 
be used against urban intellectual critics, but may have served an important legitimising 
function. The promoted the perceptions that the peasant played a significant role in the 
national polity, and that the impact of Sihanouk was greater than that of the local 
authorities on peasant lives. 
Frieson's findings suggest that peasants did not question the legitimacy of the 
arrangements which circumscribed their political environment, and retained significant 
E2 Kiernan Samlaut Part 143. 
83 Kiernan Samlaut Part 127/28. 
84 Osborne 59. 
"Osborne 59/60. 
86 Ebihara Svay 538. 
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confidence in Sihanouk, to the extent that local political committees formed by 
revolutionaries in the `liberated zones' in the early 1970s could include "members of 
Sihanouk's former government, or monks, provided that they enjoy the confidence of 
the people and enthusiastically resist the US and its henchmen" 87 The United Front 
stratagem employed by the revolutionaries meant that officials of the former 
administration who remained loyal to Sihanouk and who retained their legitimacy with 
the Cambodian peasants were mobilised into the `resistance' war against the US-backed 
Republic. 
A further aspect of the situation of the peasantry was the extent to which it was possible 
for rural aspirants to become part of the urban intellectual class. Ebihara states that the 
expansion of rural education during the Sihanouk era was highly valued by rural 
families, and offered greater opportunities for social mobility than ever before. She 
writes: 
A loosening of the traditional hierarchy has made high status more 
obtainable through achievement as well as ascription; and the expansion of 
public schooling makes education, the major means of mobility for the 
peasant, more accessible to all 88 
She adds, "several West Svay children now dream of secondary education and the 
possibility of becoming teachers or civil servants" 89 As described earlier, the lack of 
employment opportunities for educated youth became a major cause of dissatisfaction in 
the late 1960s. Yet the loosening of formal or cultural bars preventing social mobility 
during the early Sihanouk years allowed recruitment of at least some of the brightest of 
the rural youth into the urban intellectual class, thus dissipating a potential source of 
dissatisfaction within the villages. 
Other studies of rural society seek to explain peasant support for revolution by reference 
to economic grievance among the peasantry, as articulated by CPK intellectuals, notably 
87 COSVN circular, April 16 1970, quoted by Frieson Revolution 68. 
88 Ebihara Svay 419. 
89 Ebihara Svay 532. 
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Unable to command a fair price for his products, the peasant falls into a spiral of debt as 
he borrows money at usurious rates of interest to buy commodities and tools 94 
Again the lack of power of the peasant, this time economic power, is evident from this 
account. Monopolies on trade, largely in the hands of Chinese and Vietnamese, were 
connected with the Khmer political elite in these accounts through the association of 
economic exploitation of the peasantry with the `corruption' of Khmer political 
structures and the taxation imposed by the Cambodian administration. Revenues gained 
from exploitation of the peasants was used to support extravagant and parasitic urban 
lifestyles through the squandering of national wealth on imported foreign luxuries, it 
was argued. 95 
`Corruption' is a characteristic attributed by a number of commentators to Cambodian 
officials. 6 According to Vickery, this corruption was legitimised, in the early years, by 
tradition. He points out: 
In traditional Cambodia, before the French protectorate, people of status 
were rewarded not with salaries, but by a cut of the fees, taxes or products 
they collected for the crown, and with the privilege of using people of lower 
status for personal services or as direct producers of items for 
consumption. 97 
Vickery argues that the wealth generated by these activities was, in former times, 
redistributed through sponsoring of indigenous artisans, the building of temples and 
dwellings and the support of large service retinues by the wealthy. He concurs with the 
CPK analysis in claiming that in later years: 
the system was much more fragile and oppressive. Conspicuous 
consumption indulged in by the elite was no longer within the economy, but 
involved the acquisition of expensive foreign products, frequent trips 
abroad, hard currency bank accounts, and the construction of amenities 
94Hou Yuon Peasants and Politics 60-61. 
9SHou Yuon states that 49 per cent of the value of imports was represented by `products designed for the 
Europeans, the feudal class and the bourgeoisie' who make up less than 10 per cent of the population, 
Peasants and Politics 62. 
96Vickery Cambodia 1975-1982 22; Osborne 61. Later in this study, this issue is addressed in the context 
of the 1990s, and is defined under the rubric `rent-seeking', in Chapter Six. 
97Vickery Cambodia 1975-1982 22. 
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by Khieu Samphan, Hou Yuon and Hu Nim. 90 These authors offer a class-based 
analysis of the relationship between peasant-producers and other economic actors, 
particularly money-lenders, landlords, and merchants. Kiernan claims that disaffection 
among the peasantry was widespread by the end of the 1960s; 9' he uses the works of 
Hou Yuon and Hu Nim to put forward the view that it is not so much Sihanouk's 
overthrow in 1970, but his survival through the economic decline of the 1960s, which 
requires explanation. A key explanatory variable in this respect, according to both 
Kiernan and Vickery, is the lack of organisation amongst the peasantry. 92 
Although these works do not analyse the position of the peasantry from a perspective of 
human rights, and offer only glimpses of the relationship between the peasantry and 
officials of the state apparatus, they allow insight into the lack of economic power of 
Cambodian peasants in the 1960s. 
Hou Yuon argues: 
The market in Kampuchea is such that the peasant is robbed when he sells 
his agricultural produce and held to ransom when he buys the products he 
needs 93 
Monopolistic control of markets for agricultural products by Chinese compradors 
creates a situation where `the isolated, individual peasant' is compared to `an insect 
trapped in a spider's web'. Hou Yuon states: 
The prices of the agricultural products are determined on the market by the 
monopoly position of the big foreign businessmen, with the laws of supply 
and demand playing an insignificant role. The peasant is totally disarmed 
because he does not decide the prices which are fixed in Cholon by the big 
businessmen, the capitalists of industry and trade. 
90 Khieu Samphan, Cambodia's Economy and Industrial Development, doctoral thesis, Paris, 1959, 
translated by Laura Summers Cornell University Southeast Asia Program Data Paper No. 111,1979; Hou 
Yuon, "Ihe Peasantry of Kampuchea: Colonialism and Modernisation", extracts from La Paysannerie du 
Cambodge et ses Projets de Modernisation, doctoral thesis, University of Paris, 1955, translated by Ben 
Kiernan, Peasants and Politics 31-68; Hu Nim, "Land Tenure and Social Structure in Kampuchea", 
extracts from Les Services Publics Economiques du Cambodge, doctoral thesis, University of Phnom 
Penh, 1965, translated by Ben Kiernan, Peasants and Politics 69-86. 
9'Kiernan "Introduction" Peasants and Politics 13. 
92Kiernan "Introductory Note" Peasants and Politics 32/33; Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982 13/14. 
93Hou Yuon Peasants and Politics 59. 
114 
Chapter 4: A Historical Perspective 
modelled on those of Paris and New York; and the large dependent 
clienteles through which wealth was once distributed were no longer needed 
or desired 98 
Yet Frieson's interviews lead her to the view that "the relatively homogenous nature of 
Khmer peasant society, and the lack of economic grievances turned out to be formidable 
obstacles in the way of Red Khmer recruitment drives prior to 1970", 99 suggesting that 
while peasants had little power to affect either economic or political structures within 
Cambodia, neither of these were sufficiently oppressive to cause widespread discontent. 
Kiernan, too, comments that in 1967: 
in most rural areas, where grievances were comparatively few, [Sihanouk's 
popularity] remained as yet unchallenged. '00 
Frieson argues that perceptions of poverty may have been dulled by the fact that: 
Cambodia was a poor country, where most rural areas were left untouched 
by French colonialism and poorly developed after independence in 1953. 
This meant that the disruptive effects of capitalist development, well 
documented in comparable rural societies, were not keenly felt in the Khmer 
countryside. Cambodia's poverty also meant that even peasants who did 
form part of the minuscule percentage of large landowners did not 
necessarily have all the accoutrements of what is normally considered a rich 
urban lifestyle. Degrees of wealth in village society were not extreme. 101 
Once again, disparity between the perceptions of intellectuals and the perceptions of the 
peasants themselves is suggested, and the lack of information available to rural-dwellers 
concerning urban activities102 may have hindered rural appreciation of the `parasitic 
lifestyles' in the towns. 
The peasant possessed little economic power, in the same way as he possessed little 
political power, but in the absence of conspicuous local differences in wealth, rural- 
dwellers may have harboured few ambitions regarding their material circumstances. 
Frieson argues that while peasant impoverishment worsened over the period of 
98Vickery Cambodia 1975-1982 22. 
99Frieson Revolution 13. My emphasis. 
10°Kiernan Samlaut Part 15. 
'°'Frieson Revolution 27/28. Original emphasis. 
102Frieson Revolution 23. 
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Sihanouk's reign "it never reached the brink of disaster which James Scott, Barrington 
Moore, and Eric Wolf, among others, argue is the spark necessary to ignite peasant 
revolutionary potential". 103 
Sihanouk's populist courting of peasant support, and the ideology of Buddhist 
Socialism, which offered a continuity between religion, tradition, and politics, may 
arguably have produced a situation in which the peasants found little reason to question 
the legitimacy of the political and economic arrangements that circumscribed rural life, 
or to resent the fact that these arrangements left them with little political and economic 
power. 
To conclude, while disaffection amongst Cambodian intellectuals was prompted, to a 
great extent, by constraints imposed on the emerging private sector by nationalisation, 
and by the lack of political freedoms available to intellectuals during the Sihanouk 
regime, among the peasantry a different situation prevailed. The lack of political power 
available to the rural Cambodian meant little in a context where contacts in the state 
were, arguably, limited. The village structure formed, for the majority of Cambodians, a 
political framework which allowed significant levels of personal freedom and which 
was touched only infrequently by the intrusion of exploitative or oppressive outsiders. 
The weakness of the peasant vis-a-vis other economic actors, as articulated in Khmer 
communist ideology, which may well have been an objective economic reality, is not 
reflected in the peasant memories of their perceptions of this era, collected by Frieson. 
Bourdieu's analysis of the concept of doxa in political arrangements is helpful in 
understanding different perceptions of political arrangements. Bourdieu argues that 
where political arrangements are unchallenged by heterdox views, they become self- 
evident. He writes: 
The adherence expressed in the doxic relation to the social world is the 
absolute form of recognition of legitimacy through misrecognition of 
arbitrariness, since it is unaware of the very question of legitimacy, which 
arises from competition for legitimacy, and hence from conflict between 
103Frieson Revolution 28. 
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groups claiming to possess it. 104 
The oppressive nature of these arrangements is not a political factor because it is not 
perceived. The introduction of heterodox views leads to a repressive response by 
dominant groups, concerned to uphold the orthodoxy; meanwhile, the existence of a 
heterodox discourse allows articulation of criticism of this response as repressive. In the 
1950s and 1960s in Cambodia, ideological challenges to Sihanouk's rule were largely 
confined to the elite. Grievance within the countryside was frequently addressed within 
existing political frameworks of dispute resolution, through the mediation of respected 
members of the village, such as monks, or through the royal intervention of Prince 
Sihanouk, as in the Samlaut Rebellion. 
Within the elite, dissent was associated with political crisis, and dealt with by means of 
repression. These crises were attributed to outsiders in Thailand, Vietnam or the US, 
with the connivance of individual and `traitorous' members of the domestic elite, in part 
to preserve the Cambodian polity as, in Bourdieu's terms: 
a world which has no place for opinion as liberal ideology understands it, 
i. e., as one of the different and equally legitimate answers which can be 
given to an explicit question about the established political order. '°5 
Stigmatising elite dissent as `foreign' may be viewed as an attempt to neutralise its 
challenge as a "different and equally legitimate answer". 
Significantly, in view of what followed, increasing state penetration into the rural areas 
through the decade of the 1960s began to illustrate ever more clearly the political and 
economic powerlessness of the peasantry. Their own disempowerment must certainly 
have become clear to the peasants themselves particularly as more of them left the land 
or sought supplemental income in an economy increasingly penetrated by capitalism, 
leading to outbreaks of unrest such as the Samlaut Rebellion. It is significant that this 
rebellion took place in an area where military intrusion and development activities, to 
create plantations and build roads, were relatively intense, compared to other areas of 
104Bourdieu 163. 
10 Bourdieu 163. 
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the country. 106 Greater penetration by state authorities combined with the arrival of 
increasing numbers of Khmer communist and progressive intellectuals in the maquis, 
introducing a new political discourse of revolution which may have allowed greater 
articulation and awareness of grievance and thus undermined the legitimacy of 
previously unquestioned political arrangements. 
However, Frieson argues that the intrusion of revolutionaries into rural life was not 
distinguished from the intrusion of state authorities; both were met by a `passive 
deference' underlain by a `fear' of the increasingly militarised `outside forces' that 
impinged upon village life. Frieson argues that rural dwellers were driven "to find 
respite from the chaos and violence of the war.... in themselves and in their resolve to 
protect their individual autonomy, in spite of their outward mask of `support"'. 107 
The spontaneous insurrections hoped for by the Khmer communists never occurred. 
Any sense of grievance elicited by the education of peasants in communist ideology 
remained insufficiently pronounced to allow widespread recruitment of peasants to the 
revolutionary movement until the legitimising figure of Sihanouk was removed, and 
until the activities of the Lon Nol military in the early 1970s, attempting to seek out 
insurgents and Vietnamese troops, had destroyed the rural autonomy that the peasants 
sought to defend. Frieson quotes the testimony of one peasant woman from Kompong 
Thom province: 
When the Prince was there before the military forces came life was easy. 
But after the Prince was overthrown things were not easy. When the Prince 
was there there weren't any problems. We could live easily. But with Lon 
Nol it was difficult. '°8 
It is likely that for the rural Cambodian, the increasing intrusion of state, military and 
revolutionary forces into a previously autarkic existence was traumatic, and sharpened 
awareness of power differentials that had previously been a relatively minor factor in 
rural life. 
106Kiernan Samlaut Part 131-38 
107Frieson Revolution 71/72. 









Chapter S: Resources and Economies of Power 
Chapter 5: Resources and Economies of Power in post-UNTAC 
Cambodia 
Characterising the political terrain onto which human rights are promoted in Cambodia 
in the 1990s requires analysis of the nature of control exercised by dominant political 
and governmental forces, and an investigation the use of political resources within the 
framework of a political economy of power. Economies of power are functions of 
political perceptions, objectives and behaviour. In Cambodia, these factors have been 
severely disrupted over the last three decades. The violence of the recent past has 
proved destructive, not only of human life and economic resources, but of society and 
culture, with significant impact on the resources and technologies of power available to 
rulers. 
It is argued that ideological tools which could provide the basis for a hegemonic 
national discourse are weak, given the disruption of education, religion and other social 
systems since 1970, and in a context of increasing militarisation and intrusion of 
political parties and appointed state representatives into village life. The symbolic 
legitimacy enjoyed by Sihanouk in the 1950s and 1960s has been replaced by a form of 
rule in which the loyalty of the military and the state bureaucracy are key power 
resources for government leaders. It is argued further that the pluralism in political 
society in 1995/6, which saw opposing political parties competing for support in the 
villages, created new disruptions in the lives of ordinary people. 
Cambodia remains predominantly agricultural. 85 per cent of Cambodians live in rural 
areas and are "directly or indirectly dependent on agriculture for employment and 
incomes". 1 Little industrial plant exists; education and health services are concentrated 
around provincial centres. During the years of war, stable agricultural arrangements 
were not maintained, causing displacement which ruptured families and communities. 
Village organisation suffered from the movements of various armies, the widespread 
'The characterisation of Cambodia offered here comes from Royal Government of Cambodia, 
Implementing the National Programme to Rehabilitate and Develop Cambodia (Phnom Penh: Royal 
Government of Cambodia, 1995) 26. 
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Application of human rights language to this situation is problematic. While the rural 
Cambodian possessed few legal rights and little political power, contacts with the state 
were, arguably, minimal before war, insurgency, and, to an extent, modernisation led to 
disruption of rural lifestyles. Capitalist penetration was also limited and restricted to 
small private traders and money-lenders, due to governmental controls on industry and 
rice markets. Although rural indebtedness was high, the absence of revolutionary 
feeling among rural-dwellers does not suggest a widespread perception of abuse by the 
powerful in the pre-war years. Human rights discourse was not made available to the 
peasantry at this time, so it is impossible to assess how it would have been received. 
Yet over the next twenty years, penetration of national political authority into rural life 
intensified, with the intrusion of war during the years of the Khmer Republic, reaching 
an apogee during the DK era, and continuing in the form of a state apparatus of party- 
appointed officials exercising control at all levels of society under the subsequent 
PRK/SoC regime into the 1990s. UNTAC's attempts to encourage the establishment of 
a human rights movement, and human rights ideology to circumscribe the activities of 
these officials represent a new solution to a relatively recent problem - the intrusion of 
state officialdom into a rural world which traditionally saw few formal or institutional 
constraints on individual activity, but in which reverence for a monarch endowed with 
quasi-religious protective powers had endured. 
Human rights principles, which require popular acceptance of political and ideological 
pluralism, bounded by rule of law administered by `neutral' institutions of state, 
represent in many ways the antithesis of the patrimonial promotion of a nationalist, 
hierarchical and imposed `consensus' which characterised Sihanouk's style of rule. 
Forms of power exercise adopted by Cambodia's present rulers are analysed in detail in 
the next two chapters. The cultural and political impact of the human rights movement, 
and the human rights discourse which emerged from it, are examined in Chapters Eight 
and Nine. 
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laying of land mines, conscription, and collectivisation. Infrastructure has been 
destroyed, and travel around the country is both dangerous and difficult, reinforcing the 
sense of cultural and social fragmentation. 
The deaths or departures in the 1970s of almost all members of the Buddhist Sangha 
and of the intellectual stratum, and the destruction of temples and schools, disrupted the 
means by which cultural values were maintained and transmitted from one generation to 
the next. Since 1989, the country has changed economic course, embracing the 
principles of free-market economics, and an influx of mainly Western NGOs, engaged 
in a range of activities aimed at `developing' the country in prescribed directions, 
economic, social and political, has occurred. 
The disruption of these levels of human perception, behaviour and aspiration has 
brought an intense uncertainty into power relations within political society and within 
society as a whole. This uncertainty was heightened during and after the UNTAC 
period by the creation of opposition political parties and a free and critical press, the 
constitutional separation of governmental powers, and the intrusion of supervision by 
national and international organisations into the functioning of state and government. 
In spite of this upheaval, certain basic concepts of power, arguably, changed little. As 
described in Chapter Four, pre-war studies of Cambodian political life document the 
importance of the symbolic power of kingship, legitimised by the traditional religious 
cosmology, and distributed via patronage through the endemic factionalism and intrigue 
of the administrative elite, and via populist campaigning to the politically powerless 
peasantry who formed the bulk of the Cambodian population. `Democratic' processes 
such as general elections in which candidates were selected by the Prince, and in which 
the support of the peasants for the traditional hierarchy could be relied upon, were used 
to marginalise dissidence. 
Nationalist rhetoric was used to justify harsh repression of political opponents, and 
pluralism was replaced by a `consensus' imposed by the Prince himself. Even through 
the so-called `decade of destruction', the continual resurfacing of familiar modes of 
power distribution, such as patron-clientism, mass mobilisation in support of imposed 
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`consensus' and the importance of status, has been noted, indicating an underlying 
continuity in the types of power relationships and mechanisms of power, despite wide 
swings in official regime ideology. 2 
Evidence which emerged during fieldwork in 1995/6 indicates a continuing reliance by 
Cambodia's rulers, and particularly Second Prime Minister Hun Sen, on these forms of 
power. Power is overt, and exercised through personal relationship, and reciprocal 
arrangement. Clark D. Neher describes `patron-client alliances' as a common form of 
political organisation throughout Asia, which take the form of "exchange bonds" 
determining "power, status, authority relations, and the citizen's role in society'. He 
argues: 
In Southeast Asia the principal pattern of exchange interaction is the 
superior-subordinate relationship, characterised by personal, reciprocal ties 
between persons or groups of persons who command unequal resources by 
mutually beneficial transactions. They are hierarchical, face-to-face, 
superior-inferior relationships of reciprocity. 4 
In Cambodia in the 1990s, it is argued, similar relationships are organised through the 
allied structures of the Cambodian People's Party and the state apparatus. These two 
hierarchical structures, which throughout the 1980s tightly controlled much of 
Cambodian territory, have created channels and networks of patronage and protection 
running through the Cambodian polity to the village level. Central appointments by the 
CPP to village and commune level political positions have replaced the high degree of 
autarky of the countryside in Sihanouk's early reign with a highly politicised, 
hierarchical network of control and surveillance. 
The key goods offered by superiors within these structures are economic advantage and 
protection from physical abuse or punishment. This chapter and the next examine the 
workings of these structures in the context of the 1990s. Since 1991, new political 
2See Serge Thion, "The Pattern of Cambodian Politics, " The Cambodian Agony, eds. David A. Ablin and 
Marlowe Hood (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1987) 149-164. 
3 Clark D. Neher, "Asian Style Democracy, " Asian Survey 34 (1994): 950. 
4 Neher 950. 
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forces, including opposition political parties, international agencies and local NGOs, 
and new political processes, such as elections, challenge the dominance of the CPP, 
creating a situation in which the loyalty of subordinates acquires extra value for 
superiors. It is argued that the impact of attempts to promote liberal democracy in 
Cambodia have created a situation in which active loyalty in the face of manufactured 
crisis, rather than passive consent to manufactured normality, is demanded from subjects 
in return for rewards of economic gain and physical protection. 
Resistance to liberal democratic reform arises out of the extreme inflexibility of the 
managers of the economy of power in Cambodia. New images and values are resisted 
due to the intense vulnerability felt by power holders. This vulnerability is a product of 
the difficulties experienced by rulers over the past 40 years, in their attempts to capture 
and monopolise, through personal relationships and in a personal capacity, the full range 
of power resources which exist in the Cambodian polity. These attempts have prevented 
the investiture of political loyalties and power in a secular idea of the nation, and have 
led to attempts by leaders to exclude, rather than tolerating, power resources which 
could not be co-opted. Such political manoeuvres have generated a separation between 
the organisational and protective resources of the CPP, captured by Hun Sen through 
personal relationships within the military and bureaucracy; and the royalist legitimacy 
captured by Ranariddh through his relationship with his father. 
With their position insecure, CPP politicians are inclined to recycle and intensify 
attempts to monopolise old means of maintaining and exercising power, particularly via 
control of the loyalties of state employees, and to exclude competitors, rather than 
risking a new approach. This response to the UNTAC intervention has already been 
described in Chapter Three. Since UNTAC's departure in September 1993, the CPP has 
continually re-manufactured familiar icons of power and continues to rely upon 
established networks of personal relationships. 
In this chapter, CPP use of party loyalties within the state apparatus is described with 
reference to three spheres of political activity. First, the discourse employed to 
perpetuate party loyalties is described. Second, CPP strategies to co-opt or exclude 
opposition parties, and particularly tactics used to prevent campaigning by opposition 
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parties in the provinces, are analysed. Finally, the position of the judiciary is examined 
in detail to illustrate the means by which politicised personal relationships are 
maintained and conceptions of `neutrality' in the state apparatus are marginalised in 
Cambodia. Throughout this discussion, the discourse and modus operandi of the CPP 
and state apparatus are contrasted with the `neutral' mode of operation required by 
human rights principles. 
The CPP Discourse of Effectiveness and Loyalty 
Within the CPP, the perception that the role of the powerful is to protect the loyal, rather 
than to represent and lead the nation, as a secular construction, is consciously 
perpetuated by CPP leaders as a power resource. Peaceful opposition activities are often 
portrayed by these leaders, as in the Sihanouk era, as threats to national security. 
Displays of effective protection against enemies, real or imagined, are the active 
ingredient in the maintenance of Cambodian political relationships. 
A speech delivered by Hun Sen to CPP Ministry of Transport workers on 29 June 1996, 
at a time when CPP-Funcinpec relations were poor, underlines the importance of loyalty 
and personal relationships, particularly within the civil service, in the CPP's power 
system .5 Hun Sen criticised a restructuring of the Ministry of Transport undertaken 
by 
Funcinpec Transport Minister, Ieng Kieth, which had caused job losses among CPP 
ministry workers and exploited grievances of ministry workers in order to mobilise 
support for his own confrontation against Ranariddh, thereby reaffirming his position as 
protector of the party. 
Hun Sen's speech on this occasion reveals the content of the exchange-bargain offered 
by CPP leaders to their supporters. Protection, state posts, and the wider benefits of 
being an `insider' in an organisation with effective power are offered; active loyalty, 
manifested as demonstrations against opponents, is demanded. For example, on the 
question of a Funcinpec appointment to replace the CPP director of the port of Phnom 
5Extracts from this speech were reported in "Hun Sen: Exhorting the party workers, " PPP 26 July- 8 Aug. 
1996,4-6. 
125 
Chapter S: Resources and Economies of Power 
Penh, Hun Sen comments: 
I simply ... asked in return if a new director is appointed, where will the old 
one go and what fault does he have? Since then... he hasn't been appointed 
and Mr Mon Siphon remains port director. So that means in my mind that I 
can act as a defense, can offer protection... - at my level of competence I can 
offer protection. 6 
In return for this protection, Hun Sen calls for party mobilisation: 
... 
I wish to inform you that I have difficulties, that's why I need forces from 
below to protect our people. If they speak about parties, then so will we, 
and if it's party against party we're stronger. 7 
The "strength" referred to is strength measured as direct action facilitated through the 
necessary organisation to "combine forces" on the basis of shared economic interest: 
[W]e see that we cannot be honest with this tricky bunch ... We have been 
too honest already, there are now officials of us who've lost their jobs, the 
pressure continues, I've reacted many times already but today I want to 
utilise and combine the forces of the Party, the forces of the women, 
together with the law in order to struggle against these people. 8 
"Strength" emerges from a network of personal loyalties, which overrides legal "right": 
The first and second Prime Ministers have the same rights but perhaps my 
effectiveness is more than [Ranariddh's], because I have a mechanism. 
[Ranariddh] can order but our people won't listen if [he] give[s] the wrong 
order. But if I command, these people will act. That is the difference. 
In this comment, Hun Sen specifically compares the power resource of `right' (j c' ) 
with the power resource of `effectiveness' (% C07a ) and posits the dominance of 
`effectiveness', thus indicating the opposition between the structure of power he 
promotes via the CPP, and a structure of power based on rule of law. 
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equal rights for all, the leader or party with the most `effectiveness' will dominate 
because of their superior ability to harness the loyalties of the people. Given that these 
loyalties may be expressed in the form of violence against the less `effective' party, this 
translates into a situation whereby the strong dominate the weak and the majority 
dominate the minority. This is incompatible with the liberal democratic concept of 
rights as devices ensuring the juridical equality of the citizen in certain key areas of 
activity. `Equal rights', in Hun Sen's terminology, translates as the equal right to 
engage in a trial of active strength. Consequently, he urges ministry workers to "march 
from here in a demonstration and take those officials and put them back in their place.... 
it's not illegal, it's very, very right". to 
Hun Sen also accuses Funcinpec of illegality in violating his own subdecrees. He 
claims: 
they did not just abuse the low-level [workers] but the law itself.... Prime 
Minister Hun Sen requests that the workers protect his rights, because it is 
his right as a Prime Minister to sign subdecrees... So the Prime Minister 
defends the workers and the workers defend the Prime Minister. I t 
Once again, it is suggested that rights are appropriately protected by mobilising the 
support of followers in a show of strength. Although Hun Sen decries abuse of `the 
law', he does not propose recourse to the judicial system to address this issue through 
application of political notions of `impartiality' and `neutrality'. Rights are defended 
through `effectiveness' and loyalty, rather than through the use of neutral institutions 
and procedures, such as the courts. 
Hun Sen constructs Funcinpec's activities as an attack on the constitution: "If you don't 
respect the Constitution, that's not on. We all of us took the oath. " He warns, "If you 
don't abide by the Constitution you're in for it right now! " and claims: 
We put ourselves forward as the CPP and as the people implementing the 
law and Sok An, brother Ho Non, Hok Lundy, Ke Kim Yan 2 stand behind 
1°Exhorting 4. 
"Exhorting 5. 
12 These are the names of key CPP Ministry of Interior officials. 
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me. Dith Munthy, Ho Non, Sok An, look into the legal means, if they resist 
- handcuff. 
13 
Again, and throughout this speech, reference to the law is linked with a rhetorical 
emphasis on force and strength, emerging from the links of loyalty and comradeship 
between party members and control of key positions in the state apparatus, rather than 
with specific statutes, or with legal procedure. 
The fact that Hun Sen refers to the `law' and the `constitution' suggests that these 
concepts have attained some ideological power in Cambodia, which, in line with 
attempts to monopolise power resources, must be addressed and exploited. In this 
speech, Hun Sen attempts to co-opt these resources into a pre-existing economy of 
power within the CPP, rather than using them as a framework within which to reshape 
political relationships. His central concern is to use the resources of the state to protect 
structures of personal relationship and comradeship established much earlier: 
It is time for us to use all the forces in order to protect these people [of 
CPP], jobs, social achievement... The January 7th has been revived now and 
we all are the January 7th [people], so there's no problem, let's help protect 
each other. '4 
The speech contains a paradigmatic account of CPP party power. Justifications offered 
for this right reflect resources of legitimacy commonly employed by the CPP; for 
example, the `scorn' directed towards party workers who have "sacrificed so much for 
this country from January 7th [1979] up to the present" is decried; the party's rural 
school-building record is recounted; members are reminded of the CPP's sacrifices 
during the transitional period: 
We have done so much, to an extent the world has never seen before; no 
country has ever done what the CPP did, holding virtually all power, in 
control of virtually the entire territory, and exchanging that for peace, for 
national reconciliation... 15 
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The CPP is associated with strength, with benevolence to the population and with due 
regard for the future of the nation. Reference to the dual nationalities held by many 
Funcinpec politicians - "This bunch are as scared as anything, off they flee, off to France 
out of here" - indicates not only the lack of nationalism of Funcinpec politicians but also 
the weak and insubstantial nature of their challenge, compared to CPP "strength". 
Rivals who challenge CPP mechanisms are characterised as `dogs', and as appropriate 
targets for violence: "If it comes to fighting over this, so be it.,, 16 The violence 
envisaged is spontaneous violence by the workers themselves. 
Characterisation of violence as the spontaneous anger of the people, is a trademark of 
Cambodian politics. This reflects the importance of loyalty, and of active, visible 
support. It facilitates the dissociation of leaders from the actions of their followers, 
making it difficult for human rights observers to identify a `smoking gun' of evidence 
connecting the two. As a method of mobilising support, it is the antithesis of election by 
secret ballot. It is significant that CPP success in mobilising demonstrators was not 
matched by its performance at the polls in 1993. 
CPP Exclusion and Co-optation of Other Parties 
CPP relationships with other political parties reveal the reverse side of this political 
economy of power: the exclusion of outsiders and non-loyalists. For the CPP, which 
lost the 1993 election, the ability to monopolise the loyalties of a large section of the 
armed forces, state personnel'7, and local and commune chiefs was a major resource of 
power following the formation of the Royal Government, because it allowed use of the 
state and military apparata to compete with and exclude other political parties 
Control of local politics was particularly important to the CPP as this limited the ability 
of other parties to gain access to and forge personal relationships with voters. In this 
respect the CPP resembles the Democratic Party of the 1940s, in its attempts to 
16Exhorting 5. 
17This monopoly was shaken by the election result in 1993, but the result was obtained through a secret 
ballot. Open loyalties are monopolised by the CPP. These, especially in the military, are important in 
Cambodian politics, where power is exercised through mass mobilisation rather than secret ballot. 
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monopolise the loyalties of key figures in a position to deliver the vote in their district. 
Concern to protect these monopolies dictated the conduct of the CPP towards its 
coalition partners and towards political opponents between 1993 and 1997 and formed 
the context of political developments. Funcinpec's capture of potent ideological 
symbols such as the King and, of lesser importance, the electoral mandate, matched CPP 
power resources only with difficulty in the realm of everyday politics, where the ability 
to mobilise activists is key, although as Frieson described, association with the King 
was vital in winning the election. 18 
The violent and highly symbolic battle over Khmer Nation Party signboards in the 
provinces provides one example of CPP determination to maintain local control. The 
dominance of the CPP at village level is visible in the Cambodian landscape. Along 
national routes and in provincial towns and villages the CPP's red and blue party 
signboards are ubiquitous. Funcinpec offices, by contrast, appear insignificant in 
number and unimpressive in appearance. The launch of the KNP in November 1995 by 
Sam Rainsy, who enjoyed a high reputation both domestically and internationally as an 
anti-corruption campaigner, represented a new challenge to the CPP monopoly of the 
village political landscape. This challenge has been met by a variety of strategies, and 
increasing use of violence. 
From its launch in November 1995, the Royal Government consistently refused to 
recognise the KNP officially as a legal political party, employing a variety of pretexts to 
justify its stance. While the central government did not directly prevent the KNP from 
conducting activities in Phnom Penh, the party's lack of legal status led to direct 
repression of the party in the provinces. 
Throughout 1996, KNP delegations were continually prevented by local CPP authorities 
from opening party offices and raising party signs. In S'aang District of Kandal 
Province, signs were raised and lowered again at least four times. On the fourth 
occasion, according to opposition newspaper Samleng Yuvachon Khmer, local police 
18Frieson "Politics" 201. 
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fired gunshots over the heads of the crowd who were gathered for the opening 
ceremony. 19 KNP officials confirmed the newspaper's account; Rainsy commented, 
"There are provinces where there is less tension, but nowhere can we operate freelyiv . 
20 
Faced with a challenge to its monopoly of visibility in the provinces, the CPP mobilised 
violence to deny rivals physical space. 
It is characteristic that in this trial of strength, the central government dissociated itself 
from the activities of local authorities. According to the opposition newspaper 
Moneaksekar Khmer, Minister of Interior Sar Kheng denied KNP claims that provincial 
police were using violence and intimidation against KNP offices: 
At a press conference ... Mr Sar Kheng ... said, "regarding the issue of KNP 
signs in the Prey Noap District (south of Sihanoukville) - ... The KNP of Mr Sam Rainsy agreed to follow the law laid down by the Prey Noap District 
authorities and agreed to take down the signs themselves. "... Sar Kheng 
[also] denied all accusations of police and local authority violence in Kandal 
Province, claiming that in S'aang District, ... "local authorities didn't pull down the KNP signs. This is a problem between the people and that 
ply'. 21 
This presentation of violence not as official policy, but rather as a spontaneous response 
of `the people', blurs lines of responsibility and accountability, and portrays central 
government as operating to restrain human rights abuse, rather than perpetrating it. In 
the case of KNP signboards, problems of accountability were compounded by the 
existence of directly conflicting Interior Ministry directives. Moneaksekar Khmer 
describes how: 
[i]n answer to the ... CPP [district] officials, who justified themselves with a 
letter from the Ministry dated 19th April - the KNP produced a letter dated 
3rd May from the same ministry, which, according to this letter, had no 
prohibition against any of the 20 political parties pursuing activities. 2 
19"Political Repression in S'aang District: Cruel Deeds Committed by Local Authorities in S'aang District 
Against the KNP Before the Eyes of the People, " Samleng Yuvachon Khmer (SYK), 16-17 June 1996,1. 
20 Sam Rainsy, personal interview (Eng. ), July 1996, Phnom Penh. 
21"Mr Sar Kheng and the Conflicting Explanation about the Khmer Nation Party; Where Is the Truth? " 
Moneaksekar Khmer (MK), 14-15 June 1996,1. 
u"Mr Sar Kheng...... 1. The "20 political parties" were the parties registered by UNTAC to contest the 
1993 election. 
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In an earlier report on the situation in Kandal Province, the newspaper commented: 
... the S'aang District authorities did not listen to the instructions of Mr Sar Kheng, Co-Minister of the Interior, who ordered them not to interfere with 
the raising of political party signs. By such deeds, the S'aang District 
authorities seem to be scorning the Co-Ministers of the Interior. 23 
Conflicting directives and decentralisation of power into the hands of the provincial 
authorities meant that various decrees and interpretations of `the law' were selectively 
enforced at local level in the interest of local authorities, without direct central 
involvement. Khieu Kanarith, Secretary of State for Information, declared that: 
We would like to firmly reject that there is a ban on [the KNP] because all 
Cambodians have the right to found a political party and participate in 
political activities in the Kingdom of Cambodia. 24 
Kanarith explained the central government's failure to recognise the KNP legally, a 
pretext frequently used by local authorities to justify repression, arose from the absence 
of a new law on political parties. 5 An UNTAC law governing this issue existed, but 
Kanarith argued this law could not be applied because "since the creation of the Royal 
Government and the dissolution of the Supreme National Council, there was no 
authority able to interpret UNTAC law' . 26 The absence of such an authority is largely 
due to the government's own failure to set up two key institutions envisaged in the 1993 
Constitution: a Constitutional Council to interpret the constitution, and a Supreme 
Council of Magistracy to foster an independent judiciary. 27 
In this context, the Cambodian government used alleged concern for law to justify 
infringements of political rights: Moneaksekar Khmer commented, "The word `law' is 
not really connected with any article of any law or any law being agreed by the 
23"Khmer Nation Party Opens Offices in Kandal Province and Takeo Province, " MK, 7-8 June, 1996,1. 
24"There is No Ban on Political Parties! " Reasmei Kampuchea (RIQ, 28 June 1996,4. 
'Statement by Khieu Kanarith, qtd in "No Ban... " 4. 
26"No Ban... " 4. 
27This point is made in "Government Runs Along KNP's Winding Road! KNP Mocks Government! " MK, 
28-29 June 1996,1. 
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assembly, or anything' . 28 Reference to laws planned but not yet passed, while 
ministries released conflicting directives, arguably, represented an attempt to meet the 
ideological challenge of liberal human rights and rule of law concepts by a blurring of 
legal definitions aimed at securing continued discretion of action for provincial and 
local party loyalists. 
Concern expressed for order and security also appears disingenuous. Kanarith advised 
political parties to 
send information ... to the relevant authorities, before that party holds any 
meeting or opens party offices in order that the authorities can help to 
protect security and supervise; ... 
Kanarith said that "it is a very important 
issue because Cambodia does not yet have peace and security fully, which 
necessitates provision of protection to those people'. 29 
This alleged concern to protect rights arguably constructs political rights as contingent 
on submission to government protection. This places all political*activists in a 
subordinate position within the government's economy of power, and re-emphasises the 
claim that only the CPP is `effective'. It requires that all opposition activities be 
conducted under the surveillance of military and police, and creates a relationship of 
patronage between opposition politicians and the government. It associates political 
activity with insecurity; rejection by activists of the government's protection opens the 
way to physical abuse. 
While the KNP was systematically excluded from Cambodian politics, relationships 
between the CPP and its coalition partners, Funcinpec and the BLDP, combined 
exclusion with co-optation. Defeat in the UNTAC-organised election, forced the CPP 
to co-operate with these rivals. The CPP responded to this challenge by co-opting 
sections of these parties into its own economy of power in subordinate positions and 
manoeuvring to marginalise and exclude others. 
The dichotomy between co-optation and exclusion is fundamental to an understanding 
28"Mr Sar Kheng... " 1. 
29"No Ban... " 4. 
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of political events in Cambodia. One high-ranking CPP official acknowledged the lack 
of tolerance for dissent, and consequent importance of co-optation, in Cambodian 
politics: 
The fact that the two partners are still in the coalition is already a major 
step;... if we had had one in government and one in opposition, maybe we 
would already have had bloodshed in the streets 30 
The Cambodian proverb that "one mountain never has two tigers", reflects the anti- 
pluralist drive to incorporate all political forces into a single power distribution system. 
Using similar imagery, one interviewee commented on the importance of the 
participation of the Khmer Rouge in the peace process: 
Do you think it is better to have tigers in the cage or in the jungle, in the 
wild? ... It's better to have these people in the town than in the jungle... We 
would then have peace 31 
A Funcinpec National Assembly deputy commented, regarding the status of the Khmer 
Nation Party: 
I think the KNP should be in government. If the opposition party is within 
the government it will have a stronger voice and people will listen. But 
while it is outside government people don't care much. They have to work 
32 inside government - that's the best way to do the job 
Arguably, the requirement for non-violence and participation in Cambodian politics is 
incorporation - as long as all parties are incorporated into the. single, monopoly power 
distribution system, there can be peace and positive governance. Where parties or 
individuals attempt to stake out a position which is independent from the dominant 
system and its channels of power mobilisation and exercise, violence is used or 
threatened against them. 
30E3, personal interview (Eng. ), 13 Aug. 1996, Phnom Penh. To preserve confidentiality, interviewees 
drawn from the executive branch of government are identified with a letter `E' and a number. 
31H16, personal interview (Eng. ), 1 Feb. 1996, Phnom Penh. To preserve confidentiality, interviewees 
drawn from human rights NGOs are identified with a letter `H' and a number. 
32D3, personal interview (Eng. ), 4 July 1996, Phnom Penh. To preserve confidentiality, National 
Assembly deputies are identified with a letter `D' and a number. 
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It is significant that important elements of Funcinpec and the BLDP have also followed 
a strategy of exclusion on occasion. The pattern for dealing with internal opposition was 
to swiftly jettison dissenters, and then reconstitute them as targets for violence. 
Victims of such strategies of exclusion and surveillance included the Son Sann group of 
the BLDP, which was challenged by a group associated with BLDP Minister for 
Information Ieng Mouly, and targeted by a grenade attack which injured 35 people on 30 
September 1995, when it attempted to hold a congress in Phnom Penh. The assailants 
were never identified, but warnings of a possible attack were given by the Ministry of 
Interior, Hun Sen and Ieng Mouly in advance of the incident. Hun Sen warned that 
organisers would be blamed if they proceeded in the face of threats of violence, 
demonstrating the contingency of political rights: 
To those who don't listen to the government and the authorities: if 
something happens that day the government will. not be responsible. They 
must be responsible for what happens themselves. 33 
A grenade attack on a KNP rally outside the National Assembly building, on 30 March 
1997, which killed 19 people, was treated similarly. Hun Sen reportedly discussed with 
the Ministry of Interior whether they should "drag the demonstration's. mastermind by 
the scruff of the neck to court", commenting that "this bunch must be handcuffed 
according to the law as [they are] responsible for the deaths because they are the ones 
who caused it" 34 The right to physical security is politicised and rendered contingent 
on non-provocative behaviour. Protection of obedient subordinates is substituted for 
rule of law. 
From 1993 to the coup which forced Ranariddh into exile in 1997, relations between the 
two largest parties, Funcinpec and the CPP, deteriorated. According to a senior 
Funcinpec politician, the obstacle is one of incompatible ideologies: 
Cambodia is a special country because Cambodia has had war for a long 
33Television broadcast by Hun Sen, 23 Sept. 1995, qtd in Gretchen Peters, "Safety Fears for Faction: 
Amnesty, " CD 4 Oct. 1995,10. 
34Qtd in Jason Barber and Christine Chaumeau, "Slaughter on Sunday - March 30 1997, " PPP 4-17 Apr. 
1997,1. 
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time. The UN and the great powers tried to help solve the problems in 
Cambodia - that's how we were able to have the elections in 1993. But they 
did not yet disarm the people. How could we solve this problem after the 
election? The King advised all the parties that Cambodia needed national 
reconciliation. That meant we had to organise a government with two prime 
ministers... This is the problem - because Funcinpec is a democratic liberal 
party and the other party is a former socialist party. The two extremes 35 
Arguably, the major obstacle was less an issue of ideology than an issue of modes of 
power distribution. The existence of separate parties which were preparing to compete 
in elections in 1998 was incompatible with an economy of power which depended on 
the ability to be seen to exclude competitors. Funcinpec made few attempts to introduce 
democratic reforms during this period. The issue which prompted a deterioration in the 
CPP-Funcinpec relationship throughout 1996 was rather the issue of the sharing of 
administrative positions at the commune and district levels of the civil service. Failure 
on the part of Funcinpec to insert its own members into this level of the state apparatus, 
arguably, prompted attempts by Ranariddh to court Khmer Rouge defectors into alliance 
with the party in 1997, as these defectors maintained their own administrative apparatus 
in areas which had previously been beyond the control of the Phnom Penh 
administration. Hun Sen's coup was arguably a response to the first real challenge to 
CPP monopoly of local power. 
The Politicisation of State Agencies: The Judiciary 
The perpetuation of this economy of power weakens organs of state which are 
subjugated to personal and party networks. Lack of political institutionalisation in 
1990s Cambodia is almost total. State formations resemble empty shells; power flows 
through different channels. Ledgerwood's account of the failure to find a `smoking gun' 
linking central government to provincial human rights abuse reflects this 36 Figures 5.1 
and 5.2 show the divergence of actual channels for power from the constitutional ideal. 
A shadow economy of power operates by means of personal, unregulated links, 
characterised by exchange of goods, services, and protection awarded in return for 
35D4, personal interview (Eng. ), 7 July 1996, Phnom Penh. 
36Ledgerwood, "Patterns" 129. - 
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active political loyalty to an individual or party. 
The personal nature of power and its association with distribution of material benefits 
works against the spread of power throughout society via a Foucauldian "network of 
relations". It promotes a concentration of power at the apex of a hierarchy. It also 
militates against state-building because loyalty to party leaders is promoted above 
conceptions of the national interest. The continued rule of the protector at the apex of 
the system is constructed as the national interest, as the system becomes identified with 
protection of the nation. Consequently, citizenship rights of system `insiders' are of a 
different order to citizenship rights of `outsiders'. In the context of deep political 
division, this fosters use of rights abuse in conflict resolution and marginalises secular 
political devices for interest mediation. 
The case of the Cambodian judiciary is instructive, not only because Cambodian judges 
are located within the CPP economy of power and are thus expected to display 
politicised loyalties, but also because the position of the judiciary also exemplifies the 
marginalisation of law and due process, as secular devices for conflict resolution. 
Relations between court officials and the public also reflect the wider politicisation of 
the state-society relationship. The judiciary is examined here in three contexts: as it 
perceives itself as a branch of government; as it is perceived by politicians as a potential 
political weapon; and as it is perceived by human rights workers as an abusive state 
agency. It is argued that the power structure in which the judiciary exists militates 
against respect for rights of due process on the part of judges. 
a) The judiciary as a branch of government. As Figure 5.2 shows, the judiciary is in no 
sense the independent and equal branch of government envisaged in the Constitution. 
Since 1993, judicial oversight has rarely been used to legitimise government decisions 
through the application of impartial review. Increasingly, extra judicial means have 
been found to repress opponents, by-passing the judiciary altogether. Recourse to a fair 
and impartial tribunal is not a means by which disputes and conflicts are managed and 
dissipated in Cambodian politics. The Cambodian judiciary is used as a minor vehicle 
for strengthening the power of the CPP, as the dominant party in the governing 
coalition, by impressing upon the population a sense of the importance of political 
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loyalties. 
Judges, when interviewed, displayed an awareness of the role of the judiciary in a liberal 
democratic economy of power, and were particularly conscious of the relationship 
between rule of law and free market economic relations: 
[No] country [can] become prosperous until it has three different powers - 
executive, legislative and judiciary. The court department has to find justice 
for the truth for the public, so the court has to try the case legally - follow 
the law and not care about the pressures from outside. 37 
To run the country, to develop the country, we need a separation of powers. 
When people don't believe in the law, not only the court but the whole 
country suffers.... It makes it easier for the country to [deal] with other 
countries ... if we can suppress crime... We can ... make the country ordered. 
So courts and laws are very important to make the country prosperous. 
When a country develops illegally it is not a good way. 38 
Judges interviewed said that their position does not allow them to fulfil such a role. 
Institutional, political, professional, and material support are lacking. The judiciary was 
formally awarded independence by the 1993 Constitution, but the essential institution 
intended to support judges, the Supreme Council of Magistracy, has not been set up. 
This body was to have been responsible for making appointments, imposing discipline 
and assisting the King in his role as "guarantor of the independence of the judiciary" 39 
In the absence of the Council, these tasks are undertaken by the Ministry of Justice, 
compromising judicial independence and the separation of powers. 
Many judges lack any legal or judicial training. The contents of new laws are not 
circulated to judges and other court officers as a matter of course. A public defender 
complained: 
I met a [police commander] in the Ministry of the Interior - he didn't know 
that the police should give the charge to the prosecutor for the trial. In 1994, 
I went ... to interview the ... Lieutenant-Colonel in charge of the 
judiciary 
37]2, personal interview (Khm. ), 4 Apr. 1996, Kampot. All interviews were carried out under conditions 
of confidentiality; the letter 'J' and a number identify interviewees from the judiciary. 
3831, personal interview (Khm. ), 4 Apr. 1996, Kampot. 
39Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia, 1993, Arts. 113-115. 
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police. But he doesn't know the law. He said that he'd never seen the 
UNTAC law. So he just does what he did before. 0 
Deprived of information and expertise, judges are forced to depend on the more 
powerful and well-informed Ministry of Justice for advice: 
Cambodia is different from France - ... we should differentiate [between 
executive and judiciary], but now we don't have enough judges. The 
Supreme Court cannot ask the Ministry of Justice for verdicts. But in the 
lower level courts they could ask. 4' 
Lacking formal support structures, judges and the legal process are open to abuse by 
more powerful branches of government. Judges and courts receive little protection from 
armed sections of the state and are vulnerable to intimidation given Cambodia's high 
degree of militarisation: 
Since the recent election, we have become independent [but] ... in reality, we 
have pressure from the military, local authorities, other departments. 
Sometimes there is violence, sometimes verbal threats. To deal with these 
cases we depend on the local authority. Sometimes they can protect us. But 
sometimes it's a big leader of the Armed Forces and they cannot.... Most of 
the time we have got to be careful. Our safety is not guaranteed. People 
who violate the law are normally people with arms. Weapons are spread 
everywhere. 2 
One difficulty is that ... Cambodia doesn't have enough peace 
in the 
community... People who lose cases come to the court with guns. They 
bring armed people to threaten the court. They don't obey the ordinance of 
the court. 43 
It is significant that judges perceive the threat of intimidation as emerging from a variety 
of sources. While there is a widespread perception that judges "dare not go against the 
40L2, personal interview (Eng. ), 11 Jan. 1996, Phnom Penh. To preserve confidentiality, lawyers and 
public defenders are identified with an `L' and a number. 
41J4, personal interview (Khm. ), 28 May 1996, Phnom Penh. 
42J 1. 
43J5, personal interview (Khm. ), 30 May 1996, Phnom Penh. Limited support was awarded to the 
judiciary when Minister of Justice Chem Snguon protested over two episodes of violence against court 
personnel in January 1996 [Ker Munthit and Matthew Grainger,, "Snguon gets tough in support of 
courts, " PPP, 23 Feb. -7 Mar. 1996,1]. Judges interviewed reported no specific policies implemented to 
suppress these violations. 
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Ministry of Justice", 44 judges also reported hostility and intimidation from local 
authorities, police and military, as well as threats from armed criminals who may not be 
identifiable as members of the government. Although they can call on some protection 
from military police, judges largely feel unsupported in the face of these attacks. 
An attack by a group of monks and civilians on the Kampot Courthouse on 28 
December 1995 exemplifies the climate of threat which surrounds judges. The group of 
demonstrators were protesting a decision made by the court over a land dispute. Local 
police were present during the attack, in which monks broke down the doors to the 
courthouse, smashed furniture and ransacked the courts' records. Court officers, 
including judges, were forced to flee the courthouse, but no arrests were made 45 
Consequently, the court was unable to assert its authority over the attackers and the 
prestige and power of court officials suffered as a result. 
According to one human rights worker, the Kampot court later refused to investigate a 
complaint made by a woman who came from the same village as the demonstrators, as a 
retaliation against the attack. This indicates that the court officials attempted to exact 
some limited, personal vengeance for the attack. It is a response which is out of keeping 
with the establishment of rule of law but which exemplifies the use of official position 
to pursue personal agendas which characterises the Cambodian economy of power. 
In 'political' cases, it is widely believed that judges are expected to deliver verdicts 
required by the Ministry of Justice, and that they comply with this expectation: 
[Verdicts are dictated by the Ministry of Justice in] all the cases that are 
related to political members. For example - you are working in one political 
group - for the CPP. And the judge asks you to do something that is not in 
favour of you. So you will go to any person who you know and then that 
44L1, personal interview (Eng. ), 11 Jan. 1996, Phnom Penh. 
as I was able to see a video of the demonstration, documenting the event from assembly at the pagoda, 
truck journey to the courthouse, to inflicting of damage on the courthouse buildings. I was told the 
Ministry of Information had filmed this video, but it was not clear why the film had been made, nor why 
the authorities did not protect the judges and prosecutor who fled the scene. The effect of the violence 
was as clear as its instigators and ulterior motivation were mysterious. Similarly, the extent of actual 
armed intimidation against the judiciary is unclear, but that the judiciary is operating in a climate of fear 
is, on the evidence of this film, unquestionable. 
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person will ask the Ministry of Justice to provide anything like that. To 
support you 46 
In spite of this, the lack of support given to the judiciary, and the intimidation of the 
judiciary by other elements of the state, indicates that judges do not enjoy high status as 
a central element in the government's punitive apparatus. Their position may be viewed 
as that of low-status state functionaries, expected to follow orders in return for retention 
of a position which may be exploited to attract income through bribe-taking. 
Judges themselves did not consider their position as particularly valued or desirable. 
Asked why they became judges, those interviewed for this study replied that they were 
appointed by the Vietnamese-backed regime in the early 1980s which "just appointed 
people with a general education" after the destruction of the former French-trained 
judiciary in the DK era: "In the old days, you just agreed with the appointment. You 
had no choice. "47 Under the KPRP/SoC regime, the judiciary had no independence and 
no discretionary power: "When the court was founded, we were under control of the 
Communist regime - we must follow the guidance of the Party. "4g 
Judges emphasised that although the 1993 Constitution changed their role on paper, 
there has been little alteration in their material circumstances. This is apparent from a 
comparison of the neglected condition of the Supreme Court Building in Phnom Penh, 
with the restored National Assembly building and the imposing and modern Office of 
the Council of Ministers. Complaints made by judges regarding the material constraints 
on judicial activity exemplify the lack of regard given the judiciary by the centre of 
power. The level of judicial salaries, at approximately $20 a month, 
49 is inadequate to 
support an individual and inhibits honesty: 
A really serious difficulty is the standard of living of the court personnel. 




49Michael Kirby, "Human Rights Questions: Technical Co-operation in the Field of Human Rights, " UN 
Document A/50/68, Sept. 1995,12. 
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be honest. But if we don't have enough money, even honest people have 
difficulties so 
Few resources are made available for equipment or investigations; 
We have the will to rebuild the country, but we need enough budget and 
equipment. Before, we didn't have this courtroom - we just had to go and 
work in a small house..... If we compare our salary, it cannot compare to 
prices. We cannot live. We would like to find justice, but we have an 
unjust salary. 5' 
In this court, if we didn't have assistance from [foreign NGO workers] we 
might not have paper. And there is a lack of resources for investigations - 
equipment to look for fingerprints, autopsy reports. Not only that, but 
money to pay for the investigating judge to go and investigate. If he has to 
go far away he needs transport. If he stays overnight he needs money for 
rice and accommodation. 52 
Lack of material support, visible in the accommodation of courthouses in small, 
unimpressive buildings, clearly signals the judiciary's low status. International NGO 
workers describe efforts to bolster the position of judges through the provision of 
material support, training and encouragement of judges to take pride in their status: 
First, we showed up and said we care about you, we see you as colleagues, 
we support you. Second, we gave them training in analysing cases... Third 
we gave them things - for example, we upgraded the courthouses. 53 
We redid the courtroom. You can influence the whole court by redesigning 
the courthouse. Before, everyone was on the same level - the judge, the 
defendant and the prosecutor. So we raised the judge's seat. And there was 
laundry hanging up in the court - someone was living in there. We set up 
permanent desks and repainted it.... Then they feel better, as a judge, to hold 
the court - they feel proud... That's some progress. 
54 
While such international support addresses the material inadequacies arising from lack 




"19, personal interview, 31 Mar. 1996, Phnom Penh. 
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concern itself. Judges complain that other branches of government continually usurp the 
power awarded to them by the Constitution. For example: 
In Cambodia there are three classes of court... municipal or provincial court, 
Appeal Court, then Supreme Court. Some people already complained to the 
three courts - but when they lose they continue to make a complaint to the 
King. They do not accept they have lost. The King is not the one to settle 
the problems. But people try to complain to the King... so the King will 
ss order the Ministry of Justice to review the case again. 
The law says clearly that the prosecutor should direct all investigations, and 
especially the police investigations. But in some provinces, the prosecutor 
cannot even go to check the prison without the permission of the police.. 56 
Another problem is Article 5157 Before we charge someone who works in 
the civil service, we need permission from the concerned department. 
Sometimes it is easy, sometimes it is difficult - it depends. But it causes a 
delay. It normally takes six months or more. 58 
" The decision of the judge is not perceived as final, and judges are not perceived as 
possessing sole and independent jurisdiction over matters of law. This subordination of 
the judiciary as a government power reflects the marginalisation of law itself to other 
means of organising relationships and resolving disputes. Few laws have been passed 
since 1993, as significant levels of absenteeism in the National Assembly have delayed 
legislative activity. 59 Those laws that have reached the statute books are not 




5'The interviewee is referring to Art. 51 of the Law Regulating Civil Servants, passed in October 1994. 
58J 1. Under Cambodian law, detainees cannot be held without trial for longer than six months. 
59Ker Munthit, "MPs Busy Passing 106 Words a Fortnight, " PPP, 12-23 July 1996,2. The 1995/6 
parliamentary session failed to pass much of the legislation required for the holding of commune elections 
in 1997, particularly the nationality law, political parties law, and the electoral law itself. This was partly 
due to the difficulties experienced in getting a quorum of MPs to attend parliamentary debates. Extra 
sessions were scheduled for July 1997, when the assembly should have been in recess but these were 
equally ill-attended. Arguably, the problems experienced in the functioning of the National Assembly 
mirror the problems in the functioning of an independent judiciary. Both are caused by a subordination of 
law and accountability to the imperative of bolstering the visible and personal power of the executive 
branch. 
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There is not enough law in Cambodia. There are more than seventy articles 
in UNTAC law, but they are not clear. If they are not clear about the crime, 
what can the courts do? 0 
The National Assembly or the Mol or the Council of Ministers always forget 
about the criminal procedures. They just say we have the old law, use that 
one. That's why the justice system is jumping up and down. 61 
The problem is the executive doesn't look at the law - it only exists on 
paper... For example, the law on forestry. Even though there has been a sub- 
decree by the prime ministers, the forestry department doesn't follow the 
law. They are logging out the forests. We have no way to solve [the 
problem] 62 
The economy of power which operates in Cambodia provides an explanation for the 
lack of attention to legal and judicial questions. Laws are restrictive to the exercise of 
power in a polity in which political advantage is achieved through the ability to grant 
discretionary rights of protection or material advantage. The juridical equality of 
citizens implied by the strengthening of rule of law under the auspices of an independent 
judiciary is a fundamental aspect of liberal democratic and human rights respecting 
hegemonic rule. In the Cambodian economy of power, the juridical constitution of the 
citizen, imbued with entitlements and rights held against the state, regardless of personal 
status, loyalties and relationships, is anathema to the maintenance of clear bases of 
personal support through the awarding of protection and material advantage to 
followers. In the competitive political atmosphere found in Cambodia in the 1990s, it 
was not in the interests of rulers to allow such support bases to fade away. 
For this reason, arguably, the Government has not given priority to the strengthening of 
the judiciary and rule of law. A high-ranking Ministry of Justice official commented: "It 
is natural for a country just after the war to need time to rebuild the system. It can't be 
Few steps have been taken, and the done in one year. We have to do it step by step. "63 
60J 1. 
61L3, personal interview (Eng, ), 15 Mar. 1996, Phnom Penh. The term `jumping up and down' is a Khmer 
expression which could be more colloquially translated as `running around like a headless chicken'. 
62J3, personal interview (Khm. ), 4 Apr. 1996, Kampot. 
63 E2, personal interview (Fr. ), 31 July 1996, Phnom Penh. 
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consistent neglect of the legal system, to the extent that no progress has been made 
towards providing any institutional, legal or material support by the government, shows 
a pattern of lack of political will. The failure to set up constitutional arrangements to 
ensure the judiciary's independence; the failure to draft laws regarding the organisation 
of courts, and penal and civil codes and procedures; the failure to take steps to increase 
the prestige and efficiency of judges by providing them with increased salaries or 
adequate resources for conducting investigations and trials; and the continued alleged 
interference of the Ministry of Justice in verdicts, especially in political cases, indicate 
that there is, at least, no vested interest in creating a strong and independent judiciary. 
Examination of preferred power relationships suggests that there are vested interests in 
perpetuation of judicial weakness. 
Low salaries awarded to judges, by contributing to the prevalence of bribe-taking, 
ensure that the courts will not become an avenue of recourse for the ordinary citizen. 
The Ministry of Justice appears to view this prospect with approval: 
Confidence in the court system is increasing very well; but people are not 
using it more because we always use a mediation system. We have an 
arrangement to mediate between friends and family; afterwards with the 
chief of the district if he wants. If he doesn't accept the decision, then he 
has to go to court... Most of the affairs are solved by the chief of the district 
or of the sangkhat. 64 
It is highly unusual in any country for a high-level Ministry official to applaud unofficial 
mechanisms which bypass his own domain. The de-emphasis of the role of the judiciary 
is evidence that the judiciary is not seen as a channel through which power can be 
efficiently or appropriately exercised in Cambodia. Despite the terms of the 
Constitution, the position of the judiciary in Cambodia in 1996 was consistent with a 
gradual retreat away from attempts to distribute power via liberal democratic 
mechanisms. Movement towards a more familiar Cambodian economy of power was 
marked during this period. 
b) The judiciary as a tool of political repression. It might be expected that, even in this 
64E2. 
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power context, judges could occupy a favoured position as instruments of a particular 
party, performing the important function of punishing its enemies. Although judicial 
positions are monopolised by the CPP, 65 judges' loyalties do not seem to command a 
particularly high price, in terms of awarded status or material benefit. 
The judiciary is not frequently used to achieve precise outcomes in major political cases, 
as a tool of repressive government power. In such cases, the role of the judiciary has 
been minor. During the period of the fieldwork, three high-profile trials involving 
political opponents of the government were held. The trial of Prince Norodom Sirivudh, 
former Secretary-General of Funcinpec, on charges of organised crime and possession 
of illegal firearms was held in February 1996 at Phnom Penh Municipal Court. Sirivudh 
had been arrested the previous November, following newspaper allegations that the 
Prince was involved in a plot to assassinate Hun Sen. Supreme Court hearings of 
appeals against prison sentences imposed on opposition journalists Chan Ratana, and 
Hen Vipheak, both previously convicted of disinformation, were held in June and 
August 1996 respectively. 
Analysis of these cases indicates that, even in these instances, judicial process was 
relatively unimportant compared to the events surrounding the trials. This is not only 
because the verdicts were politically motivated and were probably determined in 
advance. The atmosphere of threat and the political manoeuvring surrounding the trials 
created a perception that power was exercised personally, by aggrieved individuals 
whose power had been challenged, rather than by a conceptualised notion of `society' 
operating via the impartial procedures of `the law'. Use of the courts may have been 
designed to give legitimacy to the verdicts in the eyes of the international community. 
In the Sirivudh case, the power contest underlying the legal accusations was a contest 
between Hun Sen, on one side, and the monarchy and Funcinpec, combined in the 
person of Sirivudh, on the other. Sirivudh is half-brother to the King, and enjoyed 
65Munthit, "Ranariddh Targets CPP's Control of Judiciary, " PPP 20 Oct. - 2 Nov. 1995,3. Ranariddh 
complained that there were no Funcinpec judges and that, as a result, Funcinpec could not appoint anyone 
to the Supreme Council of Magistracy, leaving the judicial system entirely in CPP hands. 
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popularity and prestige as the Secretary-General of Funcinpec. He had also been closely 
associated with former Minister of Economics and Finance, Sam Rainsy, having 
resigned as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1995 in protest after the sacking of Rainsy 
from his ministerial position and subsequent expulsion from Funcinpec. These 
activities had made him a potential target for both elements within Funcinpec and for 
the CPP. 
A significant aspect of the Sirivudh case is that, initially, legal procedures were 
followed, but these became increasingly irrelevant, as soon as it was clear that Sirivudh's 
potential allies would mount little resistance. Eventually the opportunity of resolving 
the issue via judicial process was "effectively" barred by threats of violence. Arguably, 
resort to legal formalities was employed initially as a strategy to obscure and conceal, 
from international scrutiny, the real mechanics of Sirivudh's downfall. 
Formally, the case began when Sirivudh was "invited to stay at home for his own 
protection" 66 , in the words of Minister for Information, Ieng Mouly, on 17 November 
1995, following the uncovering of evidence of his alleged involvement in a plot to 
assassinate Hun Sen. This formulation was used to avoid criticism that the activities of 
17 November 1995 violated Sirivudh's constitutional right to immunity from arrest, as 
an elected member of the National Assembly. 67 On 21 November, the National 
Assembly voted unanimously to strip him of his parliamentary immunity, without 
hearing any of the evidence against him. This allowed Sirivudh to be formally arrested 
and charged. 
These legal issues were surrounded from the outset by extra-legal activity, including 
threats of violence. The major piece of evidence against Sirivudh was a tape-recording 
of a private telephone conversation, which had been made illegally and in violation of 
Sirivudh's constitutional right to privacy. 68 On 17 November, around 100 troops, five 
"Gretchen Peters and Barton Biggs, "Gov't Implicates Sirivudh in Alleged Plot, " CD, 20 Nov. 1995,9. 
67Constitution Art. 80. 
68Constitution Art. 40, states, "The right to privacy of residence and to the secrecy of correspondence by 
mail, telegram, fax, telex and telephone shall be guaranteed. " 
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tanks and an armoured personnel carrier, loyal to Hun Sen arrived in Phnom Penh to 
take up positions around the houses of Hun Sen and Sirivudh, 69 contributing 
significantly to an atmosphere of tension and physical intimidation. Allegations of 
threats of violence also began to be made almost immediately. These were crucial in 
dictating the reaction of potentially powerful actors such as the King, Ranariddh, and the 
National Assembly. 
On 20 November, the King released a statement reporting that he had written to warn 
his half-brother to stay at home "because outside there are `anti-Sirivudhs' who want to 
kill him". 70 On the following day, after the vote was taken to lift Sirivudh's immunity, 
the Cambodia Daily reported that Funcinpec MPs had received orders from Ranariddh 
to vote in this way. MPs told the newspaper that they feared if they had voted otherwise 
they would have been "finished with Funcinpec" and "in big trouble". The newspaper 
reported that Ranariddh had "told Funcinpec MPs that if Prince Sirivudh did not stand 
trial, he could be killed" and "had given in to demands to detain Prince Sirivudh Friday 
night after receiving a report that, if he were not detained, `he would be dead by 4 am 
[Saturday]999 " 
Three days later, Ranariddh released a statement claiming, "Without my successive 
interventions, personal interventions and also in my capacity as First Prime Minister, 
72 Prince Sirivudh, at present would not longer be in this world". On 28 November, the 
King wrote to the Cambodia Daily that "Silence is golden... the less Sirivudh says, the 
better it will be for him.... The reason, in particular, is to save his life, even if he still has 
to go to prison". 3 
It is significant that at no time during the period of Sirivudh's imprisonment did any of 
69Biggs, "Distressed King to Leave Country, " CD 23 Nov. 1995,1. 
70Peters, "Sirivudh Put in T3 Prison... " CD 22 Nov. 1995,2. 
71Robin McDowell and Peters, "Sirivudh Stripped of Immunity, Taken to T3; Evidence Not Heard; MP 
Vote Unanimous, "-CD 22 Nov. 1995,10. 
n"Ranariddh Denies Losing Grip on Party, Gov't, " CD 27 Nov. 1995,8. 
73Peters, "King Says for Sirivudh `Silence is Golden', " CD 29 Nov. 1995,8. 
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these actors question why Sirivudh should be in danger, or the identity of those who 
made the threats. Potential supporters of Sirivudh behaved consistently as if violence 
against him was unavoidable, even though, following the vote to lift his immunity, 
Sirivudh was taken into the custody of the Ministry of the Interior. 
This exposes the artifice inherent in Cambodian government organisations. The 
National Assembly could not protect one of its members despite constitutional 
provisions of immunity. Funcinpec and BLDP MPs candidly admitted that they were 
intimidated and perceived themselves as powerless to affect the course of events. 
Parliamentary immunity - designed to preserve the integrity of the National Assembly as 
an institution from attempts at intervention from other branches of power - was violated 
by the individuals it protects. Instead of defending the de jure status of the legislative 
branch vis-ä-vis the executive, deputies accepted the de facto constitutional violation, 
seeking only to ameliorate the outcome, and save Sirivudh's life. 
In the face of direct threats of violence, the lack of meaning and value invested in 
constitutionality since 1993 was exposed. Rather than contributing to power or 
governance by promoting the consistent application of valued patterns of behaviour, 
Cambodian state organs merely provide the landscape over which battles for dominance 
between individuals and their followers are symbolically fought - replacing the actual 
battles between factional armies which took place in earlier years. 4 Legality is not a 
74The role of the National Assembly from 1993 to 1997, like that of the judiciary, was highly dependent 
on the wider power context described. In some issue areas the Assembly was able to operate as a 
significant political actor, while in others it was subject to intimidation by the executive power. The issue 
of legislative oversight of ministerial activities is particularly important for ensuring accountability. An 
editorial in Reasmei Kampuchea, in June 1996, described an appearance by Ing Kieth, Minister for Public 
Works, before the National Assembly to answer questions, noting approvingly that this was a sign that the 
National Assembly was taking steps towards fulfilling its role of oversight of ministerial activities. This 
occasion was the first time a minister had appeared before the full Assembly, as opposed to specialist 
National Assembly Commissions (such as the National Assembly Human Rights Commission before 
whom the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Defence had appeared). Reasmei Kampuchea 
commented that in general, the response of ministries to the National Assembly was poor, noting that 
"some government ministers do not reply to the line of questions put by the people's representatives ... 
until after the time limit" and "do not come to explain as requested by the competent commissions who 
invite them for questioning". The newspaper noted, "This lack of respect cause those who are unhappy to 
say that "the government rides a horse with no reins" ["Editorial: Welcome Courage! " RK 1 June 1996, 
2]. Significantly, the editorial warned that legislative oversight should not be used "to create a situation 
where rough words are used in order to [do each other down] or where problems are created, out of 
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significant resource of power in Cambodia; military force is. The deployment of tanks 
exhibited Hun Sen's determination that Sirivudh should be removed. Resort to the 
provisions of the constitution were considered by National Assembly members to be 
worthless in combating a credible military threat. 
Sirivudh acknowledged the mismatch between his de jure and de facto status during the 
period he spent in custody when he said later. 
I want to thank those MPs, thank my party boss for saving my life. But I 
want also to say that it was a very strange way to save someone's life, by 
voting to strip them of their immunity... I think that they really believed the 
threats that I would be killed if they did not do that. But I think many of 
them have a very heavy conscience following that vote... 5 
It is significant that the threats that Sirivudh would be killed `if he were not detained' 
and the view that his life could be saved "even if he has to go to prison"76 altered as 
soon as parliamentary immunity had been lifted. On 12 December, having brokered an 
exile deal with Hun Sen, the King wrote to Sirivudh saying that if he went to jail, "You 
would die at the hands of these people who are killers and assassins". 77 Arguably, 
between the vote to lift Sirivudh's immunity and the brokering of the exile deal on 12 
December, a decision was made to resolve the crisis by extra judicial means. 
Reflecting the decision that there was to be no trial, Sirivudh's guilt was from this point 
onward assumed. In a letter to Hun Sen, arranging the exile deal, King Sihanouk wrote: 
My younger brother, Norodom Sirivudh, uttered words directed against 
Your Excellency which were totally unjust, unjustified, and unforgivable. 
But as Your Excellency is a strong pillar in noble support of Buddhism and 
The Dharma, which encourages us to be tolerant and to accord pardon to the 
guilty, I humbly permit myself to ask Your Excellency Samdech's 
compassion ... and for a semi-pardon for my younger brother Norodom 
Sirivudh in the form of expulsion from Cambodia and consignment into 
exile in France... As for Cambodian justice, it will be able to follow its 
revenge, in order to bring the dignity (of individuals] into disrepute". 
75Biggs, "Sirivudh on Funcinpec and `Forgotten Ideals', " CD 5 Feb. 1996,2. 
76See footnotes 70 and 72. 
77 Peters and James Kanter, "King Warns Sirivudh of Possible Death in Prison, " CD 14 Dec. 1995,1. 
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course concerning the case of Norodom Sirivudh, who uttered very 
unfortunate words of menace and murder directed against Your Excellency 
Samdech.. 78 
Although the King refers to "Cambodian justice" being "able to follow its course", for 
Sirivudh to accept the exile deal requires him to accept the assumption that he is guilty. 
The King's request to Hun Sen is framed in language which is quite different from the 
language of law and rights, as an alternative system of values is invoked. The King 
places himself in the role of petitioner, emphasising the discretionary power of "His 
Excellency Samdech", within a moral world in which the duty of the ruler, according to 
Buddhist teaching, is to show compassion and mercy to the weak. The imagery invoked 
places Hun Sen in the role of a Dhammaraja whose duties of compassion define the 
concept of justice. This role contrasts with that of a constitutional ruler whose power is 
constrained by a notion of justice as an objective reality, laid down in written laws and 
interpreted by `impartial' courts. 
Similarly, Sirivudh is not constructed as a citizen with rights, including the right to due 
process to determine his objective guilt or innocence. He is constructed as a subject 
who is dependent for his status on the compassion of the offended ruler. The King 
requests that Hun Sen act to restore the appropriate, compassionate relationship between 
ruler and ruled, rather than requiring an independent investigation to determine whether 
an infraction of secular law has occurred. The terms of the request made by the King 
exemplify the extent to which a perception of the traditional cosmological relationship 
between ruler and ruled, described in Chapter Four, remains central to Cambodian state- 
society relationships. Conceptions of rule of law and the equality of the rights-bearing 
citizen are subordinate to conceptions of the power of the ruler to determine and 
embody justice and mercy. 
Shifted into this conceptual framework, the subsequent trial is irrelevant in terms of 
deciding the question of culpability. Sirivudh was required to give up his right to due 
7RNorodom Sihanouk, letter to Hun Sen, 12 December 1995, unofficial trans., published as "Exchange 
Between King Sihanouk and Second PM Hun Sen, " CD 13 Dec. 1995,9. 
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to ten years imprisonment on charges of criminal conspiracy and the bearing and 
transporting of illegal weapons. One of his defence lawyers received death threats 
before the trial, and perhaps because of this, his defence team did not cross-examine any 
witnesses. 84 Although the sentence means that Sirivudh would be arrested and 
imprisoned immediately, if he returned to Phnom Penh, on a number of occasions in 
1996 he stated an intention to return. This prompted threats from second Prime Minister 
Hun Sen that he would meet Sirivudh at the airport "with tanks and rocket launchers". 85 
These threats combined to distract attention from the trial itself, and the judicial 
punishment imposed. This issue was turned into a personal and violent contest between 
the two men: Sirivudh was cast in the role of an invading and subversive threat, while 
Hun Sen portrayed himself as the aggrieved party, purging the country of bad elements 
and avenging himself with his superior power. Once framed within this economy of 
power, legal questions became inapplicable, and few observers attempted to shift the 
level of discourse back into a more secular, juridical notion of power. The manner in 
which the Sirivudh case was treated indicates the emptiness of constitutional provisions 
and government organisations such as the National Assembly and the court which have 
not been invested with any meaning within the Cambodian power context. The 
protagonists with the relevant resources to affect the outcome were Hun Sen, drawing 
on the personal loyalties of troops, and the King, using the great prestige attached to his 
position. 
The role of the courts as instruments of government strategy in the cases of the 
journalists Chan Ratana and Hen Vipheak is similar. Although a greater role was given 
to the courts, in so far as appeals against sentence were pursued as far as the Supreme 
Court, the impact of the court's decision was largely nullified by the fact that the King 
had already offered an amnesty months before the Supreme Court's final hearing took 
place. The King stated that the amnesty would not be awarded unless the two prime 
ministers agreed. Ranariddh swiftly did so; Hun Sen, however, stated that the courts 
B4112, personal interview, 4 June 1996, Phnom Penh. 
85"Malaysian PM Sends Plug for Political Stability, " PPP 27 Dec. 1996 -9 Jan. 1997,3. 
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must be allowed to judge the cases first, thereby inserting himself in the position of 
having the final say on the matter. 86 Chan Ratana and Hen Vipheak both received 
amnesties within days of their imprisonment, after the Supreme Court upheld the 
verdicts against them. 
Again, the major power brokers in the situation were the two prime ministers and the 
King. The court's decision was assumed from the outset and discussion over the 
question of amnesty distracted attention from the court as a channel for the exercise of 
power. The outcome of the Supreme Court hearing on Chan Ratana's case was reported 
in advance in anti-government newspapers, 87 following a leak by an undercover KNP 
member working in the Ministry of the Interior. 88 The certainty of the outcome was also 
indicated by the presence of large numbers of troops around the Supreme Court building 
while the hearing was taking place. The deployment of these troops and the speed with 
which Ratana was removed to jail following the reading of the decision added an 
element of physical threat to the court proceedings. 89 
The extrajudicial killing, on 18 May 1996, of Thun Bunly, publisher of the newspaper 
Udam Kate Khmer and the fourth Cambodian journalist to be murdered since 1993 also 
overshadowed these cases 90 Bunly had also been awaiting a Supreme Court hearing. 
86Sihanouk wrote in response to a petition from Samleng Yuvachon Khmer journalists: "I am waiting to 
erase the punishment of Mr Chan Ratana but I cannot reach an accommodation with His Excellency Hun 
Sen about this matter. The erasure of Mr Chan Ratana's punishment will be effected as soon as I have 
received agreement from Mr Hun Sen" ["Sihanouk: I Am Waiting to Erase the Punishment of Mr Chan 
Ratana, but I Cannot Come to an Accommodation with His Excellency Hun Sen about this Matter, " MK 3- 
4 July 1996,1]. 
87Moneaksekar Khmer reported, accurately, in its 25 June edition, three days before the hearing that: 
the verdict against the former Samleng Yuvachon Khmer editor, Chan Ratana, ... will be 
upheld by the judges just the same. Sources added that they would seize Mr Chan Ratana 
roughly... and take him to jail immediately. ["Mr Yim Sokha Will Become the First Political 
Prisoner in the Second Kingdom of Cambodia, " MK 25-26 June 1996,1 ]. 
88N9, personal interview (Khm. ), 20 June 1996, Phnom Penh. To preserve confidentiality, journalists are 
referred to with a letter `N' followed by a number. 
"Author's observations, Supreme Court hearing of the case of Mr Chan Ratana, 28 June 1996, Phnom 
Penh. The presence of "an armed force of more than 200 troops (police and military police)"at the 
hearing was also foretold in the edition of Moneakrekar Khmer which appeared on the morning of the 
trial, ["Mr Chan Ratana is interviewed on NDN Television, " MK 28-29 June 1996,1]. 
90Two journalists died in the summer of 1994 - one was the editor ofAntarakum who was "secretly and 
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Following the initiation of all three cases in mid-1995, the use of the courts in dealing 
with journalists was abandoned in favour of more direct means of repression, 
culminating in the closing of all opposition newspapers after the July 1997 coup, and the 
death or flight of opposition journalists. 
There is little observable effort to empower the court system for use as an instrument of 
the authoritarian state in Cambodia, because the structure and discourse of the 
Cambodian economy of power militates against this. Violence is a more effective and 
useful power resource for a government which is by no means totalitarian. Power in 
Cambodia is not exercised to homogenise or regulate society, nor is it used to force 
compliance to strict and intrusive norms or rules. These roles would invest a court 
system with importance as a repressive tool. In Cambodia, pervasive lawlessness and 
bribe-taking indicate that wide margins are allowed for particular kinds of freedoms, 
although these are not liberal democratic freedoms. 
The wide margins of discretion for action, enjoyed by insiders, is arguably the most vital 
element of the economy of power in Cambodia. Power is exercised by personalities 
rather than by bureaucrats, in a discretionary and, sometimes, arbitrary manner. Political 
leaders mobilise support by protecting and rewarding supporters, and by marginalising 
opponents. By contrast, little attention is paid to the creation of systems for the efficient 
implementation of policy. Cambodian politicians seek the active loyalty of individuals, 
not the passive subjection of the population. Because insecurity pervades all levels of 
severely beaten on his head and neck" just a few days after his newspaper resumed publication following a 
bomb attack on its office in March 1994. The second was Nguon Chan, editor of Samleng Yuvachon 
Khmer (the paper subsequently edited by Chan Ratana). Nguon Chan was shot dead in Phnom Penh on 7 
September 1994, following articles in his newspaper which criticised the government and Cambodian 
businessman Teng Bunma, and which hinted at Bunma's involvement in the 2 July 1994 attempted coup. 
A third journalist, Chan Dara, of Koh Santepheap, was murdered in Kompong Cham province after 
writing articles criticising unregulated timber exports from the province to Vietnam. CPP General Sat 
Soeun was indicted for the murder but was acquitted by Kompong Cham provincial court ["Cambodia: 
Assassinations, Terrorism, Warnings, Judiciary Pursuits... Against Freedom of Press, " Address by Chan 
Ratana, Press Forum, Phnom Penh, 31 July 1996]. A Funcinpec radio disc jockey, Ek Mongkul, was 
seriously injured in an assassination attempt in February 1996, a few days after reading "an article ... 
about the government's criticism of Vietnamese encroachment along the eastern border" [Chaumeau, 
"Motive still unknown in shooting of radio star, " PPP 23 Feb. - 7 Mar. 1996,4]. Journalists have also 
been killed following the 1997 coup. No convictions have been secured in any of these cases; General Sat 
Soeun has been the only suspect arrested in connection with them. 
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society, a hierarchical chain forms through which power can be distributed. The links in 
this chain are personal ties of loyalty and support, created as people of all social ranks 
seek out or buy connections to protect themselves: 
The core members of the political party - the court cannot catch them. 
Because the court is the same party. 91 
All of our clients are poor and I never saw any rich man arrested. 2 
If one relative is powerful then the whole family - no one can threaten 
them 93 
Law is relevant to the project of politicians only in a tactical sense. Applied more 
generally, through the construction of a `rule of law state', law impedes the smooth 
working of this system. Rule of law disrupts the chains of reciprocity which bind the 
levels of the hierarchy to one another, by ensuring an even distribution of services 
according to non-personalised criteria, and by extending general and undifferentiated 
protection of society as a whole. Routing power via the judiciary detracts from the 
personal nature of power exercise. Consequently in Cambodian political trials, the trial 
itself is never the major focus of attention. The spotlight is always diverted away from 
the actual court scene towards the power brokers, the dealers, and the personalities, who 
intervene with expressions of personal animosity or offers of protection. The judge, and 
the process of law itself, remains firmly in the background. 
Pursuit of judicial repression of political enemies requires that infractions be framed in 
juridical language. This in itself facilitates articulation of criticism using human rights 
language. The length of time required for a case to progress through the courts also 
suggests that the judiciary is unlikely to become a favoured weapon of the Cambodian 
government. In the case of Sirivudh, a trial and possible imprisonment could have 
turned Sirivudh into a cause celebre. Consequently, great pains were taken to ensure 
that he would not stand trial or be allowed to return to face his punishment. 
91H2, personal interview (Khm. ), 29 July 1996, Kompong Cham. 
92L2 
93H3, personal interview (Khm. ), 4 Apr. 1996, Kampot. 
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In Cambodia, different concepts of power mean that judicial process does not legitimise 
government action in the eyes of the public and thus operate as a resource of power. For 
judicial power to bestow legitimacy implies that an action taken by the judiciary is more 
rightful than the same action taken by another power cluster. In liberal democratic 
societies, the rightfulness of the judiciary's power to punish is achieved by the 
ideological investment of the judiciary with particular attributes - independence, 
impartiality, learning, and status. 
In the economy of power described here, these qualities are not ideologically 
constructed in the same way. The ability to protect, punish and reward is valued in the 
national leader. Loyalty to a leader is rightfully rewarded by protection, while disloyalty 
is met with punishment. The display of power inherent in the Sirivudh case reaffirmed 
Hun Sen's control and leadership capacity by demonstrating his ability to avenge 
himself - personally and without help from institutions of state - upon would-be 
assassins. The treatment of Sirivudh was not legitimised by the show of judicial process 
involved, but by Hun Sen's assumption, from the first, of his right, as a powerful leader, 
to take vengeance against a challenger. Other actors in the case did not challenge this 
right. 
David Stem describes how modernity constructs the individual as a juridical entity in its 
dealings with the state, thus ensuring an even and hegemonic penetration of state power 
which acts alike on all subjects. In pre-modem states, he argues, 
relations of authority and power, obligations, provision of evidence in legal 
matters, and so on, were all tied to particular features of the concrete 
situation in which they occurred. Questions about the origin of one's 
family, one's occupation, connections with other persons, participation in 
public rituals, possession of property and so on, were critical determinants 
of one's political standing. 
Stern views the "achievement of the modem age" as the construction of the citizen 
"uncorrupted by the contingent features distinguishing one person from another" 94 In 
94David S. Stern, "State Sovereignty: The Politics of Identity and the Place of the Political, " Perspectives 
on Third-World Sovereignty. The Postmodern Paradox. eds. Mark E. Denham and Mark Owen Lombardi 
(London: Macmillan, 1996) 32. 
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the Cambodian economy of power, the status of the individual, as government views 
him, is contingent. His loyalty (and the loyalty, in turn, of his followers) is a resource of 
power for rulers whose ability to retain their position is a function of the number of 
bodies they can mobilise in their support. His personal qualities are essential to his 
utility as a supporter and to the danger inherent in his enmity. 
The assessment made by those in power of an individual's utility or potential as a 
challenger is crucial in determining whether the rights of an individual will be respected. 
If an individual is weak and unimportant, he may be preyed upon for financial gain or 
used as an example to others. If he is strong and important, able to mobilise followers 
of his own, he may be protected and rewarded in the hope that his support will be 
awarded reciprocally in the future. Senior Khmer Rouge defectors have frequently been 
treated in this way. Alternatively, steps may be taken to exclude powerful individuals 
from the political process, as in the Sirivudh case and in the coup which ousted 
Ranariddh in July 1997. Governance by means of such relationships is incompatible 
with the construction of the modem, rights-bearing citizen. Because of this, it is 
incompatible with liberal democratic rule of law as well as with totalitarian repression 
by means of law. 
Because the judicial system has a limited role in solving political problems means that 
the government has little to fear from allowing foreign NGOs, such as the International 
Human Rights Law Group's Court Training Project, to offer training and material 
assistance to provincial and municipal judges. International assistance of this kind has 
little impact on the prevailing economy of power since such assistance offers benefits to 
judges without requiring that their loyalties be transferred away from the government. 
c) The judiciary as an abusive state organisation. International training may alter the 
practice of judges in non-political cases, since central government does not monitor 
such cases. The judiciary's handling of non-political cases is characterised by human 
rights organisations not as uniformly repressive, but as erratic, and as likely to be based 
on nepotism, cronyism, or pure prejudice as considerations of either due process of law 
or the advancement of political power. International training may, in some cases, alter 
this balance in favour of adherence to legal codes and procedures. Other central features 
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which undermine impartiality in the courts are the solidarity of members of the CPP, 
and the importance of bribe taking. It is unlikely that international training can erase 
these factors since they are at the heart of the economy of power within which judges 
are located. A judge retains his position only by displaying loyalty to other CPP 
members. He can make a living only by taking bribes. For example, 
Sometimes the judge doesn't care what proof is submitted by the defender 
because they have received a bribe from the rich. And almost all judges are 
appointed by the political party, and they keep working for the political 
party. They don't work for the public, don't work for the interests of the 
people. So in any political conflict, they will support their party. 95 
The absence of adequate salaries requires that, in a majority of cases, judges be allowed 
by central government to use their position as they see fit for the generation of income 
through bribe taking. This results in a lack of trust in the court system, especially 
among the poor. For judges, as for other state employees, holding an official position 
provides opportunities for personal enrichment as a result of rent-seeking activities, and 
for networking `inside', thereby gaining access to other important state services. Within 
the Cambodian economy of power, these activities are believed to provide sufficient 
reward. 
Concerned to generate income, the performance of the judge in court must be designed 
to impress upon the accused the personal power at the judge's command. This power 
must be portrayed as unconstrained by regulations, but open to deflection through the 
offering of bribes. The judge reproduces at the micro-level the power relations that exist 
at the macro-level: power relations based upon personal ability to prevail. 
Because of the emphasis on personal power rather than on due process of law, the courts 
are perceived as threatening by ordinary citizens. As members of a society in which 
hierarchical and patrimonial relationships disempower those without insider 
connections, the ordinary Cambodian is socialised into fear of contact with powerful 
figures, unless he or she can personally access some effective means by which to 
95L4, personal interview (Eng. ), 22 Jan. 1996, Phnom Penh. 
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influence the outcome of such encounters. In part, the expertise of Cambodian human 
rights NGOs, the information they can provide about the workings of the court, and the 
language of law and rights, offers the individual some protective support on such 
occasions. For example: 
People are afraid of the court. For example, they owe someone money... so 
they go to the court and the court just tells them, "You owe money so 
you've got to pay otherwise I'll put you in jail", and then the court clerk 
says, "Come back tomorrow" and he comes back and he just doesn't feel 
safe, he thinks, "If I go a second time maybe they put me in jail" because 
every word they mentioned was just "Jail! Jail! Jail! " If they come to this 
office we explain that, "If you cannot pay all the debts at the same time, then 
you can pay monthly". So he says, "OK" 96 
A common criticism levelled at judges is that some still apply "communist ideology". 
Rather than reflecting a Stalinist philosophy of the infallibility of the Party, as the 
representative of the working class, `communist ideology' in the context of the 
Cambodian court system refers to attempts by judges to portray themselves as infallible, 
because of their status. 
Defenders suggest that these judges view a trial less as a process by which evidence is 
examined and guilt or innocence determined, than as a theatre performance in which 
their own personal status vis-ä-vis the rest of the cast - prosecutor, defender and 
accused - is re-established. By emphasising his personal power, rather than following 
codified procedures, the judge is able to enhance the perception that he is personally 
responsible for the trial's outcome. This contrasts to the liberal democratic perception 
of the judge as the vehicle through which the application of due process ensures that 
justice is done. It also differs from the Stalinist show trial, which represents the 
reaffirmation of the supremacy of Party and class. 
The need to project an image of personal power, to generate income through bribe 
taking, also encourages threats of violence against the judge by supporters of the 
defendant. It increases the tendency to erratic and arbitrary behaviour on the part of the 
"H6, personal interview (Khm. ), 3 Apr. 1996, Kampot. 
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judge and predisposes him against openness to the presentation of persuasive arguments 
and the possibility of acquittal. Public defenders, who advise their clients against 
offering bribes, maintain they are never called in by the courts in cases where money is 
involved, but only where the defendant is poor. 
The importance of personal responses is evident in a comparison made by one public 
defender of two Cambodian judges. Although one is praised as open-minded and the 
other criticised as `communist', both employ personal reactions in judging cases: 
[The judge in] Kandal province is about 45 years old and he was trained by a 
USAID programme here, the law school here, and then he attended very 
many courses - his mind is somewhat broader than the others, .... even if 
... [the 
defendant]'s a little bit guilty, if the defender tries to prove hard 
enough to him, he can reduce the sentence. It's not like other people. Other 
judges, even if you try to prove they just say - "You can say anything you 
want -I will punish you. " That is old Communist thoughts - need to be 
reformed.. 97 
Similarly, another defender feared that judges viewed appeals as personal affronts: 
I haven't wanted to [lodge appeals] so far because we will meet the judge 
again and again. Because of that case, they can cause us some pain later - 
when we meet the judge in the future for some other case. 8 
The idea of a trial as a formal process, in which participants fulfil impersonal roles is 
missing from this account. The court seeks to portray its power as a personal ability to 
prevail, which can be deflected only by bribery. In this way, the mode of power 
exercised by court personnel reflects the larger-scale uses of power in Cambodia. 
While procedures and perspectives employed by individual judges differ, responses to 
the training of international NGOs are universally hindered by the pressures inherent in 
judicial subordination to the Ministry of Justice, armed attackers, and other branches of 
local government. They are also hindered by the need to project an image of personal 
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The situation of the judiciary offers an insight into a number of characteristics of 
Cambodian political power, which can be seen to operate in a variety of milieux across 
the state and party apparatus. The highly personalised nature of relationships between 
state officials, and between state officials and the people, militates against the 
institutionalisation of bureaucratic roles and functions, the constitution of the juridical 
citizen and, consequently, respect for the rule of law, due process and human rights. 
The form of these relationships, involving reciprocal exchanges, means that treatment 
by the state apparatus of different individuals depends upon their status, and, 
particularly, their political loyalties. This is illustrated, in Figure 5.2, by the division of 
civilians into "insiders" and "outsiders". Insiders have cultivated their utility to those in 
power. Outsiders have not and are likely to receive poor treatment at the hands of the 
state apparatus, if only to maintain the perception that there is some advantage to being 
a loyal "insider". 
Within this economy of power, there is no incentive for the homogenisation of society, 
or the uniform incorporation of the whole society under the auspices of the state. The 
concept of the citizen is precluded. Because of this, liberal democratic forms of 
hegemonic control, employing concepts of neutrality, impartiality and rights to 
legitimise dominance, are impossible. Power is overt and differential treatment is a key 
resource. If equal treatment of rights-bearing citizens by a neutral state is promoted, 
patronage links lose their rationale and their effectiveness as resources of power. 
In this economy of power, support is contingent on provision of protection and material 
benefits. Leaders must continually attend to their support bases and as a consequence, 
distribution of resources is highly politicised. Control of resources is paramount in 
Cambodian politics. A party which loses this control will quickly lose support, so 
periods in opposition are to be avoided. This political reality lay at the root of the 
distrust between the coalition partners from 1993 to 1997. It also undermined the 
effectiveness of administrative organs. Each party attempted to pack state agencies with 
its own supporters in order to maximise their own ability to distribute resources in a 
partisan manner, and to inhibit the same ability in their opponents. 
As a result, state organs remained politicised. Divided political loyalties were evident 
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within the police. This dictated that inquiry into the grenade attack on the KNP on 30 
March 1997 should make "little headway" because "the police did not have the technical 
expertise to do forensic work and the CPP and Funcinpec team members did not trust 
each other' . 99 
Similar divisions were reported by an interviewee as existing within the National 
Assembly Commission for Human Rights and Reception of Complaints: 
[Regarding] political problems, [the Commission] cannot [succeed] because 
the Commission has seven members, three from Funcinpec, three from CPP, 
and one from BLDP; so if [the Commission] has some problem which 
[affects] some political party, the members of that. political party won't 
accept that. [The Commission] cannot do anything. '°° 
The Supreme Council of Magistracy has not been set up because of disagreements over 
the number of members to be nominated by each party in the Assembly. '°1 The desire 
to dominate state organisations results either in monopoly by one party or in deadlock. 
The 1993 constitution was intended to provide a framework within which a unitary state 
could be forged out from the integration of the four pre-existing administrative 
structures. The creation of a new Kingdom of Cambodia was intended to facilitate the 
investiture of diverse power resources into a single, national, framework of power, 
within which both governance and political competition could be conducted in a 
pluralist and rights-respecting manner. This required, initially, that the concept of 
unitary national institutions become the focal point of political allegiance, and later, the 
conceptual framework for Cambodian political thought and action. 
Yet the discourse of `effectiveness', focusing particularly on the ability to exclude 
competitors, militates against the conduct of peaceful party competition within a unified 
framework of valued national institutions. There was little evidence in 1995/6 that the 
process of engaging jointly in governance had strengthened confidence and rationalised 
"Barber, "Government Rows Over Bomb Probe, " PPP 18 Apr. -1 May 1997,7. 
'°°DI, personal interview (Eng. ), 3 May 1996, Phnom Penh. 
101Munthit, "Ranariddh Targets CPP's Control of Judiciary, " PPP 20 Oct: 2 Nov. 1995,3. 
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attitudes to the extent that political leaders could focus their activities on creating such 
institutions. Rather, politicians used the opportunities presented by governance to tend 
their own support bases and bolster their own power resources vis-ä-vis one another, 
particularly within the state apparatus, and in the village political landscape. Viewed as 
resources of power, rather than frameworks within power could be legitimised, state 
agencies remained weak, and subject to intimidation. 
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Chapter 6: Violence, Economic Gain and Power In Cambodia 
CPP concern to perpetuate the politicisation of the Cambodian state apparatus by 
maintaining the loyalties of low-level state employees has led, arguably, to the creation 
of significant opportunities for human rights abuse by state employees, in a climate of 
impunity fostered at the highest levels. Abuse of human rights can yield rewards for 
abusers which can cement their loyalty to the system which allows them to abuse. A 
political strategy aimed at tying loyalties in this way can compensate for the fact that the 
CPP lacks ideological legitimacy, a fact clearly shown in the result of the 1993 election. 
Gramsci describes how violence is used by rulers to exercise power without the benefit 
of patterned norms of behaviour: 
If the ruling class has lost its consensus, i. e. is no longer `leading' but only 
`dominant', exercising coercive force alone, this means precisely that the 
great masses have become detached from their traditional ideologies, and no 
longer believe what they believed previously, etc... [T]he old is dying and 
the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid 
symptoms appear... 
In Cambodia, disruption of cultural and political patterns, engendered both by civil war 
and intrusion of new ideologies, has fostered uncertainty. Violence has been used to 
plug the gaps which have appeared in the ability of rulers to command. According to 
Gramsci: 
The death of the old ideologies takes the form of scepticism with regard to 
all theories and general formulae; of application to the pure economic fact 
(earnings etc. ), and to a form of politics which is not simply realistic in 
fact... but which is cynical in its immediate manifestation... ` 
In Cambodia, arguably, a 'cynical' attempt at exploiting existing monopolies of force and 
economic opportunity, to meet the challenge posed by the formation of opposition 
political parties and the introduction of new ideologies and discourses, is underway. 
The present chapter offers an analysis of the nexus of violence, economic gain, and 
competition for power and posits a connection between the discourse of `effectiveness' 
and the incidence of human rights abuse in Cambodia. It begins by presenting a picture 
'Gramsci, "Civil Society" 276. 
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of the form of human rights abuse taking place in Cambodia as this was described by 
interviewees drawn from Cambodian human rights NGOs 2 It goes on to discuss the 
function of this human rights abuse as a power resource to resist the ideological and 
organisational challenges which accompanied the peace process. The implications of 
these findings for liberal democratic political devices to facilitate peaceful reform, such 
as `free and fair' elections, are discussed. 
Human Rights Abuse in 1990s Cambodia 
Cambodian human rights NGO workers interviewed for the present study were asked, 
"What kind of problems need to be addressed as a priority in improving the human 
rights situation in Cambodia? " Their replies are categorised in Table 6.1, matched to 
corresponding rights in the Universal Declaration. The problems mentioned by NGO 
workers encompass clusters of rights, as the third column in Table 6.1 shows. 
The single most commonly mentioned problem, land disputes, incorporates issues of 
violence, liberal freedoms, and economic rights. Land is essential to the economic 
rights to livelihood of the majority of Cambodians who depend upon subsistence 
agriculture. Land rights controversies in Cambodia do not centre on land reform or 
redistribution, as in some other Asian countries. The pressing nature of land rights 
questions arises from the widespread practice of arbitrary confiscation of land by 
officials or the military, and the lack of avenues for complaint and redress. Recourse to 
the courts over land questions often leads to demands for bribes which bias judgements 
in favour of the rich. Land confiscation may or may not involve violence; evictors are 
often armed and threats often used. 
Similarly, the question of trafficking of women and children incorporates a variety of 
abuses. Human traffickers are described as `gangs' or `mafia', constituting the problem 
as a law and order issue, although alleged police and military involvement in 
2 Further details regarding Cambodian human rights NGOs, and the sample of interviewees drawn from 
them, are offered in Chapter Seven. 
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Table 6.1 Priority Rights Issues for Cambodian NGOs 
Problem No. of Type of Rights Abused 
responses 
Land rights 8/56 Rights to own property; livelihood; freedom from arbitrary 
questions interference; effective remedy for abuse; security of home 
and persons. 
Judicial 7/56 Rights to due process; equal protection of the law. 
independence 
Climate of 6/56 Right to effective remedy. 
impunity 
Abuse of power 5/56 Rights to life, liberty and security; freedom from arbitrary 
arrest, interference and discrimination; to property; equal 
protection of the law. 
Woman- and 4/56 Rights to liberty and security of person; freedom from slavery 
child-trafficking and servitude; freedom from cruel, Inhuman or degrading 
treatment; freedom from arbitrary detention; to an adequate 
standard of living; to education; rights of the child. 
Lack of 3/56 Right to life, liberty and security of person; due process; 
professionalism freedom from torture, arbitrary arrest, detention, interference, 
in the police discrimination; to own property; to livelihood; rights of 
force prisoners. 
Abuses by the 3/56 Right to life, liberty and security of person; due process; 
military freedom from torture; freedom from arbitrary arrest, 
detention, interference; to own property; to livelihood. 
Abuse of 3/56 Rights to life, liberty and security of person; freedom from 
political rights discrimination; freedom of conscience, opinion, expression, 
peaceful assembly and association; to representation in 
government; to equal access to public service. 
Homelessness 2/56 Right to an adequate standard of living. 
Poverty 2/56 Right to an adequate standard of living. 
Malnutrition 2/56 Right to an adequate standard of living. 
Murder 2/56 Right to life. 
No separation 1/56 Right to a fair and public hearing by an Impartial independent 
of powers tribunal; to representation In government. 
Corruption 1/56 Right to equal protection of the law; freedom from 
discrimination on the basis of property. 
Rape 1/56 Right of women to security of person; freedom from cruel, 
Inhuman or degrading treatment; equal protection of the law. 
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prostitution and associated protection and extortion rackets constitutes abuse of power. 3 
Equally, sale of women and children by heads of households may be viewed as domestic 
abuse, or as arising from failures regarding economic rights, particularly rights to 
adequate standards of living. Lack of education also contributes, as parents are tricked 
into selling children to traffickers posing as legitimate employers, and are then unaware 
of avenues for complaint and remedy: 
It is bad that the parents decide for the children, that the parents accept the 
money and allow the daughter or son to go away with a foreigner that they 
don't know - but it's because of poverty... So we have to train parents ... 
First of all we need education, information, explanation. 4 
Many human rights problems arise from the related issues of poverty, displacement 
vulnerability within society, lack of education, impunity of officials, militarisation and 
abuse of power. From this perspective, the view of three respondents that "we must do 
everything at once" is significant. 
Human rights abuse emerges not as failure by the state to guarantee certain goods, 
including negative goods of non-interference, but as a systemic question arising from 
the disruption of economic, social, political and cultural arrangements which sustain life 
and dignity. All human rights workers interviewed perceived economic survival as 
dependent on the ability to combat violence and abuse of power: 
If the country does not obey human rights, our rice will be taken from us by 
a handful of armed people. 
Concomitantly, a significant number of human rights organisations complement civil 
and political rights activities with economic programmes, such as skills training or 
'See for example, Nick Lenaghan, "Officials Implicated in Koh Kong Sex Trade, " CD, 19-21 Apr. 1996, 
1; Lenaghan, "Pimps up for hefty sentences, but reservations about new law, " PPP 8-21 Mar. 1996,13. 
In the latter article, Lenaghan cites Kien Serey Phal, president of the Cambodian Women's Development 
Association, who says of a new Law on Suppression of Trafficking of Humans, "We are afraid this law 
will not be effective because the people enforcing it already have their hands in the business. " 
4H14, personal interview (Eng. ), 14 Jan. 1996, Phnom Penh. 
5M2, personal interview (Khm. ), 29 Jan. 1996, Phnom Penh. 
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financing the digging of wells .6 
Eight of the fifteen problems in Table 6.1 constitute direct abuse of power or arbitrary 
treatment of the individual by the authorities. Other problems, such as human 
trafficking, murder, and rape, may or may not involve government officials, military or 
police. Where officials perpetrate abuse, impunity and lack of judicial independence 
means that effective remedy is unlikely to be forthcoming. 
Guaranteeing political rights, which incorporates both ending violence perpetrated on 
individuals as members of political parties, or as individual dissenters, and creating 
channels for meaningful political participation, was mentioned less frequently than 
guaranteeing land ownership, due process, and ending arbitrary behaviour by officials. 
The major concern of human rights NGOs emerges as concern to alleviate official abuse 
of rights to physical and economic security. 
Interviewees were also asked, "what kinds of people suffer particularly from human 
rights abuse in Cambodia? " The majority cited the mass of poor farmers who comprise 
85 per cent of Cambodia's population. A small number cited vulnerable groups such as 
women, children, detainees and ethnic minorities. Only one interviewee mentioned 
opposition parties and journalists. Asked "what kinds of people abuse human rights in 
Cambodia? ", the majority cited government personnel, in the military, police, judiciary 
or bureaucracy. Only two interviewees mentioned criminal gangs and only two cited 
particular political parties. These findings are presented in Table 6.2, which reveals that 
the primary location of NGO activity is the interface between state and society, 
particularly at the local level. The picture drawn is of a state apparatus which abuses the 
people, often violently. 
Emphasis on abuse against the poor, uneducated subsistence farmer offers a different 
window on human rights issues from that offered by the opposition newspapers, which 
focus on abuses against political parties and the press. Reports of provincial human 
rights abuse against ordinary people are rare in opposition newspapers, despite an 
6See Appendix 1. 
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editorial stance continually reaffirming support for human rights and democratic 
principles. Such orientations are shown in Table 6.3, as evidenced by stories published 
by two opposition newspapers in June 1996. 
Table 6.2 Abusers and Abused in Cambodia 
Abusers No. of responses Abused No. of responses 
Police 13 The grass roots/ the general people 15 
Military 13 The poor 6 
Local authorities 12 Illiterate people/ those with a low 
educational level 
3 
"People with power" 10 People accused of crimes 2 
Courts 8 Women 2 
"High-ranking 
officials" 
7 Children 2 
The govemment/ 
overnment officials 
7 Ethnic minorities 2. 
"The rich" 4 Opposition parties 1 
"Armed gunmen" 4 Journalists 1 
the War" 2 People living In battlezones 1 
Military Police 2 
Gangs 2 Everybody suffers 1 
TheCPP 1 
The Khmer Rouge 1 
Village Militias 1 
"Those who control 
the rubber areas" 
1 
Table 6.3 Newspaper Coverage of Abuse 
Type of Abuse Number of News Stories (June 1996) 
Udam Kate Khmer Moneaksekar Khmer 
Land Disputes 1 1 
Abuse of Power by Police/Military 2 2 
Abuse of Freedom of Expression and the Press 5 4 
Abuse of Political Rights - Against KNP 3 11 
Abuse of Political Rights - Against Funcinpec 1 
Abuse of Political Rights - Electoral Impartiality - 
Abuse of Right to Privacy 1 
Partly, differences in emphasis reflect the orientation of newspapers towards political 
society and their readers in Phnom Penh, while NGOs penetrate further into the 
provinces, where political society is weaker and arbitrary abuse by officials more 
widespread. Partly it is a difference of ideology; this will be discussed in greater detail 
7Both the respondents who named ethnic minorities as suffering particularly from human rights abuse 
worked for NGOs aimed specifically at protecting the rights of ethnic minorities. 
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in Chapters Seven and Eight. 
Discussing particular cases, NGO workers informally divide them into three categories: 
`low-level', `serious', and `big, political'. The distinction between `low-level' and 
`serious' cases depends on two criteria - the importance of the alleged abuser, and the 
number of people who suffer from the alleged violation. Cases where the alleged abuser 
holds a high government or military rank, or where a whole village is a victim of land 
confiscation, are viewed as serious. Routine cases where few people are involved and 
the abuser has relatively little power - for example, an abuse by an ordinary policeman 
or commune official against an individual - are described as `low-level'. 
Also classed as `serious' are cases where the perpetrator is presumed to be connected to 
high ranks in the government. The murder of opposition newspaper publisher Thun 
Bunly, by two unknown gunmen, fits into this category. `Big political' cases are cases 
of violence between parties which are so serious as to prompt a government crisis, and 
to raise the possibility of resort to armed force. 
Two further distinctions may be made, illustrated in Table 6.3. Abuse may be divided 
into cases of selective violence, carried out against a particular individual - for example, 
the murder of Thun Bunly. Alternatively, it may be non-selective - arbitrary abuse the 
motive for which is unrelated to the particular identity of the victim. 
Table 6.4 Types of Human Rights Abuse 
Selective Non-selective 
Big political I Sirivudh case 
Serious I Assassination of Thun Bunly 
Shooting of Ek Mongkul 
Low-level Physical abuse of Vietnamese- 
Khmers 
Children of Krang Kontroul 
Murder of waiter by Gen. Sat. 
Soeun 
Physical abuse by commune 
authorities 
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Functions of Abuse 
A further distinction may be made between different functions of human rights abuse. 
Within the Cambodian economy of power, arguably, abuse has four major functions, all 
of which are associated, directly or indirectly, with the challenge represented by the 
existence of opposition parties and the need to bolster power resources perceived as 
under threat from discourses of human rights and rule of law. In this context, abuse is 
used to physically remove rivals and silence dissent. It is used to demonstrate the 
continued `effectiveness' of the capacity either to protect and reward or to punish and 
exclude. It is used to promote a pervasive climate of fear which motivates individuals to 
seek `effective' protection, undercutting the ideological appeal of opposition parties. It 
is used to facilitate economic gain for insiders, which is, in itself, a resource of power. 
Frequently, a single instance of human rights abuse will serve more than one of these 
functions. 
a) Big political cases. Big political cases combine practical manoeuvres to remove 
particular opponents with a carefully promoted symbolism that dramatically heightens 
the general atmosphere of fear to the point where national stability is endangered. In 
these cases, the attacker attempts to harness the power resource of national threat 
perception against his enemy. The victim of such attacks is branded a threat, not only to 
individuals, but to society as a whole. Referring to Sirivudh's alleged plot to assassinate 
him, Hun Sen told villagers: 
You have to destroy those forces from afar in all forms. No one would 
regret if they have to die because if they exist they are nothing but worms 
that destroy the society. 8 
Sirivudh was skilfully isolated from potential allies, to whom it was made clear that any 
attempt to defend him would be detrimental to their own safety. Willingness to abandon 
the victim, in a big political case, becomes a litmus test of loyalty to government and 
nation. The victim becomes an internal exile. His survival is seriously threatened, and 
it is made clear that this threat extends to anyone who allies with him. 
BExtract from speech made by Hun Sen to villagers in Kraingyov Commune, S'aang District, Kandal 
Province, 25 Nov. 1997, qtd. in Munthit, "Hun Sen: the 'Worms' that Must Die, " PPP 1-14 Dec. 1995,3. 
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The grenade attack on the KNP rally of March 30 1997 is also typical in this respect. 
The way in which security forces responded in the aftermath of the attack suggests that 
its aim was not only to remove the critical voice of Rainsy, but to act as a demonstration 
of the isolation which those who become KNP members face. After the attack, soldiers 
prevented bystanders from coming to the aid of the victims. The wounded were roughly 
manhandled onto cyclos to be taken away. A nearby hospital failed to respond with 
medical assistance or vehicles. When victims reached other hospitals, there were delays 
before they were treated. All these factors suggest that the victims had become 
stigmatised by their attendance at the rally. Several of the wounded died from lack of 
prompt medical attention. 
The ability of the government to punish and exclude in this way is a direct result of its 
monopoly of state resources and services, and of the climate of fear that exists in 
Cambodia. It is unlikely that direct orders were given to doctors not to give medical aid. 
Awareness of their position in the government's economy of power would, arguably, 
have been sufficient to convey to health workers the dangers of involvement. Such 
incidents reinforce division of society into insiders, who enjoy protection and reward, 
and outsiders, who are vulnerable and unable to enforce claims to goods or services. 
In certain situations, the Cambodian government possesses the capacity to determine 
responses absolutely. One interview described this, with reference to the Sirivudh case: 
I compare it to a typhoon... so if we are in our boat and if we don't want to 
sink, we have to come to the port, attach well to the port and stay here. 
Don't go out in front. Stay and stand by for a while. Wait for the radio to 
say to us, `Now it's gone'. '° 
The importance of Sirivudh's arrest and the bombing of the KNP demonstration arises 
from the level of threat these actors represented to the governing economy of power. 
Sirivudh, as a member of the royal family and a popular democrat, commanded certain 
resources of power which challenged CPP monopoly of power. The KNP was attacked 
9Barber and Chaumeau, "Slaughter on Sunday - March 30 1997, " PPP 4-17 Apr. 1997,1. 
1°H 14. 
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violently shortly after it entered an alliance with Funcinpec for the purpose of opposing 
the CPP in the 1998 elections. Both cases exemplify the abandonment of even a 
powerful actor, if he becomes a target for attack, by insiders who fear loss of insider 
status through association with the excluded victim. 
Big political cases are national political events, exemplifying the anti-pluralist drive 
towards monopoly at the level of national political competition. These cases illustrate 
deep vertical fissures between different party structures in political society, and show 
the uses of "effectiveness" in the CPP economy of power. Through incidents such as 
the Sirivudh case and the grenade attack on the KNP, Hun Sen demonstrated his ability 
to transcend constitutional, international, or internal political checks on his power. 
b) Local level cases. Descriptions by NGO staff of their day-to-day work give a 
stronger sense of a horizontal rift between the state and the `grass roots'. Human rights 
workers rarely named particular political parties as human rights abusers, tending to 
group `the authorities' together. 
Partly, this is because at the local level, the majority of police, military, officials, court 
personnel, and 'people with power' are CPP. Consequently, at the micro-level of state- 
society relations the 'authorities' are relatively undifferentiated politically. The difficulty 
experienced by Funcinpec in inserting large numbers of its members into the state 
apparatus except at ministerial level means that for the majority of Cambodians, 
officialdom retains the same face in the 1990s as it had in the 1980s. Thus one 
interviewee commented: 
The situation is quite difficult because the new commune chiefs are not 
selected yet, so they are all CPP. So it's quite difficult. Other political party 
members only have titles, no power. I think there will be a lot of 
intimidation [around the elections] because they are all in the same party. " 
Partly, perceptions of the 'authorities' as undifferentiated politically reflects the fact that 
the majority of Cambodians are not members of opposition parties. Abuses against non- 
members are abuses against outsiders rather than against active government opponents. 
11H4, personal interview (Khm. ), 29 July 1996, Kompong Cham. 
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Cases of non-selective violence, including land confiscation, arbitrary killing, 
intimidation and extortion by police and military, are widespread in Cambodia, and 
motivated more often by economic than by political considerations. Officials of the 
state apparatus are paid minimal salaries which they often supplement through abuse of 
rights for economic gain - through bribe-taking, extortion, the sale of confiscated 
property, and, in the case of the police and military, robbery. 
While the immediate motive is often economic, pervasive violence is an expression of 
the exclusionary ideology of the prevailing economy of power. Those with connections 
can escape being touched by such activities; the perpetrators of them, as insiders with 
connections, can escape punishment. Thus the division between insiders and outsiders 
is pertinent at every level of society, and the insecurity faced by outsiders is extreme. 
For example, 
Before we provided training to [the local people] there was a very serious 
incident in one family. The daughter was raped by the local authorities, and 
they just did not know where to go to make a complaint. They thought that 
if they went to the Commune, or to the District, it's useless because all those 
guys are fiiends with each other. 12 
This is a typical case of non-selective violence. The rape was arbitrary and the victim 
was not an opponent of the government, but her family was powerless to seek effective 
remedy because they did not have the appropriate connections. It is significant in this 
respect to note that this interviewee identifies the commune, or subdistrict, and district 
officials as 'friends with each other', indicating the increased politicisation of local 
levels of the state apparatus in comparison with the Sihanouk regime. May Ebihara 
describes the subdistrict chief for Sobay Village in 1959 as a 'fellow peasant' - elected 
by and sharing a similar background to the villagers themselves. 13 
A second case, reported by Amnesty International in March 1997, concerned a drunken 
soldier, who fired a rocket launcher over the heads of his drinking partners during an 
argument, killing six children crowded around an ice-cream stall in Krang Kontroul 
12H6. 
13Ebihara "Intervillage" 366. 
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village, Kompong Chhnang Province. According to witnesses, four soldiers, also 
wounded, shot at the feet of villagers who rushed to the scene, to coerce them into 
helping the soldiers, before helping their own children. Amnesty International's report 
quoted the words of one villager: 
We want to know why all of those people have been killed in our village and 
is it an injustice or justice that the government hasn't done anything to stop 
it? The government just allows these people to commit the same abuses 
again and again and people live in constant fear. When people are being 
murdered like animals, like chickens and ducks and the government does 
nothing about it, the people are afraid ... 
14 
Again, the presence of the military in the villages represents a feature of rural life which 
was much less common before the late 1960s. 
In both these cases, the arbitrary behaviour of members of the authorities seriously 
abused civilians, and no action was taken on behalf of the victims. After Amnesty 
international's intervention, soldiers were arrested for the incident at Krang Kontroul, 
but significantly, domestic channels of complaint were not available to the villagers 
themselves. 
The non-selective abuse of human rights at the micro-level is advantageous to leaders 
viewed as able to protect effectively, since it creates a climate of fear. Outsiders, who 
have no opportunity to secure protection or remedy for abuse, face a constant threat. 
The pervasiveness and arbitrariness of violence in Cambodia makes it particularly 
pernicious, in that the individual can take no unilateral precautions to avoid it. 
Such activities promote the strength of existing patronage machines. Against the threat 
of violence, only attachment to the authorities by means of political or family 
connections constitutes protection. Consequently, abuse acts as a stimulus to seek out 
the most powerful protector that can be found. Frequently, the most egregious abusers 
are identified as the most powerful protectors, creating a situation where abuse attracts 
support and thus creates greater incentive for finther abuse. For the CPP, pervasive 
"Amnesty Intemational, Kingdom of Cambodia. The Children of Krang Kontroul. - Waitingfor Justice 
(London: Amnesty Intemational, Mar. 1997), 4-5. 
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violence, and particularly the threat of arbitrary abuse of human rights, represents a 
significant power resource in that the offering of protection is the CPP's greatest 
strength, and the sphere in which it is unrivalled by the other parties. 's 
Victims of this power system experience difficulties in making their voices heard. 
According to one human rights worker, this is a long-standing feature of the Cambodian 
polity: 
People want to have rights. Because they are afraid of the authorities.... It is 
the custom in Cambodia that we cannot speak to the authorities, just respect, 
respect, respect. We cannot talk to the high-ranking elite - like French, 
Khmer Rouge... Before, the government had absolute power. 16 
Arguably, the greater intrusion of military and political and state officials in the villages 
in the 1990s, compared to the 1950s and early 1960s, renders the problems raised by 
such power differentials more acute. The gulf between state and citizen, at village level, 
is absolute, for those without insider connections, through family or political party. The 
climate of fear fostered by arbitrary abuse causes the continued disempowerment of the 
citizen in his relationship with state representatives and seriously impedes day-to-day, 
micro-level political participation by outsiders. Insiders, on the other hand, are 
advantaged by widespread human rights abuse. Insiders are not usually the victims of 
abuse. When they suffer, channels for gaining effective remedy are available to them. 
Violence is thus embedded in an economy of power in which protection is a key 
resource to be exchanged for political loyalty. It is exacerbated by the introduction of 
multi-party competition. Just as 'big political cases' result from competition within 
political society, so abuse of civil, political, economic and environmental rights spiral 
throughout society as a result of competition between systems of protection. 
15In the very early years of the Royal Government the Khmer Rouge offered some protection for villagers 
fleeing harassment by government military or officials; but from 1995 onwards, facing a deteriorating 
military situation, they began to pressure villages more intensely. In 1996, accounts of villages suffering 
abuse from both Khmer Rouge and government forces were reported, for example, "Mr Kem Sokha: Go 
Down to the Crocodile, Climb Up to the Tigerl Police in Chanildri District Arrest People to Extort 
Moneyl" UKK26 June 1996,1. 
16H10, personal interview (Eng. ), 25 Jan. 1996, Phnom Penh. 
179 
Chapter 6: Violence, Economic Gain and Power 
Big political cases show explicitly the current insecurity of the dominant economy of 
power, transposed into a multi-party democracy. When a patronage system is threatened 
with competition, the most symbolically significant method of defeating its rival is to 
strike at its head. Popular rivals who could provide an alternative source of patronage 
and protection are removed in order to demonstrate their weakness and to re-assert the 
power of the dominant party. 
The same competition is responsible for pervasive violence at village level. Insiders 
increase their predatory activities towards outsiders, for example, through the 
appropriation of lands, forced closure of opposition party offices, and random 
perpetration of murder, extortion and rape with impunity. These activities, and the 
climate of impunity fostered to facilitate them, reflects the insecurity of patrons when 
faced with challenge from an alternative system. Fostering of impunity reflects attempts 
to increase the cohesiveness of the system, by allowing insiders to glean ever larger 
rewards. Concomitantly, it demonstrates increasingly clearly to waverers the risks 
inherent in transferring allegiance. 
Consequently, non-selective, arbitrary violence and selective, political violence are 
related, arising from the drive towards monopoly over resources of protection and 
material enrichment. In a single-party system, monopoly is uncontested. A context 
which sees rival party machines attempting to monopolise power at the expense of one 
another is more unstable and leads to competitive excess. 
Comparison of present-day Cambodia with the Cambodia of the Sihanouldst period in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s is instructive in this respect. Then, as now, outsiders 
were isolated; hence the flight into exile of Son NgocManh, the disappearance into the 
maquis of the Khmer Rouge leadership, and the execution of thousands of dissenters on 
both left and right. It is instructive that during the Sihanouk era, the pervasiveness of 
violence increased in conjunction with increasing levels of intellectual dissidence. 
A key difference between human rights abuse in Sihanouk's time and human rights 
abuse in the 1990s lies in the extent to which abuse today emerges from politicisation 
within the villages. As discussed in Chapter Four, with reference to studies made by 
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Ebihara of village life in Cambodia in 1959, political divisions in the Sihanouk era were 
largely confined to the urban intellectual strata. Within the villages, loyalty to Sihanouk 
was widespread, and was cultivated through Sihanouk's populist activities designed to 
promote ideological adherence to the state-society relationships envisaged in the 
doctrine of Buddhist Socialism. 
During this period of Cambodian history, there was less need to manufacture crisis 
within the villages in order to prove the regime's protective capacity and the consequent 
advantages of loyalty. The ideology of Buddhist Socialism and Sihanouk's personal 
popularity obviated the need for overt exercises of political power within the villages. 
Sihanouk's use of rural support, expressed through ballots and referenda, to strengthen 
his position vis-A-vis elite rivals indicates the stability of the peasant-prince relationship, 
which did not need to be continually bolstered by use of threat. In the 1990s, this has 
been replaced by the fostering of a politicised network of appointed officials, who enjoy 
little traditional or ideological legitimacy in the villages, and whose political loyalties to 
their superiors are rewarded by high-level tolerance of their abusive activities towards 
9 outsiders' in the villages. 
The work of Ebihara and Frieson, discussed in Chapter Four, suggests that in 
Cambodian villages, at least until the late 1960s, the divisions between insiders, with 
access to the power of state institutions, and outsiders, who were at the mercy of them, 
were not as clearly defined as they are in the 1990s, because of the limited reach of state 
institutions for most of this period. In the second half of the 1960s, rural teachers and 
monks became targets of repression, but these groups were still differentiated from the 
mass of ordinary farmers, whose contact with the world beyond the village was 
generally mediated by Chinese merchants, rather than by politicised state structures. 17 
Since 1979, the civil war, Vietnamese occupation, and the building of a politicised state 
apparatus aimed at penetrating, surveilling and controlling the rural population have 
brought political divisions permanently into the lives of the majority of Cambodians. 
17Frieson Revolution 44. 
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Since the election campaign in 1993, Cambodian political parties have competed for 
active support within the villages. The self-evidence of political relationships has been 
destroyed in rural society. The insecurity of political leaders means that the loyalty of 
the ordinary villager cannot be assumed until actions prove the contrary, as it was in the 
days of Sihanouk's rule. It must be redemonstrated continually, by party membership or 
other form of attachment. Party members are rewarded by guarantees of protection and 
impunity, which alter relationships within the villages between those with political 
connections, and those without. 
The ability to monopolise force at local level remains the CPP's greatest resource. In 
response to the competitive crisis constituted by elections taking the form of a national 
secret ballot, the CPP has increasingly required active proof of loyalty from insiders, 
while employing the same tactics of violence towards and exclusion of outsiders as 
Sihanouk used against elite dissidents in the 1960s. In a context of political competition 
in the villages, where the pool of outsiders is Much larger than in the context of the 
monarch-subject relationship, violence spirals. It is this that accounts for the 
extraordinary prevalence of state violence, not just within the political arena but in all 
levels of Cambodian society down to the village. 
For the average Cambodian, the level of the state with which he is likely to have contact 
is still CPP-dominated. Membership of any other party is likely to leave him more 
isolated, more vulnerable and no better protected in the village. Tberefore a perpetual 
climate of fear of arbitrary abuse is a resource of power which serves the CPP well. 
This does not mean that arbitrary abuses are ordered by the highest levels. Abuse arises 
froma, number of contingencies, including the militarisation of society; the lack of 
income available to soldiers and police; the lack of laws, and awareness of laws; and 
most importantly, the climate of impunity which allows state departments and military 
divisions to protect their members. It is the lack of government action to ameliorate such 
causes of abuse such as, for example, removing legal impediments to prosecution of 
alleged rights abusers in the civil service - which provides compelling evidence that 
such abuses operate in the interests of leaders. Other parties were ill-equipped to 
compete in that they had insufficient organisation at village level to counter the CPP's 
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strategy. By using its monopoly of force within the villages to cultivate loyalty through 
fear, and to allow illegal self-enrichment of supporters, rather than to engender a general 
atmosphere of security and promote nation-wide development schemes, the CPP 
tightened its hold over its followers and created an environment in which violence is 
politicised. 
This analysis puts human rights abuse and impunity for abusers at the heart of the CPPs 
strategy to retain power between 1993 and 1997. It suggests finther that the economy of 
power employed historically by Cambodian rulers and recycled by the present regime is 
incompatible with political freedoms in the sense of recognition of the right to 
participate peacefully in a multiparty system. 'This is partly due to the association of 
power networks with the idea of the nation. 
The exercise of power in Cambodia takes the form of personal relationships spreading 
down and outwards from the ruler at the top of the hierarchy towards the lowest levels 
of the state. Beyond the state are the people who are excluded from possessing power 
except through personal relationships with members of the state, through family or 
political allegiances. In the traditional C=bodian kingdoms, ideally, if not in practice, 
the ruler maintained a symbolic relationship with all his rural subjects, as well as, to an 
extent, a political relationship in that he was accessible to them for receiving petitions 
and hearing grievances. Recent rulers have gained power by virtue of their ability to 
overthrow incumbents and have not enjoyed legitimacy in the eyes of the nation as a 
whole; consequently they have attempted to negate opposition by redefining the nation 
to exclude opponents as 'traitors' or 'invaders'. This tactic is familiar from the 
Sihanouk era, but, given greater politicisation at village level, it excludes much wider 
sections of the population from enjoyment of rights of citizenship. 18 
"This is an emphasis subscribed to by the political opposition also, particularly in the pro-KNP 
newspapers. As described in Chapter Three with reference to the UNTAC era, the professed concern of 
nationalists is to prevent the Khmer nation from being "swallowed by neighbouring countries a little at a 
time until it is all gone V'Who Are the Lovers of Corruption? " MK 28-29 June 1996,11" and to end "the 
barbarous war that destroys Khmers VI Really Wonder... " UKK 13 June 1996,2]". By employing rhetoric 
designed to exclude the CPP leadership as "former Khmer Rouge run(ning) to make Red Yuon politics 
C'Editorial: Political Games of Old Children - They Want to Hold Demonstrations to Get Rid of Khmers 
from Khmer Territory, " MK 21-22 June 1996,1], the nationalists are in effect redefining Khmer 
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c) Otherforms of violence. Violence in the form of continued warfare against the 
remnants of the Khmer Rouge can be explained using this theoretical model. Whereas 
the competition between the CPP and Funcinpec, and later also the KNP, was 
transferred to the political stage between 1993 and 1997, competition between the CPP 
and the Khmer Rouge remained on the battlefield. 
Violence on the battlefield has been used in a similar way to violence within political 
society itself, for symbolic and economic purposes as well as to keep rivals physically at 
bay and to provide a rationale for the maintenance of militarisation. The CPP's resort to 
military force in 1997, following Ranariddh's attempts to bring the Khmer Rouge into 
Phnom Penh in the run-up to elections, indicates that the CPP was determined to keep 
the CPP-Khmer Rouge contest on a military level. Partly this can be seen as a response 
by the CPP leadership to its military constituency. Providing military commanders with 
a raison d6tre was an important element of a political strategy which relied on credible 
threats of force. 
The CPP also attempted to use the Khmer Rouge threat as an ideological power 
resource. The stigmatising of enemies of the CPP as 'Khmer Rouge'19 is an example of 
nationalism as a common anti-Vietnamese stance. Anyone who does not subscribe to this stance is 
branded a "traitor"; for example: 
(Hun Sen] should know that anywhere where the Yuon have invaded, taken our Khmer 
territory along the border, he should go and block them, chase them out again, because he is 
responsible for the destiny of the nation.. If he is a patriot, he should know what he should 
do! If he still acts as if he doesn't know about, or hear about, or isn't bothered about these 
problems then it can only be that he is connected with these actions. And if he is the 
instigator of the loss of Khmer land to Am... and of calling the Yuon to enter and settle 
the whole country, and helping the Yuon to have high positions; then truly hasn't he become 
a traitor? CMr Hun Sen Should Knowl" UKK 19 June 1996,4]. 
This alleged concern for the destiny of the nation excludes a section of the nation through use of the 
exclusionary terms 'patriot' and 'traitor'. The issue, although aimed at personalities such as Hun Sen, 
involves the status of hundreds of thousands of Cambodians of Vietnamese origin. Rhetoric excludes 
these, and by association excludes anyone with a pro-immigration stance as excluded from legitimate 
political participation by reason of their ethnicity or beliefs. By defining these issues as a litmus test of 
loyalty to the nation, peaceful democratic debate on these issues is ruled out in favour of the kind of 
exclusion and division that perpetuates violence. 
19For example, the KNP reported from Phnom Penh on 16 Nov. 1996: 
In a press conference held today at Hun Sen's residence, 3 Khmer Rouge defectors stated 
that Sam Rainsy has connections with the Khmer Rouge, has received money from the KR 
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this. The symbolism inherent in the CPP-Khmer Rouge conflict and its impact on the 
peace process between 1991 and 1993 has been discussed. The resurrection of the 
January 7th holiday in 1996, despite opposition from Funcinpec, to commemorate the 
, liberation' of Phnom Penh from the Khmer Rouge, shows that this symbolic resource is 
still awarded some political potency by the CPP. In a speech made on this day, Hun 
Sen took the opportunity to remind crowds of the DK era, and of his own alleged role in 
liberating Cambodia: 
Today is the day that saved us from Pol Pot's genocide, the day that gave us 
the second birth.... This historic victory has saved the nation. It has saved 
millions of lives in a timely manner. It has brought democracy and the 
respect for human rights back to life and has actively participated in the 
effort for regional peace and stability... If I did not ask foreigners to liberate 
the country, who would have come? Answer it, answer the question. 20 
promoting the image of effective protector requires promoting the perception of 
immediate threat. 
Economic considerations also came into play. Before the defection of Ieng Sary and his 
troops in September 1996, the mineral wealth and timber resources controlled by them 
in the Pailin region were highly desirable prizes. Proposals for contracts with Thai 
has met Khieu Samphan in Bangkok, KNP is full of KR members. Sam Rainsy has incited 
to violence these 3 defectors by instructing them to throw grenades at foreign embassies, 
especially the US, French and Australian embassies and by promising to pay US$3,000 for 
each grenade launched. Many other details are given of Sam Rainsy's connections with the 
KR. 
The KNP feared that this would be used as a "pretext" for action to be taken against Rainsy, either 
judicially or extra-judicially ["Hun Sen-Sam Rainsy, " Camnews 17 Nov. 1996 04: 31: 14 -0500]. A more 
subtle example is taken from Reasmei Kampuchea. The newspaper reported a coincidence between a date 
fixed by Rainsy for leading a demonstration in France, and a date given by Khmer Rouge radio as 
beginning a drive to 'arrest anyone who still serves the government'; Reasmei Kampuchea commented, 
46We can see that Mr Rainsy and Mr Khieu Samphan coincide just as if it was prearranged. One struggles 
against the government and curses the government from outside, and the other announces the capture and 
extrajudicial execution of anyone who still works for the government. We don't mean to accuse Mr Sam 
Rainsy of being drawn into the Khmer Rouge, or that he is Khmer Rouge; but only to recognise that these 
two men like to do things in a similar way" VMr Sam Rainsy and Khieu Samphan Want Things to 
Coincide? " RK 9 June 1996,2]. 
"Extract from a speech made by Hun Sen, at the Hun Sen Gardens, Phnom Penh, 7 Jan. 1996, qtd in 
Munthit, "Funcinpec UIPs Rally Against Jan 7 Holiday, " PPP 12-2S Jan. 1996,1-2. Here, Hun Sea 
relates 'human rights' and 'democracy' specifically to the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge, conflating 
human rights abuse with the policies pursued in the DK era. This tactic has been discussed in Chapter 
Three with reference to the UNTAC era. 
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logging and mining companies were considered by the prime ministers in February 1996 
in anticipation of military victory in the area. 21 Opportunities for establishing lines of 
economic patronage are also inherent in the financing and equipping of military 
operations. According to one analysis: 
A continuing civil war ... accounts for 58 per cent of the current 
expenditures in the 1995 National Budget and helps to conceal the many 
irregularities and abuses of power. This includes the payment of salaries to 
ghost soldiers, purchase of overpriced equipment and other inflated 
expenditures involving 'commissions', collection of 'taxes' and 'duties' by 
armed groups acting as substitutes for the official Tax Department, massive 
illegal logging and smuggling, drug trafficking, covert borrowin s on behalf 
of the State contributing to the parallel budget run by the Army. 
N 
A strategy of continuing conflict was also problematic in certain respects. The 
continuing conflict was unpopular with Cambodians generally, and bringing peace 
would provide a boost in popularity for the peacemaker. Furthermore, while some 
advantage could taken made from the insurgency, embarrassing reverses on the 
battlefield were certainly disadvantageous to the CPP's 'effective' image. 
The major factor in the decision to return to war when peace seemed imminent, by 
means of the July 1997 coup, was undoubtedly electoral strategy. A united front of 
KNP, Funcinpec and Khmer Rouge, the latter rehabilitated through their break with Pol 
pot, was considered too formidable an electoral opponent. By opening up areas where 
the CPPs writ did not run, co-opting significant numbers of Khmer Rouge troops, and 
removing the threat of Pol Pot's return, the front would have significantly undermined 
the CPP's ability to monopolise power. 
An indication of the future reaction to the defection of the Khmer Rouge can be seen in 
a speech made by Hun Sen to party members in Kompong Cham, in June 1996 
following reports that Pol Pot had died. According to Reasmei Kampuchea: 
His Excellency Hun Sen said that, "These days there is one political party in 
Cambodia which creates political crises in Cambodia in order to seek 
21Cha=eau and Matthew Grainger, "Deals Being Discussed for Pailin BootY; ' PPP, 23 Feb. -7 Mar. 
1996,1. 
22S= Rainsy, "Tbe Current Situation... " 2. 
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political scapegoats ...... And they currently put out propaganda to the effect 
that "Pol Pot is dead, which is a new and very obvious political trick in the 
future ... .... His Excellency explained that perhaps in the future they would 
raise the issue of negotiations between the legitimate Royal Government of 
Cambodia and the rebel group of Khmer Rouge.... because they have 
claimed that Pol Pot is dead. 
The report continued to warn against "Pol Po&I in general. Although only other 
members of the Khmer Rouge leadership were mentioned by name, Hun Sen referred to 
"all Pol Pots within and Pol Pots without ... joining togethee'. This implies that "Pol 
Pots" exist both inside and outside the Khmer Rouge. 
If one Pol Pot is dead, not all are dead yet. Why? Because of the designated 
political organisation and troops of Pol Pot who speak in the style of Pol 
Pot, so that even if Pol Pot is dead, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary.... Pol Pot's 
designated political organisation is not yet all gone. This is why "we 
mustn't have hallucinations about the ability of Pol Pot to return at all, 
because these days all Pol Pots within and Pol Pots without are currently 
joining together". 23 
The existence of the Khmer Rouge is the necessary foil for such displays. The words of 
Hun Sen suggest that without Pol Pot, a new enemy, external or internal, will be 
manufactured. 24 
Violence within society in 1990s Cambodia, which frequently takes the form of crime, 
revenge killing and domestic abuse, is also politicised. These forms of violence are 
perceived as widespread by Cambodians, contributing to the climate of fear: immediate 
fear of attack, in the case of crime, and a less immediate but no less substantial fear of 
societal break-up, in the case of domestic violence. 
Crime is promoted by the atmosphere of lawlessness engendered by the arbitrariness of 
government abuses, the corruption within the police and courts, and the lack of laws 
themselves. The failure to institutionalise law and order means that amongst civilians, 
23"Create a Political Crisis in Order to Find Political Scapegoats, " RK 12 June 1996,1. 
24'Me trial of Pol Pot reported by Far Eastern Economic Review correspondent NateMayer as having 
been held on 25 July 1997 by the Anlong Veng Khmer Rouge under Ta Mok, has brought about this 
situation; see various reports, PPP 15-28 Aug. 1997. The trial was pre-empted by the creation of a new 
battlefront and military attack on Ranariddh as a Khmer Rouge collaborator. 
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as well as between government personnel and citizens, the strong prey upon the weak. 
The issue of crime is highly politicised. A letter to the editor printed in an opposition 
newspaper claimed the government, and particularly the CPP promoted crime in its own 
interests: 
If we take a look at the current situation in the country, we will see the 
vicious war without end; destructive deeds of murder and abduction for 
ransom occurring all over the country; economic saboteurs dodging taxes; 
there is addiction in many places; prostitution; and homeless people 
proliferate causing fear ... but there are profiteers from these problems too... 
those who have a history of stealing national resources, those who have a 
history of approaching other nations for help, those who have many villas, 
those who have man cars, because of their power, those who rely on power 
and so on and so on. 
Concern over the effects of crime has implications for human rights. Since UNTAC's 
era, human rights NGOs report attempts by the government to identify them as 
46 protecting criminals',. 26 Provisions in the Paris Agreements called for the release of all 
prisoners of war and civilian detainees held in connection with the conflict. The 
mandate to oversee human rights led UNTAC to release all detainees held for long 
periods without trial against whom there was insufficient evidence for a hearing. 27 
These efforts were still blamed, in 1996, for rampant crime. The newspaper Udam Kate 
Khmer reports: 
Mr Hun Sen said in Kompong Speu recently, "Gangs of thieves and gangs of 
criminals who were released from jail in the UNTAc era have gone back to 
25 "Stir the Water Until it's Muddy - Easy to Catch Fish: 'MK 34 July 1996,1. The references to 
'stealing national resources' and 'approaching other nations for help' clearly identify the 'profiteers' as 
members of the CPP. 
26The following comments are typical: 
At the start the local authority or the government circulated rumours that all human rights 
workers are protectors of bandits, criminals.... they assist (prisoners] but not the victims of 
crime [H5]. 
Nowadays robbers arrive at the court with freedoms. They have the freedom to do whatever 
they want to do. When they catch robbers, human rights organisations come and scream, 
protest, put it in the newspapers, make declarations. When they have freedom, they think it 
means they can do whatever they want.. They want to copy westerners but in fact they go 
too far (M]. 
27Comprehensive Arts. 16; 21-22. 
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illegal activities agains28 
The report went on to describe a declaration by Hun Sen that his own bodyguards would 
be redeployed to protect society and restore order. The newspaper claimed that this 
move had three functions, to distract attention from CPP violence, to increase 
surveillance of opposition politicians and journalists, and "to show that he is the 
strongest and has greater effectiveness than the whole government! t. 29 By this means, 
crime is constructed as a threat against which Hun Sen is able effectively to protect. 
While it is used to political effect, crime in Cambodia cannot be laid at the door of 
either government, human rights NGOs or released detainees. It must be viewed as 
arising from systemic factors. The failure to institutionalise the legal equality of all 
citizens leads to relationships of power appearing at every level. The orientation of 
political relationships is always towards the extraction of maximum advantage by the 
strongest party, with the objective of maximising power. Arguably, in an atmosphere of 
social dislocation and free market economics, such an attitude has been transferred into 
social and economic relationships too. 
With no institutionalised framework for conflict resolution, vendettas, including revenge 
killing, lead to spiralling violence. The disruption to social organisation over the past 
twenty-five years has also caused a breakdown in moral values in the eyes of 
interviewees: 
In Kompong Speu there was a husband who got drunk and hit his wife. 
After he learned about rights, now he just sleeps instead. And problems 
with children - want to fight all the time. But after human rights training we 
can reduce such violence. Because before, our young men used to go and 
live in the monastery and were taught by the monks how to live a good life. 
Now human rights organisations have to do thiS. 30 
The most traumatic development in Cambodian society was the harsh 
Kluner Rouge revolution. It destroyed humanity in many Cambodians. 
When stealing was taken as normal for survival... We lost that.... And the 
28"Mr Hun Sen Deploys His Own Bodyguards Because He Doesn't Trust the Activities of the National 
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young Cambodians now who were born. and brought up in the [Khmer 
Rouge] days - some of them are brutes. 31 
Perceptions such as those above suggest a polity pervaded by fear and social crisis, 
consonant with the analysis of an economy of power which places a premium on 
provision of protection to loyalists and exercise of overt power against opponents, in the 
context of multi-party competition. 
d) Human Rights abusefor economic gain. Human rights abuse is also important in 
offering the opportunity for insiders to enrich themselves in material terms at the 
expense of outsiders, upon whom they may prey with impunity: 
Most of the Cambodian officials, they just use their power for their own 
interests and it starts from here. Because if you are a policeman, you have a 
gun and because you have this you are able to get any intereSt32 that you 
need. That's the problem. 33 
In Cambodia, the phenomenon of 'rent-seeking' - the We of an official position to 
generate private income - is widespread in all levels of government. While the 
imposition of small 'fees' by teachers or healthworkers for services constitutes a minor 
burden on the public and is not perceived as a human rights abuse, extortion and robbery 
by local military and police is perceived as such. At the highest levels of government, 
officials using their position to seek personal gain has far-reaching consequences for the 
social, political and economic development of the nation. 
The many land rights complaints received by human rights organisations exemplify the 
connection between human rights abuse and economic gain: 
Land disputes are very important. After the liberalisation of the economy, 
the price of land increased and the powerful people or the authorities - some 
of them violate the rights of the people. They occupy the land using the 
military, by force, or by other means, tricks... For example in Kompong 
Speu town, we helped the people to remain in the same place after they 
arrested some people and put them in jail; or after they trick the people, we 
31H16. 
V-1, "'Me term 'interest' - tIS =AS refers to profit or advantage; it is often pecuniary and extracted from 
connections to a patron or from holding a position of power. 
33 L1. 
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assist the people... But sometimes we fail also. 34 
Some property of the people has been confiscated by the authorities to sell to 
the rich, to businessmen .... [T]he land issue in Cambodia is a very, very big 
question right now. Because land attracts a high price. So people wh *o 
have 
a plot of land near the city have been victims of land confiscation. 
Sometimes in the provinces. 35 
In a predominantly agricultural country, with little alternative employment available, 
uncompensated land seizure is disastrous for farmers, but by fostering impunity, the 
CPP is able to provide for the economic welfare of its followers by this means, without 
expending its own resources. 
In the cities, squatters and other urban poor are at risk. A letter to an opposition 
newspaper argued that the demolition of "hundreds of illegal buildings and small 
houses", which took place before the 1993 election under the slogan "Improving the 
Beauty of Phnom Penh", was in fact used to clear plots of land which were 
sold by the CPP to investors under the slogan of free market economics. 
Not only this, but factories, undertakings, public buildings, village halls, 
houses, hundreds more places that belong to the state were sold. 
Income generated was used to buy CPP votes, the letter asserted. 36 
Land disputes are complicated by a paucity of land ownership records following the 
upheavals of the last twenty five years, and by the lack of effective and meaningful 
judicial oversight. It is a relatively new form of abuse. While historical precedents can 
be drawn from, for example, the confiscation of land to create fruit plantations which 
sparked the Samlaut Rebellion in 1967/8, this appears, from the historical record, to 
have been a relatively localised form of abuse at the time. In the 1990s, a more 
widespread trend of using human rights abuse to gain economic advantage can be noted, 
emerging from the new property relations created by the transition to a free-market 
economy in the late 1980s. 
34H5, 
personal interview (Eng. ), 10 Jan. 1996, Phnom Penh. 
35iA. 
36"Stronger then a Tigerl" A reader's view, MK 28-29 June 1996,1. 
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In the 1990s, the illegal sale of other 'national resources', such as timber, to raise money 
for the political purpose of vote-buying is also frequently alleged by the political 
opposition. Sam Rainsy, former Minister of Economics and Finance and currently 
president of the opposition Khmer Nation Party, charged in 199S that both prime 
ministers had reneged on commitments to limit timber exports. Rainsy argued the prime 
ministers were involved in secret exports, carried out by the military, under the Ministry 
of National Defence, avoiding scrutiny by customs officers and by all other organs of 
state. 37 Rainsy argued that vast sums were being lost to the national budget from this 
unscrutinised and untaxed trade; the same was true in the rubber industry, largely 
38 
controlled by 'armed gangs', 'provincial governors' and 'warlords'. 
This view is supported by the environniental. NGO Global Witness, which has 
repeatedly made charges of illegal logging in Cambodia, and claimed in 1997 that 
illegal logging is fuelling a parallel budget to equip and feed .... .. private 
annies! ' which de-stabilise the country and hinder economic development.... 
The effects of the situation run counter to development, plunder the 
country's resource base and result in increased human rights abuses. 
"Forestry officials can't do their job anywhere.... Independent RCAF groups 
are popping up because of the income.... There are well-armed and financed 
groups all over the place". 39 
Environmental issues are frequently addressed by Cambodian human rights NGOs. For 
example, the Cambodian Committee for Human Rights in 1996 raised a number of 
environmental issues with government, including silting of the Mekong River in Phnom 
40 Penh, logging, hygiene in fish farming, and water and air pollution. The right to a 
healthy environment has been recognised in international law as a so-called '1hird 
generation right' . 
41 In economies based on subsistence agriculture, environmental 
37SaM RainSy, "The Logging Issue, Its Impact on Public Finance, Environment, and the Food Situation. " 
Cambodia: Documentsfor the International Conference on the Reconstruction of Cambodia (1CORQ, 
Rainsy (Paris, 14-15 Mar. 1995). 
38SaM Rainsy, "A Condition for Further International Assistance Should Be Greater Transparency in 
Public Decision Maldng, " Documentsfor ICORC 4; 6. 
39Hurley Scroggins, "Bout of pre-CG Lobbying, " Phnom Penh Post, 27 June- 10 July 1997,15. 
4OH13, personal interview (Khm. ), 10 July 1996, Phnom Penh. 
"Ibird generation rights, including the rights to peace, development, and a healthy environment, were 
introduced into international law following the UN General Assembly's 1986 Declaration on the Right to 
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issues have a major impact on farming patterns, affecting the right to an adequate 
standard of living. Deforestation in Cambodia has been connected to flooding, which 
endangers lives, livelihoods and homes ý2 
The involvement of the military in illegal logging also turns logging areas into no-go 
areas for civilians, enhancing the climate of fear. Use of secret logging revenues to 
support political parties is a political rights issue. Use of human rights abuse for 
economic gain, at the highest levels of governance, occurs on a scale sufficient, 
arguably, to retard modernisation and development, impede democratic accountability 
and political participation, and wreak major changes in the lives of ordinary 
Cambodians. Rights-based analysis of such issues suggests that imposing divisions 
between different 'generations' of rights disguises their indivisibility in connection with 
systemic abuses of power. 
Politicised Development and Political Competition 
Widespread use of funds gained from abuse of rights, including rights to a healthy 
environment, impinge upon wider concerns of accountability and transparency of 
governance. In the political sphere, the channelling of funds away from the coffers of 
state institutions, and into the pockets of political figures for use in winning political 
support, undermines efforts to encourage neutrality and accountability in the state 
bureaucracy. 
According to a confidential report submitted by Rainsy to the Consultative Group on 
Cambodia meeting in Tokyo in May 1996: 
Second Prime Minister Hun Sen has already begun his election campaign 
Development These rights are discussed in Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and 
practice (London: Cornell UP, 1989) 143-157. 
42SaM Rainsy argues that uncontrolled deforestation led in 1994 to "successive flooding and drought of 
very uncommon intensity. The consequence was a disastrous harvest, a sharp increase in the price of rice 
(and hence inflation) and now an extremely serious food shortage, bordering on famine, for a large part of 
the rur-9 population.... [I]t is only a foretaste of what is to come if Cambodia's evergreen forest coverage, 
which has declined dramatically from about 70 per cent of land-area in 1970 to less than 40 per cent at 
present, is allowed to decline yet ftirther [Rainsy, "Cambodia: Ile Logging Issue, Its Impact on Public 
Finance, Environment and the Food Situation! 'Documentsfor ICORC 6]". 
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and proudly shows off his "donations"; hundreds of schools, canals and 
parks bearing his name and reportedly financed out of his own pocket. He 
openly acknowledges that he has requested and received "contributions" 
from prosperous companies and wealthy individuals. This corrupt system of 
clientelism works to the detriment of the State which is deprived of normal 
revenues and thus unable to perform its normal functions. In the absence of 
transparency and accountability, it is increasingly difficult to plan and 
implement development policy at any level, in any sector. 43 
Rainsy criticised the acceptance of 'gifts' and 'tips', including a tip from the Malaysian 
firm Ariston of $108 million, by the two prime ministers from private companies when 
governmental contracts were signed. Such tips, Rainsy argued, militated against the 
formation of clear development plans. He commented: 
In Cambodia, certain leaders treat State assets and the property of the nation 
as their own personal belongings. Leaders have acted more as businessmen 
out to make a fast buck, than as statesmen responsible for their country's 
future. 44 
The emergence in Cambodia of an underground economy, serving the interests of power 
rather than promoting a modernist development strategy, provides important power 
resources to those who wish to resist democratic change and rights to political 
participation. By using the military to avoid oversight and by encouraging the 
complicity of low-level officials, economic gain by the elite can take place beyond the 
controls of state, democratic accountability or law. 
The culture of individual appropriation and distribution of state budgets is anti- 
modernistý viewed from a liberal pluralist perspective, since it does not permit the 
formation of a secular or 'neutral' conception of national development or the national 
interest detached from personalities and their individual political agendas. It 
perpetuates politicisation in all aspects of state domestic policy. If the state budget is 
usurped by individuals to be bestowed as gifts, then there can be no planning, no 
oversight, and no criticism of the pattern of disbursement; indeed, no policies as the 
term is understood in a liberal democratic context. 
43 Sam Rainsy, "The Current Situation in Cambodia is Appalling, the Donor Countries Must React 
Urgently, " unpublished note for the Consultative Group Meeting, Tokyo, 11-12 July 1996,6. 
44Sam Rainsy, "Transparency" 9. 
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This politicisation has a significant impact on political participation and pluralism in 
that there is no role for a loyal opposition party in such a political system. Citizens are 
not perceived as enjoying a right to equal benefit from the state budget, so there can be 
no basis on which to criticise. Parties within government will divert as many funds as 
they are able to appropriate to areas strategic to their own political bases. Parties 
without access to funds are disempowered through their inability to reward support. 
Consequently, development activities are politicised. Hun Sen, in a speech to business 
students at the University of Phnom Penh, argued that 
We should not worry even if there are 50 more political parties... The 
Cambodian people would benefit from more (political] parties because the 
parties would compete to build schools and roads and dig wells. 45 
The dividing line between state funds and party funds, state income and personal 
income becomes blurred. One opposition newspaper asks: 
where does [Hun Sen] get the extra money he has to give to students, give to 
the people and build schools, tarmac roads, canals, saying it is a present 
from himself and makes them put his name on these? 46 
In a subsequent issue the same newspaper declared: 
We believe that the general citizens certainly understand about the 
demagogic tricks without doubt and the citizens will be hurt and will join in 
the resistance in the democratic political movement to struggle and demand 
the return of justice, a free society, and conscience for the national 
47 interest... 
it is unclear whether ordinary Cambodians view the issue similarly. Pro-CPP 
48 
newspapers give wide and laudatory coverage to these activities. Yet students 
'sExtract from a speech by Hun Sen at University of Phnom Penh, 3 Feb. 1996, qtd in Vong Sokheng, 
"Parties Could Boost Development, PM Says, " Cambodia Daily, 5 February 1996,8. What is significant 
is not the fact that Hun Sen claims to accept new parties, since this statement is contradicted by his 
activities vis-A-vis political rivals; rather, the comment is an indication of the patron-client ideology 
underlying conceptions of national development. 
'6"Mr Hun Sen Should Know! " UKK 9 June 1996,1. 
47 "Military Might and Demagogic Tricks" UKK 13 June 1996,3. 
48 Newspaper accounts of Hun Sen's appearances at various events in the provinces invariably include 
descriptions of gifts donated. For example, speaking to orphans and disabled children at a celebration for 
International Children's Day in 1996: 
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demonstrated against the sale of state-owned buildings and enterprises, viewed by the 
students as a means to enrich officials and politicians, in 1991.41 
Such issues exemplify the relativism inherent in different economies of power. In a 
one-party system, the requirement that leaders redistribute through patronage the income 
generated from control of national and state resources may work well in ensuring that 
wealth does not become too highly concentrated at the apex of society. 50 The 
implications of this culture in a society where liberal democratic style political 
competition is promoted are not benevolent, because of the tendency for different party- 
patronage systems to compete to divert resources towards their own supporters. The 
burden on the non-politically aligned - outsiders - increases along with the'scale of rent- 
seeking activities at the highest levels. 
It has been suggested that the rapid sale of state property which occurred before the 
His Excellency the Second Prime Minister said that: there are hundreds of thousands of 
orphans who were freed to live their lives by the 7th January 1979. Both blind children and 
children with other physical disabilities are a sorrow and a worry to His Excellency, who 
will continue to pay great attention to these... His Excellency Hun Sen gave to each child 
10,000 riel, and a Vshirt, and gave breakfast V'Render Powerless Politicians Greedy for 
War, " RK 2 June 1996,5). 
Later the same month, Reasmei Kampuchea reported donations to CPP members in Kompong Cham 
Province comprising: 
three school buildings, of 15 rooms, in Lvay Commune, Koh Souten District.... 25 water 
pumps, 5 tons of rice to Koh Souten District, and 1-3 million riel to Lvay Commune. His 
Excellency gave $ 10,000 from the CPP to the Lvay CPP for the citizens who were members 
of the party to borrow for business r'Create a Political Crisis in order to Find Political 
Scapegoats, " RK 12 June 1996,1. ] 
Similarly, the newspaper reported gifts given by Ranariddh in Banteay Meanchey province: 
the school building, built of brick, and tiled, had four rooms with desks, and cost 
US$27,150, which was a gift from His Majesty Norodom Ranariddh. His Majesty 
inaugurated a road with a bridge..., 12.5 km long, costing US$65,000 which was a gift from 
His Majesty and Nhiek Bunchhay V'His Majesty the Prince is Embarrassed in front of Mr 
Banharn, " RK 27 June 1996,1]. 
49See Amnesty International, State of Cambodia. Killings ofDemonstrators, London: Amnesty 
International, Jan. 1992. 
501t should be noted that the failure of the rich to redistribute the gains of office, which were used instead 
to pay for luxury imports, was an important part of the critique of CPK intellectuals in the 1960s. See 
Michael Vickery Cambodia 1975-1982 22. 
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election was prompted by the CPP need to buy votes in the 1993 election. 51 While 
democracy is supposed to enable control of government by citizens, it may also lead to 
greater intensity in familiar means of shoring up support, leading to excess. Practices 
which are tolerated at a low level, are rendered burdensome. 
Further abuse then arises from attempts to stifle criticism of these activities. The 1991 
student anti-corruption demonstrations ended with eight demonstrators killed. 52 
Criticism by the opposition press of development activities in the Kraingyov 
Development Zone, which has benefited from Hun Sen's personal investment, led to an 
attack on the office of opposition newspaper Sereipheap Thmei in October 1995 by 
angry Kraingyov villagers. Hun Sen's open and immediate support of this attack, in 
which he said: 
I just would like to exercise my right... to express the opinion that 
Kraingyov people were not wrong in their action. 53 
indicates the denial of the appropriacy of criticism of patronage/development activities 
by the political opposition. 54 
Hun Sen's claim that "those who are opposed to Kraingyov people ... are Khmer 
Rouge"55 reconstructs the newspaper's criticism of technical standards as an insurgent 
attack, heightening the tension surrounding the incident and justifying derogation of the 
rights of the newspaper staff by the villagers. 
Hun Sen's relationship with the Kraingyov Commune exemplifies the use of the 
material advantages of power - for example, control of state funds - to reward loyalties 
in reciprocal and personal relationships. This dynamic of patronage and loyalty, which 
is the context within which every aspect of governance takes place in Cambodia, 
51"Stronger than a Tiger! ". 
52 Amnesty, "Killings ...... 
53 Extract from a speech by Hun Sen in Kraingyov Commune, S'aang District, Kandal Province, 30 Oct. 
1995, qtd. in Barber and Munthit, "PM Says Attackers Defended their Honor, " PPP 3-16 Nov. 1995,1. 
` This remark underscores the conflation of 'right' with the right to engage in trials of populist strength 
with critics, as described in the previous chapter. 
55 Attackers I- 
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combines with multi-party political competition to cause extreme politicisation of all 
spheres of Cambodian life. There is little sense within Cambodian politics that policies 
could be made to enhance the life of the nation as a whole. Disbursements of material 
goods are made competitively with party interests in mind. Winning votes is viewed as 
a function of personal relationships conferring material benefits rather than of more 
abstract ideological appeal: 
people need help for their communities and as individuals. As long as 
anyone can help them they will vote for them. 56 
In this political economy of power, mobilisation. of loyalty to and extreme alienation 
from the state and its activities are inextricably linked. Several interviewees expressed 
the alienation of the people from the business of govenunent: 
You have to decide in your life; if you want money - OK, go into politics, 
into business.... The kind of people who do politics are the ones who like to 
become leaders with money, with power... But we, we work with the grass 
roots. 57 
If I was a candidate for a political party, I wouldn't have the chance to... 
provide any support to the people. I would have my position - big man, 
Congressman - you know, in Cambodia he is called "Your Excellency". It's 
the top. But if we are more concerned about people than about status, it's 
better to work in NGOs. 58 
Before we expected that Ranariddh , because he was a teacher 
in the Faculty 
of Law in France, would bring democracy and respect for human rights to 
Cambodia. But then he became the first Prime Minister. He put [these 
principles] aside. And now many foreigners expect that Sam Rainsy and 
Sirivudh will be good political leaders in our country in the future... like 
Ranariddh! Now they don't yet have power, but what then? I don't believe 
59 that, now. 
56D3, personal interview (Eng. ), 4 July 1996, Phnom Penh. 
57H14. 
58L3. 
5t5. By contrast, one National Assembly Deputy argued that the backing of the constitution and the 
electoral mandate made the Assembly a more effective champion of rights: 
I think local NGOs are not effective for solving these problems with human rights because 
the Cambodian leaders don't respect these NGOs much... we are members of parliament 
elected by the people. We have power given by the people - not like local human rights 
NGOs. Not like international NGOs. We have influence over the local authorities... We 
can check the prisons any time. We can ask some questions of the government. We have 
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The activities of politicians were seen by interviewees from human rights NGOs as 
largely self-serving, unrelated to the promotion of the general welfare: 
Within the parties there is nepotism to help the people who get along 
together well... Party members don't work for the government - they work 
for their own political party from top to bottom. 60 
In the 1990s, the CPP, with its 1980s State of Cambodia frarnework left more or less 
intact, and even strengthened due to the new availability of international aid, worked 
towards monopolising resources of power and presenting itself as the single frarnework 
for the distribution of key goods: economic benefits and physical protection, particularly 
in the villages. This strategy was specifically referred to by Hun Sen in April 1996: 
If you want to overthrow me by using military force, don't expect to win... 
you cannot win. You absolutely cannot win. I don't care who you are.... To 
overthrow me by using military forces is not possible .... Today, I am here to help provide for a school building. Other politicians must come to build 
eight school buildings, that is the best way to beat and overthrow Hun Sen. 61 
Siinilarly pro-CPP newspaper Reasmei Kampuchea editorialised: 
The best way to beat the People's Party is to compete to develop the 
countryside. Even though the People's Party has set out very far ahead of 
otheryarties, only if they use this strategy to compete can they have some 2 hope. 2 
The CPP's rival, Funcinpec, also newly empowered by its return to Phnom Penh after 
many years on the border, attempted to insert its own members into the distributive 
structure, while competing for the right to monopolise resources of power. Funcinpec's 
bid was strengthened by the legitimacy bestowed by its electoral mandate and by its 
association with the King, who, as constitutional monarch and symbol of the unity of the 
nation, retains a monopoly on cultural symbols. 
legislative power. (D I]. 
It is significant that this National Assembly deputy was among those forced to flee Cambodia following 
the 1997 July coup, and has since returned under UN protection. 
60H I, personal interview (Khm. ), 4 Apr. 1996, Kampot. 
"Extracts from speech made by Hun Sen at a school inauguration ceremony, Prey Veng Province, 8 Apr. 
1996, qtd in To Serey and McDowell, "Hun Sen Warns of Assassination Plot, " CD 9 Apr. 1996,3. 
629 Tditorial: If you want to defeat the People's Party, " RK 29 June 1996,2. 
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Funcinpec was also bolstered by the support of the international community which is the 
source of the majority of economic resources. To some extent, Funcinpec was able to 
distribute economic benefits of its own, although Hun Sen, in his speech to the Ministry 
of Transpor4 denigrated these efforts: 
They tried to build schools but ultimately they just changed the school 
signboard, changed the name... What sort of nonsense is thatl ... Yesterday 
the people said they received one toilet and the name was changed, that was 
in S'aang District. Just one toilet and they change the name of the school, 
whereas for that I build three buildings.... (P]ut your own, you build one, I'll 
build ten. We're a superpower too when it comes to doing that. 63 
Unable to dominate economic resources completely, the parties engaged in competition 
to display generosity, fuelling corruption, so that the burden on the citizen increased. It 
may be assumed that the burden fell most highly on outsiders, while the benefits were 
distributed disproportionately towards insiders. Part of the profits made from the rapid 
deforestation of Cambodia may have been redistributed in the villages by means of 
patronage. The fact of redistribution does not substitute for a sustainable environmental 
policy to safeguard agriculture and subsistence farmers. 
Implications for Liberal Democratic Processes of Reform 
Arguably, the systemic causes of human rights abuse in Cambodia cannot easily be 
addressed by means of liberal democratic devices. A primary device for reform, as 
envisaged by the Paris Agreements, was the device of periodic free and fair elections. 
In liberal democratic polities, the political pluralism promoted by elections and the 
institutionalisation of the role of loyal opposition are intended to overcome tendencies 
by governments to reward an exclusive group of supporters disproportionately in a 
competitive political context. Cambodia's recent electoral experience exemplifies the 
inapplicability of liberal democratic forms transposed into a different power context. 
Elections are a new component of the 1990s Cambodian political environment. 64 in 
63 Exhorting 415. 
64'Me constitution grants "citizens of either sex of at least 18 years of age" the right to participate in a 
"free, universal, equal, direct and secret ballot" to elect deputies to five-year National Assemblies, 
Constitution Arts. 34; 76; 78. 
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theory, a poll empowers outsiders, once every five years, to express their discontent at 
the position in which they find themselves. It is for this reason that elections were seen 
by UNTAC's Human Rights Component, as vital to the promotion of human rights in 
Cambodia: 
The relationship between human rights and the transition to democracy is 
very close: a level of respect for basic rights and freedoms was essential for 
the beginnings of popular political participation; conversely, the 
establishment of representative institutions and processes will act as the best 
long term safeguard for human rights. 65 
VVhile the Cambodian public responded with enthusiasm to the UNTAC election, 
analysis of responses by party leaders to the 1993 and forthcoming 1998 elections 
suggests that power was and will be exerted in such a way as to prevent elections from 
performing this political function. 
To the extent that a meaningful choice is available in an election, such a ballot 
represents a serious crisis for an economy of power such as that seen in Cambodia. This 
can be seen from the increasing violence which has occurred in the run-up to the 1998 
elections in Cambodia, culminating in a coup in July 1997 which removed Ranariddh 
from power and saw the killings of government opponents. 'Me crisis represented by 
elections is intensified in Cambodia by the fact that the party which is dominant in terms 
of military power does not control ideological resources of power, such as royal sanction 
or nationalism. Resort to force is likely as the dominant party attempts to prevent 
ideological attacks from competitors. 
An incumbent facing democratic elections has a number of choices. The most obvious 
solutions to the threat of removal are to rig the ballot via vote-buying or other means, or 
to intimidate the voters. Possession of military power makes these options attractive. 
Alternatively, potentially effective rivals may be removed in advance of polling day. 
Another strategy is to inform voters that, whatever the result of the election, power will 
not change hands, thus turning the election into a test of loyalty. 
"Human Rights Component 63. 
201 
Chapter 6. - Violence, Economic Gain and Power 
If international legitimacy is required, and international scrutiny constrains the actions 
of the rulers, the first three options may not be available. The latter alternative requires 
intensifying the existing economy of power. The level of potential threat and potential 
reward must be ratcheted up, to retain sufficient support in the key areas of bureaucracy 
and military. By this means, even if the voters elect an opponent, the instruments of 
state power can be relied upon to prevent a transfer of power. 
Familiar resources of power will be used in electioneering - the attention of the voters 
will be drawn to the physical strength and ability to protect the loyal and punish the 
disloyal, displayed by the incumbent and his followers, and the relative weakness, in this 
respect, of the opposition. Such'power will be portrayed as inherent not in the 
incumbent's inhabitancy of powerful state institution, but in the organisation and loyalty 
of party followers. The question will be tacitly raised, what will happen to this centre of 
power if another party, on the basis of an electoral win, attempts to take control? Such 
power, the electorate will be reminded, cannot be peacefully transferred, since it inheres 
in persons, not in institutions. This is exemplified by Hun Sen's regular reminders to 
the electorate of his relative youth: 
if you create any crisis, time is on our side because I'm just 44 years old and 
will not die that soon. Whereas some are old and have prepared passports 
already. Some have already gone, some are preparing their pass 
, 
Torts... I'm 
just 44 years old... I've survived one attempt to assassinate me ... 
6 
In a society where knowledge of the catastrophic effects of violence is widespread, the 
electorate are likely to be highly responsive to such threats. This was the thinking 
underlying CPP secession threats following the 1993 elections. By demonstrating its 
continued power, despite the electoral returns, the CPP was able successfully to demand 
a place in the government. The CPP thus demonstrated to the Cambodian people that 
power in Cambodia does not inhere in an electoral mandate. 
The coup of July 1997 achieved a combination of strategic objectives; it informed voters 
that the CPP is the only effective operator in Cambodia. Critics and popular opponents, 
66 Exhorting 5. 
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particularly Ranariddh, Rainsy, members of the Son Sann BLDP grouping, and groups 
of Khmer Rouge with whom Ranariddh was allegedly negotiating, have been removed. 
"Fair" elections may now take place and affirm the CPP's hold on power. The 
experiences of 1993 and 1997, showed that UNTAC's emphasis on democratic 
accountability as a key plank of human rights policy was misplaced. The CPP does not 
view the election as a resource of Power domestically, but as a crisis, which necessitates 
full deployment of familiar power resources, such as violence and material patronage. 
Analysis of the risks inherent in fighting elections offers an explanation for this. 
Arguably, the following necessary, if not sufficientý conditions must be met before 
incumbent power holders will run the risk of fighting a democratic "free and fair" 
election: 
1. That no reprisals be taken against ousted incumbentsfOr activities while in power. 
A kovemment that has ruled by division, violently abusing and enriching themselves at 
the expense of both rivals and outsiders, can expect to face sanctions after handing 
power to a rival. Unless this condition is fulfilled, the dynamic of loyalty and protection 
requires that the party leader continue to ful#1 his responsibilities to his followers, who 
will be unprotected from revenge after his fall from power. If the leader cannot 
convince followers of his ability to protect, his followers are likely to replace him with 
one of their own number rather than allow the monopoly of force to pass to an 
opposition party. 
2. That the interests of the incumbent and the interests ofthe challenger not be 
fundamentally opposed. While fear of reprisals may be the most immediate conflict of 
interest between the incumbent and the challenger, other conflicts may be pertinent. 
Some minimal area of consensus is required for the incumbent to be allowed, by his 
followers, to submit to the possibility of being ousted. There must be a view, on the 
part of the incumbents, that life would be tolerable in opposition. Two factors discussed 
previously militate against this in Cambodia: the limited role of the opposition, which 
confers little status on ousted leaders; and the widespread perception that political rivals 
constitute a threat to the survival of the nation. 
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3. That the incumbent's political appeal be based on something other than his control of 
the government. If the incumbent maintains the loyalty of his followers solely through 
functions associated with his monopoly of force and economic goods, he will be unable 
to maintain a coherent party organisation in opposition. The dynamic in operation 
among the three governmental partners indicates that loyalty, in the 1990s environment, 
flows towards power. A number of Funcinpec deputies in early 1997 split from 
Ranariddh to form a pro-CPP Funcinpec fraction within parliament. Earlier in the life 
of the government, the split between the Ieng Mouly and Son Sann fractions of the 
BLDP also indicated that part of the party was successfully co-opted by the centre of 
power. 
4. That the incumbent and hisfollowers have an alternative means oflivelihood. There 
must be some other means by which the incumbent, if ousted, can maintain a certain 
status and standard of living in society. This implies that some economic opportunities 
exist that are not contingent on political connections. At present this is not the case mi 
Cambodia; although the NGO sector arguably contains a number of politicians-in- 
waiting and may absorb some ousted deputies after the next elections. 
In Cambodia, none of these conditions obtain at present. The CPP controls few 
ideological resources. It mobilises support through offering protection and material 
goods, and is ill-equipped to survive without control of these resources. In maintaining 
its pursuit of monopoly control and perpetuating the distinction between insiders and 
outsiders, the CPP responds to the dynamics of its own internal system and obstructs 
democratic reform and emergence of hegemonic forms of control and order. 
Institutionalisation of income, status or protection would undermine the party's 
functions and is opposed to its interest. - 
Lack of institutions means that a party's display of power is continuous in Cambodia. 
The political contest is ongoing. Personal allegiances must be continually tended. An 
important reason for Funcinpec's weakness compared to the CPP, despite their 
overwhelming electoral victory and capture of the royalist mantle, lies in the fact that 
Funcinpec has failed, since 1993, to maintain relationships with old party loyalists, and 
failed to cultivate successful new ties of loyalty within the state administration. 
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Funcinpec's overtures to the Khmer Rouge in 1997 represented an attempt to make up 
for this weakness. 
The CPP, on the other hand, maintained its relationships extremely effectively, and is 
consequently able to mobilise supporters for attacks against enemies, as in the Sirivudh 
case, the sacking of the Sereipheap Thmei office, and as threatened in the denunciation 
of Ing Kieth. The CPP has demonstrated to Cambodians its effectiveness through its 
ability to remove opponents and to protect supporters. Funcinpec has removed only its 
own members - Sirivudh, Rainsy, and finally even Ranariddh - and demonstrated only 
its failure to protect its insiders. According to Hun Sen: 
Power is based on reality - what you dare to say you must dare to do... When 
they listen to what you say, this is power and when no-one listens to you, 
this is no power. If (they] demand the dissolution of the National Assembly 
or the Royal Government or to affect the Constitution, Hun Sen would like 
to declare to use armed forces to suppress [them].... I have the strength to 
do... I have the power to order troops, armed forces and that power entitles 
me to protect the Constitution. 67 
The electoral mandate has little relevance as a resource of power because it offers only a 
snapshot of the distribution of passive support at one particular time. Liberal 
democratic ideology institutionalises this snapshot into the basis of power itself by 
promoting the concept that the electoral mandate is identical to and indistinguishable 
from the will of the people; and by promoting loyalty to the maxim that the will of the 
people should rule. In Cambodia such a process of institutionalisation has not taken 
place and power continues to be a function of the ability to be 'effective' - to prevail in a 
crisis, through mobilisation of active loyalty. 
The 1998 election is unlikely to be politically significant following the removal of 
serious rivals in July 1997, unless significant interventionary support is offered to CPP 
opponents by the international community. An electoral mandate can only confer power 
if loyalty within the nation is primarily to the electoral system, rather than to individual 
parties. In Cambodia, sufficient time has not yet elapsed for such loyalty to become 
67 Extract from a speech made by Hun Sen at a medical training school, Phnom Penh, Apr. 27 1996, qtd in 
"Hun Sen: 'Live and Die With the People' , 'I PPP 3-16 May 1996,3. 
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engrained. Entrenchment of the concept in the future seems unlikely given the 
continued use of violence to undermine pluralism. As a technique designed to empower 
outsiders, promoting respect for human rights abuse, democratic accountability via 
periodic free and fair elections has failed. 
Given that elections cannot be effectively used within the Cambodian context to achieve 
outcomes which empower outsiders, it is necessary to question the relevance of "human 
rights" as a political concept within the Cambodian political framework. Since 1991, a 
number of voices have emerged within Cambodia which critique the existing political 
fi-amework, with reference to both liberal democratic ideas promoted by the 
international community, and to so-called 'Cambodian values', presented as emerging 
from Khmer culture. These critiques, and the nature of the internationally sponsored 
, civil society' from which they emerge, are examined in detail in Chapters Seven, Eight 
and Nine. To provide a context within which to examine these local intellectual 
responses to the human rights situation, some comments can be made regarding the 
theoretical implications of the analysis offered here for cultural relativist critiques of 
universal promotion of human rights. 
It has been argued that the problems prioritised by Cambodian human rights NGOs arise 
from systemic factors which are integral to the Cambodian political economy of power. 
Frequently these problems encompass abuse of a variety of different rights, going 
beyond the liberal cluster of civil and political freedoms to encompass rights to 
education, livelihood, and a healthy environment. When these abuses are viewed within 
the context of the system that produces them, the indivisibility of certain goods, which 
can be conceptualised in the language of rights and freedoms and which are essential for 
survival in culturally significant ways, can be perceived. 
The applicability of liberal democratic solutions to denial of these rights cannot be 
clearly demonstrated. In Cambodia, much of the current violence springs from the 
existence of political competition. Because the key power resource of 'effectiveness' 
manifested through control of force and violence has become separated from major 
ideological power resources, of royal sanction and nationalism, the polity is split into a 
group of loyal insiders, who are rewarded, and a large group of outsiders who are 
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targeted. 
Within traditional Cambodian culture, a unified patronage system would have provided 
protection and reward within a hierarchical political framework legitimised by 
traditional and religious values and discourses. This fi-amework has been sundered and 
the structural and superstructural elements of power have been turned against one 
another causing a mismatch between legitimacy and power. The application of liberal 
democratic solutions, through, for example, the creation of liberal democratic organs of 
state or promotion of civil society may exacerbate violence since these formations are 
not promoted within a liberal democratic framework of understanding and political 
pluralism. 
The term 'human rights' can arguably be usefully applied in this situation, not in order 
to beckon liberal democratic solutions, but to mark practices which make an acceptable 
standard of living impossible. Arbitrary violence and dispossession is, arguably, 
particularly pernicious because the individual can take no steps to protect himself other 
than adherence to potential abusers. Consequently, within the framework of the 
economy of power currently prevalent in Cambodia, such violence has a tendency to 
spread and increase. As yet, it will be argued in the next chapters, few internal 
mechanisms have emerged within the current Cambodian power structure which can 
prevent the spread of violence and stabilise the situation. Violence will continue to 
spiral until a monopoly is re-established. 
The use of violence in Sihanouk's time involved repression of urban intellectual 
malcontents; the loyalty of the broad mass of the peasantry engendered greater stability 
in the countryside. In the 1990s, Cambodians perceive violence as pervasive, arbitrary 
and directed against large sections of the population. Sihanoukist repression targeted 
the small stratum of intellectuals who had broken the prevailing, stable political 
relationship between ruler and ruled by questioning the position of the monarchy. The 
targets of violence and extortion in the 1990s are politically unconnected, punished for 
political non-engagement rather than active disloyalty. Non-selective violence is the 
category which most concerns Cambodian human rights activists, for whom 
arbitrariness and insecurity are key concerns. 
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The most important distinction, arguably, between human rights abuse in Sihanouk's 
day and human rights abuse in the 1990s is that Sihanouk gained the support of rural- 
dwellers by ideological means, even though this ideology permitted and, arguably, 
provoked intolerance of intellectual dissent. In the 1990s, the CPP has little ideological 
legitimacy. Its strategy for gaining support is identical to its strategy for crushing 
dissent - promotion of a climate fo fear within which only loyalty to the CPP can offer 
protection. 
The concerns of Cambodian human rights workers interviewed for the present study can 
be found to underpin many of the lists of rights put forward by theorists favouring a 
4 common core of values' approach to meeting the cultural relativist challenge. 68 Where 
the actions of government arbitrarily threaten large sections of the population, who are 
not themselves a threat to the government, thereby creating a climate of fear and 
insecurity, human rights can be said to have been abused. Sanctions against individuals 
who have chosen to put themselves into a position of dissent, in situations where 
conformity would not endanger their physical, economic or cultural survival, 69 are less 
widely decried. 
The common core of values is in essence an agreement that government action should 
not arbitrarily cause individuals or communities to live in a state of perpetual insecurity, 
because this is an outcome which undermines the reason for the development both of 
cultures and the modem state as contexts which facilitate human endeavour. This 
outcome has characterised the Cambodian economy of power since 1975. 
Such a definition of human rights abuse would exclude from protection members of 
Cambodia's political society, such as Sam Rainsy and Thun Bunly, as well as the 
nineteen victims of the 30 March 1997 grenade attack. Significantly, comments made by 
the injured to the press after the attack, stressed their lack of involvement with the KNP- 
68For example, Peter Berger, "Are Human Rights Universal? " Commentary, Sept. 1977,60-63. 
61Cases where not dissenting would endanger physical, economic or cultural survival could include 
situations where individuals or communities resist government development proposals which will 
endanger their livelihood or destroy sacred areas; repression of such dissent by government would 
constitute abuse under the common core of values definition. 
208 
Chapter 6. Violence, Economic Gain and Power 
This theme was used by Hun Sen who asserted the organisers of the demonstration, who 
had led these innocent people into danger, should be punished. Liberals would refuse to 
accept this formulation of human rights, since it precludes protection of peaceful 
movements aimed at changing political systems. 
A common core of values definition of human righst would, arguably, condemn the 
violence of Cambodia in the 1990s, but would allow recognition of the early Sihanouk 
era, at least, as an 'acceptable' regime. Liberals would reject this thesis, on the grounds 
that, as in Sihanouk's era, the stability of an anti-pluralist one-party system is unlikely to 
pertain over the long term. An unresponsive, unaccountable regime will break down. 
The liberal project seeks to ensure that change occurs peacefully. Repression of cultural 
change is the issue which renders cultural relativism counterintuitive. When a small 
movement aimed at transforming the economy of power begins to grow and to challenge 
vested interests, it may be constructed by national leaders as a cultural anomaly and a 
threat to national cultural values. Intellectual dissent was constructed in this way in 
Sihanouk's day. Creating protected political space in which advocates of change can 
organise is a core feature of the liberal project. It is also the most controversial in terms 
of universality. 
In Asia, the most pervasive form of final check on political economies of power which 
have become malignant are various concepts of the 'right to rebel'. Liberalism attempts 
to regularise, sanitise and institutionalise this right through establishment of rights to 
political participation and free and fair elections, which can substitute stable and 
peaceful transitions for bloody revolutions. The Cambodian case suggests that this 
substitution is not necessarily effective if the necessary consensus on the power of the 
electoral mandate does not exist. While superficially the project of reducing violence 
which has become abusive, according to any common core of values that could be 
-projected, may seem to be a universal one, nevertheless the importance of cultural 
context, in terms of perceptions of political power relations, means that the causes of 
violence need to be addressed in culturally specific ways. 
Human rights can be used as an ideological power resource in this project. Arguably, 
even if the bundle of goods set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are not 
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universally recognised as of special significance, the term "human rights abuse" is 
universally recognised, by governments, as requiring special justification or denial in the 
eyes of the world. By n=ing particular events 'abuses', the human rights movement 
stigmatises them, denying their rightfulness and placing pressure on the abuser. 
The most effective use of the term, in the Cambodian context, is arguably not to 
promote a specific bundle of internationally recognised goods, but to attract ideological 
power resources towards a negotiated definition of the term which mediates between 
local and international concerns. Universalists at the international level may argue that 
local redefinition of the term devalues its use as a standard of criticism validated by 
international law. Arguably, this level can only be invested with meaning through the 
negotiations of local actors which connect it to the different understandings and 
concerns of ordinary people. UNTAC attempted to address this question through its 
encouragement of and assistance to indigenous human rights associations in Cambodia 
which could take on the task of promoting human rights following UNTAC's departure. 
The remainder of the present study analyses the work of these organisations in the 
political context described. 
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Chapter 7: The Human Rights Movement and Civil Society 
The Cambodian Human Rights Movement 
Cambodian human rights NGOs were first established under the direct auspices and 
protection of the UN. In its final report, the Human Rights Component stated, "Support 
for indigenous human rights associations and other non-governmental organizations was 
a particular concern. "' These organisations represented a new kind of political structure 
in Cambodia, as well as a non-governmental conduit through which international 
engagement could continue. The present chapter analyses the structure and the political, 
social and economi c status of these organisations, and locates them in relation to the 
wider social strata in Cambodian society. 
UNTAC viewed the non-governmental orgqnisations that were set up under its auspices 
as a Gcivil society' development. This conception draws on a broad body of literature 
referring to the role of private interest organisations in strengthening pluralist liberal 
democratic values. 'Civil society' can be viewed as the organisational and co-ordinating 
capabilities of non-state society. 2 The development of 'civil society' organisations in 
many countries of the South has been seen as providing an impulse towards democracy, 3 
through the ability to facilitate "full political and economic participation by the pooe,. 
Michael Bratton comments: 
By their very existence, NGOs help to pluralize the institutional 
environment and, to the extent that they encourage participation in decision 
making, to promote a democratic political culture. 4 
UNTAC's Human Rights Component believed, 'The strengthening of civil society is 
'Human Rights Component 9. 
2 Definitioa offered by Laura Roper Renshaw, . "Strengthening Civil Society: the role of NGOs. " Development 1994: 46. 
'See for example, Larry Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society, Toward Democratic Consolidation, " 
Journal ofDemocracy 53 (1995): 4-14. 
4 Michael Bratton, "The Politics of Government-NGO Relations in Africa, " World Development 17 
(1989): 570. 
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the most essential guarantee against the recurrence of the state repression of the past. "5 
It reported at the end of UNTAC's mission, "Cambodian political and civil society 
tenuously began a process of re-establishment, many aspects of which are even now 
perhaps irreversible. t6 
Given the intransigence of the major political parties, displayed during the transitional 
period and beyond, the formation of an independent civil society able to co-ordinate 
interests was seen by UNTAC as vital in balancing government power and entrenching 
democratic attitudes. This could build both peace and a stronger, more secular, sense of 
the Cambodian nation. In civil society analysis, this is usually viewed as taking place as 
a consequence of the role of civil society as a forum for mediating grassroots or other 
'indigenous interests as these are formulated and expressed by the interest groups 
themselves. Civil society socialises individuals into national political discourse by 
providing them with an opportunity to discuss and promote their own interests and 
concerns within a pluralist political framework. 
In discussing this attempt at fostering Cambodian civil society, a key question concerns 
the level at which such pro-democratic participation and interest articulation occurs. 
Viewed as a movement of civil society, Cambodian human rights NGOs differ 
significantly from civil society in other Southeast Asian countries. Their emergence as 
'the children of the UN 0 sets them apart from civil societies which develop out of 
grassroots interests. Norman Uphoff draws a distinction between the 'grassroots 
organisations' and 'non-governmental organisations' which together comprise a third, 
civil, sector between the market and the state. 8 
Uphoff views grassroots organisations as "any and all organizations at the group, 
511uman Rights Component 7. 
6Human Rights Component 68. 
7 Nfichael Kirby, 'Oral Statement, ' delivered to Third Committee of the General Assembly, 27 Nov. 1995, 
2. 
8 Norman Uphoff, "Grassroots Organisations and NGOs in Rural Development: Opporranities with 
Diminishing States and Expanding Markets, " World Development 24 (1993): 607-622. 
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community or locality level. "9 He defines the 'group level' as "a self-identified set of 
persons with some common interest, such as occupational, age, gender, ethnic or other 
grouping"; the 'community' level is defined as "an established socio-economic 
residential unit, often referred to as the village level"; while the 'locality' is viewed as "a 
set of communities having social and economic relations, usually with interactions 
centred around a market town. "10 
While grassroots organisations are defined in terms of the spatial level at which they 
operate, non-governmental organisations, which include grassroots organisations, are 
better defined in terms of the "incentives used to get co-operation or compliance. " 
While the state uses bureaucratic mechanisms and enforcement, and the market uses 
calculations of private interest, the "third sector depends more on voluntaristic 
mechanisms, involving processes of bargaining, discussion, accommodation and 
persuasion. " 12 He notes that there may be overlap between the sectors in their use of 
these three different methods of gaining compliance. 
It will be argued in the remainder of this dissertation that while the human rights NGOs 
s tudied in Cambodia form part of the 'third sector', they are not primarily located at the 
grassroots level. Although they maintained offices in most of Cambodia's provincial 
towns, and attempted to maintain contact with volunteer 'informants' at the subdistrict 
level, these NGOs pursued a top-down approach to human rights promotion, with 
policy-making occurring at the level of the head offices in Phnom Penh, frequently in 
collaboration with other NGO head offices, or with representatives of the international 
community. The 'bargaining, discussion, accommodation and persuasion' envisaged by 
Uphoff s definition takes place primarily at this level, between NGO directors, 
government officials, and representatives of the international community. 
There is a strong emphasis within these NGOs on didactic transmissions of concepts and 
9 Uphoff 609. 
10 Uphoff 608. 
11 Uphoff 610 
12 Uphoff 610. 
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policies to the 'grassroots' through 'education' rather than through participation by the 
lower levels. As described in Chapter Six, human rights NGO workers interviewed 
stated that the major sufferers of human rights abuse were the 'grassroots'. 
Interviewees, arguably, viewed human rights promotion as a task for 'professionals', 
rather than for the grassroots themselves. These 'human rights professionals' are 
divorced from the grassroots by virtue of their full-time status as human rights workers 
and by virtue of their origins in a professional middle class which is not representative 
of the majority of the Cambodian population. 13 They are divorced from wider middle 
class support by the lack of private sector white-collar employment in the Cambodian 
economy, and the politicisation and patrimonial aspect of public sector white collar 
employment described in Chapter Six. 
It is argued that this orientation towards 'professionalism', rather than grassroots or 
middle class participation, emerges to a great extent from the weak and politicised 
conditions, respectively, of the grassroots and the middle class. This has prompted close 
ielationships to be forged between human rights NGOs and the United Nations and 
other organisations which represent the international community, a relationship which is 
finther strengthened by the perceived funding and protection capabilities of the 
international community. Arguably, the Cambodian human rights workers interviewed 
respond to a great extent to the priorities of their international donors and protectors. 
Policies implemented represent opportunities foregone, and in imposing particular 
structures, mechanisms and perceptions on Cambodia, UNTAC and subsequent foreign 
intervening agencies created a framework for human rights activity which both 
facilitates and constrains. 
The remainder of the dissertation explores in detail the relationship between human 
rights NGOs and the international community in the fields of protection and finance, 
ideology and discourse, and strategies for constraining the abuses of the Cambodian 
government. It is argued in the present chapter that the hierarchical structure and 
13 The relationship with other sections of the Cambodian urban middle class is described in the second 
half of the present chapter. 
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professional status of Cambodian human rights NGOs contribute to a human rights 
movement which resembles, to a great extent, channels for the dissemination of 
international human rights discourse, rather than for the promotion of a grassroots 
discourse developing organically in the villages. 
It is argued also that this orientation dovetails with familiar hierarchical structures in 
Cambodian politics. Arguably, as Heder and Ledgerwood pointed out in their analysis 
of the UNTAC era, the relationship between the international community and local 
NGOs did not challenge, and even reinforced, orientations within Cambodian politics 14 
towards political relationships which focus on the distribution of economic benefit and 
protection in return for activities which display and promote ideological loyalties. 
It is considered that this orientation does not necessarily further consolidation of 
democracy within the lower levels of Cambodian society, as emphasis on hierarchical 
structures and bureaucratic, rather than participatory, responses to human rights abuse 
does not directly empower the grassroots vis-A-vis the state. 
Rather, this emphasis encourages continued reliance on the international community and 
well-educated human rights 'professionals' to mediate state-society relations. A 
necessary consequence, arguably, of UNTAC's promotion of itself as the provider of 
protection and of remedy for abuse during the peace process, and the promises of 
continued engagement via the Secretary General's Special Representative for Human 
Rights in Cambodia, and the United Nations Centre for Human Rights Field Office in 
Cambodia, was to discourage creative development of grassroots strategies of 
resistance, which might have led to popular empowerment! 5 
The Cambodian NGO movement as a whole formed a large and varied sector in 1995/6. 
In 1995,90 organisations were members of the Cambodian Co-operation Committee, 16 
14 Heder and Ledgerwood "Introduction7 18. 
"The content of conceptions of human rights possessed by the Cambodian human rights movement two 
years after UNTAC's departure is discussed in detail in Chapter Eight. The movement's attempts to 
provide redress for abuses are analysed in Chapter Nine. 
16 CCC Agency Personnel Listing, Phnom Penh, Dec. 1995,1-6. 
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the largest umbrella grouping of NGOs, formed "to share the lessons of the NGO, 
experience, to monitor development assistance and to promote partnership between 
international and national NGOS.,, 17 Of these, 41 were development organisations, 30 
were organisations catering to the needs of minorities, special interest groups or 
professionals, 10 were human rights organisations, 5 were cultural organisations and 4 
were smaller umbrella groupings of NGOs. 
The interviewees selected for this study from the NGO movement, were drawn from 
organisations whose primary activities were human rights-related; NGOs which 
identified themselves primarily as 'development' NGOs were not studied, although it is 
acknowledged that within a civil society analysis, to the extent that they pursue 
participation in development, such NGOs may also play an important role in promoting 
democratisation and accountability at the grassroots level. Minority rights and special 
interest NGOs which organise human rights programmes were also studied. 
The rationale for selecting interviewees from these NGOs was the hypothesis that these 
NGOs will be central for developing a culturally-embedded Cambodian conception of 
human rights and for developing strategies for promoting respect for human rights and 
processes ensuring remedy for abuse, within society and the Cambodian state apparatus. 
The NGOs, and other 'civil society' groupings selected, also reflect the attention paid by 
UNTAC to these groups as important to the promotion of human rights in Cambodia. It 
was hypothesised that the concepts developed and the strategies pursued by these groups 
would provide insight into the nature of cultural mediation of internationally-promoted 
ideologies within the Cambodian context. It cannot be presumed that the structure and 
orientations of these NGOs are representative of the Cambodian NGO movement as a 
whole. 
Interviews with these members of these groups, and observation of their activities, 
suggested that Cambodian human rights NGOs have adhered quite rigidly to UNTAC's 
example, in the form of their activities, if not always in their conceptions of human 
17 "Action Plan for 1996", CCC Newsletter, Phnom Penh, Nov. 1995,1. 
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rights 
' 
themselves. In their ideological orientations and in the form of their activities, 
these groups adhere closely to the international agenda. Yet international intervention in 
Cambodia has been interpreted, by these interviewees, within a conceptual framework 
of patronage and hierarchy; arguably, this reflects a conception among these groups of 
themselves as clients of the international effort in Cambodia, which provides them with 
funding and protection in return for ideological loyalty. 
StajfIng and Membership. Despite the wide variety amongst NGOs in terms of size, 
geographical scope and range of activities, some features are characteristic. All the 
NGO representatives interviewed had been educated at least to high school standard; 
many also had degrees either from universities within Cambodia, universities abroad, or 
from educational institutes set up in refugee camps on the Thai border during the 1980s. 
Most were drawn from white collar occupations or professions, such as banking, 
medicine, law or teaching. Many were returnees from the west or from refugee camps. 
The first six human rights organisations to be established in Cambodia have continued 
to represent the leadership of the NGO movement, through their active engagement in 
NGO coalitions. Four of these six NGOs, Licadho, Adhoc, Vigilance, and Outreach, 
maintain provincial offices and conduct training activities throughout the country in all 
but the most remote provinces. 18 The remaining two, the Cambodian Institute of 
Human Rights and the Khmer Institute of Democracy, maintain fewer offices but are 
active in producing Khmer translations of human rights materials, have produced 
regular television programmes and televised debates on human rights issues, and are 
active in advocacy work. 
A brief sketch of the backgrounds of the founding leaders of these six NGOs illustrate 
the distance between these NGO leaders and the grassroots constituency they claim to 
represent. Vigilance was established by Kem Sokha in 199 1. Kern Sokha later left the 
"Details of the activities and geographical scope of these NGOs can be found in Appendix 1. Generally, 
the north-eastern provinces of Stung Treng, Ratanakiri, and Mondulkid have seen few human rights 
initiatives, partly because these provinces are inaccessible by overland travel, and can be reached only by 
canoe or by air. These provinces are sparsely populated, and are home to non-Khmer speaking tribal 
conununities, which have historically had relatively little contact with the lowland Khmer. 
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NGO to stand as a candidate in the 1993 elections on behalf of the BLDP in Takeo 
province. He is a returnee from the US with long-standing links to the BLDP, formerly 
the KPNLF, when it was part of the resistance movement in the 1980s. Kern Sokha was 
involved in human rights work within the KPNLF before founding the NGO, but 
returned to politics in the belief that the National Assembly would prove a more 
powerful forum for dealing with human rights complaints. He became president of the 
National Assembly Commission for Human Rights and Receiving Complaints after the 
promulgation of the 1993 constitution and gained a reputation for outspoken defence of 
human rights within the government. 19 
Outreach was founded by Srey Chan Phallara, a former state bank official and leader of 
the party-affiliated women's mass organisation of the bank under the SoC regime. She 
was trained as a lawyer in the University of Phnom Penh's law faculty before 1975, and 
was sent to the countryside to work as a farmer during the DK era. She left the- state 
bank to found the NGO when international support and protection for human rights 
work became available in 1992.20 Kassie Neou, head of the Cambodian Institute for 
Human Rights is a returnee from the US, where he worked for the Cambodian 
Documentation Commission which gathered information on human rights abuses in 
Cambodia during the DK era. He was active in refugee camps such as Site 2 on the 
border, particularly involved with the production of Khmer-language literature on 
international human rights law, and returned to Cambodia to found the CIHR during the 
21 transitional period. 
The president of Licadho, Dr Peng Chiv Kek Galabru, is a medical physician who spent 
most of the 1970s and 1980s in France. Her family background allows her access to the 
highest levels of government; she went to school with Ranariddh; both her parents held 
19 Personal interview. Individuals are named in this section because the information offered is either 
uncontroversial or already within the public domain. Details of date and place of interview are not given 
to avoid cross-referencing the named individuals with comments, made by them under conditions of 
confidentiality during the interview, discussed elsewhere in the dissertation. 
20 Personal interview. 
21 H 16. Kassie Neou was not available for interview during the fieldwork period 1995/6. 
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ministerial positions in the Sihanouk regime; and her father was also minister without 
portfolio attached to the SoC Office of the Council of Ministers from 1989 to 1993. Her 
husband is a French diplomat. In the 1980s, Kek Galabru, while still in France, served 
as an informal liaison officer for CPP/SoC was a member of the CPP; she takes credit 
for persuading Hun Sen to allow visas to the first Medecins Sans Frontier and Amnesty 
International teams to visit the country in 1989 and 1991, respectively. 22 
Adhoc was founded by another former CPP member, Thun Saray, who occupied 
political positions in Cambodia under the SoC. The organisation was established in 
1992 as a consequence of his experiences as a political prisoner in 1990/9 1, in the last 
years of the SoC regime, when he was detained without trial for attempting to set up a 
new political party. His experience of SoC prisons prompted him to abandon politics 
for human rights work. 
The Khmer Institute of Democracy was headed in 1995/6 by a returnee from Britain, Dr 
Lao Mong Hay. Trained as an academic in the UK in the 1970s, Lao Mong Hay was an 
active member of the KPNLF in the 1980s, involved in human rights work within the 
organisation on the border, where he was director of the Institute of Public 
Administration in Site 2 camp, teaching courses on human rights. He was a 
representative for the BLDP on the Supreme National Council during the UNTAC era, 
and afterwards headed the Cambodian Mines Advisory Centre. He left this organisation 
to lead the Khmer Institute of Democracy, which was originally set up by the Australian 
royal biographer Julio Jeldres, in 1994.23 
All six NGO leaders described are highly educated with experience in professional, 
government or international NGO work. While the human rights activists who staff 
their organisations do not enjoy the same high political profile, the sample of 
interviewees selected reflected this mix of returnees and non-returnees, and of former 
SoC employees with professionals from health, education and law. This is important in 
22Personal interview; extra details supplied by Laura Summers. 
23 Personal interview. 
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view of the fact that Cambodian human rights NGOs claim to represent the 
6grassroots'. 24 Information gained about the educational and professional backgrounds 
of the human rights workers interviewed strongly suggested that human rights workers 
are not themselves members of the 'grassroots' but rather emerge from the small 
Cambodian stratum of urban intellectuals. 
The stated motivations of human rights NGO workers for engaging in human rights 
work are also revealing in this respect. Commenting on her decision to found a human 
rights NGO Kek Galabru stated, 
Since 1970... when we had the coup detat until the beginning of January 
1971 (when she left for Paris]... I saw already the sorrow in my country. It 
was an island of peace, a land of smiles in Cambodia and it turned into an 
island of sorrow. So I already had the idea that it's good to have a human 
rights organisation to watch what's going on in Cambodia, because when 
you have war, always, always you have abuse of human rights. So I was 
motivated from the beginning of the war but I was waiting for the right 
moment. 25 
She added a further motivation was, 
my willingness to help the grassroots.... I help them to get access to the legal 
process - we need to protect them, because they are lost, they are alone, 
nobody to take care of them. 26 
These comments not only suggest an idealised view of Cambodia in the pre-war years, 
but a distinctly patrimonial relationship between the NGO and the grassroots. The view 
that NGOs could 'protect' the grassroots is reminiscent of the importance of the rhetoric 
of protection in Cambodian political society, and contrasts with ideals of local 
grassroots empowerment which are central to analyses of the democratising effect of 
civil society formation. Lao Mong Hay took a different view, describing himself as a 
24 This claim was expressed both in answer to the question"What kinds of people suffer most from human 
rights in Cambodia? " and also to the question "Whose interests does this NGO represent? " Concerns to 
help the grassroots were also expressed in discussing motivations for becoming involved in human rights 
work, as described below. 
25 Personal interview. 
26 Personal interview. 
220 
Chapter 7.7le Human Rights Movement 
'technocrat'. He presented his motivations for becoming involved in human rights work 
as a legacy of his studies in Britain: 
Living in Britain gave me quite a lot of ideas about human rights, about rule 
of law... My goal [was] to return and become and academic, because I 
would like to brini 
7 
back home ideas, knowledge and pass them on to my 
young compatriots. 
Although it is couched differently, this view supports the thesis that Cambodian human 
rights NGOs perceive their role as facilitating the circulation of international, rather than 
dgrassroots' discourses, and view political reconstruction in Cambodia as a top-down 
process of training rather than a process prompted by grassroots initiatives. 
Thun Saray's personal experiences as a political prisoner led him to human rights work 
via concerns about political rights: 
In jail, I saw the maltreatment of prisoners; and also I would like to have 
liberty in our society - why can't we express ideas, why can't we have 
liberty of association? I observed the maltreatment of the prisoners, 
especially the political prisoners - like animals. They put us in dark cells 
with shackles... And I didn't believe that before. I thought that the political 
prisoners had a room, could read, study, meet the family but in reality, no. 28 
Concern for the rights of political prisoners in this account, and particularly the 
distinction between political and other prisoners implied in the expectation that political 
prisoners would be offered study facilities in prison, again distances Thun Saray from 
the 'ordinary' Cambodian. Only two interviewees, aside from Thun Saray, claimed to 
have been motivated by abuses suffered personally - one said he had been the victim of 
a violent attack and the other had been evicted from her house. One more interviewee 
was motivated by the lack of freedom of expression within the country generally. 
Kek Galabru and Lao Mong Hay were both motivated by concern to help others by 
offering protection or knowledge. These motivating factors were more typical of the 
group of interviewees as a whole; for example, a public defender explained that he 
27 Personal interview. 
28 Personal interview. 
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wished to share experience abroad within Cambodia: 
From 1989-93,1 was working in Site Two Camp... I had experience in law 
and helped to form the judicial system, legal system, in Site Two ... I think 
through the work here I can share my experience to help my people. 29 
Other NGO representatives explained that they attempted to offer help to constituencies 
which they believed could help to develop the nation. For example, 
In Cambodia since the war, many children were homeless and uneducated 
and children are very important for the future of the nation, so if they 
children are not educated it will be a very big problem for Cambodia, so to 
help our country we are focusing on the children, especially on their rights. 30 
A number were motivated by abuses they had witnessed, particularly abuses aimed at 
the poor. A provincial human rights director commented: 
I am interested because when I was a student I was very interested to help 
others especially the one who suffered or was threatened and especially 
when I was a kid in the village, local authorities with power always take 
land from the poor people. And the poor people have no education, they 
don't know how to complain or whether what the local authority has done is 
right - so they just keep quiet and suffer all that. And so I would like to help 
- the idea of helping each other, make them realise who the property belongs 
to and how they should take care of their property. 31 
It is significant that two human rights organisations which worked with minorities such 
as the Vietnamese, Cham and upland tribal communities were headed and staffed 
mainly by members of the Khmer Kampuchea Krom community - ethnic Khmer from 
southern Vietnam: 
In fact I am not native -I am Khmer Kampuchea Krorn and was living in 
Vietnam and when I was there I saw the dire sufferings of the minorities, so 
I had the idea to set up human rights education for the minority people. In 
communist countries - they use their authority against the minority so these 
people are very frequently violated. 32 
29 L2. 
30 H18, personal interview (Eng. ), 18 Mar. 1996, Phnom Penh. 
31 H6 
32 Ml, personal interview (Khm. ), 18 Mar. 1996, Phnom Penh. 
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Such comments suggest that many Cambodian human rights workers view themselves 
as professionals, working on behalf of those who cannot help themselves, rather than as 
facilitators of direct political and economic participation by the disempowered. This 
perception is significant in that it represents a different form of civil society 
development in Cambodia from that described in much of the literature. 
Motivations for engaging in human rights promotion were seen by foreign human rights 
workers and former UNTAC officials as resulting to a great extent from lack of 
alternative white-collar occupations in the Cambodian economy: 
NGO work in Cambodia generally is a good job for young, bright people. 
Foreign aid is coming in - it has prospects and a good salary... A lot of 
hopeful, mildly idealistic youngsters join because they get foreign aid. They 
do care, but enthusiasm for human rights is complex. It's perceived as a 
growth area. 33 
[Cambodian human rights workers] didn't go in as human rights activists. 
They mainly went in for the salary. Or for the card. But gradually they 
began to believe in them. 34 
These comments characterise Cambodian human rights activists as members of the 
educated elite, seeking career prospects in an economy which offers few alternative 
opportunities. Remarks made by Cambodian NGO directors suggest that they, too, 
viewed professionalism and expertise rather than grassroots; commitment, as the most 
valuable qualifications for human rights work. From their perspective, staff shortages 
were acute until UNTAC's departure, because local NGOs could not compete with UN 
salaries. After 1993, NGOs were able to employ former local UNTAC staff. Accounts 
given by human rights NGO directors suggest that conviction is perceived as less 
important than general professional competence for NGO staff: 
When we set up our NGO, the UN was here so the UN took all the best 
elements... Cambodians who know English, French, anything... they pay 
well, so how can we compete with the UN? .... Only after the UN departure 
could we get some... But then some went to the embassies, private 
3311, personal interview, 22 Aug. 1995, Washington DC. 
34 12, personal interview, 24 Aug. 1995, Washington DC. 
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companies, as they have some knowledge, how to deal with people, how to 
work, how to co-ordinate, how to use English, so off they went to have a 
good salary and we had to take elements that weren't really good. But we 
train, train, train ... 
35 
High-ranking government officials or [those) who have a stable life in 
society don't like to have adventures with us. Because this activity is 
dangerous for them. And that's why the people who came from the 
provinces are teachers.... or students or ordinary people - they helped our 
organisation and worked with us from the beginning, at first as volunteers, 
receiving only a small fee. That's why we could not select the good people 
for our activity. 36 
All of our staff are volunteers, and so far we have not got any payment for 
them. Because we have no funds for salary for them. I think it seems very 
strange to people that they volunteer. But actually they volunteer because 
most of them just finished school or university and they have no job to do. 
So I just try to persuade them to work here because even if now we have no 
salary, we ho3e that in the future if we are doing a good job, somebody 
might help US. 7 
This attitude suggests that human rights work is seen less as a matter of ideal than of 
professional organisation. Lack of emphasis on strength of conviction, as opposed to 
general professional competence, in the hiring of human rights workers by directors of 
NGOs further suggests the technocratic and professional, rather than political, nature of 
these organisations. Emphasis on professionalism may work to marginalise the 
constituency represented from setting the agendas and defining the concepts implicit in 
human rights work. Consequently, a 'professional' human rights NGO sector may not 
have the democratising impact expected, although it may operate to ameliorate the level 
of 'abuse', defined according to their own criteria. 
One international human rights worker, who works closely with Cambodian human 
rights NGOs believed that the provision of international salaries and protection to 
human rights workers had led to an organisational spirit which differed from that of 
35HI4. 
It5. 
37 H18. This NGO, in common with some other smaller NGOs, did not pay salaried staff, but, in common 
with other NGOs, sought funding to pay professional staff in the future. 
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human rights NGOs in other countries: 
The strength of a human rights organisation is primarily based on the 
commitment of the people. Having so much money may give rise to a 
situation where you don't really get the right people to do human rights 
work - that's a reality in Cambodia. There are people doing human rights 
work and yet do not really care that much. 38 
Asked during interviews about their motivations for becoming involved in human rights 
work, most interviewees, as expected, spoke about the importance of human rights 
ideals rather than the job opportunities offered. 39 One interviewee cited salary as a 
factor alongside ideological concerns: 
First of all I worked for the government, but I like this kind of job -I get a 
better living standard and salary.... But I worked five years for government - 
it's a bad situation. I've seen eople coerced by the local authorities so I 
became interested in protecting. 
po 
Dr Lao Mong Hay stated that he became involved in human rights work after rejecting 
the option of working at the University of Phnom Penh because of the poor salaries paid 
to faculty members: 
I failed to get a job at the university, not because of anything related to me, 
but because of the below-survival salary. I could not be a university 
lecturer, I could not take bribes from the students. I had been taught by 
British society to help others, not to commit sins or crimes... I can use this 
institution to disseminate knowledge, skills and ideas. 41 
This account underscores the position of NGOs as organisations of professionals and 
intellectuals who find the patrimonial environment of public service stifling to reform 
efforts and aspirations. It fiirther demonstrates the top-down approach of this NGO, 
which contrasts with grassroots organisations formed by volunteers, or local activists as 
'80, personal interview, 15 Jan. 1996, Phnom Penh. 
39While the answers given to this question offer insight into how human rights concepts are perceived by. 
interviewees, within the interview situation it is to be presumed that interviewees would be unlikely to 
admit to any financial motivations. This does not necessarily mean that these motivations are not 
significant. 
40 HI, personal interview (Khm. ), 4 Apr. 1996, Kampot. 
"' Personal interview. 
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direct expressions of grassroots concern. 
Arguably, these answers may also indicate a perception among human rights workers of 
themselves as potential patrons of the disenfranchised and oppressed. As described in 
previous chapters, political relationships in Cambodia frequently take the form of 
exchange bargains. Goods exchanged are frequently protection and loyalty. The 
relationship between human rights organisations and the grassroots can also be viewed 
in these terms. Protection is offered, via a hierarchical framework established for 
handling complaints of abuse, in return for grassroots participation in education and 
training activities which promote ideological loyalty to the aims of the human rights 
NGO movement. 
Viewed from this perspective, human rights organisations appear as one level in a 
patrimonial hierarchy within which international donors are the patrons, and the 
grassroots are the clients. Human rights workers form the link between an 
interventionist international community concerned to promote liberal democratic 
ideology, and a marginalised and abused grassroots constituency formed of 
disempowered individuals seeking protection from an intrusive state apparatus and 
military. 
Members of the grassroots are encouraged to become members of human rights NGOs. 
UNTAC's Human Rights Component reported that human rights NGOs had gained 
more than 150,000 members by the end of the UNTAC period, 42 but membership does 
not require active involvement in human rights promotion. Becoming a member of a 
human rights NGO requires only that the applicant fulfil a five-day training course in 
human rights. Such training courses are offered by human rights organisations in village 
pagodas and schools throughout Cambodia. 
One international NGO worker suggested that such perceptions motivated members of 
the Cambodian public to join human rights organisations: 
42 Human Rights Component 66. 
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Often people joined just to get the membership card - there was a card mania 
in Cambodia... They want it because they see it as another patron, and 
because the card has their picture on it - not many Cambodians have photos 
of themselves. 43 
The passive nature *of membership and the perception among both members and human 
rights NGO workers that their job is to protect and educate suggests that ideological 
input from members on the activity and orientations of the organisation is minimal. 
Size and Range ofActivities. The professional and top-down approach of many human 
rights organisations in Cambodia is underlined by descriptions offered by NGOs of their 
activities. Although the particular focus of activities differed among NGOs, all the 
interviewees viewed the content of human rights work generally as falling into four 
main categories: education for the general public; training for employees of the state 
authorities; monitoring of the human rights situation in the provinces or constituencies 
in which they operate; and investigating or referring complaints of specific cases of 
abuse. This similarity of perception may have arisen from the position of Cambodian 
NGOs vis-h-vis the international community which, arguably, has set the agenda for 
NGOs within Cambodia to a very large degree. 
It is significant that these activities tend to reinforce the relationship between the 
'grassroots' and the human rights NGOs, rather than attempting to develop the 
assertiveness of the 'grassroots' themselves. Educational activities carried out by 
national NGOs within the villages frequently focus on teaching villagers how to defte a 
human rights abuse, and how to 'make a complaint' to an NGO office if a human rights 
abuse occurs. Emphasis on training and educational activities suggests there is little 
concern to debate and develop indigenous definitions of human rights, within the 
national NGOs- 
Variation in size between these organisations is wide. The largest human rights NGOs, 
Adhoc, Licadho, Vigilance, and Outreach, pursue activities in a range of human rights 
fields, commissioning reports into issues such as human trafficking and child labour, 
4111. 
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organising regular visits to prisons; taking a leading role in NGO coalitions, such as the 
Action Committee, the Cambodian Human Rights Co-ordination Committee and the 
Committee for the Monitoring of Free and Fair Elections (COMFREL); and lobbying at 
th e international level. 
They sustain professionally-staffed provincial offices in almost all Cambodia's 
provinces, and undertake education and investigation activities in villages throughout 
the countryside, attempting by this means to build networks of human rights informants 
at the local level who can pass on information regarding cases of local human rights 
abuse. They also meet regularly with government officials in meetings and seminars, 
organising training sessions for government personnel, particularly the police and 
military, and making contacts within the administration which can be used in seeking 
redress in cases of human rights abuse. 
Other NGOs have a much narrower focus, implementing a limited range of projects in 
particular geographical locations. For example, the Victim Contribution and Assistance 
Organisation operates only through the efforts of volunteers in Phnom Penh and the four 
adjacent provinces, and restricts its activities to seeking funds to provide relief to 
families victimised by human rights abuse, and to offering free English lessons to 
children, combining language instruction with education on the rights of the child. 
Other NGOs pursue human rights activities as one of a range of programmes catering to 
the needs of a particular constituency; for example, the Cambodian Disabled People's 
Organisation, the Vietnamese Association and the Urban Sector Group. These small 
NGOs rarely contact the government directly to pursue human rights concerns, but 
operate as links between a particular constituency, such as urban children, disabled 
people, ethnic minorities and the squatter community, and the larger human rights 
NGOs. 
I It is notable that 'capacity building' within the villages was not mentioned by workers of 
the national human rights NGOs as a concern, although capacity building among 
disabled people and urban squatters was an important activity for the special interest 
organisations working with these groups. The director of one organisation working with 
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urban squatters described its goals as follows: 
My organisation talks to the people in the squatters' districts and if the 
government has a plan to evict people from their own community - for 
example, the government has a place it has provided to be a new community 
for these people - and then my organisation talks to the people and takes one 
representative from each community to do a survey of the place that the 
government wants to move these people to... to find out whether the place 
the govermnent wants to move the people to is good or not.... Afterwards 
the representatives will go with this organisation and with other 
organisations also to be involved in the discussions with the government.... 
This way we can present one clear voice to the government. 44 
It is significant that this interviewee did not view his organisation as a human rights 
organisation, commenting: 
This organisation is not involved deeply in human rights, but just works for 
housing rights. But this organisation also supports rights. 45 
The modus operandi of this organisation, which also organises small-scale 
demonstrations of squatters in front of the National Assembly or the Office of the 
Council of Ministers to protest against eviction orders, differs significantly from the 
education, training and complaint receiving role of the larger human rights NGOS. 46 
This raises the question of whether non-governmental organisations in Cambodia which 
do not identify themselves as human rights organisations are engaged in activities which 
encourage economic and political participation, thus performi ng a role which resembles 
more closely the democratising role of civil society envisaged in the literature. This is a 
question for further research. Arguably, human rights NGOs have viewed their 
grassroots constituency as targets for education in norms emerging from the 
international community, rather than attempting to engage members of the grassroots in 
debate on the appropriate political and economic content of human rights in Cambodia. 
This analysis, arguably, is also bome out by the nature of training sessions held by 
" Personal interview 
45 Personal interview 
46 This difference in strategy is discussed further in Chapter Nine. 
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Cambodian human rights NGOs. Those observed for the present study took the form of 
a talk offered by a human rights trainer on international human rights law and concepts, 
sometimes cross-referenced with ideas drawn from Buddhist teachings, followed by 
questions from the audience, answered by the trainer. In the training sessions observed, 
little opportunity was offered for listeners to debate issues or personal experiences. 47 
This didactic quality, focusing on transmission, rather than debate, of concepts, is 
underlined by accounts of training offered by provincial NGO directors working for 
different NGOs, in Banteay Meanchey and Kompong Cham. provinces: 
We teach people that human rights are similar to Buddhism. Because when 
I teach people, I put up a poster and the poster says about Buddhism, *tells 
the people about sin. And when people in Cambodia hear about sin, they are 
scared about that. 48 
We give training to government staff and people in the province. We 
disseminate human rights doctrine, law of democracy, national constitution 
of Cambodia, criminal code of UNTAC, other laws declared by the UN 
since the election - to sum up laws which give benefit to the people. 49 
In the latter account, the definition of 'benefit to the people' is assumed, rather than 
open for discussion by trainees. The training activities of human rights NGOs suggest 
that while human rights are offered as a framework within which political activity can 
be organised, the nature of the framework itself is not considered an appropriate issue 
for participatory debate, but as a fixed set of norms taken from international law and 
discourse, to be implanted into Cambodian politics and society. To this extent, 
democratisation is seen as the harnessing of external ideologies and practices rather than 
the development of an indigenous framework for conflict resolution beginning with 
empowerment of individuals at the grassroots level: 
We learn from our mistakes. All together, we follow the international 
community's wishes, Cambodian wishes, and try to solve the problems in a 
47 Author's observations, training sessions held by the Khmer Buddhist Society and Adhoc, January and 
July 1996. 
48 H21, personal interview (Khm. ), 26 January 1996, Phnom Penh. 
"' HI 1, personal interview (Khm. ), 30 July 1996, Kompong Cham. 
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50 
peaceful way. Democratic process is the most peaceful way. 
Relationship with the International Community. The impact of the preferences of 
international funders on Cambodian human rights NGOs is strong. As discussed, 
human rights workers frequently viewed themselves as working to inculcate 
international norms in Cambodian society. This view has emerged, arguably, both from 
the circumstances under which human rights organisations, were set up in Cambodia, 
and from continuing reliance on international funding and protection. 
Formal NGOs are a new phenomenon in Cambodia. Until 199 1, the Cambodian Red 
Cross was the only indigenous NGO in evidence, although 
State supported 'mass organisations' such as the National Women's 
Association, the Youth Association and the Trade Unions, at first politically 
oriented and motivated, played a significant role in civic, health and 
sanitation education, in literacy campaigns, vaccination campaigns, and in 
assisting the families of soldiers lost in battle. 51 
These mass organisations were not independent of government, but were formed to 
facilitate the implementation of government policy. In the 1990s, they were replaced 
through the encouragement of the United Nations and other international donors, by 
non-governmental organisations which had more opportunity to pursue objectives 
independently of the Cambodian government, as the international effort to rehabilitate 
and reconstruct Cambodia made grants of aid available to indigenous organisations. 
Heder and Ledgerwood described human rights organisations during the UNTAC era as 
"fledgling facsimiles of archetypical bodies of civil society" which, under UNTAC's 
,, 52 protection, "play[ed] a disproportionate and precocious role. 
The degree of exposure to international influence and ideology varies between NGOs. 
The larger human rights NGOs employ expatriate staff, visit counterparts in other 
H16. 
Eva L. Mysliwiec, "Cambodia: NGOs in Transition7', unpublished paper presented to the United 
Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), Workshop on the Social Consequences of 
the Peace Process in Cambodia, Geneva, 29-30 April 1993,8. 
52 Heder and Ledgerwood, "Introduction! ' 18. 
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countries, and lobby at the international level. Smaller NGOs must compete with each 
other and with larger NGOs for the attention of international organisations and 
embassies. 
Networking between local and international NGOs is facilitated by umbrella 
committees, including the Action Committee and the Cambodian Human Rights Co- 
operation Committee, in the human rights field, and Ponleu Khmer, which organised 
popular debates on the Constitution in 1993. Interviewees considered that participation 
in these committees provided protection to NGO workers; smaller NGOs gain strength 
through these contacts with larger local counterparts. A hierarchy of NGOs has 
developed with smaller urban NGOs and the provincial offices of the larger NGOs 
looking for leadership and support to the head offices of the six national NGOs, and to 
the umbrella groupings. Larger Cambodian NGOs frequently take the lead in initiatives 
which require an approach to be made to the government, and offer, to a limited extent, 
training and finance to smaller NGOs. Consequently attitudes to human rights work 
emerging from the largest Cambodian NGOs filter through the movement as a whole. 
International influence can be characterised as follows: 
The UN just has a support role - political, financial, technical... Especially 
how to lobby, how to set up systems of communications. And when the 
political authorities give trouble - intervene and bail them oUt. 53 
The channels by which protection and aid flow from the international community to the 
NGO movement, and the ideological response from Cambodian human rights workers, 
can be viewed as bearing a striking resemblance to familiar Cambodian power 
relationships which reward appropriate ideological stances with economic benefit and 
physical security. Heder and Ledgerwood describe UNTAC-Cambodian relations: 
UNTAC at times seemed pervaded with the condescending belief that "the 
Cambodians" were incapable of anything unless UNTAC held their hands 
and walked them through it... the hierarchical nature of Cambodian 
5315, personal interview, 13 Aug. 1996, Phnom Penh. 
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54 
political/social patron-client networks fit all too nicely with such attitudes. 
Other international observers and participants in UNTAC's mission recall 
64patemalism"55 and "colonialiSrn,, 56 in UNTAC's attitudes: 
During UNTAC ... there was a patronising attitude, they are like children, 
they can't stand on their own feet, they don't know what they are 
doing .... [UNTAC] failed to think of the NGOs as independent, self- 57 
sustaining, domestic entities. It thought of them as outgrowths of the UN 
Examination of the forms of protection and funding offered to NGOs by the 
international community and the services provided by NGOs to international donors 
illustrates the nature of the relationship between the international and local human rights 
movement. 
protection. Significant support and protection was necessary from UNTAC in order for 
human rights organisations to appear; at least one of these spent its first months of 
operation housed in the UNTAC Human Rights Component office under its direct 
protection. 58 In an attempt to encourage the assertiveness of local NGOs, UNTAC and 
international NGOs offered protection in a variety of ways through, for example, 
assistance with regional and international networking, 59 technical assistance and training 
to provide "skills and self-confidence"60 and physical support from the presence of 
international observers. These activities were aimed at changing decisively the cultural 
parameters of the relationship between rulers and ruled: 
I would go on all investigations with people from [human rights NGOs]... 
but they had just started, they were scared to death. They had no money, no 
protection.... it was a new idea that you should question authority. The way 




58H17, personal interview (Eng. ), 9 Jan. 1996, Phnom Penh. 
59Dennis McNamara, "UN Peacekeeping and Human Rights in Cambodia: a Critical Evaluation". Unpub. 
paper delivered at Meeting on UN Peacekeeping and Human Rights, Geneva, Aug. 1994,17. 
60 12. 
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Cambodians deal with authority - it's all very well expecting them to go to 
the provincial governor, but do they ever dare to go even to their father 
that's the key question. 61 
International provision of material aid is also sometimes used to support Cambodian 
NGO attempts to gain official compliance, in a manner familiar to the Cambodian 
economy of power. For example, intervention in Koh Kong Province, where court rent- 
seeking interfered with scheduling of trials, was described: 
We went to the prison ... We said if we can have a session to educate 
everyone about their rights then we'll help get some stuff for them - 
whiteboards for education, hats, a volleyball - we bought cement to rebuild 
the kitchen and pots and pans. And we got them to promise that lawyers can 
have free and open access to the prison. We got sixteen cases that had not 
been tried, scheduled. But we had to do it in a nice way. 62 
These comments illustrate the means by which political, financial and technical support 
were intended to support Cambodidn human rights workers in their attempts to address a 
government and state apparatus which was hostile to human rights promotion during the 
UNTAC period and beyond. It will be argued in Chapter Nine of this dissertation that 
Cambodian NGO workers have not formulated any clear strategies aimed at making 
themselves independent of international protection. Cambodian human rights workers 
interviewed generally viewed the protection of the international community as essential 
to their work now and in the future. 
Funding. Funding for Cambodian human rights NGOs comes from the international 
community. The international effort to aid the reconstruction of Cambodia is co- 
ordinated through the Consultative Group on Cambodia (CG), formerly the International 
Committee for the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC) which meets regularly to 
discuss aid disbursements to the country. This co-ordination body includes 
representatives from multilateral donor agencies, international institutions such as the 
United Nations and the International Monetary Fund, donor governments, and donor 
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1. The chart accurately depicts the mix of donors contributing to the reconstruction of 
Clambodia. Only 5 of the organisations, studied received no external funding at all, and 
these organisations indicated that they were in the process of submitting proposals to 
international donor agencies. 
Concern regarding the extent to which international control of funds has led to 
international agenda-setting within Cambodian NGOs is apparent among some sections 
of the international NGO community. One criticism was voiced in a joint statement by 
international NGOs made to the Donor's Review Meeting in Phnom Penh in 1993: 
The rehabilitation program is weakest in its efforts to include Cambodians in 
the design and planning phases of projects and in facilitating the transfer of 
information technology so necessary to the process of decision-making. 
Information relevant to project planning and project appraisal, as well as 
information technologies themselves appear to be concentrated in, and under 
the control of, the expatriate community, while Cambodians are relegated 
more and more to the role of passive actors in the rehabilitation process. 
Too often Cambodians are the last to be informed regarding new 
developments. More efforts to provide essential documentation and reports 
in the Khmer language would help to increase Cambodian participation in 
all aspects of the rehabilitation and development process. 63 
An international NGO worker interviewed similarly criticised foreign control over the 
non-governmental sector: 
We'll all leave. Most international organisations have foreigners in 
positions of authority. But we need to develop human resources - we don't 
have qualified people, but there's a growing pool of capable people who 
64 have practical experience - they are not given a chance. 
Reliance on foreign funding has constrained Cambodian human rights NGO activities, 
I and has allowed foreign agencies and governments to a great extent to set the agenda for 
NGO activities. The Cambodian human rights NGOs studied submit annual proposals 
and reports for funding to international donors, and spend much time attempting to 
cultivate contacts in donor organisations. Competition for funding increases ideological 
63 'INGO Statement for the Donors' Review Meeting, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 25 February 1993,3. 
64 18. 
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homogenisation arnongst these NGOs, as they network with one another and with 
international human rights workers and undergo training in the framing of funding 
proposals. 65 
None of the human rights NGOs studied attempted to raise funds from the Cambodian 
population itself, in line with their perception of human rights NGOs as providers of 
services to the grassroots, who need to attract grassroots interest through, for example, 
the provision of lunch at training sessions, rather than depending on their financial and 
other support. Some interviewees arguably viewed the relationship between the NGOs 
and the grassroots as a process of exchange, whereby the grassroots agree to be educated 
in human rights ideology in return for economic incentives. 
For example, one NGO, which focused on providing public defenders to accused 
persons and human rights education programmes in the villages, decided to begin a 
chicken farming development project in order to generate greater interest from the 
Cambodian public: 
First we had a policy of human rights for Cambodian people but when we 
tell them about rights... and people say, "Oh, we need human rights but we 
do not have any money to buy food - even if we care about human rights we 
do not have any money to buy food". And if you have human rights and 
development together that is the way to teach about human rights and 
democracy in Cambodia. That's why I started development work. 66 
The orientation towards professionalism among the NGOs studied also prompts them to 
search for foreign funding to provide salaries to staff, where possible. As described, use 
of volunteers is viewed by human rights NGO directors as a last resort, if funds for 
professionals are not available. Training rural Cambodians in human rights norms is a 
labour-intensive activity. Because of the hierarchical nature of Cambodian human rights 
NGOs, money is urgently required to meet the costs of sending professional urban 
educators out into the countryside, to visit different villages and communities: 
" For example, the British aid organisation Voluntary Service Overseas places professional fund-raisers 
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One problem is funds. We need to publish documents, need money for 
trainers to go to the provinces. 67 
We haven't been up to the North East. We concentrate on the Cham 
minorities, because it's difficult [to reach the North Eastern tribal 
communities] because of road communications. The budget for the 
association is low. We are appealing to foreign associations for funds to 
facilitate going to the North Eastern provinces. 68 
In the field of human rights, close contact with the UN is maintained via the United 
Nations Centre for Human Rights Field Office in Cambodia, which holds regular 
meetings with local NGO representatives, offering advice and funding, through the 
Trust Fund for a Human Rights Education Programme in Cambodia. Grants awarded to 
NGOs and to the Cambodian government through this programme up to July 1995 are 
set out in Tables A and B of Appendix 2. 
The disbursements made through the Trust Fund illustrate international. support for the 
four main areas of activity described by Cambodian interviewees: education, particularly 
through the production of Khmer language booklets, school curricula, newsletters and 
videos; training for state officials, particularly in the penal and legal systems; and 
monitoring and investigation. A particular concern of the international community, 
since UNTAC, has been the provision of Khmer language copies of the international 
human rights treaties signed by the Supreme National Council during the transitional 
period. International NGOs, foreign aid programmes and embassies also contribute 
directly to the continued financing of Cambodian human rights organisations. Co- 
funding of human rights projects by different international organisations, who meet to 
discuss aid disbursements within the framework of the CG, contributes to the 
homogeneity of Cambodian human rights NGOs, and of their projects. 
One international human rights worker commented that the interests of international 
NGOs in maintaining programmes in Cambodia at times conflicted with the task of 
empowering Cambodians to set the human rights agenda. A case exemplifying this, 
61 HIO. 
69 M5, personal interview (Khm. ), 17 May 1996, Phnom Penh. 
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according to this interviewee, was the case of the Cambodian Defenders' Project (CDP), 
which is run by the Washington-based Human Rights Law Group. In 199516, the CDP 
was headed by two co-directors, one American and one Cambodian. One group of 
public defenders split from this organisation to form their own public defenders' NGO, 
Legal Aid of Cambodia. The interviewee described the reasons for this split: 
[International human rights workers] said, [the Cambodian CDP employees] 
can't run their own show. They were making a lot of money (in USAID 
grants], so there was a lot of resistance from the Washington office. That 
was very unfortunate... Also they said the Khmers were not ready. But 
when will they ever be ready? We have to take the risk. And they will 
undergo a mental change when they take over. 69 
While the CDP is unusual in that most Cambodian human rights NGOs are headed only 
by Cambodians, the impact of foreign preferences, particularly those of funding 
organisations and of international trainers working in Phnom Penh is high throughout 
the Cambodian human rights NGO sector. 
Ideological Impact. To a great extent, the Cambodian human rights NGOs studied 
reflect the need of international human rights promoters to develop local 
implementation agencies for their policies. During UNTACs mission, local human 
rights organisations were vital in assisting with the implementation of UNTAC's 
training programmes, 70 and in linking UNTAC with the Cambodian population in a 
way that the existing administrative structures failed to do. 
After UNTAC's departure in September 1993, they were to continue to provide a 
channel of communication and power between the international community and the 
Cambodian people, which could bypass the political power concerns of government. 
This attitude is noted in one commentary on the Cambodian NGO sector during the 
transitional period: 
In the Cambodian situation it was not uncommon, in the period after the 
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their client NGOs to avoid working with the Cambodian administration 
which they, the donors, do not support. 71 
International NGO workers interviewed believed that external influence has defined the 
content of human rights work conducted in Cambodia. Ideological adherence to 
international norms may be seen as a service provided by human rights NGOs in return 
for the funding and protection they receive: 
[The approach of Cambodian NGOs is) in many cases a very traditional 
Western approach. LTNTAC encouraged NGOs in strict civil and political 
rights - rights to life, against torture. So the human rights NGOs mainly 
concentrate on that.... It's what they've always been led to believe because 
of the backing from Western human rights activists and donors - but the 
also set their own agenda based on what they perceive are the basic issues. 
W 
We had to work to give them this heavy re-orientation on what they were 
doing and what they were supposed to do. We had to say, ' No, no, no - as a 
human rights NGO, this is what you should do'. That takes time... the 
human rights NGOs are still struggling to learn themselves just exactly what 
human rights work iS. 73 
They spend a lot of time finding out about abuses and reporting them to the 
relevant authorities. That's the UNTAC dynamic. UNTAC wanted to 
protect human rights groups from pressure and the human rights groups 
didn't want to expose themselves. They often adopted education as a safe 
74 option, or reporting abuses to UNTAC for action... 
Heavy reliance by human rights NGOs on foreign funding and training has continued 
since the departure of UNTAC in September 1993. In part, one international NGO 
worker suggested, this reliance is prompted by the attitude of NGOs themselves: 
Sometimes they say, we can't do this now, we need more training. We have 
to tell them, no, what you need now is to put into practice the training that 
you have already received. 75 
71 Mysliwiec 16. 
7115. 
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This input is highly valued by the Cambodian NGO workers interviewed, because the 
Cambodian economy is incapable of supporting such a large, professional non- 
governmental sector. It is also a signal of political support, which translates into the 
protection that is essential, given the climate of fear which lingers in Cambodia. 
Cambodian human rights workers regard close association with international sources of 
power as strengthening their own internal position, which is distanced from both 
grassroots and state centres of power: 
International NGOs can provide some more advice and ideas on how to 
solve the problem. Because international NGOs have been experienced for 
a long time in this area... We need to get experience and ideas from them. 76 
The international NGO has more power than the local NGO to meet the 
government authorities; like it's easy for them to have access to the Prime 
Ministers, the King or the Ministries. So the international NGO has more 
power. 77 
Heavy reliance on international norms and values in formulating conceptions of human 
rights, arguably, also reflects the view that promotion of human rights in Cambodia is an 
international, rather than a local, project: 
Wejust respect the law of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights... We 
also rely on the Agreements of 31 October 1991, the Peace Accords - at that 
time human rights were born in Cambodia, so I just rely on that. 78 
[The UN Border Relief Operation] hired people to help teach human rights. 
they financed publications on human rights and so on. And so I feel the 
adoption of human rights by Cambodia is a collective work. And it was 
enshrined in the Paris Agreements and later on in the Constitution. 79 
Such attitudes militate against the development of creative and participatory grassroots 
solutions to Cambodia's human rights problems. Yet, although power relationships 
between the international community, the government and Cambodian human rights 
76 HIS. 
77 L4. 
78 H20, personal interview (Khm. ), 26 Jan. 1996, Phnom Penh. In fact, the Paris Agreements were signed 
on 23 Oct. 1991.31 Oct. is the date of the King's Birthday. 
79 H16. 
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NGOs circumscribe the human rights movement, there is room for negotiation, as both 
'patron' and 'client' seek to exploit mutual contact to their greatest advantage. While the 
international agenda has heavily influenced the local one, the contextual and cultural 
variables, particularly the response of the Cambodian government, have also had a 
significant impact on human rights activity and discourse. Although interviewees 
claimed to 'rely on' international treaties for their conceptions of human rights, in fact, 
these frequently differed significantly from conceptions of human rights found in liberal 
democratic ideology. 
The response of interviewees to international intervention reflects the impact of a 
negotiation between the human rights movement, the grassroots, the Cambodian 
government and the international community within the particular environment of 
Cambodia since 1993. While international backing heavily influences NGO activity in 
human rights promotion, perceptions of the condition and capabilities of the 'grassroots' 
and fear of a violent government response are certainly constraining factors on NGO 
ideology and activity. 
The attitudes of the Cambodian human rights movement also reflect the cultural 
backdrop to their activities, as they strive to promote human rights ideals in the setting 
of the Cambodian political economy of power. This response is manifested by the 
human rights activity and discourse which continued in Cambodia in 1995/6, three years 
after UNTAC's departure. 
It is argued in later chapters that in both their activities and in the human rights 
discourse which has emerged from the Cambodian human rights movement, the impact 
of this process of negotiation can be perceived. The conflicting pressures, funding and 
patronage opportunities, and cultural values which circumscribe NGO work have 
affected the way that human rights, as a political concept, has been introduced into the 
Cambodian political economy of power. Arguably, the result has not been the 
emergence of the kind of participatory, grassroots civil society anticipated in the civil 
society literature. 
The next chapter examines the production and nature of the human rights discourse 
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employed by the Cambodian human rights movement, and argues that this discourse is 
the product of attempts by Cambodian activists to marry the human rights ideology 
promoted by international organisations with, firstly, a set of pre-existing cultural values 
which inform Cambodian understandings of political and social events; and secondly, 
with the search for solutions to the particular human rights problems which face 
Cambodians. 
Chapter Nine analyses the strategies of Cambodian human rights activists in one sphere 
of activity - gaining redress for complaints of abuse - to illustrate the constraints on 
NGO modes of operation which arise from the Cambodian power environment. 
Particular emphasis is laid on NGO perceptions of threats to their security. 
Politicisation. The trend towards politicisation of institutions of state discussed in 
previous chapters raises the question of politicisation within the Cambodian human 
rights NGO movement itself. Arguably, politicisation in this sector is not significant; 
little evidence of differences in responses between interviewees with different political 
backgrounds was found and the close scrutiny of human rights NGO activities by 
international trainers and funders precludes open manifestations of political loyalty in a 
sector which, as discussed, views itself as financially and physically dependent on 
international backing. No evidence was found that political party patronage played a 
significant part in mainstream NGO activities. 
Among human rights and defenders NGOs, rival groupings can be discerned, although 
these are linked by human rights workers to personality clashes rather than political 
interests. Two groupings of human rights NGOs have emerged, each with its own 
umbrella coalition. The Action Committee is led by Licadho, Adhoc and Vigilance, 
while the Cambodian Institute of Human Rights and Outreach are active in the 
Cambodian Human Rights Co-operation Committee. These groupings have also given 
rise to two electoral monitoring committees, COFFEL and COMFREL. Few political 
differences can be discerned between these two groupings and two interviewees, both 
involved in more specialised NGOs which deal with both groups, described the 
242 
Chapter 7. The Human Rights Movement 
difference as a difference of 'personalities' and 'personal styles'. 80 
Human rights leaders interviewed tended to excuse themselves from these failings by 
pointing to the lack of maturity of the movement; for example, 
We established the Action Committee... We are trying to develop it but 
NGOs are new, they are busy trying to develop their own organisation - 
that's why we need time to have group collaboration in the future. 81 
One high-ranking official pointed out, the friction within the NGO movement decreases 
the effectiveness with which NGOs are able to address government: 
The fact that there are two NGO committees, not one, means their strength 
is divided in half The government is only one, but it is dealing with two. 
So their strength is divided by 50 per cent. We told them, your strength 
depends on yourself. If you want 100 per cent strength you have to agree. 
And government will react accordingly. 82 
A more serious and more overtly political issue arose with the elections of an NGO 
representative to the National Electoral Commission, a body set up to organise national 
elections in 1998. NGO members participating in the ballot were allegedly offered $100 
each to vote for a pro-CPP NGO director. 83 Chea Chamroeun, president of the Khmer 
Youth Development Organisation, won the seat with 84 of 156 ballots cast, defeating 
Lao Mong Hay of the Khmer Institute of Democracy, who received 45 votes. 
The Phnom Penh Post quoted an unnamed United Nations human rights worker who 
claimed that it was well-known in the foreign donor community that Chea Chamroeun 
was funded by the CPP, and that he "does not have any confidence from the donor 
community" as a result. 84 Yet the fact that he was successful in gaining the NGO seat 
on the National Electoral Commission raises concerns that NGO voters, too, were 




93 "Buying Your Way into Democracy - NEC Bribes Alleged: 'PPP 2-15 Jan 199 8,1/2. 
84 "Buying Your Way... " 1. 
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susceptible to offers of money on this occasion. 
This ballot was, arguably, unusual in that it involved an area of NGO activity which was 
not subject to the demands of international donors. The NGO director alleged to have 
offered bribes, and many of the NGOs which voted, were development, rather than 
human rights, NGOs; the political orientations of development NGOs are not studied 
here. Generally, foreign donor scrutiny of NGO activities, particularly in the human 
rights field, where the UN Centre for Human Rights and the Human Rights Task Force 
work closely with NGOs, seeks to ensure that NGO activities conform to donor 
expectations. Many interviewees emphasised the 'neutrality' of their organisation, as 
discussed in detail in Chapter Eight. 
To the extent that this concept of 'neutrality' has become central to discussions of 
human rights in Cambodia it is an important element of the Cambodian human rights 
discourse, and consequently of the political landscape, despite the fact that occasional 
deviations from a policy of neutrality may occur in particular, highly politicised events 
such as the election described. During the period of fieldwork, deviations from a 
gneutral' policy took the form of inactivity due to fear within the human rights 
movement; no examples of political patronage directly affecting human rights work 
were found. Inactivity due to fear is discussed fin-ther in Chapter Nine. 
The Human Rights Movement and Cambodian 'Civil Society' 
The characterisation offered above posits a significant distance between the level of 
operation of human rights NGOs and the Cambodian 'grassroots'. As organisations 
largely staffed by members of the educated class, it is necessary to consider the extent to 
which human rights NGOs reflect the emergence of a wider, 'middle class' civil society 
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within Cambodia. 85 
JI. S. Girling, analysing democratisation trends among the middle class in Thailand, 
states, 
The middle class is generally perceived to be a heterogeneous grouping 
comprising: civil servants and academics; salaried employees of the majority 
of modem business; small businesspersons and shopkeepers; and 
86 independent professionals. 
He views this class as "the major constituent of civil society"87 . 
Arguably, in Cambodia, the division between the human rights NGO movement and 
many 'middle-class' professionals in the public sector is wide. Civil service employees, 
particularly, are heavily constrained in their political activities by the politicisation of 
the state apparatus, described in previous chapters, which demands that their loyalty be 
invested in hierarchical patron-client relationships with superiors, rather than 
encouraging the development of autonomous or semi-autonomous professional 
associations. 
In part, the attachment of low-level public employees to superiors within the state 
apparatus is the result of the search for security in a climate of fear. Yet in part, also, 
patrimonial relationships within the state apparatus reflect the 'insider' status of civil 
service employees, who, perhaps, view attachment to superiors as rewarding politically, 
85 Formation of a self-conscious, professional middle class pursuing its own interests has been linked in 
the literature to the promotion of human rights in other countries in the region. See, for example, Daniel 
S. Lev, "Human Rights NGOs in Indonesia and Malaysia" Asian Perspectives on Human Rights, eds. 
Claude E. Welch and Virginia A. Leary, 142-16 1; John Girling, "Development and Democracy in 
Southeast Asia, " The Pacific Review 1 (1987): 332-340 and "rhailand in Gramscian Perspective" Pacific 
Affairs, 57 (1984): 385403. It is important to note that in much of this literature, the formation of a self- 
conscious professional class is associated explicitly with the level of economic development within the 
countries examined. In Cambodia, the level of economic development lags far behind that of many other 
Southeast Asian countries, so it may be expected that the emergence of a politically vocal professional 
class would be delayed. Arguably, in the context of an international intervention designed to foster the 
growth of a pro-democratic 'civil society' in conditions of material scarcity, political factors impeding this 
process in the context of underdevelopment must be examined. 
86 J. L. S. Girling, Interpreting Development. Capitalism, Democracy and the Middle Class in Thailand, 
(Ithaca: Cornell University South East Asia Programme, 1996), 44. 
87 Girling Interpreting 54. 
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socially and economically. The use of official positions for rent-seeking in performance 
of state duties is one perquisite available to civil service insiders. State salaries, around 
$20 a month for teachers 88 andjudges, 89 rising to $1,300 to $1,500 for members of 
parliament, 90 are minimal and there are few white-collar employers in Cambodia aside 
from the state, who could bid up salaries or provide alternative employment 
opportunities. Supplementing official salaries through abuse of power and/or rent- 
seeking activities is attractive in these circumstances. 
Rent-seeking activities encompass a range of different forms of behaviour; judges and 
civil servants may demand bribes, teachers and medical staff may demand unofficial 
fees for their services; soldiers may set up illegal checkpoints on the highway to demand 
unofficial taxes from travellers; police may impose arbitrary fines. Establishing whether 
such rent-seeking activities are judged as unethical or immoral within Cambodian 
political culture is beyond the scope of this study. A distinction must be drawn, in the 
light of the human rights concerns described in the previous chapter, between the 
imposition of fees for services by teachers and health workers, and the use of force to 
extract rent, by soldiers and armed local officials. 
The former category of rent-seeking may not impose a heavy burden on the public. Yet, 
arguably, pervasive low-level rent-seeking in many public services, including health and 
education as well as the police, military and bureaucracy, inhibits the ability of non- 
governmental critics, within human rights NGOs and elsewhere, to attract the support of 
low-ranking civil servants in a movement to isolate, politically, human rights abusers 
within the state apparatus. Rent-seeking activities provide a cushion which prevents 
economic necessity from forcing the disaffection of low-level state employees. By 
ensuring that even such basic services as education and health care are only available to 
those who pay, rent-seeking activities encourage further pursuit of rent, as poorly paid 
teachers must find the means to pay fees to poorly paid doctors and vice versa. 
88"Please MrTolLah, Tell Hun Sen! " letter from a former teacher, MK34 July 1996,1/3. 
89 Kirby 12. 
90 Munthit, "NIPs Busy Passing 106 Words a Fortnight, " Ppp 12-25 July 1996,2. 
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Engagement in rent-seeking activities encourages the formation of protective 
relationships with superiors rather than professional relationships with colleagues. 
A position within the patron-client networks that pervade the state apparatus can also 
offer social and political advantages, in return for political loyalty. Many state 
employees use state positions mainly to make insider contacts, supplementing their 
income through secondary employment. Opportunities for career advancement and for 
securing, for example, university places for one's children, or preferential treatment by 
other civil service officials, may be highly valued by civil servants. 
Consequently, state employees are atomised, concentrating on forming relationships 
with superiors and the public which will facilitate the political protection and income 
generation essential for survival, rather than on forming professional relationships with 
one another. The formation of a self-conscious professional class with distinct political 
interests is inhibited. There is no realistic alternative for the majority of insiders but to 
continue to participate in the system. 
One NGO worker described the position of teachers caught in this power relationship: 
Sometimes, I am very angry with the teachers. They want to protest to get 
more salary. I say, why don't you try to write a letter? (They answerj "No, 
no, no, I can't. " Because they're scared, you know? They think the 
government will try to kick them out, do something bad. They're scared 
because of politics - they hate politics. 
91 
Fear of losing one's position is associated, not primarily with loss of the minimal salary, 
but with loss of insider status. This status generates the ability to gain economic rent 
from power relationships and the exploitation of insider-outsider differentials, and 
protection from superiors and insider contacts. The organisation of the state apparatus 
thus reinforces insider-outsider differentials in society, increase the tendency of insiders 
to remain attached to the dominant hierarchy and cause, sometimes, the enforced 
complicity ofjunior state employees in the abuses of their superiors. 
91RI, personal interview, 31 Jan. 1996, Phnom Penh. 
247 
Chapter 7., Yhe Human Rights Movement 
The emergence of a 'professional' or 'middle class' voice within the public service 
professions, supportive of human rights promotion and independent of the politicised 
state apparatus, is inhibited in these conditions. Lack of private sector white-collar 
employment opportunities, and the dearth of politically active businessmen or 
commercial employees, resulting from the limited size and lack of development of the 
Cambodian private sector, compared to that of Thailand, ftu-ther constrains the 
emergence of a 'middle-class' movement for change. 
Yet in attempting to foster civil society, UNTAC selected a number of professional 
groups for training, listed in Appendix 1, Table B, which are identifiable as 'middle 
class' groups, as described by Girling. Journalists, monks, teachers and students were 
among those groups whom UNTAC anticipated could contribute to the human rights 
movement in Cambodia, because of their position as important shapers of public 
opinion, national discourse and political culture. 
The relationship of these groups to one another, to the state apparatus, and to the 
international community is described here to inform, an analysis of the similarities and 
differences of Cambodian human rights NGOs with these other, important, targets of 
international human rights promotion. Three important organisations staffed by 
4middle-class' professionals are considered here, namely, the Buddhist Sangha, the 
Royal University of Phnom Penh, and the Cambodian press. 
These three institutions are significant in that they represent important channels by 
which national political and cultural discourse circulate. Recently and historically, these 
institutions have been subject to intense efforts by political parties to obtain their 
ideological allegiance. The Sangha and the university, particularly, have a history in 
Cambodia of producing important political constituencies, in the shape of monks and 
students. Monks occupy a revered position in political and cultural life at the grassroots 
village level, and are viewed as important in shaping rural public attitudes and providing 
legitimacy for political regimes. 
Students graduate from university to comprise the ranks of rural teachers, professionals 
and low-ranking officials who may in time form the forefront of Cambodia's efforts to 
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modernise. Through its ideological impact on these important groups, the university, as 
an organisation, is now, as in pre-war times, in a key position to shape the particular 
characteristics of Cambodian political debate. 
It is significant in this respect that monks and intellectuals were two groups which 
formed the core of Democratic Party support in the 1940s and were highly critical of 
Sihanouk from the 1950S. 92 They were also particular targets of repression during the 
DK regime of 1975 to 1979. Under the PRK/SoC regime of the 1980s, the Sangha and 
the university were re-established, but heavily politicised and expected to serve the 
ideological objectives of the government. In the 1990s, the efforts of certain 
international NGOs have focused on realigning these two groups to conform to liberal 
democratic conceptions of 'neutrality', yet because many senior appointments to these 
institutions were made during the PRK/SoC regime, international efforts conflict with 
continuing attempts by the Cambodian parties to use these instiýutions to bolster 
political power vis-a-vis rivals. 
A free press has rarely been a feature of Cambodian political life in the past. Journalists 
who criticised the government were suppressed in both the Sihanouk era and the 
Republic. From 1975 to 199 1, the only publications produced in Cambodia were organs 
of the state, while Khmer Rouge radio broadcasts from the border areas were used as 
political propaganda to undermine the Phnom Penh regime. Since 1993, divisions in the 
press have closely resembled divisions in political society. 
Relationship with Political Parties. The press, the university and the Sangha differ 
from human right NGOs in that they are not primarily dependent on international 
interest for their emergence and continued functioning. These political-cultural 
institutions did not emerge as 'children of the UN', although some of their activities are 
foreign-funded. Consequently they have a different relationship with the international 
community and are more closely tied, through their origins, recent history and, 
sometimes, present day funding arrangements, to Cambodian political society. 
92 Chandler Tragedy 31-32; 88. 
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Since 1993, the Buddhist Sangha has been formally restored to the position it held in the 
Sihanouk era as state religion and one of the three pillars of cultural legitimacy - nation, 
religion, King. 93 Within the Buddhist Sangha, or community of monks, evidence of 
political alignments within wats is the legacy of attempts by the PRK and SoC regimes 
to capture the Sangha politically as a source of legitimacy. During the PRK/SoC era, 
appointments to the highest ranks of the Sangha were political. Supreme Patriarch of 
Monks Sangharaj Tep Vong was appointed to the Kampuchean National United Front 
for National Salvation (KNUFNS) and elected as member of the National Assembly in 
198 1.94 
Political divisions exist within the monkhood as monks who worked in border refugee 
camps aligned with the resistance parties in the 1980s are integrated into Cambodian 
wats. One example of the problems arising from such reintegration were exhibited at 
Wat Than, Phnom Penh, in July 1996, when pro-CPP monks demonstrated against the 
ousting, by a Funcinpec appointee, of the CPP abbot, and the redistribution of 
accommodation to Funcinpec monks. According to the pro-CPP newspaper Koh 
Santepheap, representatives of Ranariddh spoke disrespectfully to demonstrating 
monks, challenging them to fight and threatening them withjail. 95 This story also 
reflects the uncertainty of power relations between the monkhood and the government 
authorities, discussed in more detail in Chapter Nine. 
The University of Phnom Penh is also located within a political patronage system, 
specifically that of the CPP. Teachers are expected to be CPP members and most 
gained their positions under the SoC regime; many received education and training in 
Vietnam, the former Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc countries. Their politicised 
status as public employees resembles that of lower ranking levels of the civil service. 
93 Constitution Art. 43 states, "Buddhism shall be the state religion! '; Art. 4 states, "Ilie motto of the 
Kingdom of Cambodia is: 'Nation, Religion, King'. " 
94VI, personal interview (Khm. ), 13 June 1996, Phnom Penh. Monks will be identified by the letter 'V' 
and a number to preserve confidentiality. 
95 "One Mountain has Two Red Tigers - Demonstration at Wat Than to Oust the New Man, " Koh 
Santepheap (KS), 24 July 1996,4; "It is Not Right to Use Violence Towards Monks! Threats to Put All 
Red Monks In Jail, " KS 25 July 1996,4. 
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As a profession, university teachers remain captured in the political and economic 
imperatives of government service. Low salaries inhibit professionalism, but the 
requirement of political loyalty prevents teachers from campaigning for higher salaries. 
A professional association for teachers, re-formed since the 1960s, fails in this respect: 
The organisation does not talk about politics, or about economics... The 
teacher's salary is low - about $20 to $40 - it cannot support life. Why 
doesn't the teachers' organisation say anything about this? ... They know 
about democracy and liberty, but they don't know how to apply liberty and 
human rights on this issue. 96 
Low salaries inhibit attempts to strengthen the profession: 
Teachers ... cannot live on their salary. The teacher has to sell cakes to 
students, or has to drive a moto, or give a private course at lunchtime. You 
cannot expect the pedagogy to improve... it affects the relationship between 
the teacher and the student. The student is not respectful to the teacher. 97 
Teachers and staff in Cambodia have descended into corruption... as a result 
of low salaries. They come to work late and leave early... I have never seen 
teachers' spirits as low as they are this year. 98 
Government interest in and patronage of students is exemplified by the recent 
construction at the university of the Hun Sen Library, donated by Hun Sen. Students 
regularly write to Hun Sen personally, to ask for funds for particular study projects. 
According to a National Union of Khmer Students (NUKS) representative, "rhe 
government provides very strong support on the problems of students, especially 
Samdech Hun S&'99. In return, student groups have supported pro-government 
demonstrations! 00 
9'U I, personal interview (Eng. ), 20 May 1996, Phnom Penh. University staff will be identified by the 
letter 'U' and a number, to preserve confidentiality. 
97 U3, personal interview (Eng. ), 10 June 1996, Phnom Penh. 
" University professor Chhay Yiheang, qtd by Soly Vannpok and Chhun Phaveng, "Pressure of Poverty; 
Pressure for Success, " PPP 12-25 July 1995,16. 
99S2, personal interview (Khm. ), 28 June 1996, Phnom Penh. Students will be identified with the letter 
'S' and a number to preserve confidentiality. 
10IMessages allegedly from university students supporting Hun Sen were broadcast on the radio following 
Sirivudh's arrest. Students also demonstrated against the pro-KNP newspaper Moneaksekar Khmer in 
July 1995. 
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The emergence of more than 40 newspapers competing for internal readership following 
the arrival of UNTAC in 1991 represents a new phenomenon in Cambodian politics, but 
newspaper circulation is confined to urban centres. 101 Many press organs have retained 
close ties with political sponsors. Opposition newspapers, including Samleng Yuvachon 
Khmer and Moneaksekar Khmer, which published an edition every three to four days, 
initially adopted a pro-Funcinpec stance 102 but have been closely associated, since 1995, 
with expelled Funcinpec member and former Minister for Finance and Economics Sam 
Rainsy, and his Khmer Nation Party. Others, including Cambodia's two daily 
newspapers Koh Santepheap and Reasmei Kampuchea, adopted a pro-CPP editorial 
stance. 
Frequently, the opposition and pro-government newspapers denounced one another in 
editorials. An important example of this, exemplifying the impact of political 
polarisation in the press on the status of the profession and upon press freedoms 
generally, followed the sacking of the Sereipheap Thmei office by angry Hun Sen 
supporters, outraged by the newspaper's criticism of the Hun Sen Development Zone in 
Kraingyov Commune. Following this incident, the newspaper Koh Santepheap 
published an editorial advising protesters in future to attack printing presses rather than 
newspaper offices themselves, as this would be more effective. 103 The editorial 
prompted privately-owned printing houses to refuse to publish further issues of the 
opposition newspapers, resulting in the suspension of these newspapers throughout 
November 1995. 
A weak centrist group of 'independent' newspapers, most of which published less 
frequently, also existed. Division in the press reflected political division in society, and 
between 1993 and 1997, journalists were the major target for violent repression by 
government. 
101 All the journalists interviewed said that distribution costs and lack of demand in rural Cambodia 
prohibited wider circulation of newspapers. 
102 N5, personal interview (Khm. ), 22 Apr. 1996, Phnom Penh. 
103 Heng Sok Cheng, "Dissident Papers Close, Future Cloudy, " PPP 1-14 Dec. 1995,14; N5. 
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Journalists drew explicit connections between politicisation of the press and the 
economic structure within which the industry operates. Low circulation, relatively high 
production costs, little advertising revenue, and poor infrastructure for distribution mean 
that newspaper sales do not generate profits. Individual newspapers are not eligible for 
foreign aid and in an economy containing little popular spending power, money is made 
from providing political services to the elite, rather than economic services to the 
masses. 
Consequently journalists operate within the Cambodian system of political patronage: 
The Cambodian media cannot earn money by their profession... because of 
the economy and ... the human resource problem... They live because of 
their writing, not because of their selling of their newspapers. There are no 
advertisements, so the source of finance comes from politicians, from 
extortion - corrupt practices. 
104 
Political patronage within these institutions, particularly the university and the press, is 
matched by international interventions which attempt to promote an ideological 
reorientation, emphasising the values of neutrality and professionalism which are central 
to liberal democratic social and cultural organisation. 
International Intervention. The university has seen intense Western input, since 1993, 
into curricula, research and intellectual development. French experts designed the 
curriculum in the Faculty of Law; the Italian New Humanities NGO designs and 
implements the curriculum in the social sciences, bringing in foreign experts to lecture 
directly to students. 
To an extent, a new ideology has been imposed by this means on the university, much as 
communist ideology was imposed in the 1980s. One lecturer commented that in the 
early 1980s, "Marxist-Leninism was a major subject in all faculties" but this has 
changed since 1993: 
Now we have to teach from the Ancient Greeks up to Foucault. Only a 
small part of it's about Marxism. Before we just taught that Marx and 
'04N3, personal interview (Eng. ), 27 Mar. 1996, Phnom Penh. 
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Engels and Lenin were very good leaders. But now we have to analyse 
about the bad side and the good side. We have to say it's not all good and 
not all bad. For example, Marx is a great hilosopher about alienation and 
dialectic but not on political organisation ... 
X51 
Ideological reorientation has been accompanied by the need for teachers to acquire new 
language skills and academic habits as academic exchanges with the Soviet bloc are 
replaced by new Western contacts. This reorientation will take many years to complete 
and, arguably, weakens the university meanwhile. Skills acquired during the 1980s via 
mass Soviet bloc exchange programmes have become obsolete because they are not 
valued by Western financial patrons: 
Before some teachers studied in the Soviet Union, some in Vietnam and 
other socialist countries. But they don't know English or French very well. 
Since 1993 we've returned to French and English - it's caused a lot of 
difficulty. 106 
It's difficult for our department... Some teaýhers have been to study abroad 
but the other teachers don't know foreign languages... The first problem is 
language. 107 
The speed with which Soviet bloc influence was replaced by Western intervention 
between 1990 and 1992 caused the abandonment of skills built up in the 1980s. English 
and French language skills are at a premium in the NGO labour market. French 
language, particularly, has been promoted within higher education through provision by 
the French government of aid earmarked for French teaching. English is considered by 
teachers and students vital for dealings with regional neighbours, as well as with 
significant donors such as the United States and Australia. 108 These external 
considerations have ruled out a more controlled transfer of language skills which might 
have ameliorated disruption within higher education. 
Western NGOs operating within the university have also encouraged a revival of 
105ul. 
106u 1. 
'O'U2, personal interview (Eng. ), 20 May 1996, Phnom Penh. 
108U3. 
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research activity, following a moratorium of many years. Political questions will arise 
as researchers are encouraged to cultivate a Western-style critical role. According to one 
faculty member: 
Research themes can influence the students. For example, one piece on 
liberty in Cambodia was published in a university magazine... a lot of our 
intelligentsia discussed this research document. 109 
The lack of professional confidence which inhibits attempts to lobby government on 
issues of salary may also prevent assertion of rights to academic freedom in the future. 
In teaching, also, the division of society into insiders and outsiders, and the centrality of 
rent-seeking in this process, conflict with meritocratic ideals promoted in Western 
ideology. This is exemplified by the widespread sale of public examination answer 
sheets, by teachers and, sometimes, Ministry of Education officials. " 0 
Student politics is similarly located. There are clear political divisions between student 
organisations; for example, the Khmer Students Association (KSA) cultivates contact 
with the NGO movement, specifically through membership of the NGO coalition 
Pýnleu Khmer, while the National Union of Khmer Students (NUKS) cultivates contact 
with the government. 
The KSA has adopted the concerns of the human rights NGO movement and view their 
role as facilitating accountability and encouraging intellectual freedom among students, 
through a monthly newsletter and through the organisation of forums addressed by 
National Assembly deputies. Such activities are a new feature of student life in 
Cambodia. Students report increased freedom of expression within the university since 
the 1993 elections, although one student commented, "we are concerned because when 
we exercise our freedom of speech we are accused of being anti-govermnenf'. 111 The 
119ul 
110 "No Bribes at Ministry; Cheats Resort to Throwing Rocks, " PPP 12-25 July 1996,16. In this report, 
Minister of Education Tol Lah claimed that measures had been taken to prevent bribe-taking at the 
Ministry of Education for the first time in 1996. The report described instances of bribe-taking by 
teachers, in return for providing answer sheets, or allowing students to take examination papers outside 
the examination room, in order to seek help from relatives. 
"' S 1, personal interview (Khm. ), 19 Mar. 1996, Phnom Penh. 
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NUKS focuses on providing fmancial support for students: 
This association will try to support what the government wants it to support. 
For example, if the government doesn't have enough money, then the 
association can try to help students. 112 
International intervention in redesigning curricula for students, including developing 
human rights curricula for use in schools represents an ideological challenge to the use 
of the education sector as a channel for distribution of patronage. According to 
Moneaksekar Khmer. 
... The many schools that Hun Sen has made recent efforts to rebuild, using 
corrupt money from concealed sources, excite middle and high school 
children; but those children haven't yet reached the legal age of 
enfranchisement and [they] will change their minds as they learn the truth 
from their studies... Between now [and then], the children will learn the 
meaning of purity, or progressive vision, and of right choice. ' 13 
Offering opportunities to individuals to pursue education may initially operate to bind 
loyalties, but increasing educational standards, especially in the context of a Western- 
influenced liberal curriculum, may create demands that cannot be met through a 
patronage-based economy of power. 
The 1994 abandonment by the Ministry of Education of the system of assigning jobs to 
university graduates heightens the impact of international intervention upon university 
students, as students compete for relatively high-paying jobs in foreign firms or the 
international NGO sector. According to one faculty member: 
[University staff are] very worried about professions for students. There are 
no real plans in the Ministry of Education. For example, in [this] 
department, it will be very difficult [for the graduating students] in the 
future to find a job. We sugest to the students that they should study 
English, French or computers. 14 
Lack of private employment opportunities and poor state salaries increase the 
112 S2. 
"Hun Sen will be Defeated by National History, " MK 25-26 June 1996,1. 
114u 1. 
256 
Chapter 7: 7le Human Rights Movement 
attractiveness of service jobs with foreign NGOs or companies for graduating students: 
Khmer children are not afraid of conscription any more so don't get state 
jobs (especially in teaching)... Having passed their Bac. Dip. they hire 
themselves out to companies, for example driving vehicles... , and earn $70 
at the very least... If the salary is still as low as it is now, in the future 
Cambodia will have a shortage of teachers ... 
115 
Entry of graduates into the foreign NGO sector at low levels, for example, as chauffeurs, 
represents a drain of talent which is problematic in an economy which, for historical 
reasons, lacks professional and intellectual resources. Students must choose between 
the conformity and patron-clientism of the state sector, and wcll-paid jobs working 
under foreign control. Demonstrations organised by students at the Institute of 
Technology in 1994, to demand provision of English language classes at the Institute, 
indicate the extent to which students orient their career ambitions towards the foreign 
sector of the ecqn0my. 
Within the press, international assistance has not been made available to individual 
newspapers, although international trainers provide workshops for journalists in attempt 
to improve professional standards within the Khmer-language press. Financial aid has 
been made available to NGOs set up to promote the professional interests of journalists. 
The press came to be represented by four journalists' associations, as the press split into 
opposing groups in the search for patronage. The largest, the League of Cambodian 
Journalists (LCJ), contained mainly pro-government newspapers. The Association of 
Independent Journalists comprised six pro-KNP newspapers; of four journalists killed 
between 1993 and 1997, three were from this group. The Khmer Journalists Association 
(KJA), the first press association formed during the UNTAC era, claimed to be 
independent of any political party. 
The defection of pro-govemment newspapers to the LCJ in 1995 was described by one 
KJA member as 
not a very big surprise. Because the government doesn't understand what 
115'Tlease Mr Tol Lah, Tell Hun Sen! " letter from a former teacher, MK 3-4 July 1996,1. 
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we want to do.... When this association defended the freedom of speech of 
an independent paper that spoke very strongly against the government - they 
said, 'the KJA is the opposition - we don't want opposition against the 
government'... And the newspapers who were with the government split 
from us. And since that time the government has attacked us every day 
(through this] group of newspapers ... ; that we work for foreigners, that we 
are puppets of the Americans... We are like the Khmer Rouge who do bad 
things to the government.... Relations are not good. ' 16 
Attempts to divide independent organisations, co-opting certain sections and 
intimidating others, has been characteristic of CPP strategies towards political society 
since 1993. The media closely mirrors political society due to the direct financial 
patronage of newspapers by politicians. Newspapers associated with the political 
opposition were subject to intense pressure from threats of physical violence and 
prosecution. 
In 1996, a fourth association was formed by a breakaway group from the. LCJ. This 
group claimed interference by the League in editorial policy, on behalf of the authorities. 
It is equally likely that formation of new media groups had begun to be perceived as an 
opportunity to attract international aid, following extension of Asia Foundation aid to 
the LCJ in early 1996. The LCJ president, Chum Kanal, described the means by which 
the LCJ had set out to attract international aid: 
[At first] the international community were looking at the LCJ and thought 
we were pro-government, so no international organisation helped us... until 
we had an election on 4th July 1995.... We chose the president and sub- 
presidents according to democratic principles. I was selected to be 
president. And then I asked ambassadors and international journalists and 
various NGOs.... The ambassadors were surprised that the democracy was 
so open.... For the next six months, the international organisations were still 
suspicious of me. They still thought the LCJ supported the goverment. 
But later on the)r knew. ' 17 
According to Chum Kanal, the presidential election was organised according to 
American-style voting procedures, while sub-presidential elections were organised 
1 "5N3. 
117 Personal interview. 
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according to French-style voting procedures, in order to attract a maximum of 
intemational support. 
Most Khmer-language newspapers were personal outfits, run by owner-editors, some of 
whom were journalists under the SoC regime and others of whom entered the profession 
as recent graduates, returnees from refugee camps, or from other fields of employment. 
They were usually sponsored by individuals or parties! 18 Similarly, media 
organisations, increasingly, took on this aspect as the press corps fragmented in pursuit 
of government or international finance. The concept of professional organisations 
forming a broad framework for pursuing common interest, regardless of political 
difference, did not take hold. Fracturing along lines of political disagreement made it 
difficult for such organisations; to do more than use links with government and the 
international community to offer members material advantages over, or protection 
against, competitors. 
Government willingness to allow foreign funding and training of clients in the press, 
university and elsewhere indicates the confidence of the government in its ability to 
maintain control. Government encouragement of direct international funding obviated 
the need for political patrons to compete with sources of international funds. 
International ideology could be counteracted by increasing the threat of violence against 
outsiders. This was noted particularly in the press. Constant pressure was applied to 
critical journalists through intimidation and threats, actedupon frequently enough to be 
credible. 
This strategy, combined with material incentives awarded to loyalists along with, not 
instead of, international funding, allowed the CPP to maximise power vis-A-vis the 
international community. Control of violence ensured that the CPP could silence the 
opposition press whenever it wished. This ability was demonstrated, as described, 
during November 1995, following the attack on Sereipheap Thmei, preventing pro-KNP 
newspapers from covering the Sirivudh case. 
I 1"rhis characterisation is made in "Individual Freedoms in Khmer Newspapers, " Damnung 
Pachubonnophiep, 12-13 June 1996,1. 
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Internationa interventions in te university and the press offered education in human 
rights as part of a wider training strategy aimed to strengthen the professionalism and 
neutrality of these groups in line with professional ethics common in Western liberal 
democracies. Arguably, continued attempts by goverrunent to politicise these 
institutions contributed to the continued weakness and vulnerability of the teaching and 
journalism professions, as evidenced by the lack of political influence of their 
associations. Both these professions are constrained by material scarcity and the 
political loyalty demanded from those reliant on political patronage or state salaries. 
The Sangha, arguably, is in a different position as it gains strength from its relationship 
with the Cambodian public, rather than with either political parties, or the international 
community. 
Monks rely on the donations of lay Buddhists for their living, and consequently it is 
their status in the local community that determines the expansion and prestige of the 
monkhood. Increasing numbers of monks and popular patronage of temples in the 
1990s, and plans to reopen the Buddhist University, closed since the 1970s, are likely to 
strengthen the autonomy of the religious establishment. The extent to which monks 
themselves are re-establishing their traditional role in the villages as community 
educators, advisors and arbitrators is a question for further research. 
It is unlikely that the position occupied by monks in the early twentieth century as key 
mediators in dispute resolution and overseers of the system of pagoda schools will ever 
be reattained, given the expansion of a secular legal system and of state education, 
which began in Sihanouk's em and was re-established as a governmental concern under 
the PRK/SoC. Yet, activism by monks on social issues has been encouraged by 
international and local human rights NGOs who see monks as a useful agent of 
dissemination of human rights teachings. 
Initiatives such as the Dhammayietra peace march, the Battambang-based Buddhism for 
Development organisation, and a project sponsored by the Khmer Buddhist Society to 
train monks to disseminate human rights teachings among the rural population, 
represent a new intrusion of monks into political life as non-party aligned agents of 
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national reconciliation and reconstruction. It is significant that the monks who founded 
the Dhammayietra and the Buddhism for Development organisation have returned from 
abroad since the start of the peace process, while the Khmer Buddhist Society is a 
Cambodian-American organisation. 
Direct Engagement in Human Rights Work While the development of the professions 
has not yet reached a stage where a civil society of professional interest groups can be 
seen to have emerged, there is overlap between the Sangha, the University, the press and 
the human rights NGO movement, as participation of, particularly, monks, students and 
intellectuals in human rights activities is encouraged by human rights NGOs. 
Some students and university teachers are active members of human rights NGOs, or 
form their own associations to promote freedom of debate and human rights education. 
The Khmer Students Association, for example, is an active member of the Ponleu 
Khmer umbrella grouping, while individual university professors are members of the 
Khmer Writers Association. The Khmer Journalists Association allies with human 
rights NGOs to lobby the government on issues of press freedom. Human rights NGOs 
encourage the participation of monks, particularly, to lend authority and legitimacy to 
their activities; four of the NGOs studied offered training courses in human rights to 
monks. 
Discussing their motivations for becoming involved directly in human rights work, 
individual interviewees from these groups expressed similar concerns to those expressed 
by human rights NGO workers. A number of these professionals viewed the status and 
expertise implicit in their professional role as attributes which they could draw upon in 
order to improve the condition of the nation and the people. For example, some 
students and intellectuals interviewed perceived human rights and education as related 
issues: 
We decided to start a human rights programm e to help develop the country. 
Because if we want to improve the country we need to give people a high 
level of education. 119 
119wi. 
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During the war the old well-educated people died or went to another 
country, so only the young people are left who have education. So we think 
that we should explain the cause of human rights to our families, our 
neighbours and everyone... Because we are well-educated so we understand 
what a violation is and how the government should treat the citizens. 120 
Senior monks who supported human rights education programmes emphasised links 
between human rights and morality, seen as the professional preserve of monks: 
The important part of human rights is the moral part... We cannot erase the 
past 20 years but we can improve Cambodian morality a lot. We can reduce 
violence and abuse a little bit. 121 
The monk is the teacher of the nation. The nation is the student. The 
teacher has to advise the student... Monks support the right of the people; 
the right person is the person who will make peace for the country. 122 
If [monks] can set an example, that is the most help they can give to 
people... The first role of monks is to set an example and to be a spiritual 
advisor. This is their true role. But in modem so6iety, sometimes, if society 
does not function normally, they need to be involved in many areas, in 
development, in socio-economic issues and so on. 123 
Journalists, also, viewed their role as educating the people to understand human rights, 
democracy and government activity. Two opposition journalists, and one 'neutral' 
joumalist described this as follows: 
In every edition, we write about human rights and democracy.... We can't 
make the government change their policy, but my special aim is to try to 
explain to the common people. If people know about the principles of 
democracy then they will know about government leaders and which to 
choose in the election. 124 
I wanted to become a journalist because of the political situation, because I 
want democracy and I want people to know about human rights - that 
everybody has their own rights to have a good living, to do something - 
because I have suffered violence in the Khmer Rouge regime, and from the 
120 si. 
121vi. 
122V2, personal interview (Eng. ), 19 June 1996, Phnom Penh. 
123V3, personal interview (Eng. ), 22 June 1996, Phnom Penh. 
124N7, personal interview (Khm. ), 15 May 1996, Phnom Penh. 
262 
Chapter 7., The Human RightsMovement 
Vietnamese-backed Communist regime. 125 
The important point is that this newspaper is neutral. It is working on a 
neutral basis - to criticise and point out bad points and good points of 
government. We criticise everyone, whoever they are and try to serve 
Cambodians. 126 
The links between education, religion, information and human rights promotion, posited 
in these accounts, are discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. Among 
interviewees from the university and the press, goals of human rights promotion not 
explicitly fmmed in terms of the formation of a relationship with the 'grassroots', in line 
with the fact that newspapers and the university serve an educated, urban minority. Yet 
a concern to develop a human rights discourse which can be circulated through 
professional activities in order to facilitate social development can be perceived in these 
remarks. 
The motivations of Cambodian human rights workers, particularly, and to an extent, of 
other professional, "middle-class" Cambodians who engage in human rights activities 
can be compared to the account of 'noble patronage' offered by Girling in examining 
middle-class political activities in Thailand: 
The 'noble form' [of patronage] ... is a way of making merit, which can be 
earned by such actions as sponsorship of the deserving poor... NGOs, in 
particular, and civil society in general express the noble form. 127 
Both the human rights NGO workers and individual members of the other groupings 
studied viewed their positions, as educated professionals, as key for the dissemination of 
human rights teachings and for other forms of social activism. These individuals, 
arguably, are isolated from the active support of wider sections of the urban educated 
stratum, because of the politicisation of state structures and the press, the 
underdeveloped nature of the private sector, and the weakness of professional 
associations. Economic and political imperatives thus constrain the emergence of a 
12'5N9. 
126NI, personal interview (Khm. ), 3 July 1996, Phnom Penh. 
127 Girling Interpretations 5 6. 
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broad "middle-class" movement for change. 
Yet, arguably, a network of educated, urban individuals, who participate in human rights 
work, and share similar views of the professional, technocratic nature of human rights 
promotion, has developed, with international support. The nature of the human rights 
discourse used by this network, and of the strategies used to ameliorate human rights 
abuse, are analysed in the next two chapters. 
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Foucault argues, "relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor 
implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a 
discourse. "' Within the evolving economy of power in Cambodia, discussed in previous 
chapters, human rights were promoted as a discourse within which criticism of and 
resistance to abusive practices could be framed. 
The term 'discourse' is understood here to mean a common conceptual framework, 
comprised of political concepts which transcend individual experience and thus have the 
power to unify political activity by constituting a framework of shared meaning. The 
power of a discourse is located in concepts which provoke a common response and can 
thus unite individuals in pursuit of a common cause. 
The activities of human rights NGOs, post-UNTAC, comprise education, training, 
monitoring and investigation, as described. These tasks can be viewed as attempts to 
achieve two objectives. The first objective, associated with education and training 
initiatives, is to embed a human rights discourse into Cambodian political culture. The 
second is to strengthen this discourse, through facilitating its circulation and associating 
it with other pre-existing power resources, to the point where it can effectively challenge 
the power resources of violence and impunity employed by human rights abusers. 
The Carabodian human rights discourse has been produced through the intensive 
internal activities of human rights NGOs, in holding joint discussions, workshops and 
seminars within the movement, and in their outreach efforts, which include training, 
education, distributing leaflets, producing human rights curricula, issuing press releases, 
and holding celebrations on Human Rights Day (10 December). NGOs have invested 
much effort in producing Khmer translations of international human rights law and 
booklets which use cartoons and stories to discuss human rights issues, which are made 
available to the general public. They have also developed curricula to be used by 
'Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures, " Dirks, Eley and Ortner 211. 
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teachers in schools, and have trained monks to deliver lectures related to human rights 
issues at traditional Khmer ceremonies. 
A large part of NGO activity involves sending education teams to the countryside to 
organise human rights classes for ordinary Cambodian villagers, aimed at familiarising 
ordinary Cambodians with the idea of human rights. By these means, NGOs have 
introduced the concept of human rights more widely into Cambodian understandings of 
, 
the position of the individual within the national polity. This process is still at an early 
stage; while the term 'human rights' has become familiar in the Cambodian press and in 
the speeches of politicians, it is unclear how understandings of the term vary among 
different sections of the Cambodian population, particularly in remoter areas. This is a 
question for finther research. 
In this chapter, the understanding of the term possessed by a specific group of 
t, 'arnbodians is analysed, namely, those Cambodians who form part of the human rights 
NGO movement itself, or of other sections of the community who have been exposed to 
human rights education since UNTAC. Conceptions discussed here are those which 
resurfaced time and again in discussions with interviewees, 2 and which consequently, 
appeared to be widely shared within the movement. 
This analytical strategy is limited in that it focuses on similarities of conception rather 
than on the breadth of views within this group. This strategy is nevertheless valuable in 
that it points to the strongest, because most widely shared, elements of the nascent 
human rights discourse. The concepts analysed in the remainder of this chapter are 
concepts which were striking in that they were at the heart of the views of human rights 
held by a wide variety of interviewees. Consequently, it is considered that these 
concepts are at the core of the unifying power of the Cambodian human rights 
2 For this analysis, data are drawn from interviews with 24 Cambodian human rights NGO workers 
(denoted by the code letter '11% 4 public defenders (V), 9 journalists (W), 4 minorities rights NGO 
workers (W), 2 students ('S'), 3 university faculty members (U), 3 religious NGO workers (W), 5 
monks ff) and 1 writer (W). The comments of 4 National Assembly deputies ('D'), relevant to this 
analysis, are also discussed. It should be noted that alternative human rights discourses may be circulating 
in Cambodia at different levels of society. Here, the term 'human rights discourse' refers to the discourse 
circulating within the group studied. 
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discourse. 3 
It must be emphasised that the discourse of human rights taking shape within the 
Cambodian human rights movement is only one of many political discourses circulating 
in Cambodia at present. The discourse of violence and 'effectiveness', arguably, 
continues to circulate more widely than the discourse of rights. Human rights discourse 
remains subordinate to the discourse of protection and economic distribution through 
patronage which is promoted by the CPP-aligned state structures. Consequently, the 
production of a Cambodian human rights discourse cannot be viewed as precipitating, of 
itself and in the immediate political environment, a reduction in human rights abuse. 
Yet the efforts of international and Cambodian human rights workers have created a 
situation where, among some sections of the Cambodian polity at least, discussions 
about human rights and about the nature of human rights work can take place within a 
shared conceptual framework. 
Aus, described in Chapter Seven, the activities of both international and Cambodian 
human rights promoters in Cambodia have focused heavily on inculcation of 
international norms into Cambodian politics. Yet it is argued in this chapter that the 
discourse which has emerged within the human rights movement in Cambodia fi=es 
these norms and values within a culturally specific set of attitudes. Marshall Sahlins 
comments that, 
The World System is not a physics of proportionate relationships between 
economic 'impacts' and cultural 'reactions'. The specific effects of the 
global-material forces depend on the various ways they are mediated in local 4 
cultural schemes. 
3 Because of the paucity of base-line data on Cambodian attitudes to many of the issues raised, the 
assessment which follows must also be viewed as a preliminary attempt to delineate some of the main 
strands of political thinking among the group studied. In outlining these strands, an attempt is made to 
provide details of the individual authors of the statements employed so as broadly to locate them within 
the structure of the NGO movement described in Chapter Seven; but the constraints imposed by 
guarantees of confidentiality made to interviewees necessitate some loss of nuance in this respect. 
'Marshall Sablin , "Cosmologies of Capitalism: The Trans-Pacific Sector of 'Ile World System', " Dirks, 
Eley and Ortner 414. 
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Since UNTAC, human rights concepts have been negotiated by pro-grassrootss 
Cambodian organisations who mediate between international donors and advisors, 
government, and their grassroots constituents, to formulate and disseminate a concept of 
human rights. The discourse produced and circulated by these organisations; reflects, 
both self-consciously and unconsciously, values claimed by interviewees to be inherent 
to Khmer culture, as well as the particular social and political status of human rights 
activists within that culture. 
Two key strands are noted in the discourse circulating amongst Cambodian 
interviewees. The first emerges, arguably, from the position of the Cambodian human 
rights movement in society. As described, many Cambodian interviewees viewed 
themselves as 'professionals' and 'technocrats', aiming to implement activities on 
behalf of a disempowered grassroots. Emphasis within the discourse employed by these 
interviewees on the 'neutrality' of their own organisations and of human rights 
conceptions dovetails with their perception of themselves as a movement. The 
neutrality of technocratic solutions to human rights abuse is contrasted with the 
politicisation and exclusionary tactics of state and political party structures. Twenty-two 
of fifty-five non-governmental interviewees used the term 'neutrality' or 'neutral' to 
define their ideology or activities. 6 
A finther element of this strand of thought is the view that professional, educated 
individuals are required to mediate between the state apparatus and society. The 
importance of professional mediation is reflected in the activities of human rights NGOs 
in educating both state employees and the public, and in constructing themselves as 
receivers and bearers of complaints to the authorities. This strand of thinking can be 
also be viewed as dovetailing with hierarchical and top-down conceptions of power. 
SThe term "Pro-grassroots" rather than "grassroots" is used advisedly, given the backgrounds and 
6professional' emphasis of interviewees described in the previous chapter. 
6 The breakdown by occupation is as follows: H=8, L=3, M=4, N=3, R-3, V-1. While this constitutes a 
minority of interviewees, arguably, the incidence with which this term appeared in interviewee accounts is 
significant in that the word 'neutral' was selected by interviewees themselves, when talking about their 
work in a variety of contexts, and was not prompted by any particular question, in line with the interview 
strategy described in Chapter One. 
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These conceptions are demonstrated both through the hierarchfcal structure of the NGO 
movement itself, and in the use of this hierarchy in seeking remedy for cases of abuse, 
as described in the next chapter. 
A second strand of thought emerges from the perception that human rights abuse in 
Cambodia is a result of contingent historical factors. Arguably, institutions of state are 
not seen as inherently abusive, as they are in liberal democratic thought. A state-society 
relationship based on mutual concern and co-operation is, arguably, considered possible 
by many interviewees. The damage to social order suffered by Cambodian society 
during the war is frequently viewed as causing the abusiveness of the state apparatus; 
abuse is not seen as an automatic consequence of state intrusion into previously autarkic 
and poorly organised villages. Consequently, emphasis is placed on altering individual 
attitudes within government, and restoring moral and religious values lost during the 
years of warfare, on the assumption that state officials who are possessed of the 
appropriate moral values will not abuse human rights. 
Again the concept of education is important to this strand of thinking, to promote 
harmony, morality and individual empowerment. Thirty-four out of fifty-five non- 
governmental interviewees, and two out of four National Assembly Deputies, mentioned 
at some stage during the interview the importance of education generally for human 
rights, 7 while of the 28 human rights and minorities rights organisations studied, 21 
pursued educational activities as a major concern. 
The concept of morality and/or reciprocity in social relationships, often framed within 
the context of Buddhist teachings is also important in this respect. The importance of 
morality in social and political relationships was mentioned by 11 of 55 interviewees; 8 
links between human rights and Buddhism were drawn by 24 of 55 interviewees, ' and 
7 By occupation: D=2', 11=13, L=3, M=3, N=6, R=l, S=2, U=2, V-3, W=l. A relatively stronger 
emphasis on the importance of education is displayed by journalists, students and intellectuals, but this 
view was also held by more than half the human rights NGO workers interviewed. 
8 By occupation: H=3, N= 1, R=2, U= 1, V=3, W= 1. 
'By occupation: H=8, L=3, M=l, R=3, U-2, V=5. In the case of monks (V) and religious NGOs (R), the 
question "Is there any connection between human rights and Buddhism? " The interviewees counted here 
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reciprocity in relationships as a means of promoting change was mentioned by 16 of 55 
interviewees. 10 
Both these strands of thinking are important in their implications for popular 
empowerment. Location of professional organisations at the heart of the political 
process, as technocratic mediators between state and society, and perceptions of 
themselves as intellectuals charged with the task of educating both state officials and 
citizens in appropriate political responses and moral values, lead to didactic NGO 
strategies of human rights promotion. Attempts to create new grass-roots forums of 
political debate and participation is not a major NGO concern, as described in the 
previous chapter. Arguably, the focus of human rights work in Cambodia is on 
empowerment of government through amelioration of human rights abuse, rather than 
on empowerment of the individual or grassroots community. 
Professionalism and Neutrality 
The importance and meaning of 'neutrality'l I was explained by a provincial director of 
the office of one of the largest human rights NGOs, from one of Cambodia's most war- 
tom provinces: 
I first became interested in human rights work because human rights are 
neutral. The work is neutral because [we are the] people in the middle. We 
have two functions - to investigate the problems people have, and solve 
them. And sometimes to educate in the human rights field - police and 
government officials, and the people in the villages. 12 
A significant aspect of NGO work attempts to create a 'neutral' arena within the 
Carnbodian polity. In part, arguably, the widespread use of the term 'neutrality' 
answered that there was a positive connection; their replies are analysed more fully later in the chapter. 
Other interviewees volunteered a connection between Buddhism and human rights when asked if there 
were any conflicts between human rights and Khmer custom and tradition. 
lty occupation: H-5, L-4, N- 1, S= 1, R=3, U- 1, V- 1. 
"In Khmer: This is defined in the Dictionnaire Cambodgien as "that which is in 
the middle; that which represents the centrists; that which is not a member of any group or party, " 
Dictionnaire Cambodgien (Phnom Penh: Institut Buddhique, 1967) 1688. 
12 H2 1. 
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amongst interviewees can be seen as a response to concerns of international donors that 
funds aimed at the non-governmental sector should target non-political organisations. 
In part, it also reflects memories of the Sihanoukist foreign policy of 'neutralism' which 
was designed to mediate between the various foreign ideologies viewed as impingeing 
upon Cambodian national political life during the 1960s, thus creating a political space 
within which Buddhist Socialism could be practised. 
Arguably, the particular conception of the term in the 1990s also reflects the political 
perceptions and needs of NGOs operating in a highly-politicised environment. The use 
of the term 'neutrality' to define a sphere for NGO activity within the Cambodian polity 
is a particular response to the international ideological requirements and the nature of 
domestic political control which represent features of the present Cambodian political 
landscape. Use of this term, arguably, also reflects perceptions among interviewees, of 
the human rights movement as 'professional' and 'technocratic', and the emphasis on 
the educative role in introducing international norms, rather than on a role of facilitating 
emergence of indigenous norms through participatory discussion and action. 
The stability of the liberal democratic state arises in large part from its ability to portray 
itself, and the covert power exercise on which it depends, as neutral. This is the reason 
for the importance of independence of judiciary and media and the neutrality of 
bureaucracy and armed forces in a liberal democratic polity. In liberal democracies, 
politics is constrained by neutrality, in that the realm of political governance is restricted 
within 'neutrally' determined constraints, such as judicial oversight. Concomitantly, 
democracy offers a certain element of participatory political control over the 'neutral', 
preventing a serious and destabilising mismatch between norms of governance and 
popular aspiration. 
In the Cambodian context of civil war and politicisation of all spheres of public life, 
neutrality is seen as a region located in between the macro and micro-levels of 
Cambodian politics: the intrusive, exclusive, and loyalty-based arena of party politics; 
and the 'grassroots' level of the villages, where private life occurs in conditions of 
tenuous subsistence and ubiquitous, arbitrary violence. As professional 'people in the 
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middle', human rights workers can mediate between the demands of political leaders 
and the plight of the poor. They attempt to promote consensus among authorities and 
people, increasing the sphere of 'what goes without saying' (to borrow Bourdicu's 
phrase) and does not need to be continually reaffin-ned: relations of domination in 
society. 13 
As described in earlier chapters, neutralism has played little role in governance in 
Cambodia since 1970. Cambodians are required constantly to display active political 
loyalty in order 
, 
to receive the benefits of governance. Consequently, neutralism 
represents a re-emergent force in Cambodian state-society political relations in the 
1990s, and a rallying cry for the NGO movement. It represents an organised and self- 
conscious attempt to delimit the sphere of 'politics' from the sphere of basic needs. It is 
associated with a particular anti-political stand, where politics is equated with self- 
serving behaviour and greed: 
The kind of people who do politics are the ones who like to become leaders 
with money, with power. 14 
Most of the Cambodian officials, they just use their power for their own 
interests. 15 
Self-consciously 'neutral' NGOs, journalists and monks can both define a neutral 
political arena and inhabit it. They can mediate between government and citizen 
physically and immediately by, for example, existing as an avenue for complaint which 
does not require the citizen to approach directly a member of the authorities. They can 
also define the content and limits of 'neutrality' by acting as a referee of state-society 
13 "Because the subjective necessity and self-evidence of the commonsense world arc validated by the 
objective consensus on the sense of the world, what is essential goeswithout saying because it comes 
without saying: the tradition is silent, not least about itself as a tradition... " Bourdicu 163. It is not 
suggested that this level of consensus can be attained in the near future by Cambodian NGOs; but through 
their mediation, they are attempting to create a framework for regulating the intersection between the 
political sphere and the sphere of grassroots social, cultural and economic activity. Such regulation would 
obviate the need for the endless reaffirmations of loyalty (on the part of the people) and power (on the part 
of the government) which have led to the constant and arbitrary abuse of human rights in the provinces. 
14 H 14. 
15 Ll. 
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relations, establishing a regulatory framework and training both sides to respond within 
it, in line with the 'professional' and 'technocratic' orientation of Cambodian human 
rights NGOs. Grassroots participation in defining the 'neutral' is not emphasised by 
interviewees, arguably because Cambodian human rights NGOs view the process of 
consensus-building as a technocratic, rather than a political, task. 
Evidence that human rights and other NGOs are taking on this role can be extrapolated 
from the contrast, posited by six interviewees, between their neutrality and the 
4political' nature of other groups in society. Human rights abuses are perceived by these 
interviewees as political, because they arise to a great extent out of political competition 
and the associated politicisation of state-society relations, as described in Chapter Six. 
in these accounts, human rights work is 'not political' in the sense that it is anti-political 
- working to ameliorate the destructive effects of politics on individuals. It reflects a 
perception that Cambodian governance requires an injection of moderation, consensus 
and non-confrontation, to replace politics, in order to regain an apprppýriate harmony in 
state-society relationships. 
An important element of the 'anti-political' discourse under discussion is the rejection 
of the exclusionary and personal nature of Cambodian patrimonial politics. These 
characteristics of political activity are replaced in this discourse by secular goals of 
development and modernisation to benefit the grassroots as a whole. Those who 
employ this discourse seek to define a political order for the nation, as politicians do, 
but they view this order as situated in the context of a secular nation. This is 
differentiated from the exclusivity and competition of political society. A former 
teacher, and head of education for one of the largest human rights NGOs, commented: 
The authorities accuse us of being political. But we tell them, no we're not 
political at all. We help the grassroots only to know about rights... 
Everything we do has to do with developing the country, cutting down 
violations. 16 
A similar view was expressed by a human rights NGO provincial director in the 
16 HIO. 
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relatively peaceful province of Kompong Som: 
Our work is not really political work. NGOs just work in order to improve 
the standard of living of the people and protect human rights. 17 
Similarly, a young returnee lawyer heading a public defenders' NGO commented: 
We don't get involved in any political situation, but only rights for the 
people. We work for democracy in Cambodia, we work for human rights 
and work for legal protection of the people. 18 
'Political work' is viewed here as divorced from development, standards of living, and 
protection of rights - primary state functions in most modernising societies. Rather, 
politics is seen as an elite preserve. The distance between politicians and the 
4 grassroots' or the 'poor' who are seen as the major victims of human rights abuse, 
allows human rights promotion work to constitute itself as an arena within which 
protection and support is available to the many refugees exiled from, but continually 
oppressed by,. the political sphere of party competition. This was described by a 
provincial human rights NGO director from Kampot province, which has seen 
significant Khmer Rouge and RCAF activity: 
I think human rights work is work which is against political activities. It 
serves people. It is neutral. We don't support any political party... We on17 
educate people, especially the police and the citizens, to understand rights. 
Promotion of neutrality militates against the exclusionary tendencies of existing power 
networks. Those who participate in the discourse of neutrality, arguably, attempt to 
reclaim the nation as a secular construction providing the benefits of protection and 
economic development to all citizens. 
Yet it is significant that 'human rights education', rather than development of grassroots 
democratic participation, is viewed as the means to achieve this. Rather than 
challenging the elitism and exclusivity of party politics, and seeking to reintegrate issues 
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of human rights, development and rule of law into national politics through empowering 
the grassroots to participate, human rights promotion seeks to insulate the grassroots 
from destabilising political competition. 
Several interviewees explained the neutrality of their organisations, as arising from the 
fact that they did not seek power. Within the definition of power used in this 
dissertation, the formation of a hegemonic consensus to circumscribe political activity 
does constitute power-seeking. Yet a distinction can be made in terms of the contrast 
between 'power over' and 'power to'. The activities of politicians described in earlier 
chapters constitute attempts to exercise 'power over' citizens, through a combination of 
patronage, protection and abuse. Among Cambodian NGOs, the type of power sought 
was more frequently the 'power to' develop the country and raise standards of living 
through consensual, co-operative efforts in pursuit of national goals, defined not by 
processes of political participation but, frequently, by the NGO movement, or their 
international sponsors. 
These kinds of power correspond to the levels of structure and superstructure - of overt 
power and covert power. In liberal societies, the 'power to' possessed by the state is a 
function of its alleged neutrality and the ideological legitimacy of political control via 
democratic participation. Hegemonic control reconciles the people to the state's control 
and direction of them; power is exercised by the state at the superstructural level leading 
to co-operative efforts towards national goals established through processes 
incorporating ritualised forms of democratic participation. 
In Cambodia, the state is politicised and cannot command general support as a result. It 
is left only with 'power over' - overt power, or power by means of force or patronage. 
This type of power is not so productive in the economic sphere. The legitimacy of 
politicians extends only to 'insiders' - 'outsiders' have no reason, aside from fear, to 
grant them authority. 
Attempts to promote the power to mobilise society's 'outsiders' in the drive for national 
development - work which was specifically described as 'not political' and 'neutral' - 
emerges from a concern to constrain politicisation. Outsiders arc frequently viewed as 
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anti-political - "they hate politiCS,, 20 - due to their suffering at the expense of the 
politicisation of Cambodian life. Because of their exclusion from politics, these 
outsiders also experience difficulties in exercising civil, economic, social and cultural 
rights, as these rights are politicised - rendered contingent on party political loyalties - in 
the Cambodian environment. Their alienation is complete, and those human rights 
activities which circumscribe the arbitrary and invasive interventions of the state 
apparatus into the lives of farmers and other 'outsiders', constitute a stabilising role for 
the non-governmental sector. 
Extension of protection and representation to the previously vulnerable and alienated 
sgrassroots' prompts 'neutral' NGOs, lawyers and journalists frequently to present 
themselves as representing the people, and hence the nation. A young US-trained 
lawyer, and a woman provincial director of a large human rights NGO, based in 
Kampot, commented: 
The [1998] election is going to be monitored through the participation of 
NGOs, as representatives of the Cambodian people.... NGOs are neutral and 
they represent the Cambodian people. That is what we require, and we have 
21 lobbied the government. But we haven't received any reply yet. 
Parties sometimes help the people. But the people don't really need that. 
The human rights organisations give what people really need. Because with 
the parties there is nepotism to help people who get along well. But with 
many NGOs, people are braver - because we observe and consult. 22 
The focus of the Cambodian government on rule by exclusionary forms of patronage 
and protection, rather than by law, and the consequent spiralling violence and alienation 
from government, allows the interviewees quoted here to claim popular mandate as a 
power resource of their own. 
By claiming to represent 'the people', these interviewees deny legitimacy to politicians 
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reminiscent of Sihanouk's use of his rural power base to exclude urban intellectuals 
from meaningful political participation in the 1960s. These interviewees take control of 
the superstructural level. Equating their 'representation' of the people with neutrality, 
some interviewees attempted to define themselves as the arbiters of the political system, 
denying this role to the political parties which also attempt to equate themselves with a 
national system. Yet 'representation' of the people does not entail use of grassroots 
participation as a legitimising resource of power. 
A member of the Khmer Kampuchea Krom community, who headed an NGO focusing 
on the rights of minority groups, commented: 
If there is a 1998 election, ... there will be a neutral mass movement which 
... belongs to the people, not the parties. So the signatories [to the Paris Agreements] must support this neutral mass movement, practically and 
fmancially. And the leader of the neutral mass movement is Sihanouk.... 
Because he's the top man, he's the powerful man, so he can cope with all 
the problems.... This movement is responsible for two sectors, to provide 
training and educate the people on the election and to monitor and observe if 
the election process is free and fair. 23 
This interviewee combines royal sanction and international aid, as decisive resources of 
power, with a popular movement, yet, again, ideological participation by the grassroots 
is not considered. Rather, it is suggested that the people will be 'trained' and 'educated' 
by the mass movement, much as electoral mobilisation was viewed as a means of 
&educating' the people in Sihanouk's day. 24 In the perceptions of these interviewees, use 
of such political, but not party political, sources of legitimacy offers the opportunity to 
undertake both an educational and a refereeing role to uphold ideological values implicit 
in the description "free and fair" - concepts promoted by the international community in 
Cambodia since UNTAC. By this means the violations associated with political party 
competition may be overcome. 
The central place of neutrality in this discourse also reflects the reformist orientation of 
23M1. 
24 See Armstrong 20. 
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the Cambodian human rights movement. %ile this discourse denies government the 
right to politicise private life and to reinvent politics and the nation in their own interest, 
strengthening of governmental ability and willingness to pursue appropriate national 
goals such as development and stability is also required to serve NGO-defined 
4grassroots' interests. Over the long term, it is considered, the protective role of NGOs 
should be taken over by a strong but 'neutral' state apparatus, within which 
politicisation has been replaced by appropriate benevolence towards the people. 
Promoting this constitutes the second prong of the human rights promotion effort. 
This view was noted particularly in attitudes towards the legal system, consonant with 
the importance of an effective court system for protection of human rights. In this 
context, interviewees raised the issue of problems in attempting to implement a 
reorientation of government power while avoiding a destabilising challenge to it. A US- 
trained lawyer who also headed an NGO urgent-action coalition, commented: 
We don't want to change any judges. But we need to give training. This 
persuades them to be neutral... I think training is better than moving the 
judge from here to there. Because if ... the law or the king takes them from their post, that will anger the party and we don't want to have any political 
conflict like that. So we start by negotiating, by solving the case peacefully, 
rather than do something violent. We keep all the judges and provide them 
with training. 25 
A public defender commented: 
I don't want to blame the government. Because I think we had very weak 
organisation before and in any country, organisation should develop more, 
day by day. I believe that our government will be stronger in future... We try 
to help in any way we can. 26 
Similarly, the president of a national human rights NGO argued for the need to: 
Train more judges, train more defenders, train more lawyers - everybody, 
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The concept of 'rule of law' was used by interviewees in this context. The same NGO 
director stated: 
A country which develops - it's because this country respects the law. Our 
leaders used to compare everything with Singapore, saying, 'look at 
Singapore, it's tough with journalists' and so on. But don't forget that 
Singapore respects the law. They may be tough - they don't give much 
freedom to the press, but besides that it's a country that respects the law. 23 
Emphasis on neutrality and law, even at the expense of certain human rights in this last 
comment, is central to the view of international human rights ideology perceived 
through the conceptual lenses of the Cambodian human rights movement. This aspect 
of international liberal democratic norms has, arguably, attained'Power within the 
discourse of human rights used and promoted by the group of Cambodian human rights 
activists studied because it dovetails with the motivation to provide assistance to 
members of the grassroots who are marginalised and abused by the politicisation of 
Cambodian political life, and to constrain the politicisation of the state apparatus. It 
reflects a technocratic rather than a 'political' stance, and, arguably, concern to promote 
a stable framework within which subsistence and modernisation activities can be carried 
out within Cambodia. 
Emphasis on neutrality further reflects the climate of fear which constrains Cambodian 
human rights activists. A 'neutral' stance can free the NGO movement, to an extent, 
from the constraint of government suspicion and hostility. A Khmer-American 
interviewee, engaged in a nation-wide programme to train monks as disseminators of 
human rights ideals, commented: 
Sometimes you create a problem for yourself if you advertise too much. 
Because people are scared of you if you become too popular... You need to 
understand, if you have power you will have trouble... '9 
Framed within the context of 'training' and 'education' activities carried out by 
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promoted is not a framework within which democratic participation at grassroots level 
plays an important role. While the concept of 'free and fair elections' is adopted as a 
concern, emphasis is placed on ensuring that the voting ritual is free of violence and 
intimidation. Little attempt is made by NGOs to consolidate deeper forms of 
democracy, by promoting forums within the villages, through capacity building and 
encouragement of debate, which can challenge politicised state structures. 30 
The focus of NGO activity is on reconciling both politicians and grassroots to accepting 
as legitimate, and thus neutralising, existing hierarchical and centralised state 
institutions, bounded by authoritative rules of behaviour, largely set by the international 
community, rather than on encouraging empowerment through promotion of deeper 
forms of participation at the local level. Mile the neutrality of state institutions is a key 
liberal concern, arguably this focus also fits well with ideals regarding the appropriacy 
of developing harmonious hierarchies in political relationships. 
In viewing their organisations as representatives of the grassroots, these interviewees 
create a new NGO role of bringing people and government together in a redefined, 
NGO-mediated state-society relationship. By combining this mediation role with 
education and training for both sides, together with mild use of sanctions in cases of 
abuse where government is unco-operative, it is possible to educate both citizen and 
government in civic responsibility. An interviewee who worked with the urban squatter 
community described this relationship: 
Our organisation's responsibility is to bring relevant information from the 
squatter community to the government, and ask the government to give 
more understanding to the community... We don't try to force the 
government, we just try to make them understand more... sometimes the 
government has a plan for a new home for these people. But ... some [squatter] communities just want to do as they please... We have to persuade 
[them] to follow the government's plan. Because we cannot leave 
30 An exception to this is the series of debates organised by the NGO coalition Ponleu Khmer to allow 
villagers the opportunity to debate the draft constitution in 1993. In 1995/6, none of the OTganisations 
studied appeared to be continuing with such activities, except the minorities organisations cited in Chapter 
Seven. 
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31 
everything up to the ideas of these people. 
The president of one of the largest human rights NGOs concurred: 
Sometimes [in land disputes] we would like to conciliate. We would like to 
play the mediator because the local authority has strong reasons also to 
move out the people in the public interest. 32 
Similarly, a lawyer and head of an NGO urgent-action coalition commented: 
All human rights NGOs have to keep their eye on the people and the 
government. Sometimes the government invades the right of the people. 
Sometimes the people don't obey the orders of the government. Human 
rights and the rule of law have to be respected by the government and the 
people. We are a central point. 33 
By their position 'in the middle' these interviewees attempt to shield the people from the 
state, but also to educate the people about their responsibilities towards the state. These 
comments indicate that the people do not set the agenda for the NGO, but the NGO sets 
the agenda for the people. By interposing themselves as arbiters of legitimacy in 
between the state of the people, institutions of state can be both strengthened and limited 
and the people protected and disciplined, as the two sides are drawn together in a 
legitimising process in which the role of the professional human rights movement is 
vital. 
Neutrality allows NGOs to gain the trust of government; for exarnple, the leader of an 
NGO coalition, invited to comment on draft legislation, maintained: 
They invited us... because they wanted to find justice. And because NGOs 
are neutral organisations. We are neutral that's why the government trusts 
US. 34 
From the point of view of members of the government, co-operation with NGOs is seen 
3 'M2. Significantly, the interviewee worked for one of the few NGOs which does attempt to encourage 
grassroots participation in discussing government proposals for housing and eviction issues. 
32 H5. 
DiA. 
UH15, personal interview (Eng. ), 23 Mar. 1996, Phnom Penh. 
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as conditional on NGOs behaving appropriately. A senior official at the Ministry of 
Justice commented: 
I am glad to see local NGOs. I don't like them disturbing the Ministry of 
Justice, but we need their advice. 
35 
But we need constructive critics - they 
should work with the goverrunent. 
Similarly, a chief of cabinet at the Ministry of Interior stated: 
I said to the NGOs (regarding NGO representation in the elections] don't 
take this for granted. There is a long fight ahead, not in the streets or in the 
jungle, but intellectual. Don't spoil things by maldng unreasonable 
demands. 36 
'Neutrality' defines an area in which NGOs can pursue non-confrontational activities 
aimed at promoting harmony and mutual respect between state and society. 
Education is seen as essential for re lating state-society relationships. Student gU 
representatives interviewed, for example, perceived themselves as particularly qualified 
to disseminate human rights teaching because "they're well educated so they understand 
9 37 what a violation is and how the goverm-nent should treat the citizens. Without an 
educated class, society loses its sense of right and wrong, according to this view. Thus 
the ability to understand human rights is closely tied to more general education and 
participatory notions of human rights exercise must be delayed. 
The head of one of the first human rights NGOs to operate in Cambodia commented: 
The first step was to educate in the city, educate all police, soldier, social 
worker, teacher, etcetera... I think that [at this] level, almost all of them 
studied in high school... they understand about social activity. But the 
grassroots level do not understand about social activity and do not 
understand about human rights... They ask the trainer, what are human 
rights? What is democracy? They don't know because they stay in the 
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Consonant with the use of human rights discourse to promote consensus, a number of 
interviewees argued that human rights were destructive if used for selfish purposes. 
Knowledge of human rights had to be combined with proper understanding of diverse 
relationships in society. This attitude contributes to lack of interest in promoting 
grassroots participation and emphasis on education in civic responsibilities. The 
president of a national human rights NGO commented: 
We tell the people that when we have rights we have also duties, 
obligations. For example, we have the right to life. We must also have the 
obligation to respect the life of another.... It's the curriculum that we give 
them. Duty to the family, duty to yourself, duty to the community and duty 
to the nation, to society. 9 
A leading member of a pro-government student organisation, and a lawyer heading a 
public defenders' NGO who had been active in the administration ofjustice in border 
refugee camps in the 1980s, made similar points: 
I don't demand the same level of respect for human rights as in Western 
countries ... If we try to have all... in Cambodia this is not good at all because Cambodian people mostly are illiterate so if we say we have all 
freedoms it is not good. It is dangerous for Cambodia [because] Cambodian 
people are not ready to get those rights, they don't well understand the 
Universal Declaration yet. 40 
Democracy also can create big problems. For example, I vote for you ... 
because I think that you will do something for me; but after I've elected you, 
you don't do anything for me. I'm angry! I will vote for one of those other 
people without thinking that the other person might be even worse. Tbat's 
why I think democracy may not be so good... So if we want democracy, we 
should raise education. 41 
This was also reflected in the attitudes shared by interviewees from human rights NGOs 
and journalists who defined themselves as 'neutral I or 'independent, towards the more 
politicised sector of the Cambodian press. The more politicised journalists were viewed 
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opponents and concentrating on "pornography and violent crime". 42 Two journalists, 
one a member of an independent organisation and the other associated with the CPP felt 
that the lack of professional training and structure in the Cambodian press was 
problematic: 
We have no school of journalists. There is a workshop... but it is not very 
professional like a school. We feel the lack of training in our country... The 
style of writing - most of them write what people want to read. For 
example, one guy says, "I'm going to run stories about sex"; and it makes 
the paper very famous. So all the papers follow... And they can make very 
good sales... They need to understand about professional codes. 43 
In previous regimes - when you reach the age of forty you can be an editor - 
if you've got a bachelor's degree and also have professional experience, and 
also a degree from a government administration course. But now - at the age 
of 25 you can become an editor - even if you don't have a high school 
diploma... So the freedom is very free... Journalists curse at people. By not 
respecting moral codes they create their own laws.... That's why I think we 
should have a code of ethics. 44 
In these accounts, lack of education is seen as a barrier to appropriate exercise of rights. 
Professionalism, and education generally, were finther associated with a specifically 
political phenomenon - knowledge of the 'way to criticise'. This point was made by 
two intellectuals, one a professor in the University of Phnom Penh Faculty of Social 
Science, and the other working in an NGO organised to train journalists and encourage 
writers: 
In Cambodia there are a lot of different classes. The class of farmers is very 
ignorant. They can't criticise - they are angry, but they don't know the way 
to criticise. Some, not a lot, but some of the intelligentsia, know about this. 
But they are afraid, because even in the ancien rýgime - thy didn't speak 
truly, like in Europe. Their way of speaking was very subtle. 4 
Some journalists attack the government very strongly. Then the government 
makes a complaint. Those papers are not professional enough - so they get 
42N8, personal interview (Khm. ), 16 May 1996, Phnom Penh. 
43 N3. 
44NIO, 
personal interview (Khm. ), 28 July 1996, Phnom Penh. 
45ui. 
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trouble. But if they were very clever,, ve7 highly-educated people, they 4 
would not get trouble from the government. 4 
These remarks indicate a certain element of mistrust of the uneducated and the 
grassroots in the thinking of human rights, and other, professionals. In positing a 
responsibility to exercise rights in a manner which will not bring 'trouble from the 
government', they also put education and facility in handling power relationships at the 
centre of an individual's ability to have his rights respected. This attitude creates a 
place for human rights NGOs, intellectuals and, to an extent, journalists, situated 
between the grassroots and government, as professional complaint-carriers. Such a role 
resembles Gramsci's definition of intellectuals as the 'functionaries' of the 
superstructures: 
the functions in question are precisely organisational and connective. The 
intellectuals are the dominant group's 'deputies' exercising the subaltern 
functions of social hegemony and political govenunent. 47 
Education to increase the number of people who 'know the way to criticise' was seen by 
many interviewees as essential, both to regulate contact between the state and the 
grassroots and to reduce the tensions in political society, particularly those generated by 
the confrontational style of the press. In this sense the human rights effort is clearly 
hegemonic in terms of imposing constraints on the ability to challenge the government 
through training in adherence to professional standards, rather than being the destructive 
force of social division feared by some Asian leaders. 
By defining, and thus limiting, the appropriate forms of government criticism, it is 
possible for human rights groups to stabilise government control, provided government 
is prepared to respond appropriately when criticised through these means. Education 
was thus viewed by many interviewees as essential to the ability of the citizen to 
participate in political processes in a meaningful way. 
Lack of education in Cambodia was also seen as central to understanding of human 
"Wl. 
47 Gramsci, '*Tbe Intellectuals" 12. 
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rights abuse, which is viewed as stemming from widespread illiteracy and ignorance, 
including lack of knowledge of religion, morality and law. In part, problems of 
illiteracy and lack of access to information are constructed as geographical issues, 
associated with remote areas of the country, where abusive authorities and armed 
insurgents hold sway. Such remote areas are described as realms of lawlessness, ruled 
by the gun, creating a spatial as well as an ideological challenge in the task of 
constituting a hegemonic, inclusive sense of nation. 
Interviewees based in Phnom Penh contrasted the provinces unfavourably with the city, 
while provincial interviewees also spoke of remote areas where military gunmen, Khmer 
Rouge and bandits abused the people., Provincial directors of national human rights 
NGO from Kompong Chmn and Kampot provinces commented: 
There are places that have a lot of human rights abuse on the other side of 
the Mekong River... But. this organisation and other organisations cannot 
reach there. When we go there, they just point guns and ask for money... 
They are armed J eople but we don't know who they are. They just come 
from the jungle. 
[There are] some remote areas where we have never provided training... We 
just cannot trust the local authorities - they may kidnap and extort money. 
49 
In these areas, particularly, reconstruction of "society" is considered necessary in order 
to remake social and political relationships. Human rights training needs to be 
associated with a wider educational drive, that will enable these villagers to deal more 
effectively with abusive intruders, as well as respond more appropriately to authoritative 
governance, these interviewees believed. The same point was echoed by a senior CPP- 
appointed monk and by two intellectuals: 
In isolated villages, monks sometimes cannot reach there to provide 
education. So there is violence and robbery. And some people in the forest - 
we can't contact the villages in the Khmer Rouge areas at all. Also in 
remote areas the villagers are not well informed about the law. We need to 
48H7, personal interview (Khm. ), 30 July 1996, Kompong Cham. 
49H6. 
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educate isolated villages and illiterate villagers about the law. 50 
Rural people suffer most. For example, recently we heard from Karnpot, 
some villagers have had members of the local authorities telling them not to 
have certain political beliefs. The local authorities forced the people to 
drink some water, and they said there was a magic potion in the water, so 
that after drinking, the people would die if they didn't vote for the CPP. 51 
The problem is lack of knowledge, especially for women. Because they 
don't have knowledge, gangs can buy girls in rural areas for prostitution. 
Education can solve this. It's because of illiteracy... People who sell their 
daughters for prostitution, it's because they don't know anything... When 
they can read, they can see if this is good or not. They can read the news 
and talk about the problem. 52 
Without education, villagers cannot protect themselves and cannot perform their civic 
responsibilities. Thus they cannot contribute to a stable and benevolent state-society 
relationship. 
It is considered that more information, especially about available channels for 
complaint, allows increased awareness on the part of ordinary people of appropriate 
relationships with state officials, bringing greater balance into state-society relations. 
The director of a human rights NGO in Karnpot province commented: 
An uneducated family [had to go to court]; so they asked some one who had 
been to court before... [That person] told them, if you don't have money 
don't go to court. So they felt afi-aid. They didn't have money so they 
didn't want to go to court. So we explained all about the court room 
process, how you should behave in a court room - even if you don't have 
money at all you can still go to court. 53 
In this case, the professional advice of human rights activists informs the conduct of the 
citizen. Equally, some interviewees claimed the intervention of professional human 
rights experts could inform the conduct of represent atives of the state. As described in a 
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political questions or significant amounts of money as relatively immune to injections of 
human rights discourse by defenders and NGOs. In other cases, interviewees claimed 
some success. A Phnom Penh-based public defender, who had worked on high-profile 
political cases, as well performing advocacy work in provincial courts, commented: 
we know the theory and we know the law so it's easy for us... as defenders 
we can say anything and we have enough knowledge, we understand 
everything in the law, and so the police dare not do anything wrong when we 
are there... Most of the people are poor and illiterate. Because they have no 
knowledge, they don't understand their rights... And so the government 
official or the police can do anything they want against them. 54 
Similarly, a human rights provincial director from Kampot commented: 
Now we have respect from the police because... our organisation just 
(argues] that the government set forth the law, so ifs not an obstacle to 
police work. We just help them, provide assistance, give them some 
55 knowledge, guidance of how to go about the case. 
Training for local police and officials is also seen as effective. Another Kampot 
provincial director commented: 
There is abuse of human rights because people who hold power don't 
understand, don't know the law and don't really understand human rights. 
Until we have human rights organisations go down there and train them and 
then they realise what human rights are and will change a little bit. 56 
Despite the inconsistency between respect for human rights and the economy of power 
described in previous chapters, professional mediation and training for both authorities 
and citizens in these norms is viewed as providing a discourse which prescribes norms 
for behaviour. 
Without human rights principles, outsiders can only be placed in a relation of exclusion 
from or opposition to the state. Human rights activism can enlist individuals, whose 
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dispossessed and abused into reformist, rather than insurgent or criminal activities. 
Human rights training provides a basis for resolution of disputes, thus constituting a 
discourse of truth which is a basis upon which power can be exerted. The comments of 
a Kompong Cham human rights worker and the director of an association working with 
the Khmer Kampuchea Krom. minority illustrate this: 
Now they understand, and dare to make a complaint. Previously they were 
unable to do that. 57 
If they have something that belongs to them and ... another person (also 
claims it] then there is a case to be settled. They can make a complaint. 58 
By recasting conflicts as 'cases to be settled' and acts of violence as 'human rights 
abuse' and establishing access to professional machinery, however imperfect, aimed at 
resolving disputes, human rights training can defuse situations of conflict. Unjust 
solutions offered by local authorities can be used to rally support for reform; the 
existence of a reformist movement in itself creates a new conceptual framework within 
which popular perception of conflict, abuse and resistance can be located, altering 
society's response to the state. 
An important element, arguably, in both government and NGO attitudes, is the view that 
relationships between these two sectors should appropriately be characterised not by 
inherent tension constrained by rights, as in liberal theory, but by trust, co-operation and 
mutual respect. Attention is paid to inculcating these attitudes, rather than attempting to 
strengthen the capacities of local communities for self-defence, through political 
participation in their own grassroots interest organisations, against abusive authorities. 
Arguably, this conception is informed by the belief that the entrenched division between 
elite and grassroots cannot be easily removed. Interviewees drawn from human rights 
NGOs characterised the class of people they represent as "poor", "illiterate", "lacking in 
knowledge", "simple" and "weak! '. Efforts to empower the grassroots are secondary in 
57H4. 
"H19, personal interview (Khm. ), 10 May 1996, Phnom Penh. 
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NGO activities to the need to protect them from the immediate abuses of the powerful. 
A leading NGO director commented that rights guaranteed by Cambodia's 1947 
Constitution 
... were granted by the king, but who cares? I wouldet care who granted 
those rights, whether they were ac ired by struggle, as long as they were 'V 
enshrined in our basic constitution. 
ý 
Arguably, the extremely weak position of the grassroots combines with an NGO 
inclination towards benevolent hierarchical power arrangements to prompt this attitude. 
Emphasis is placed on gradual change which will prompt no sudden government 
repression. Immediate concern is for protection of potential and actual victims of abuse, 
of the professional and neutral status of the NGOs themselves, and for the promotion of 
a hierarchical but mutually supportive political relationship between political elite, NGO 
movement and grassroots which can accommodate rights. 
Rebuilding cultural values 
Orientation towards reform of government attitudes also reflects the widespread belief 
that loss of values such as tolerance, respect and co-operation, viewed as traditionally 
Khmer, is the underlying cause of human rights violations. The largest Cambodian 
human rights NGOs devote much time to education and training activities for 
government officials, police, and military, as well as local people. Curricula place great 
emphasis on concepts of tolerance, mutual respect, law and order, and citizenship, 
values which many interviewees believed were fundamental to Khmer culture but had 
been lost during the years of war and upheaval. This view was expressed by, among 
others, the provincial director of the Siern Reap section of a nation-wide human rights 
NGO; a leading CPP-appointed monk; and the Phnom Penh-based president of a 
national human rights NGO: 
Human rights so far have not existed in Cambodia - that's why I wanted to 
work in this organisation... but its difficult to do it well because Cambodia 
59H16. 
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lost everything during the war. 60 
During the three years, eight months [of the Pol Pot regime] it seemed that 
Cambodians lost their minds, lost all their values. Up to now, we have not 
been able to correct all. We just try to improve a little bit .... 
61 
I think that our people have a particular character. They are a little bit 
extremist. When they would like liberalisation..., they go beyond the limit 
sometimes. And when they would like to be communists, they want to be 
the best communists in the world - like Pol Pot. A little bit extreme, some 
people. I think it is perhaps because we suffered oppression for so long. 62 
This attitude was also reflected in an article printed in Reasmei Kampuchea newspaper 
which commented: 
The number of Cambodian children who lost their lives under the genocidal 
regime of Pol Pot in the period of three years, eight months and twenty days, 
(was about one million). Children who are still left after the genocidal 
regime ... don't have a soul, have lost all their spirit of dignity 
in society. 
Some children have become murderers, some children cease to recognise 
their father and mother as their honoured parents. 63 
The legacy of war, oppressive rule and foreign occupation are viewed as having 
disrupted or destroyed Khmer systems for cultural reproduction. Education is viewed as 
particularly significant for restoring order in this respect. Most interviewees did not talk 
about education specifically as a right, but educational activities are crucial to their 
strategies. As well as providing a means by which international non-ns can be 
inculcated, within the human rights movement, as within the political opposition, 
education is seen as vital for restoring order to society through a rebuilding of Khmer 




63"Render Powerless Politicians who are Greedy for War, " RK 2 June 1996, S. This editorial comment 
was made in a report of a speech made by Hun Sen on International Human Rights Day while distributing 
gifts to poor children. In the speech, Hun Sen emphasised his determination to end the Khmer Rouge 
activities which had proved so harmful. While there is clear propaganda value in viewing the DK regime 
as responsible for Cambodia's continued social problems, nevertheless the idea that Cambodia suffered a 
loss of moral cohesion during the DK era, from which it has never recovered, appears to be widely held. 
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Both the education system and the Buddhist religion, which were closely linked together 
in traditional Cambodian society until the 1920s through the system of pagoda schools, 
were destroyed during the 1970s. They were rebuilt as separate, highly politicised, 
systems during the 1980s under the tight but ideologically crude control of a foreign- 
advised and -backed regime. Some interviewees posited this as a direct cause of the 
current pervasive violence and corruption in Cambodian society; for example, an 
intellectual educated before the war and now involved in training journalists 
commented: 
After twenty years of civil war, many of the most highly educated people are 
dead, especially the groups of people with the highest morality. Now we try 
to educate new ones. Because after Liberation Day [7 January 19791 
education was restored but there were some problems - those people didn't 
have enough morality. So over the next twenty or thirty years, public 
servants will gradually become less corrupt. 64 
iS ilarly, a senior monk who spent much time in the West and in refugee camps on the 1M 
border, and is now active in the Dhammayietra movement, commented: 
Part of the problem is a problem with education in the past. During the long 
years of conflict, there was a lack of education, so the people imitated the 
evil ones - they believe in violence. Violence becomes something normal or 
ordinzy. They have bad habits. We have to change the bad habits in the 
mind. 
A senior CPP-appointed monk placed greater emphasis on the importance of education 
within a Buddhist framework of morality: 
(Before 1975] the Buddhist monks kept the people in place. So did the 
temple. By recreating Buddhism again and having many monks we can cut 
violence and anarchy... I want to educate Cambodia in what was lost - 
respect for the Buddhist religion and human rights... We need to strengthen 
the Buddhist monkhood. And the Buddhist monks need to strengthen the 





Chapter 8: A Cambodian Human Rights Discourse 
Of particular concern was the replacement in the 1980s of the lost systems with 
Vietnamese control. Vietnamese cultural systems have been viewed historically as a 
threat to Khmer culture through the constant pressure of the Vietnamese population and 
their tendency to overflow onto Khmer lands, whether through annexation, occupation 
or immigration. Some interviewees viewed Cambodia's problems as stemming from 
centuries-long contact with foreign powers, others from recent ideological intervention. 
The president of a national NGO stated: 
After the Angkor period, our nation declined - under the pressure of both 
neighbours, Vietnam and Thailand - sometimes under the control of 
Vietnam, sometimes under the control of the Thai. And after that under the 
control of the French colonialists for more than 90 years. This is the reason 
our people are a little bit extremist. 67 
This view was echoed by the Ven. Mahaghosananda, spiritual leader of the 
Dhammayietra movement: 
Many other ideas have come to invade the Cambodian people. Many ideas 
have come from Communist countries or from other countries. The main 
idea of the people are either nihilistic or internalistic ideas. Buddhism is 
between these two ideas. Buddhism takes the Middle Path. It's neither 
internalistic nor nihilistic... Ideas from Russia, other communistic countries - 
other countries have to avoid them. They are violent ideas. We practice 
non-violence. 68 
It is notable in these accounts, that the particular conditions in which state intrusion into 
rural life took place in Cambodia are blamed for the abuse inherent in state-society 
relationships. The search for contingent historical factors to explain the abusiveness of 
the state allows avoidance of the central thesis of liberal ideology which holds that the 
power to abuse is inherent in state institutions, and must be constrained by protection for 
individual autonomy. War and foreign dominance are blamed for the failure of Khmer 
society to restrain the abuses of the growing state apparatus. Consequently, human 
rights promotion is frequently associated with solutions which seek to rebuild cultural 
values viewed as central to Khmer politics and society in an idealised past, and lost 
67 H5. 
6gThe Ven. Mahaghosananda, personal interview (Eng. ), 19 June 1996, Phnom Penh. 
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during the colonial era, the DK regime and the war. 69 
Perceptions of human rights promotion are closely tied to this perception of the 
condition of modem-day Cambodian society. Human rights are viewed by the 
interviewees quoted as part of an ideological armoury to be used to recreate a stable 
foundation in cultural values for legitimate and authoritative governance. 
Expanding literacy and access to information can integrate the nation, setting common 
standards of behaviour throughout the territory, and homogenising relationships within 
the home, village, and arenas of governance, as described. This rebuilding of power as 
cultural hegemony can render use of overt power obsolete. In building this framework, 
human rights activists interviewed emphasised the importance of using familiar values, 
viewed as culturally appropriate for the re-establishment of national identity and 
authority. Citizenship, viewed as civic responsibility, must be based on shared values, 
so promotion of human rights tends to reach into popular morality and religious 
principle. 
The result is an approach to human rights promotion which undermines the Asian values 
arguments of the Singapore School by conflating rights with the shared values that the 
School advocates. In Cambodia, human rights are viewed as a possible vehicle through 
which shared values can be reconstructed. The director of human rights education for 
one of the largest human rights NGOs commented: 
Before, our young men used to go and live in the monastery and were taught 
by the monks how to live a good life. Now human rights organisations have 
to do thiS. 70 
Restoration of Buddhist values was viewed widely among the group of interviewees as 
one means by which appropriate relationships in society can be re-forged. One of the 
most explicit statements of this ideal is put forward by the Ven. Mahaghosananda, a 
patriarch of the Cambodian Sangha who received a doctorate from Nalanda Buddhist 
69 This is a familiar theme in Cambodian political discourse. The idealised view of a natural Khmer state- 
society hierarchy echoes the central themes of Sihanouk's Buddhist Socialism in the 1950s. 
70HIO. 
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University in India in the 1960s and has participated in international religious 
movements for peace. His philosophy is practised in Cambodia through the annual 
Dhammayietra peace march, led by Mahaghosananda. Its philosophy attempts to 
combine Buddhist and human rights values with a particular agenda for change. A 
leaflet distributed by walkers on the Fifth Dhammayietra in 1996 describes a simple 
five point plan for ending the violence in Cambodia and the world: 
1. First we must meditate in order to have peace in our hearts; 
2. Make peace in our families; 
3. Make peace in our villages; 
4. Make peace in our country; 
S. Make peace in the whole world. 71 
As one Dhammayietra organiser described it, 'The aim of the peace march is to make 
everyone become calrný5.72 According to the Ven. Mahaghosananda: 
The movement for peace has to come from the Cambodian people, and 
every Cambodian can do this... We have to protect ourselves first, but we 
have to protect other people so that we can protect ourselves. Because we 
are interdependent people - we have to have mutual conduct. 
73 
The mutual relations between people mean that peace is located in the interpersonal 
relationships of society; in this way, "we must make peace in six directions - with our 
parents; our teachers; our husband or wife; our friends; with the King, the people and 
9 74 Buddhism; and between the government and ourselves! . The location of peace 
making at the level of the individual, and his relationships with society, arises from an 
analysis of the causes of war centred on individual moral attitudes. In the words of the 
Ven. Mahaghosananda: 
Eveqthing has its cause and its condition... The cause of fighting and war is 
7'Leaflet collected from Dhammayietra Peace Marchers, 1 June 1996, Phnom Penh. 
72R2, personal interview (Khm. ), 16 Mar. 1996, Phnom Penh. 
"The Ven. Mahaghosananda, personal interview. 
74Tbe Ven. Mahaghosananda, personal interview. 
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greed, anger, hatred and ignorance. The cause of peace is morality, 
concentration, and wisdom. Also truthfulness and gratitude. When we have 
truth there is no more greed. When there is compassion there is no more 
anger. When there is wisdom there is no more ignorance. So there is no 
more fighting. We must keep morality. 75 
In this analysis, the intentions of individuals towards one another is couched not in 
terms of freedoms and rights, but in terms of what Inada calls "soft relationshipS". 76 
Such an analysis implies that the movement for peace must begin by recasting 
relationships which are at present based on "greed, anger, hatred and ignorance' with 
relationships based on "morality, concentration, ... wisdom..., truthfulness and 
gratitude". 77 The same analysis is applied to human rights: 
Buddhism is like human rights. Let us begin first with life. Buddhism says 
not only should we not kill - but we should save life. Second we must 
abstain from stealing, from taking property from other people. Third we 
should respect other people. We should abstain from adultery- love our own 
wife and our husband and do not cheat. We have to be truthful. Fourthly 
we should not cheat people through telling lies. Not insult them. Not be 
talkative. We should talk very truthfully, lovingly, usefully. We have to 
speak kindly, with loving-kindness, compassion in speech, balance and 
equanimity in speech. We must speak in the right place at the right moment 
with the right person. 78 
This analysis places less emphasis on proscribed interference into individual autonomy 
"The Ven. Mahaghosananda, personal interview. 
76According to Inada, soft relationships are manifested, in human relationships, "in terms of the intangible 
human traits that we live by, such as patience, humility, tolerance, deference, non-action, humaneness, 
concern, pity, sympathy, altruism, sincerity, honesty, faith, responsibility, trust, respectfulness, reverence, 
love and compassion. Though potentially and pervasively present in any human relationship, they remain 
for the most part as silent but vibrant components in all experiences. Without them, human intercourse 
would be sapped of the human element and reduced to perfunctory activities. " Kenneth K. Inada, "A 
Buddhist Response to the Nature of Human Rights, " Asian Perspectives on Human Rights, eds. Claude E. 
Welch and Virginia A. Leary (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1990) 98. These soft relationships include 
but go beyond the hard relationships used in Western formulations of human rights, which constitute "a 
mechanistic treatment of human beings where the emphasis is on beings as such regardless of their inner 
nature and function in the fullest sense, " Inada 95. For Inada, the inclusion of elements of soft 
relationships into human rights analysis is necessary in order for a complete analysis which takes into 
account "the unique coexistent nature of rights and feelings [which] constitutes the saving truth of 
humanistic existence" Inada 102. 
77The Ven. Mahaghosananda, personal interview. 
78 The Ven. Mahaghosananda, personal interview. 
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than on prescribed interpersonal attitudes. 
Framed within Buddhist values, a concept of human rights emerges which is distinct 
from the liberal concept. Whereas Western human rights prescriptions for interaction are 
largely negative and minimalist, demarcating a sphere of non-interference, a number of 
Cambodian interviewees, viewed human relationships as much more maximal and 
productive. A senior monk associated with the Dhammayietra movement described the 
meaning of freedom in Buddhist philosophy: 
The only difference [between Buddhism and human rights] is that Buddhism 
goes further and higher than the concepts of democracy and human rights 
and freedom... Real freedom includes the freedom of everyone. Buddhism 
talks about loving-kindness, compassion, and wisdom - principles of 
Buddhist teaching and global concern. It talks about respect and love for 
everyone without limit or boundary. What we call freedom in Buddhism is 
freedom from greed, hatred and delusion. When people are freed from these 
they can only make a good thing for everyone. 79 
These interviewees were concerned to use human rights to recast relationships within 
society according to positive, and allegedly traditional, values of tolerance, mutual 
respect and concern. Where liberal human rights values emphasise autonomy, or 
freedom from coercion, to facilitate individual effort, these Cambodian interviewees 
saw human rights as creating an opportunity to build productive, co-operative 
relationships between society and the state apparatus. 
Comments made by other interviewees regarding the nature of political relationships 
between the public and the state apparatus emphasised co-operation and mutual 
responsiveness. Although interviewees believed that the government should be 
responsive to the ideas of the people this was often not associated with popular 
empowerment, but with changes in the culture of government itself. The director of 
human rights education of one of the largest NGOs commented: 
People want to have rights. Because they are afraid of the authorities. But 
after training he can go to talk to the higher authorities. Before we give 
training maybe they are afraid. But now if we have a problem we can speak. 
79V3. 
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It is the custom in Cambodia that we cannot speak to the authorities, just 
respect, respect, respect. We cannot talk to the high-ranking elite - like 
French, Khmer Rouge... Before the government had absolute power. But 
now we have a new government - all the people should give their ideas. 80 
Ideas of grassroots self-development and empowerment are viewed as less important 
than promoting an atmosphere of trust and co-operation between the powerful 
centralised state apparatus and the people. According to the president of one of the 
leading human rights NGOs, this relationship pertained during the Angkorean era: 
If we can refer back to our glorious era, the twelfth to thirteenth centuries, ... 
there was a sense of values similar to freedom, human rights and 
democracy... the sense of moral values that high-ranking officials in those 
days had to adopt before becoming leaders of the people. Of course there 
were no elections. But they were not employed to take everything from the 
people, but to respond to the wishes of the people. 81 
Idealised views of the Angkorean state-society consensus also informed the Sihanoukist 
ideology of Buddhist Socialism in the 1950s and 1960s. The compassion allegedly 
displayed by great Angkorean kings such as Jayavarman VII towards his people was 
prominent in Sihanoukist political discourse and remains as an ideal in Cambodian 
political ideology in the 1990s. Continued beliefs that this harmonious political 
relationship can be recaptured underlies, arguably, the strong emphasis on Buddhist and 
other moral values in human rights education initiatives. 
In this way, the Ven. Mahaghosananda comments: 
Gover=ent is by the people, of the people, for the people. Buddhism had 
this idea long ago - 2,540 years ago.... [Elections] are important to know the 
ideas of the people - what they want, what they love and what they desire ... 
92 
Democratic expression of popular will is seen in Dhammayietra philosophy as taking 
place within the political framework of "the Cambodian tinity - nation, Buddhism, and 
the King, " which "support peace in Cambodia and the people love these national 
80H 10. 
81H16. 
82Tbe Ven. Mahaghosananda, personal interview. 
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pillare'. 83 The equation of nation, religion and King with legitimacy, harmony and 
peace indicates the importance of unification around cultural symbols. 
Attitudes among interviewees regarding the importance of training government 
employees and working with government to promote a change in attitude on the part of 
individual state employees suggested that altering the uses of power in government, and 
constraining politicisation, rather than devolving power away from government to 
community organisations, was a central concern. This concern contrasts sharply with 
trends in the academic literature on democratisation and development, which has 
increasingly viewed the institutions of state as flawed in their ability to promote human 
rights and increased standards of living. 84 
Activists from different Cambodian non-government sectors shared the view that human 
rights combine with Buddhism to provide a basis for more positive and constructive 
social relationships. A CPP-appointed monk concurred with the view shaped by monks 
associated with the Dhammayietra: 
The important part of human rights is the moral part. Human rights are the 
same as Buddhist principles. For example, Buddhism says don't kill. And 
also human rights say we have the right to live. Also possession - the right 
to possess property. Buddhism says don't steal. And also respect for 
women's rights, like for example rape. Buddhism says don't commit 
adultery. And if you are in government then you shouldn't lie to the people. 
So Buddhism says you cannot use verbal abuse to give dishonour to people. 
And the fifth principle is don't drink. Because if you drink you may violate 
human rights because you lose your temper. So those five principles relate 
very closely to human rights ... In fact, maybe Buddhism is better than human rights because it says we should respect not only humans but the 
lives of animals too. 85 
A CPP national assembly deputy and a lawyer working in a US-sponsored public 
defenders' NGO saw the relationship similarly: 
Cambodians are Buddhists, so concerning Khmer traditional custom, human 
83 The Ven. Mahaghosananda, personal interview. 
84 See Nandy 271/272 for a discussion of this trend. 
85VI. 
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rights are enshrined already. For example, killing and torture, - in Buddhist 
wisdom all these elements should be avoided.... There are five 
commandments; for example, avoid sex, don't play cards, don't torture. All 
these are prohibited. 86 
Human rights are very similar to Buddhism... like the Buddhist is not 
allowed to kill, not allowed to say bad things, lie, drink alcohol - that's a 
good way for the Buddhist people. And also human rights prohibit harming 
other people. 87 
It is significant that these interviewees, and others who spoke similarly about human 
rights, did not talk about a similarity of underlying aims between human rights and 
Buddhism, but spoke as if the 'five commandments' of Buddhism were identical to 
human rights provisions in law. For these interviewees, arguably, the details of 
international human rights norms are of secondary importance to the objective of 
creating a new basis for order in society. The connection between religious principles 
and human rights was considered to apply to other religions too. One interviewee who 
worked with the Cham community saw a similar positive influence stemming from 
Islarn: 
The Muslim religion and human rights are the same. They are all the same - 
Buddhism, Islam, human rights - they just make people non-violent. One 
Cham living in the Cham community - he was very aggressive, used obscene 
language to his neighbours... He is Cham but he didn't understand what it 
means to be Cham. So the president of this organisation took him to the 
mosque to pray and after one month everything changed and he ... became a 
good person in the community... Human rights and religion go on the same 
boat in the same direction. People have to live peacefully and not be 
aggressive to each other. 88 
Arguably, human rights and Buddhism become fused sinc 
' 
e, in the eyes of most 
respondents, the anarchy responsible for human rights abuse in Cambodia can be 
overcome by the propagation of an authoritative moral code. Human rights, as 
promoted by the international community, offer one such code. Within Cambodia, the 
principles of Buddhism, already widespread among the population despite the disruption 
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of the 1970s and 1980s, offers another. Conflating the two creates a discourse which 
connects the grassroots to the international community, facilitating exercise of 
international power and protection at the grassroots level. 
The practical imperative of disseminating human rights principles and investing them 
with moral authority also contributes, prompting the use of monks as human rights 
trainers. The director of the largest programme of human rights education for monks 
commented: 
The Buddhist monk is very important in Cambodia and has respect from the 
people... When monks provide lectures the people listen - all people, 
educated people, anyone - because we are Buddhists. 89 
A Banteay Meanchey provincial human rights director also saw the relationship as 
useful for promoting human rights issues: 
We teach people that human rights are similar to Buddhism. When I teach 
people, I put up a poster which talks about Buddhism, tells the people about 
sin. And when people in Cambodia hear about sin, it scares them. 90 
In addition to their authority as spiritual advisors, monks also traditionally play a central 
role in the community. The human rights education director of a national NGO pointed 
out that monks could provide physical facilities for human rights activities: 
If we don't have a classroom, monks can give a room. Sometimes they give 
tea. 91 
A recent graduate from the University of Phnom Penh working with an NGO coalition 
commented: 
Monks have to be concerned about human rights because the monks look 
after the people. 92 




92 S3, personal interview (Eng. ), 26 July 1996, Phnom Penh. 
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that of reciprocity of tolerance and mutual respect. This was put forward by a number of 
interviewees as enshrined in the principle: 
If you do a bad thing, you will get a bad result. If you do a good thing, you 
will get a good result. 93 
This principle was viewed as having literal application to human rights work and was 
central to a view of change which focused on changes in individual attitudes. Protection 
from human rights abuse was perceived as inherent in adherence to human rights 
principles in one's own treatment of others. This point was made by two lawyers and a 
provincial human rights director, among others: 
In the Buddhist words - if you want others to respect you, you have to 
respect them first. It's like human rights too. If you do not violate them, 
they will not violate you. 94 
We have the concept of tolerance. For example, if we know ourselves that 
we should not do this or that to other people, then other people will also 
know that they should not do this and do that. Because if you infringe other 
people's rights, they have the right to infringe back to us.... so I have to 
protect my rights and I have to protect other people's rights. That is the 
5 peaceful way. 
The similarity between human rights and Buddhism is that when you 
commit a crime it might be that someone comes and takes revenge; 
Buddhists say when you commit sin, one day you might get the bad result 
back from your sin. For example, when you commit murder, one day you 
might be killed by someone else. 96 
These interviewees saw training as enabling protection of the grassroots, not only 
through increasing awareness of channels for complaint, but also by providing a moral 
blueprint that could spread from individual to individual, infecting, eventually, the 
abusive structures of local government themselves. This was described by a lay 
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future because peace can spread from one person to anothee. 97 
Belief in the power of individual example to affect one's own treatment at the hands of 
others was central to the perception of change held by many interviewees. Through the 
principle of reciprocity, many interviewees believed, a change in the attitude of a single 
individual could bring about a change in values which could spread throughout society, 
altering not only the rights-abusive state-society relationship but also tackling violence 
within the home, within the village, and, particularly, on the battlefield. A public 
defender who had worked in the justice system in the border refugee camps commented: 
If there's rights here, the government official understands what the people's 
rights are, and if the police or soldier they know what their obligation, their 
duty is, and they do not disturb people - it will make peace in Cambodia. 
Because when you know what your rights are, I know what my rights are, I 
don't want to violate your rights, and you don't want to violate my rights. 
So there will be peace. 98 
Similarly, a US-trained lawyer working for an NGO urgent-action coalition stated: 
Where there is human rights there is understanding. If we understand each 
other there will be peace. Even ... the people living with the Khmer Rouge 
- ... We would like to bring them to join the community and explain to them 
about human rights. Rather than carry a gun and fight. We don' t want to 
fight. 99 
Representatives from a Buddhist NGO and the Kompong Som office of a human rights 
NGO echoed this view: 
If we respecý we will have peace. 100 
When we have human rights, people respect each other and this can help end 






101H9, personal interview (Khm. ), I July 1996, Kompong Som. 
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Religion, human rights, and education are seen as closely linked in an effort to 
strengthen core values in Khmer society, which have been threatened by war, social 
disruption and foreign domination. These values - notably, mutual respect, tolerance, 
co-operation, subtlety in criticism, and understanding - are seen as essential to the 
rebuilding of the Cambodian nation. 
Consequently, the ideology of human rights that is being propagated differs from liberal 
notions in several important ways. Values emphasised are positive prescriptions for 
appropriate behaviour in relationships, representing blueprints for action rather than 
safeguards of autonomy. Consequently they tend to be identified with moral 
prescriptions - for example, Buddhist precepts against intoxication and adultery are 
grouped with human rights, whereas liberal ideology locates these activities firmly in 
the sphere of individual choice. 
Within the context of the anarchy of Cambodian society, these prescriptions make sense 
in terms of the underlying aims of human rights - the preservation of human dignity. 
The comment that "the fifffi principle is don't drink. Because if you drink you may 
violate human rights because you lose your temper" is more understandable in the 
context of the case of 18 September 1996 in Krang Kontroul Village in Kompong 
Chhnang, where, in the words of Amnesty International: 
six children were killed when a drunken soldier fired a B-40 rocket at the 
ice-cream stall where they were gathered. The six children - one boy and 
five girls - were between two and eight years old. Six months after the 
killing, the villagers of Krang Kontroul are still waiting for justice for their 
lost children. 102 
Arguably liberal human rights formulations are viewed as inadequate for protecting 
against arbitrary violence in a society where cultural maxims for behaviour are 
perceived to have broken down. Freedoms in the absence of disciplined behaviour, in 
accordance with culturally embedded moral codes, are perceived as dangerous by many 
Cambodians in the human rights movement. Human rights are used instead to build the 
102 Amnesty International, Kingdom of Cambodia. The Children ofKrang Kontroul. Waitingfor Justice 
(London: Amnesty Intemational, Mar. 1997) 1. 
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consensus within which freedom can be exercised, since without this consensus freedom 
is meaningless. 
The employment of moral codes, as well as legal codes, reflects, arguably, the weakness 
of political institutions and the lack of education of the 'grassroots'. Laws, especially 
when unenforceable, cannot command allegiance as easily as prescriptions for 
behaviour which are already deeply culturally-embedded. As a high-ranking Ministry of 
Interior official commented: 
It is now a fact of life in Cambodia - we can talk about rights, democracy, 
equality, freedom of expression - but to people it is an intellectual approach; 
like all intellectual approaches you need knowledge, understanding, 
experience, long term and stable structure of education. People are more 
concerned to find ways of survival for themselves and their children - that's 
a matter of life and death. They have time to go to school only if their 
survival needs are already met. In poor countries you can't ask villagers to 
think about human rights when they have nothing to eat or didn't ever go to 
school. Human rights and democracy have to be second to economic 
conditions. Otherwise those people will not support them. 103 
Many interviewees accept this premise while rejecting the conclusion. The human 
rights discourse emerging from the movement associates human rights promotion with a 
restoration of national values, of tolerance and respect, to provide the appeal to turn this 
, intellectual approach' into a human approach that meets survival needs by limiting 
random violence. Religion is particularly important in this respect. According to Yum 
Din, Director of Religious Affairs at the Ministry of Cults and Religions: 
In Cambodia since 300 BC, Buddhism has been in the bodies and hearts of 
the Cambodian people. Buddhism is the philosophy of the Cambodian 
people and the national opinion - not only the national opinion, but the 
national identity... If you go to the countryside, wherever you see a village 
you see a pagoda. That pagoda is the priority of the Cambodian people. 104 
The importance of Buddhism as an ideological system lies in its accessibility. As such 
it provides the basis for a national progression away from violence which is meaningful 
103 E3. 
104Yum Din, Director of Religious Affairs, Ministry of Cults and Religions, personal interview (Eng. ), 23 
July 1996, Phnom Penh. 
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and authoritative for all Carnbodians. Education, too, provides a hegemonic tool which 
socialises individuals into their appropriate roles as citizens. 
Missing from this discourse is a creative approach to the question of empowerment and 
participation. In propagating concepts drawn from international law, as well as from 
Buddhism and from notions of morality, the approach of the human rights NGO 
movement is didactic, rather than participatory. 
Discipline, professionalism, and adherence to imposed norms of behaviour are 
emphasised, at the expense of deeper forms of democracy or individual freedom 
facilitate through empowered community forums of discussion and action. A 
harmonious relationship between a centralised and hierarchical government apparatus, 
and Cambodian citizens, sharing mutual respect and rightful conduct, is viewed as the 
appropriate goal. Frequently, this goal is framed in terms of visions of an idealised past. 
In their attempts to use these tools, and in the nature of their goals, the discourse of the 
human rights movementý arguably, reflects the negotiation of a professional strata of 
educators and complaint carriers between the limiting constraints of foreign ideological 
demands, the condition of the grassroots, and the limits to government tolerance. This 
discourse also reflects a concern to strengthen the Cambodian state, viewed as subverted 
by foreign influence and war, rather than to create alternative sites of power within the 
Cambodian polity. The ways in which this discourse of human rights is reflected in 
attempts to seek remedy for particular cases of human rights abuse are discussed in the 
next chapter. 
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Chapter 9: Oversight of State Power: Sovereignty and Intervention. 
The introduction of a human rights discourse into Cambodian politics does not, of itself, 
entail that the incidence of human rights abuse will fall. As described in previous 
chapters, the discourse of human rights has been promoted within an economy of power 
in which violence and economic patronage still remain the dominant power resources. 
Hun Sen's attempts to subordinate 'right' to 'effectiveness' have been described. 
Human rights discourse challenges the validity of the employment of violence, 
particularly, to bolster power, yet at present human rights discourse is insufficiently 
powerful to marginalise the use of violence as a power resource. 
The challenge represented by human rights discourse has in some forums increased the 
tendency of power-holders to resort to violence, in an attempt to overcome this 
challenge. A Cambodian newspaper editor, who described his own newspaper's 
editorial stance as 'neutral', perceived this situation as follows: 
The situation now cannot be compared to the old [KPRP/SoC] regime. Now 
the press can express their opinion - but security for journalists is very bad. 
Before, in the old regime, there was no freedom but security was very good. ' 
Repression of the press is explicitly connected here to the exercise, by j ournalists, of 
their freedom to criticise. In other political forums, as described in the attempts of the 
KNP to open local party offices, the challenge represented by human rights discourse to 
an economy of power based on patronage and protection has prompted a violent 
response from governmental figures seeking to shore up old networks of support by 
eliminating critics who employ human rights discourse, and by intensifying their 
exploitation of familiar power resources of violence and patronage. 
The fear of violent response to the categorisation of a particular activity as a 'human 
rights abuse' arguably illustrates the potency of such discourse as a challenge to power, 
but also reflects and increases the vulnerability of the challenger, as an individual, to a 
repressive response. Attempts to promote a reorientation of the state-society 
lNI 
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relationship, and to disseminate the notion of the rights-bearing citizen, may be 
perceived as threatening by the leaders of patron-clientist power networks. 
Consequently promotion of human rights discourse has the potential to prompt violent 
repression in some situations, as well as to deter it in others. 
This creates a dilemma for human rights groups attempting to achieve redress from 
government for specific cases of abuse. Response to their activities in Us regard has 
been varied, with the government on occasion responding to their demands and on other 
occasions ignoring them, or responding ineffectively. VvUle outright repression of 
human rights activists was not common, interviewees from human rights NGOs 
believed that their survival is the result of their own caution in challenging government 
and of the protection offered to them by the international community. This reflects a 
perception that human rights discourse requires the support of technological power 
resources, such as the capacity to deny aid, in order to ameliorate their personal 
vulnerability as challengers to governmental discretion in the use and abuse of power. 
Interviewees drawn from human rights NGOs regarded international support as central 
to their ability to demand accountability. On occasion they left this task entirely to the 
international community, reflecting the perception that the international community 
possessed the requisite power resources to perform this task successfully, while human 
rights NGOs did not. Arguably, from 1993, the influence of the CPP economy of power 
increased and tolerance of pluralism in political society diminished, culminating in the 
July 1997 coup, suggesting that governmental power resources were strengthening at the 
expense of those of the international community and local human rights sector. 
increasingly, the discourse of 'effectiveness' reasserted its dominance over the discourse 
of human rights. 
Analysis of the relationships between the non-governmental sector, the governmental 
sector and the international community to provide oversight and redress for abuse 
suggests that the international community is perceived by Cambodian interviewees as an 
important actor in Cambodian politics, playing a role which extends beyond traditional 
constraints of sovereignty. Human rights workers look to the international community 
for assistance because of a perceived lack of power resources available to them within 
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their own polity. They fail to work actively to build power resources and connect 
human rights discourse with practical achievement at the grass roots level, instead 
depending on international power which, arguably, has proved ill-equipped to demand 
accountability from the Cambodian state. 
Human Rights NGO Strategies for Demanding Remedy and Governmental 
Responses' 
Demanding remedy for abuses, especially those perpetrated by abusers who occupied a 
position of importance within the political party and state hierarchies, causes conflicts 
between NGO and governmental interests within the Cambodian political economy of 
power. Cambodian leaders manufacture support largely by ensuring the ability of 
insider-abusers to prevail over outsider-victims. Protection of insiders is an organising 
principle of the Cambodian economy of power, while demanding that they be held 
accountable for their actions is an essential element of human rights work. 
Human rights NGOs, it is argued in this chapter, frequently rely on international power 
to deal with this potential conflict, reflecting risk-minimising strategies which emerge 
from two related concerns: fear of retaliation from abusers, and perception that domestic 
power resources available to NGOs, including the nascent human rights discourse, were 
weak. 
The impact of these factors is exemplified in NGO attitudes to publicity. The use of 
publicity to put pressure on abusive governments represents use of the power of human 
2 The account of NGO strategies presented here is extrapolated from interviews with human rights 
workers employed either directly by the two urgent-action committees, the Action Committee, and the 
Cambodian Human Rights Co-ordination Committee, or by the human rights NGOs which form the 
membership of these committees. Interviewee accounts of NGO strategies were verified by checking 
against press reports, internal NGO reports and newsletters, and the committees' records of press releases 
issued by them in 1995/6. They were also checked with international workers liaising with these 
committees. The channelling of action on most serious cases of human rights abuse through these two 
committees encourages uniformity within the movement in strategies for pursuing remedy for cases of 
human rights abuse. Significant international input in serious cases is sought by the committees 
themselves, ftirther standardising approaches. Consequently in discussing these strategies, the human 
rights NGO movement is treated as a single actor, where differences in approach between NGOS were 
found these are specified. Human rights NGO strategies contrast with strategies pursued by the political 
opposition as described in this chapter. 
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rights discourse. It is a common strategy employed by human rights NGOs in many 
countries. 3 Where human rights discourse is well-entrenched and widely-circulated 
within the polity, the more publicity generated, the greater the pressure on government 
to respond. 
Within the Cambodian economy of power, an important element of power is its overt 
nature. To be seen to prevail is vital to any leader attempting to attract followers. In 
these circumstances, public submission by government to the power of human rights 
discourse, represented by public NGO demands for remedy, imposes greater costs on 
government power than accommodation reached in private. Public governmental 
compliance with human rights discourse strengthens the power of the discourse as a 
resource to be used in future confrontations, and limits governmental discretion of 
action and denies the discourse of 'effectiveness' concomitantly. 
Consequently, a number of interviewees from human rijhts organisations believed that 
the Cambodian government was more likely to resist, and retaliate against, a public 
demand for redress than a private one. Public demand for remedy is considered risky by 
Cambodian human rights NGOs; their vulnerability as organisations and individuals 
constrains their activities in this area. 
Publicity can take different forms, with different degrees of risk attached. Publicity 
addressed to an immediate public, for example, within the village where the abuse 
occurred, was viewed as highly risky by interviewees. Victims were viewed as weak 
and likely to lose any direct confrontation; the determination of inherently more 
powerful abusers to prevail over the challenge mounted by human rights discourse 
within their own immediate domain was perceived as high. Consequently, human rights 
NGOs habitually publicised abuses to an audience which was distanced from the site of 
the abuse itself, for example by releasing a statement concerning abuse in the villages to 
the Khmer-language press which reaches a largely urban audience. Serious complaints 
3 For an analysis of its use and the concomitant government response, in Argentina in the 1980s see Alison 
Brysk, "From Above and Below: Social Movements, the International System and Human Rights in 
Argentina, " Comparative Political Studies 26 (1993): 259-283. 
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requiring a significant exertion of pressure onto goverrunent were sent even further 
afield, to relevant organs of the international community. 
Commonly, cases were not publicised at all, but raised privately in closed government- 
NGO meetings, sometimes at provincial level but often in Phnom Penh, far from the 
victim and the abuser, reducing risk substantially. In pursuing remedy, human rights 
NGOs routinely shifted the level of confrontation upwards, away from the site of abuse, 
to national or international forums. This strategy is illustrated in Fig. 9.1, and shows the 
hierarchical organisation of the NGO movement, as described by interviewees. The 
more serious the abuse is perceived to be, the higher the level at which remedy for abuse 
is pursued, reflecting, arguably, belief that effective power emerges from the 
international community, and becomes more diffuse with distance from the sources of 
international power - foreign embassies, international NGOs and the United Nations. 
Addressing a complaint to a forum removed from the site of abuse reduces the symbolic 
meaning attached to both abuse and demand for remedy, as exemplary exercises of the 
power of human rights discourse. It does little to promote human rights discourse in the 
villages. Threat of retaliatory violence from government is also less, as officials 
approached are removed from the gaze of local onlookers and less sensitive to 
conclusions that may be drawn locally from their decision, concerning the 
'effectiveness' of the official vis-A-vis the NGO. 
Pursuing remedy at higher levels also means that less personally vulnerable members of 
the NGO sector make the necessary contact with government. An NGO head office is 
more secure than a provincial office. NGO coalitions are more secure again, while 
international NGOs are perceived as immune from retaliation, reflecting a top-down, 
hierarchical view of power distribution. Perceptions of NGO weakness at local level 
also reflect the economic context in the countryside, characterised by poverty, illiteracy, 
poor infrastructure for travel and long-distance communication, and limited media 
networks - all factors which limit the circulation of human rights discourse. Strong 
links between isolation and fear imply that this context adds significantly to physical 
insecurity. This insecurity arguably reflects difficulties experienced in connecting into a 
mutually supportive relationship with their own 'grass-roots' constituency, which is 
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viewed as 'weak', subject to close surveillance, and engrossed in day-to-day subsistence 
activities. It also reflects the greater ease with which human rights discourse circulates 
at national and international levels, and the orientation of NGOs away from an 
aggressive strategy of encouraging empowered grass-roots participation in politics. 
Instead, human rights workers seek to avoid attracting the attention of local officials, 
thus increasing the need to maintain close contacts with more secure colleagues in 
Phnom Penh and the international community. 
There are serious weaknesses in this strategy. Higher government officials may support 
abusers, in line with an economy of power where impunity, demonstrations of 
effectiveness' and domination of outsiders by insiders underpin the maintenance of the 
CPP power base. Even where remedy is provided, lack of publicity renders the NGO 
victory less symbolically valuable. New precedents are not set, and human rights 
discourse is not promoted by means of a public demonstration of its utility as a power 
resource. There is little impact on the general climate of fear experienced by outsiders, 
or the climate of impunity enjoyed by insiders, so that opportunities for empowerment 
of outsiders vis-i-vis insiders are lost. 
In pursuing these strategies, human rights NGOs lose the opportunity to demonstrate the 
practical applications of the discourse they have developed amongst themselves, and 
which they seek to disseminate through education. They also lose the opportunity to tap 
into local discontent and develop the assertiveness and political participation of the 
grass roots which could, over time, replace dependence on international intervention. 
Within this strategy also, efficacy remains contingent on government willingness to 
engage in dialogue. The strategy is low-risk in terms of likelihood of retaliatory 
violence, but success is dependent on political factors, and less likely to have a 
generalisable deterrent effect. 
Attempts are made to search for domestic power resources to strengthen their position 
vis-A-vis government. Monks are viewed as valuable domestic allies due to their 
authoritative cultural status which, it is considered, renders them immune to violent 
retaliation. Involvement of monks in human rights issues is also considered to add 
significant costs to abusive practices, rendering their surveillance of officials a valuable 
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power resource. Consequently, one human rights NGO proposed a scheme to form 
juries of prominent citizens, including monks, to observe trials: 
Carnbodians are Buddhists.... So if we select high-ranking monks to be 
members of the jury, this factor is very crucial. Because for Buddhists, 
when any person does something wrong, then the monks can point out what 
is right and what is wrong. 4 
Similarly, other human rights NGOs advocated deploying monks at polling stations to 
act as 'witnesses' during the general elections, to constrain attempts to intimidate voters 
or employ unfair practices. One religious NGO focused on forging links between 
human rights activists and monks, regarding the inviolability of monks and the power of 
religion as important resources for human rights promotion: 
The political groups, the powerful - they try to grab the monks.... Because 
monks are very powerful.... theý try to eliminate monks from politics... 
Because the monk is dangerous... 
This attitude, arguably, reflects the concern of human rights activists to embed human 
rights discourse into more powerful and better-circulated local discourses, such as that 
of the Buddhist religion. Monks themselves were less sanguine about their power; a 
high-ranking CPP-appointed monk and a senior monk returned from work in refugee 
camps both saw the power balance differently: 
Buddhist monks ... feel inferior because of the three years, eight months. They are scared of the governrnent and military. I keep trying to address the 
monks' morale by training monks and government employees to understand 
one another. 6 
Monks are interested to work in society, to help people to understand the 
situation. But monks too - many young, new monks - they find it difficult to 
understand, themselves... They have no power to protect. Monks also need 
protection sometimes. They too fear the possibility of violent action. 7 
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The dominance of violence over religious discourse, as well as over human rights 
discourse, exemplifies the central problem of power in war-torn societies such as 
Cambodia's. The climate of fear inhibits the emergence of domestic power resources 
able to promote a new discourse, which incorporates the rights of the weak. 'Mese rights 
remain contingent on the whims of political interests allied to the military. 
A possible exception to this rule is the Dhammayietra peace march, one movement 
which directly, publicly and symbolically challenges violence. It passes through war 
zones and minefields and is greeted by soldiers who temporarily lay down their weapons 
to receive its blessings. The Dhammayietra is currently an isolated example. 
Significantly, its leaders have spent many years abroad, and the movement engages 
international as well as local adherents, although employing indigenous cultural symbols 
and religious discourses. 
Despite Dhammayietra's popularity with villagers along the route, the rigours of 
marching suggest that participation in it will remain restricted to a dedicated core, 
mainly of monks and nuns, who are seen by lay Cambodians as enjoying special 
protection against violence because of their status. The accessibility of the movement to 
ordinary Cambodians, aside from the days when marchers pass their homes, is limited. 
Unlike human rights organisations, the movement does not seek to maintain permanent 
surveillance of local authorities in the provinces. 
In most circumstances, the extent and scale of the violence that has occurred in 
Cambodia has, of itself, almost guaranteed the immunity of violence to popular 
condemnation through use of a discourse. Canibodia's violent past is notable for its 
lack of individual martyrs - the sheer number of victims has caused the dead to remain 
by and large nameless. Movements bearing the names of fallen heroes have not been a 
feature of recent national history. Such movements would allow a particular political 
vision, which is opposed to that of the controllers of violence, to transcend violence 
through the fact that the vision outlives the death-by-violence of the visionary. Keeping 
alive the names of those who have died is an important part of human rights work, as 
exemplified by the Mothers and Grandmothers of the Plaza De La Mayo in Argentina, 
who displayed the pictures of the 'disappeared' in order that their vitality, as young 
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political activists, should transcend their fate. Such activities deny govenunent the 
ability to effectively crush dissent. They engage the wider public in the remembrance of 
the abused, eliciting public solidarity, and thus broadening the abuse from an attack by 
govenunent on an individual to an attack by government on society as a whole&. 
In Cambodia, the display of photographs of Tuol Sleng victims resembles this 
movement, but even in this monument, the number of photographs and the nature of 
their display as a sea of faces, in identical dress and often unnamed, emphasises the 
anonymity of those who died. In addition, the museum has been politicised by CPP 
monopolisation of the memorial. It has become linked with controversy over Vietnam's 
I'liberation7' of Canibodiaý Its impact as a challenge to violence is diluted by the fact 
that current violence is frequently carried out in the name of protection of Cambodians 
from the Khmer Rouge. Propaganda emphasising the need for protection disempowers 
ordinary people, increases the climate of fear, and is used to justify finther human right 
abuse. It prevents the establishment of alternative public loci of power, and prompts 
continued reliance by human rights activists on international power and protection. 
Government responses to NGO demands frequently comprise neither outright 
compliance nor outright opposition. In many cases, government cultivates a 
sympathetic appearance, while relying on systemic safeguards for abusers to render 
these efforts ineffective. This is particularly so in cases attracting international attention, 
where failure due to lack of expertise or finance is frequently claimed. 
Responses to complaints of human rights abuse made by Cambodian human rights 
NGOs, with or without international support, may be met by a variety of governmental 
strategies, representing a varying degree of success for local NGOs. Three such 
strategies can be defined as follows: 
a) Compliance with NGO demands. Most interviewees in human rights NGOs claimed 
8 For a discussion of the strategies of this movement, 'see Brysk. 
9 For a discussion of the utility of the Tuol Sleng museum as a tool for human rights promotion see 
Terence Duffy, "Towards a Culture of Human Rights in Cambodia, " Human Rights Quarterly 16 (1994): 
82-104. 
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that the government responded to NGO demands with effective action in some areas of 
activity. For example, the president of one of the largest human rights NGOs, which 
organises regular monitoring of the conditions of prisoners, claimed that decisive action 
was taken regularly by the Ministry of Justice to exert control over the judicial system, 
at the prompting of NGOs: 
In the past two or three years we have helped a lot of victims and the number 
of detainees held over six months in jail is reduced almost to nothing now. 
Before - two years, more than one year, or five years in jail - but now if we 
know that one prison has one or two detainees held over six months in jail, 
we send a letter to the Justice Ministry immediately to ask them to send 
those people to a tribunal. They respond immediately to that. 10 
This is significant in that, according to the interviewee, a predictable pattern of 
behaviour has been established nation-wide. Prison visits by foreign and local NGOs 
were an established feature of the human rights situation prior to the collapse of the 
coalition government in 1997. Significantly, even after mass arrests of pro-Funcinpec 
political activists following the coup, visits by human rights NGOs to these detainees 
were permitted. 
The 1996 arrangement with the Ministry of Justice reflected an opportunist strategy, on 
the part of the NGO concerned, rather than a demand for compliance with democratic 
principle. According to the constitution, the judiciary is independent of the Ministry of 
Justice, monitoring the legality of executive decisions rather than vice versa. 
Conspiring with the Ministry to intervene in judicial oversight of prisons resulted in 
releases of detainees, but was contingent on politics rather than law and strengthened the 
position of the executive vis-h-vis the courts, rather than the position of the courts vis-h- 
vis the executive. The political trials described in Chapter Five, and others which took 
place after the July 1997 coup, illustrated the continuing subservience of law to the 
politics of 'effectiveness', despite human rights NGO activities to assist detainees. 
Opportunistic responses to human rights abuse do not advance more stable frameworks 
of governance based on a state-society relationship in which citizens are empowered. 
10 H5. 
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NGO ability to shape the political context is limited, since operation within it requires 
acceptance of its reality. NGOs, via the two NGO urgent action committees, attempted 
to use existing and potentially abusive intra-governmental power relationships to correct 
abuse, rather than creating new power resources to empower victims. The alternative, 
liberal democratic vision of appropriate political relationships expressed in international 
human rights promotion was employed only marginally when confronting government 
over cases of abuse, in line with the widespread view, discussed in Chapter Eight, that 
cultivating the sympathy. of individuals in government can promote a harmonious and 
non-confrontational state-society relationship. 
Attempts to demand government compliance with liberal democratic ideals were made 
sporadically in the law courts by defenders presenting an alternative vision ofjudicial 
duty based on the Constitution and the concept of rule of law. Some success was 
achieved in cases unimportant to the economy of power in which judges were located. 
Activists interviewed in 1996 believed it was too soon for this to be attempted more 
assertively, but deterioration in respect for human rights since 1994/5 suggests a 
strengthening of government at the expense of human rights NGOs, rather than vice 
versa. Power relations have become more, rather than less, unequal. 
b) Sympathetic action taken at ministerial level, frustrated by localfactors promoting 
impunity. In other cases, an appearance of sympathy by higher levels of government is 
nullified by systemic features of the economy of power which promote impunity at the 
provincial government level. Two such cases illustrate this phenomenon. The first was 
a case in which a commune official shot and killed a member of the public in a village 
in Kampot province. A provincial human rights NGO officer in Kampot said that the 
provincial government had issued a warrant for the arrest of the abuser, who had been 
captured by police and taken to Kampot provincial court for trial. When the case came 
to court, the abuser was acquitted, and the provincial human rights NGO officer alleged 
that judges had taken bribes from the accused! 1 It is unclear whether Us outcome was 
foreseen by the provincial authorities, but in general terms, judicial corruption is crucial 
11 H3. 
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for sustaining the impunity of insiders, and has not been addressed by government. 
A second case, more widely publicised, shows action by both executive and judiciary 
frustrated by military impunity. Military action, including the laying of landmines, 
creates no-go areas for civilian authority which foster this impunity. In Kompong 
Cham, human rights NGO workers described "'rubber areas" controlled by "armed men 
who come from the jungle"12 which they feared to enter. In 1996, Kompong Charn 
Provincial Court issued a warrant for the arrest of an RCAF General, Sat Soeun, accused 
of the arbitrary killing of a 16-year-old waiter in Kompong Cham provincial town, but 
Soeun was able to escape to military zones. According to two Kompong Cham human 
rights workers, Soeun was protected because of his status as a military strongman: 
Previously Sat Soeun had several successes - wherever he went he always 
succeeded in protecting the province or forcing the Khmer Rouge out. And 
also he can earn enough money for his chief. 13 
In my opinion, they cannot catch him because he has a lot of soldiers... 
Cambodian people are afraid of him. 14 
Although the chief prosecutor of Kompong Ch= court claimed: "There is no way that 
he can escape", 15 police eyewitnesses to the shooting had failed to arrest Soeun on the 
scene, and the RCAF subsequently claimed they were unable to find him, although 
NGO workers had received reports of sightings of Soeun, serving with the military and 
in remote rubber plantations in Kompong Cham and Stung Treng provinces. 
Such cases illustrate that impunity is decentralised in Cambodia, rendering 
implementation of rule of law problematic. Central government faces possible 
resistance from local concentrations of power which become increasingly independent 
with distance from Phnom Penh. In this respect, power in Cambodia is both limited in 




"Claudia Rizzi, "Two More Murders Pinned on Socun, " PPP 8-21 Mar. 1996,3. 
16 Anderson, "Tbc Idea of Power in Javanese Culture". 
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it is projected from the centre dwindles towards the periphery. Local power-maximising 
opportunities provided by military activity, cross-border trade, control of natural 
resources and other variables complicate this picture, creating a patchwork of 
overlapping jurisdictions, conceived both spatially and hierardhically, which are staffed 
by personnel whose relationship to other jurisdictions is determined by considerations of 
patronage, loyalty and protection. 
Party, state and military are connected, but not monolithic. The importance of personal 
relationships, variety of personal interests and difficulty of effective oversight causes 
slippage so that while orders from above impinge on the decisions of inferiors, they 
form one more or less important variable among many. The certainty with which 
particular outcomes can be predicted is low, due to low homogeneity among power 
holders and power conditions in different parts of the country. The success of the CPP 
arises from the ability of leaders to utilise decentralisation to their own advantage, while 
avoiding imposing burdensome demands, such as respect for the law or acceptance of 
central intervention to prevent abusive practices, on significant local players. 
Intervention of human rights NGOs in this landscape of chaotic power relations and 
interests is uncertain, utilising a flexibility over individual cases that does not sit well 
with attempts to institutionalise a unified discourse. Conflicts continually arise between 
using pre-existing power interests and alliances to secure remedy in individual cases, 
and attempting to alter the political fi-amework in favour of human rights principles. 
c)Strategies to Promote NGO SeIr-Restraint. Promotion of self-restraint on the part of 
human rights NGOs, through the manufacture of a climate of fear to surround, 
particularly, political cases, can also be viewed as a strategy pursued by government to 
prevent the effective demand for remedy. The means by which this climate of fear is 
promoted has already been described in Chapter Six. Further examination of two cases 
illustrates the impact of this on the activities of human rights NGOs. 
The assassination of Thun Bunly, publisher of Udam Kate Khmer, on 18 May 1996, 
exemplifies, not only the weakness of the press, but the inability of the human rights 
NGO movement to capitalise on the deaths of those who publicly and peacefully defy 
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the power of violence. It also illustrates the marked difference in ideology between 
human rights NGOs and the political opposition. 
A fellow opposition journalist explained Thun Bunly's death as prompted by a visit to 
France organised by a Khmer diaspora organisation, the Committee for the Support of 
Patriots and Democrats in Cambodia, during which Bunly and Sereipheap Thmei editor 
Hen Vipheak publicly 
attacked the two prime ministers very seriously, over corruption and human 
rights violations and letting the Vietnamese invade Cambodian territory. 
And so this made the two prime ministers very, very angry. 17 
This interviewee also reported that the journalists were adv ised they would be in danger 
when they returned but: 
of course when they came back.... those two didn't reduce their criticism (of 
the two prime ministers]. Actually, they increased it. And so this made the 
Second Prime Minister very angry. This caused the assassination. 18 
Although the murderers were unidentified, the assassination took place in a Phnom Penh 
street in broad daylight. 
The case was difficult for Cambodian human rights NGOs. Its political overtones made 
it too sensitive for contact with officialdom to be effective in gaining remedy. Concerns 
to preserve their neutrality constrained NGO intervention. Thun Bunly had a 
controversial reputation for abrasive and insulting journalism. His ideological style was 
directly opposed to that of local human rights NGOs. Action taken by NGOs comprised 
investigation of the crime, including interviewing witnesses, and the issuing of press 
releases calling on the government to investigate, as well as consultation with the 
international community. 
On the morning of Thun Bunly's death, his newspaper printed a public notice of his 
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Kate Khme? 'which reported that a military colonel was looking for Bunly's house and 
had: 
let slip when he was drunk that when he found the home of Tbun Bunly then 
he would play a trick that would surprise the whole of Phnom Penh ... 
19 
The story published several details regarding the identity of the alleged assassin, 
probably in an attempt to harness the power of publicity to protect the potential victim, 
but this strategy failed and Thun Bunly was shot dead on the morning that the story 
reached the news stands. 
Given the political connotations of the case, and the fact that the threat had been 
publicly announced on the day of the murder, government response shows a remarkable 
lack of regard for even the appearance of remedying an abuse. Under the guise of 
keeping an open mind while investigating, the Ministry of Interior impugned Thun 
Bunly's character, claiming he had abducted and rhped a young girl, owed money in 
relation to his logging enterprises, and drawing attention to rivalries between his two 
wives. Meanwhile, police intimidation of Bunly's family and of witnesses, and failure 
20 
to investigate seriously, were alleged by Bunly's KNP colleagues. 
The fact that no arrests were ever made suggests the government felt there were few 
costs to be endured if the killers were not found. A concern to demonstrate government 
non-involvement would have led to a show of investigation, and perhaps the arrest of a 
scapegoat. Failure to investigate properly added an unequivocal charge of negligence to 
the suspicions of government involvement with the murder, contributing finther to the 
climate of impunity which fosters abuse in Cambodia. In line with their non-political, 
technocratic orientations, senior employees of the two urgent-action committees focused 
on this aspect of the case: 
The government says that its investigation is not yet finished, but we don't 
think the government takes this investigation very seriously. We always 
19"Someone is looldng for the Editor of Udam Kate Khmer, " UKK 18 May 1996,1. 
2001, personal interview (Khm-), 17 June 1996, Phnom Penh. The letter '0' denotes an official in the 
opposition Khmer Nation Party. 
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follow up cases like this, but the government always answers, 'Wait for a 
moment, the investigation is not yet finished'. 21 
We just got a letter from the Ministry of the Interior which said Thun Bunly 
died because of his personal problems. If we had a government that worked 
for the people, the killer would be found. Many people saw the killers - not 
their faces but their clothes. The police could really find the killers. It's 
human rights abuse. 22 
Non-governmental reactions, even with royal and international support, failed to secure 
remedy. Initially, the case was extensively covered by all sections of the local press, 
with greater or lesser weight given to the Ministry of Interior accusations, or those of 
Udam Kate Khmer, depending on the political orientations of the newspapers. 
Credence to the pro-KNP stance was given by two powerful actors: the King, who 
condemned the assassination as symbolising the extent of Cambodia's retreat from the 
principles of the 1993 Constitution; 23 and the United Nations Centre for Human Rights 
which also released a statement, noting that"the killing coincided with the opening of 
the first KNP offices outside the capital, in Sihanoukville" and that Thun Bunly had 
received death threats following his recent criticisms of the government. 24 
21HI2, personal interview (Eng. ), 8 July 1996, Phnom Penh. 
22H13. 
23 The King stated: 
Since the adoption of the Constitution ... in 1993, ... we have been very sad about the many 
abuses of the letter and spirit of this Constitution, which have happened continuously 
because there is no respect for it at all. Some of the laws which have been passed by the 
National Assembly ... also have details which do not strictly follow the spirit of the 
constitution as stated above. 
Since ... UNTAC, the Cambodian people themselves have been personal witnesses to 
violent and shameful deeds and many assassinations of newspaper reporters and other elites: 
which is a political crime that cannot be denied. 
I ask the government and National Assembly in the not too distant future to make the 
second Kingdom of Cambodia a state of law where in the end the political actions, words 
and attitudes, etc., of all the national authorities are determinedly honest to the oath which 
they have made in front of the royal throne in the temple in the Royal Palace 
VIAnnouncement of the King: 'unofricial tram. into Khmer, repr. in UKK, 23 May 1996,1]. 
24 UN Centre for Human Rights, "rhe Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General for 
Human Rights in Cambodia Expresses Grave Concern at the Murder of Mr Tbun Bunly, " press release, 20 
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Despite the involvement of these powerful actors, the failure to arrest a suspect meant 
the farore died down after three to four weeks in the opposition newspapers, and less in 
the pro-government press. Significantly, no sustained public campaign was launched by 
local NGOs to keep the issue alive. A public relations assistant at one of the largest 
human rights NGOs explained that human rights NGOs never close files on unresolved 
cases, but do not spend time publicising them: 
We always follow up everything we start. Some cases drag on for a long 
time, but we don't drop them... If journalists come to the office and ask for 
information, we provide it. But we can't spend too much time on that - we 
have our own work to do. 2S 
A minority human rights NGO activist, who was active in one of the urgent-action 
committees, expressed distrust of the politicised press: 
We don't pay much attention to newspaper sensationalism - they report false 
information and cause trouble to ýeople, exaggerate information... they blow 
things out of proportion. 26 
These attitudes, along with practical difficulties regarding mass communication in 
Cambodia which limits the reach of newspaper circulation, constrains public 
campaigning over human rights issues, and the circulation of the human rights 
discourse. Materials produced by human rights NGOs themselves aim to educate the 
public about the content of rights, rather than about cases of abuse in their own country. 
This, arguably, reflects a perception that the human rights discourse must be 
strengthened as a national discourse before it can be employed to challenge vested 
power interests over particular cases. It reflects a perception that, in political cases, 
human rights NGOs risk loss of their neutral status in the eyes of the government if they 
intervene, significantly increasing their vulnerability. Furthermore, it reflects NGO 
avoidance of strategies which mobilise ordinary Cambodians in human rights 
campaigning in a participatory, and confrontational, manner. 
May 1996, Phnom Penh. 
25H24, personal interview (Eng. ), 22 May 1996, Phnom Penh. 
26HI9. 
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Bunly's party, the KNP, organised a more visible condemnation of the abuse, on the 
occasion of Thun Bunly's funeral. The cortege attempted to pass the National Assembly 
building, and a stand-off with police ensued, which became a symbolic public 
confrontation of the government with its alleged crime. 
Such demonstrations represent more highly charged confrontations than denunciatory 
press releases, because they visibly lay responsibility for abuse at the door of the 
government, involve a wider public in an active process of condemnation, and empower 
the group of victims who thus vocally assert their rights. It is remarkable that the 
Cambodian human rights movement almost uniformly avoids this style of campaigning. 
Exceptions to this rule include demonstrations held by the squatters' organisations to 
protest forced evictions. The annual Peace March also involves a symbolic 
confrontation of war with peace but is less unequivocal in laying responsibility for 
problems and remedies at the door of individuals. The impact of specifically political 
demonstrations can be inferred from governmental reactions to them: student 
demonstrations in 1991 ended with troops firing on crowds, while grenades were thrown 
at a KNP rally outside the National Assembly in March 1997, killing 19 people. 
Almost all the human rights NGOs studied avoided this arena for pursuing remedy for 
abuse, because such strategies conflict with less risky strategies of developing private 
NGO-government contacts which can tap into governmental power resources. 
Arguably, faced with a choice between developing contacts with government or publicly 
condemning government, human rights NGOs have leaned heavily towards the latter. 
Direct confrontation of governmental power resources, particularly in political cases, is 
perceived by interviewees as ineffective and dangerous. A lawyer who headed one of 
the urgent-action committees commented: 
The main priority is to negotiate with the government because the 
government has power. F11 give you an example - Prince Sirivudh has been 
arrested. Not only the common people, even the international community 
[were watching] the situation, but he was arrested by the government. 27 
214. 
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His view was echoed by the head of a public defenders' NGO: 
For now we have to compromise ... a lot, so that we can do what we can do, 
slowly. There is a Cambodian proverb which says when the water flows 
strongly, if you put a piece of rock to stop the water, it will be washed away. 
You have to go slowly to reach your goal. Democracy is a very long way 
away. 28 
Instead human rights NGOs attempt to co-opt governmental power resources, which 
requires a non-confrontational stance. Terms used to describe NGO-govenuncntal 
contact included: 'discuss'; 'exchange views with'; 'collaborate'; 'give constructive 
criticism'; 'persuade'; 'just say peacefully'; 'work out a solution with; 'conciliate'; 
appeal to'. Words specifically rejected include 'confront'; 'denounce'; 'condemn'; 
force'; 'criticise'. For example, three senior members of the two urgent-action 
committees commented: 
We don't like to confront the -government. This is our policy... If we dorft 
collaborate with the government now, I think we cannot solve the problem 
of human rights violation properly... If we act like that, the government will 
be angry with us ... and they will make obstacles for our activity and they 
may cut off training with government officials. 29 
Sometimes they are high-ranking but their knowledge is low. So we have to 
understand ... what kind of strategies we can use to discuss with them. How 
can we get feedback from them? We have to understand how to get a profit 
from them... if we force them to have respect for human rights its useless. 30 
The Action Committee and the UN Centre for Human Rights are working 
very closely with the government to promote human rights in Canibodia. 31 
This attitude differs markedly from the stance of the opposition press which has chosen 
the path of condemnation to deny legitimacy. Newspaper attacks on individuals 
coalesce around a number of themes. Lack of education is a frequent criticism, which 
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responsible for chaos in social relationships: 
Mr Sar Kheng has a very short measure of culture, has never received a high 
2 
level of qualification. Even if a law was good in some way, Mr Sar Kheng 
wouldn't be capable of implementing in accordance with it. 2 
Other accusations include alleged adherence to 'communist' ideology, and a desire to 
'trick' and exploit the Cambodian people for their own gain, to the detriment of the 
nation. The government is characterised as "a Communist-style regime painted over 
with democratic colours in order to mislead the Khmer people", 33 operating for the 
enrichment of leaders who "steal and destroy forests and national resources ignorantly, 
against the national interest, thereby abusing the heritage of the people and opening the 
9,34 door to allow the Yuon to enter illegally and infiltrate the'whole country... The 
newspapers view change as coming through mass mobilisation: 
The Khmer Nation Party joins with all the liberal democratic forces in 
society, is unafraid of the obstacles of the group of political leaders ... 
35 
Khmers must wake up and help the Khmer nation before it is too late. 36 
KNP emphasis on the danger represented by the government to the nation contrasts with 
human rights NGO efforts to mediate between government and people. Human rights 
workers viewed the rhetoric of opposition journalists as alarmist and rabble-rousing, 
provoking government hostility and consequently as negative in its impact on political 
life. They spoke of the importance of adopting the right tone in contacts with the 
government. The president of one of the leading human rights NGOs commented: 
I know a little bit about Cambodian mentality. It's... not so much a question 
of what you say as how you say it... If we deal with issues not personalities - 
we don't just say, "This fool Hun Sen is no good, he's uneducated". It's 
32 66IS Sar Kheng Violating the Law or Doesn't He Know the Law? " Samleng Yuvachon Khmer (SYK), 16- 
17 June 1996,1. 
33 "Whose Cambodia? " editorial, MK7-8 June 1996,1. 
34 "Ranariddh is a Doctor of Law, " UKK 9 June 1996,1. 
35 "Whose Cambodia? " editorial, MK 7-8 June 1996,1. 
36 "The Suffering of the Khmer Nation from Demagogic Communist Politics, " MK 14-15 June 1996,1. 
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cheap, that sort of writing. That's why a lot of journalists have had trouble. 37 
The head of a public defenders' NGO commented: 
We have to criticise - but we have to criticise for improvement. Ranariddh 
used to be angry with the press. They spoke very badly about him, cursed 
him ... Some newspapers have no morality... And they look down on him - he didret feel happy about that. They should criticise in an improving way - 
give him some suggestions so he can know how. 38 
Such NGO strategies are thus incompatible with the strategies employed by the political 
opposition. The increased political tension prompted by opposition activities militates 
against governmental sympathy for NGO petitions concerning'grass-roots' issues. 
Concern over the radical nature of political opposition led to an explicit distancing of 
the Cambodian human rights NGO movement from the KNP. The president of one of 
the largest human rights NGOs commented: 
We have to show the government that we are neutral... not party political. 
Regarding the Rainsy issue, we were very careful. When Rainsy... sent 
someone to complain to us that he had one of his staff killed, we didn't take 
that immediately, we sent our staff to make an investigation first... They 
would have attacked us so we didn't make a public release... but when we 
saw an ambassador or member of the international community we said we 
are sorry that a political party cannot set up now.... That is our duty - it's 
clear, our mandate... Non-ambiguous. 39 
This comment reflects the distance between neutral, professional NGOs, and political 
society. Arguably this distance arises from the view among NGOs that party politics are 
divisive and weakening to the integration of the nation within the framework of a 
national state-society consensus. Although this human rights worker claims the 
mandate is 'very clear', in fact the NGO did not take the usual step taken in cases of 
extrajudicial killing, namely the issue of a statement to the press. 
Arguably, the differing strategies of human rights NGOs and opposition political 
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abuses and seeking remedy for them, human rights NGOs have created a place for 
themselves in relation to the prevailing system, as professional petitioners with inside 
contacts which they use for the benefit of outsiders. They ameliorate the worst excesses 
of the system by providing some channels for outsider grievance, and avoid repression 
by not significantly jeopardising governmental means of reproducing power. Their 
technocratic, anti-political approach contrasts with the highly political, confrontational 
and participatory approach of the political opposition. As discussed in earlier chapters, 
there can be no construction of a 'loyal' but critical and overtly political opposition in 
the Cambodian economy of power. 
Because of these differing orientations, human rights NGO workers interviewed 
perceived a conflict between their work with the 'grass roots' and the interventions 
within political society expected of them by liberal international donors. Many 
interviewees, arguably, believed that interventions in particular cases of abuse should be 
separated from education work aimed at strengthening human rights discourse. The 
level of understanding of human rights discourse achieved in Cambodia up to the 
present was insufficient to allow this discourse to prevail in confrontation with 
government power resources. While educational activities were aimed at strengthening 
this discourse for use in the future, premature attempts at such confrontations would 
result in government repression of the human rights movement. 
This point was made explicitly with regard to the Sirivudh case, by the president of a 
national human rights NGO, the president of an NGO coalition and the head of a public 
defenders'NGO: 
We cannot allow our organisation to be destroyed by a confrontation like 
that. We need our organisation to survive to protect other people... And also 
Sirivudh can be protected by the international community better than us... if 
we use the bad things and we become the enemy of the government, we 
cannot help the poor people, the weak people. 40 
Some cases we cannot take because it's very dangerous. Like the case of 
Prince Sirivudh - we have to be silent... Because now the government 
40H5. 
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shows that they are willing to co-operate a little bit, with training for 
officials and police. Why confront them if they are willing to co-operate 
like that? 41 
In my opinion, we should help all. Except for some cases that are big 
political cases. Because... we have one case but destroy another thousand 
cases.... For example, the Sirivudh case. 42 
Because of this, both the human rights NGOs studied and the political opposition 
themselves look to the international community to intervene over the most sensitive 
abuses in political society. Frequently, this is presented as a logical response to the 
greater range of power resources available to the international community. 
A view of the international. community as able and willing to intervene in such cases 
was remarkably widespread among interviewees. Comments made by the president of a 
minonties NGO and by an opposition journalist are typical: 
International organisations are able to tackle [these] problems.... We never 
go directly to government. We deal with the district and provincial level; 
but when something serious 
43 
happens we appeal to international 
organisations, especially Geneva. 
Some groups can protect (political activists], for ex=ple international 
human rights NGOs and international journalists... one man was arrested for 
releasing [anti-government] leaflets into the air (attached to balloons] during 
(US Secretary of State] Warren Christopher's visit. But the international 
community came to visit him (in jail] frequently so he wasn't seriously 
punished. He was tortured less. 44 
In the Sirivudh case, local NGO coalitions took no public action beyond sending 
4reýommendations' to the Ministry of the Interior and lobbying privately at the 
international levelýs The local opposition Khmer-language press was not publishing 





45 One NGO director took a public stand, see Lao Mong Hay (director, Khmer Institute of Democracy), 
"Me Year of Darkness; the Year of Light, " PPP 29 Dec. 1995-11 Jan. 1996,20. 
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following the attack on Sereipheap Thmei. The treatment of Sirivudh was condemned 
only at intemational level. 
This behaviour supports the suggestion made in Chapter Seven, that, to an extent, the 
relationship between the international community and Cambodian human rights NGOs 
has come to resemble traditional Cambodian patron-client relationships. International 
organisations were seen by interviewees as protectors, who can intervene on behalf of 
Cambodian NGOs in situations where these face a powerful antagonist in the shape of 
the Cambodian government. This characterisation of the local-international relationship 
has important implications for the peace-building and state-building processes discussed 
in Chapter Two. V*Ule human rights NGOs continue to rely on international 
organisations for protection, they fail to develop and test internal power resources which 
could act as democratic safeguards. Reliance on international organisations to oversee 
the state disempowers local citizens, and encourages the transposition of the 
uncertainties of international relations into Cambodian politics. 
Use of international power resources to strengthen a domestic position is not new or 
unique to Cambodia. The Cambodian case is rernarkable, arguably, because of the 
extent to which international power is viewed as a central factor in Cambodian politics. 
Cambodian interviewees imputed extensive responsibilities in the human rights field to 
the international community, suggesting that their conception of sovereignty differs 
significantly from those usually employed by liberal international relations theorists. An 
absence of perceived boundaries demarcating Cambodian from international political 
concerns has far-reaching implications for the creation of a Cambodian political 
community or nation, and, consequently, for the prospects of state-building activities 
aimed at constituting a secular, rights-bearing Cambodian citizen. As Edwards 
comments, the effect is uncertainty regarding the extent to which Cambodian problems 
can or should be solved by Cambodians. 46 
To preserve their access to govenunental power resources, and in view of a perceived 
46Edwards 62. 
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lack of non-governmental power resources and weakness of human rights discourse 
within the domestic arena, human rights activists were observed to use international 
forums as outposts of domestic politics. Foreign embassies, the UN, particularly the UN 
Centre for Human Rights, and international NGOs are viewed as powerful backers and 
risk-free sites for confrontation. 
The Paris Agreements provided legal basis for this. Non-CPP politicians interviewed 
regarded certain provisions of the accords as removing rights from Cambodian 
jurisdiction, and creating a legal obligation of international rights-based intervention. 47 
Generally, they expressed little anxiety regarding the possibility of rejection of 
international intervention by the government. For example, a Funcinpec National 
Assembly deputy with a reputation for promoting human rights issues within the 
assembly commented: 
The international community has done a good job in the past. I hope they 
continue with their responsibilities. Their responsibility now is to help us 
raise concerns if they see government violations of law and human rights ... 
48 
Similarly, a senior official in the Khmer Nation Party and a prominent opposition 
journalist commented: 
The international community has already made a lot of sacrifices, spent a lot 
of money, raised a lot of hopes and expectations. They can't let us down 
now... We have the Paris Peace Agreements - eighteen countries committed 
themselves to ensure respect for democracy. Through this unique agreement 
the international community is cornn-ýittedý9 
The Paris Peace. Accords said very precisely that the intemational 
47For example, "The other Signatories to this Agreement undertake to promote and encourage respect for 
and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cambodia as embodied in the relevant 
international instruments and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, in order, in 
particular, to prevent the recurrence of human rights abuses (Comprehensive Art. 15(b)]; " and "In the 
event of serious violations of human rights in Cambodia [the parties to this agreement] will call upon the 
competent organs of the United Nations to take such other steps as are appropriate for the prevention and 
suppression of such violations in accordance with the relevant international instruments (Agreement 
Concerning Sovereignty ArL 5.4. ]. " 
48D3, personal interview (Eng. ), 4 July 1996, Phnom Penh. This deputy fled Phnom Penh following the 
coup of July 1997, to return in January 1998 under UN protection. 
49 02, personal interview (Eng. ), 8 August 1996, Phnom Penh. 
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community must make Cambodia democratic and have respect for human 50 
rights. 
Human rights workers interviewed believed the continuation of indigenous rights 
initiatives was dependent on international engagement. Human rights NGO employees 
in Kompong Cham, Phnom Penh and Kampot viewed this issue as follows: 
Previously the Royal Government wanted to close the UN Centre in Phnom 
Penh - if that happened other human rights organisations would lose their 
will and their independence because of the security situation and because 
working in the provinces is not secure. 51 
International organisations are very important for us. Without the UN office 
in Cambodia the government would violate everywhere. 52 
We are lucky to have the UN Centre. Otherwise NGOs might not be able to 53 
work. 
The perceived contingency of individual physical security in the Cambodian power 
environment is such that the presence of the human rights NGOs' main patron, the UN 
Centre for Human Rights, is considered vital to the power balance permitting NGO 
activity. 
The irreplaceability of the international community's power was considered by most 
interviewees to arise from two resources of power which cannot be manufactured 
locally: the perceived immunity of foreigners from government-sponsored violence; and 
control of the international aid on which the Cambodian government depends. These 
resources counterbalance the Cambodian government's key resources - the ability to 
protect or violate physical and economic security. 
A number of interviewees argued that without aid, "Ibe Cambodian government cannot 
5ON9. As argued in Chapter Three, these interpretations of the Paris Agreements are at variance with the 
pragmatism displayed by UNTAC on operational matters. They are also at odds with the continuing 
pragmatism of foreign donor governments, described below. 
51H4. 
52 H 15. 
53 Hl. 
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survive... more than six months". 54 Control of aid, and immunity from violence, gave 
the international community, in the eyes of many interviewees, almost unlimited power 
which should and could be exploited in the interest of human rights. The leader of a 
religious NGO which operates human rights programmes and a lawyer who heads one 
of the urgent-action committees commented: 
The international community should try to help Cambodia reduce the 
number of political parties. Only two or three, not twenty parties.... They 
can do it by giving money and putting conditions on - saying, if you join 
together I'll give you this. Then they will do that. And when they have a 
power balance, that is democracy working. 55 
The international NGO has more power than the local NGO; for example, it 
is easy for them to have access to the prime minister, King or ministries... 
Because ... Cambodia is alive now because of the international community. Peace came here from the international community and development also ... If the government does something that is not in accordance with the ideas of 
the international community ... the international community will be 
unhappy... The goverriment has to be respectable in the eyes of the 
international community. 56 
Aid is also important to give the government the means with which to respond to 
particular human rights demands. For example, one squatters' organisation explained 
that they themselves could have little impact on government decision-making unless 
they joined forces with international agencies who could fimd the solutions advocated 
locally. 57 
While aid is perceived as allowing the international community to reward government 
respect for human rights, immunity from violence allows international organisations to 
investigate and publicise abuses that Cambodian human rights NGOs avoid, some 
interviewees believed. A senior employee of one urgent-action committee commented: 
Local NGOs cannot investigate some cases. For example, in Koh Kong, if 
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to IdIl us. So local NGOs can't do anything... And in Kampot - Amnesty 
International was able to go there and get information. They can do 
something. But local NGOs can't - they're too scared. 
58 
Such immunity from violence was considered particularly important to monitor 
elections. Regarding the 1998 elections, a senior official from the opposition Khmer 
Nation Party commented: 
[Local monitoring committees] are not enough. We need more than this. 
Because the communists have guns so if we only have a local committee it's 
not very strong, because they have guns. Cambodians need help from the 
UN and from powerful countries to support the election. 59 
Lack of ability to prevail against guns is the vital element preventing democratic 
consolidation and the emergence of the human rights discourse as a dominant discourse 
in Cambodian politics. The immunity of the international community is only transferred 
to their local counterparts with difficulty. Although some interviewees said that over 
the long term Cambodians should be able to help themselves, many activists emPhasised 
the importance of moving 'step by step' and of not fixing time limits for their goals. 
Maintaining international engagement was a major concern. 
Intertwined with the issue of physical security is the question of status, particularly the 
question of how to address high-ranking figures. The comments made by some human 
rights workers suggested a belief that adherence to conventions of respect for rank can 
advance their cause, yet the circumstances of human rights work require that such 
conventions be broken, as the prerogatives of the powerful are challenged. Here, 
international input is valuable. Local human rights NGOs, as subjects in a hierarchical 
society, are subordinate to governmentý but the international community is seen as 
enjoying a status commensurate with their power, allowing them to address the 
Cambodian government more easily. Interviewees discussing the propriety of proposing 
training for the 'top leaders' raised this. The president of one of the largest national 
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attempts by NGOs to train them: 
We are trying to organise a seminar ... [and] invite ... officials from the Interior Ministry, the Justice Ministry, Military Police, Defence Ministry, 
and human rights organisations to discuss, to get to know each other ... I got 
a phone call from the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, she said, "Why 
do you want to train us? " I said, "No, we wouldn't like to train you, we 
would like to invite you to participate... "60 
A Khmer-American organising training programmes for monks commented: 
I teach the monks, the monks go to the villages and teach the people, but 
nobody is teaching the top people. Who can teach them? I cannot teach 
them because they are very powerful. They will kill me. I told the UN 
many times... there is only one way - the international community can teach 
them. 61 
This context has left these interviewees with few qualms regarding issues of state 
sovereignty. They view the international community as a powerful patron to be wooed 
into alliance with the Cambodian people against abusers within their own government to 
consolidate democracy. 62 This view is also reflected in the opposition newspapers who 
give wide coverage to international events which lend political support and ideological 
legitimacy to the Cambodian political opposition. 63 
6OH5. 
61Rl. 
62 Only one Cambodian interviewee expressed doubts regarding the ability of the international community 
to prevail in Cambodia; these were doubts regarding the political will of the community to act: 
Now I'm worried about assassination attacks (against Members of Parliament]... Attacks by 
the powerful.... Because now they have big, big power. Before, the powerful people only 
tested the situation between the international and the local. (Now] they think they can... 
Before I believed [the international community had power]. But now I don't believe it. Big 
countries or international community think about their own interests. They think about 
democracy also, but not for Cambodian people, for the region... [D 1]. 
63 Such references include: 
reports of political protests and statements by Khmers abroad. For example "What are the 
Demonstrations Doing in Paris? " MK 18-19 June 1996,1, reporting demonstrations over the death of 
Thun Bunly; "The Cosapadec Committee supports the Patriot and Democrat in Cambodia, Chan 
Ratana, in Jail K30 June "t SY -01 July 1996,1, reporting a statement on Chan Ratana's trial released 
by a Khmer NGO in France. 
reports associating the KNP with international human rights and democracy movements; for example, 
"Amnesty International wants the Release of Journalist and Prisoner of Conscience Chan Ratana in the 
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In keeping with these views, one Funcinpec National Assembly deputy, with a 
reputation for supporting human rights promotion, placed the Cambodian government 
into a patron-client relationship with the international cornrnunity: 
Human rights have to be respected because we are different [from other 
countries]... we are like UNTAC's baby and we have to behave well... The 
West wanted to stop the fighting and invested $2 billion. Of course they 
expect a good job. So this is one of the fundamental things we must do - 
protect human rights compared with Western standards. 64 
This approach subordinates issues of sovereignty and cultural diversity to a relationship 
in which ideological loyalty reciprocates for financial assistance. Arguably, it is 
supportive of the cosmopolitanism of An Agendafor Peace, and other policy agendas, in 
its suggestion that aid imposes an obligation to standardise political procedures. This 
view also reflects a form of cultural homogenisation which operates without reference to 
democratic participation and represents the antithesis of popular sovereign control of 
Kingdom of C=bodia, " SYK 30 June -01 July 1996,1; "Announcement of the Joining of an 
International Asian Democratic Movement, " MK 11-12 June 1996,1. This article reported the KNP's 
membership of a coalition of Asian pro-democracy parties, along with delegations from Burma, Sri 
Lanka, Indonesia and Nepal. 
coverage of international criticism of human rights in Cambodia; for example, "European Parliament 
Announces E. U. Connects Aid to Cambodia with Respect for Human Rights and Democracy" MK 3-4 
July 1996,1; "US Senate says Cambodia has Strayed Away from the Journey Towards Human 
Rights; Drug Trafficking Increases and Destruction of National Forests... " UKK 19 June 1996,1; and 
22 June 1996,1. 
The pro-KNP newspapers also follow the KNP policy of calling for international sanctions on Cambodia, 
in connection with human rights abuse; for example, Udam Kate Khmer printed a statement from the 
Khmer Nation Party with regard to human rights conditions placed by the European Parliament on EU aid: 
The impositions of conditions on international aid will not make the Cambodian people 
suffer as the current prime ministers claim, but will prevent various irregularities and abuses 
of the leaders (like the uncontrolled destruction of forests and the illegal use of state money 
and fraudulent embezzling of public assets and so on) which are the real cause of the 
suffering of the Cambodian people. V'KNP Supports Decision of Council of Europe 
Announcing Conditions on Aid to Cambodia! ' UKK 2 June 1996,1 ]. 
Similarly, Moneaksekar Khmer editorialised: 
If the international community postpone aid to Cambodia it's because they recognise that 
some Khmer leaders take advantage of aid intended for the country and the Khmer people... 
International aid for the Khmer nation and all the Khmer people is not for the shoring up of 
power of any one group of individuals. V'Editorial: If International [Community] Postpones 
or Cuts Off Aid, That is a Mistake by the Leadersl" MK 5-6 June 1996,1. ] 
64D3. 
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cultural and political norms. 
At the root of these ideas lies, arguably, the frustration faced by activists working 
outside the prevailing Cambodian economy of power. Marginalised, domestically, by 
dominant discourses of violence and 'effectiveness', and subject, as individuals, to 
coercive forces they are unable to combat human rights activists and opposition 
politicians turn to the international community for support and legitimacy and 
consequently offer various rationale for continued international intervention. 
International Intervention and Government Response 
The record of the international community in Cambodia suggested that faith in 
international action to constrain government abuse is misplaced. Attempts by UNTAC 
to bring abusers to justice almost uniformly failed, and a gradual deterioration in civil 
liberties from 1993 to 1997 suggests that, increasingly, the international community 
failed to deter human rights abuses and provide the balance against government 
oppression for which Cambodian human rights workers interviewed hoped. 
One UN worker interviewed in Cambodia believed NGO strategies that depended upon 
a UN presence in Cambodia were misconceived: 
The reality is that the UN is not able to handle these cases - we are not a 
Special Rapporteur's office, we are not UNTAC. We have no investigation 
mandate... An approach which seems to push responsibility onto the UN is 
not sustainable. There is not much political support for this office beyond 
1998... The international community feels the transitional period is over. 65 
From 1993 to the 1997 coup which ousted Ranariddh, the Cambodian government, 
especially the CPP, repeatedly probed to test international resolve on human rights. The 
results arguably convinced CPP leaders that the international community could not, or 
would not, impose significant constraints on a strategy of violence. This was 
particularly so, in the case of the 1997 coup, where CPP violence was allegedly 
prompted by moves by Ranariddhs's party, the KNP and other smaller opposition 
65 15. 
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parties to ally with the international, pariahs of the Khmer Rouge. 
This failure is significant because it raises questions regarding the ability of the 
international community to preserve a principled stance over a sustained period, to allow 
an opportunity for 'peace-building' in the manner envisaged by Boutros-Ghali. 66 It also 
casts doubt on the ability of a local human rights movement to make progress in state- 
building in the presence of the international community. 
The inability of the international community to respond to CPP probes resulted from 
two deficiencies: lack of political will and lack of political instruments. Difficulties 
experienced by UNTAC in controlling the administrative structures between 1991 and 
1993 were described in Chapter Three. Since the departure of UNTAC, international 
supervision of human rights focused on regular monitoring reports produced by a UN 
Special Representative for Human Rights in Cambodia, and by international NGOs. 
Potential for constraining the Cambodian government depýnded on the impact of these 
reports on the Royal Government's international image, and, crucially, on willingness of 
donors to give international aid. 
The first Special Representative, Michael Kirby, paid seven visits to Cambodia between 
1993 and 1996. His reception by the Cambodian government worsened until he was 
reportedly 'ignored' by second Prime Minister Hun S en throughout the last year of his 
tenure in the post, and by both prime ministers on his final visit. Shortly after his 
resignation, Hun Sen, in a speech to Interior Ministry officials, called him "a crazy 
lawyer whom I have hated for as long as I have known him", adding: 
I am really disgusted by Kirby and never want to meet him again, and ask 
the UN to drive him away because I cannot work with him any more. 67 
The UN High Comn-iissioner for Human Rights, Jose Ayala Lasso, was also refused 
meetings with Hun Sen and Ranariddh when he visited Cambodia in February/March 
" In this respect, divisions within the Security Council over the appropriacy of intervention to promote 
human rights are particularly important. 
67To Serey and Pip Wood, "Hun Sen Calls Justice Kirby a'Crazy Lawyer', " CD 7 Mar. 1996,6. 
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68 1996. 
Kirby reported in September 1995 that, of 19 human rights recommendations he had 
made in 1994/5, the government had failed to respond to 10. Another, concerning the 
expulsion of Sam Rainsy from the National Assembly, had been called "unwarranted 
interference in the workings of Cambodia's sovereign National Assembly"69 by 
Ranariddh. Kirby regarded action taken on most of the other recommendations as 
insufficient. A written government response to this report stated Kirby had 'jumped to 
conclusions' adding: 
we appreciate very much the concerns made by the Special Representative 
on Human rights ... [but] we still believe that this draft report should be 
written in a balanced manner in order to reflect the many efforts made by the 
Royal Government of Cambodia at a time when the latter is still facing with 
human, material, and financial constraints (sic. ). 
The government complained that the Special Representative acted like an "authoritative 
law enforcement officer", criticising but not "providing enough technical assistance to 
help implement, protect and improve the human rights situation which has been so far 
, 70 much better' . 
Lack of action by the Royal Government and use of complaints of inadequate material 
means to justify inaction suggest that the government viewed the Special 
Representative's recommendations as having little impact on its own interests, 
particularly on international aid donations, and saw pursuit of internal power- 
maximising strategies as more important. This is an indication that non-governmental 
interviewees overestimated international influence over government decision-making. 
Cambodian human rights activists also, arguably, misread the issue of aid conditionality. 
The Cambodian government exploited conflicting interests in the international 
community on the aid question. While the Paris Agreements contained human rights 
68 Chheang Sopheng, "Gov't, UN Sign Rights Pact, " CD 1-3 Mar. 1996,8. 
69Kirby'7echnical Co-operatioif'35-38. 
7ONady Tan, letter to Mr Daniel Premont, Phnom Penh, 14 Oct. 1995,4. 
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provisions, the driving force behind the peace process was the global and regional desire 
to integrate Cambodia into the Asean and Pacific Rim economic markets. 7 1 As the 
1990s progressed, early post-Cold War emphasis on human rights and democracy 
receded, and free market economics stood out more sharply as the major factor in 
international relations. The US retreat from support for economic sanctions against 
human rights abusers, particularly with regard to renewal of Most Favoured Nation 
trading status for China, 72 would have been noted by the Cambodian government. 
During the Sirivudh affair, Hun Sen publicly defied the US to remove Cambodian MFN 
status: 
For Americans, if they talk too much about Cambodian affairs, we'll stage 
another demonstration demanding them to pay us compensation [for the 
war]... We're not going to die if they give MFN or not... During the State of 
Cambodia era, we lived in a time when they attacked us, they surrounded us, 
they imposed sanctions against us. We survived (then] and why can't we 
survive now? 73 
Subsequently, Hun Sen tempered these remarks, but reiterated his intention"to protect 
independence and sovereignty of the country, stopping you from interfering in the 
s74 internal affairs and from considering my country as a small one of yours'. Shortly 
71See James A. Baker 111, "America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community, " Foreign 
Affairs 70.5 (1991): 1-18; Surin Maisrikrod, "Thailand's Policy Dilemmas Towards Indochina: ' 
Contemporary South East Asia 14 (1992): 282-300. 
72President Clinton campaigned in 1992 on a platform of conditional UEFN renewal for China, but in 1994 
adopted the opposite policy, explaining: 
To those who argue that in view of China's human rights abuses we should revoke NfFN 
status, let me ask you the same question that I have asked myself. will we do more to 
advance the cause of human rights if China is isolated or if our nations are engaged in a 
growing web of political and economic co-operation and contacts? [Qtd in Susumo 
Awanohara, "Full Circle, " FEER 9 June 1997,14]. 
73 Extracts from a speech made by Hun Sen, Kandal Province, 5 Dec. 1995, qtd in Barber and Munthit, 
"Hun Sen talks tough to the West, " PPP 15-28 Dec. 1995,3. Referring to this speech, one human rights 
NGO director commented: 
He said that before the election we worked without the international community. But it's 
not true! Cambodia was aided completely by the former Soviet Union. Why has he 
forgotten that? But now... the Communist countries have fallen and now we need 
international aid.. Can we live with only businessmen from Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Taiwan? I doubt it. Because these businessmen, when they give $ 100, they plan to take out 
$300[HI4]. 
74 Extract from a speech made by Hun Sen, Kandal Province, 9 Dec. 1995, qtd in "Hun Sen Talks 
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afterwards, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Winston 
Lord said during a visit to Cambodia that the US Administration was in favour of 
unconditional renewal of MFN . 
7s Hun Sen claimed in February 1996 that 
officials from the United States had a meeting with me - we spent three 
hours talking and eating together - they told me they will grant aid to 
Cambodia despite their current [budget] problems. 76 
Japan and Asean had long-standing policies of treating human rights as a domestic 
issue, stances praised by Hun Sen: 
Don't protest against Japan, it does not interfere, it is ve 
79t 
good. Japanese 
assistance is the only one which does not have conditions. 77 
The muted international outcry surrounding cases such as the Sm**vudh case and the 
grenade attack on the KNP demonstration suggested a lack of international will to tie 
human rights to aid. One UN official commented on the Sirivudh case: 
What could be done? It wasn't Tianamnen Square. 78 
Human rights abuse in Cambodia, arguably, was not dramatic enough to attract world 
public concern, so it was ignored by outside powers with economic agendas to pursue. 
International intervention post-UNTAC fell far short of the principled protection of 
human rights and promotion of human rights discourse anticipated by Cambodian 
interviewees. At times it followed an openly self-interested agenda. For example, an 
anti-drugs law drafted on the advice of the UN and US included many provisions 
abusive of human rights, including awarding police powers to detain for 96 hours, 
search premises, persons and vehicles, tap phones, open mail, confiscate property and 
Tough .. it 
75Robin McDowell, "Lord to Push for 'Unconditional' MFN; ' CD 17 Jan. 1996,1. 
76 Extract from a speech made by Hun Sen, Kong Pisey District, Kompong Speu Province. 12 Feb. 1996, 
qtd. in Chheang Sopheng, "Hun Sen Blasts Opposition Efforts Abroad, " CD 13 Feb. 1996,6. 
77Extract from a speech made by Hun Sen, Kandal Province, 5 Dec. 1996, qtd- in "Hun Sen Talks 
99 Tough.. 
7814, personal interview, 2 Apr. 1996, Phnom Penh. 
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tap into computer records, all without reference to a court. 79 
Ironically, given that the law was reportedly drafted on American advice, the opposition 
newspaper Moneaksekar Khmer protested: 
All countries that respect democracy never give limitless power like this to 
the police.. Various countries which have begun to have a big problem with 
addictive drugs, they still always respect the human rights and democratic 
principles of the citizen. 80 
In the Cambodian context, where human rights efforts focused on combating arbitrary 
behaviour by police, the law represented a major setback. A Colombian lawyer, Juan 
Pablo Ordonez, living in Phnom Penh, commented: 
The US government is definitely [pressuring Cambodia] because it is part of 
[the US] agenda to impose this kind of law.... (An election topic] will be 
about the war on drugs. (The Clinton Administration] will get called about 
certifying Cambodia, but they will be able to say 'yes, but now Cambodia 
has this wonderful new law. ' It serves [the US] purpose if this is made law 
before [the] November [elections]. 81 
Such issues reveal the limits to principled action in international political will, and the 
structure of power and interest underlying nascent cosmopolitanism. Following the 
coup in July 1997, few countries have imposed sanctions on aid: the US and Germany 
have cut aid and withdrawn aid workers, and Australia has stopped military aid. It 
appears likely that elections which fulfil certain minimum conditions will see at least 
some of this aid restored. 
Concern to maintain international engagement to promote human rights in Cambodia 
impedes the development of grass-roots participatory processes which would aid the 
constitution of the secular, rights-bearing, juridically equal citizen. Power resources 
internal to the country are considered by opposition politicians and by human rights 
79Provisions of the draft law on the supervision of addictive drugs as reported in a statement to the 
national assembly from the Cambodian Human Rights Co-operation Committee reported in "Draft Drugs 
Law is a First Step by the Government towards Destroying the Solidarity of Opposition Politicians, " MK 
25-26 June 1996,1. 
$(ý"Draft Drugs Law is a First Step ...... Original emphasis. 
81Qtd in Grainger, "Critics slam tough drug law pushed by US, " PPP 14-27 June 1996,3. 
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NGO activists, as inadequate, as exemplified by lack of strategies among human rights 
NGOs to mobilise popular activity and debate, and by emphasis on strategies aimed at 
engaging international support. 
The horrors occurring during the internal conflicts of the Cold War years, and a 
continuing reliance, nationally, on international aid, encourage the view that the 
Cambodian population is at once too 'extremist'82 and too weak to generate their own 
domestic power resources for constraining the state apparatus and protecting human 
rights activists as individuals. As a result interviewees from the human rights 
movement viewed themselves as wards of the international community and looked to 
international power to fight the abuses of the CPP. 
This strategy is the obverse of state building which requires that a nation-state nexus be 
constituted as the framework within which the economy, polity and society are 
organised. The modem state avoids overt politicisation itself in favour of an imposed 
4neutrality' or consensus, which encompasses and shapes political competition, 
demarcating the domestic from the foreign: 
In nationalist ideology, the state is the political embodiment of the nation, 
and has the responsibility for protecting and developing it. This means 
creating a national market, defining and protecting national rights of 
citizenship and providing the public goods and services essential to one 
nation. Since nation building requires intense loyalties, the state is accorded 
a monopoly on the symbols of patriotism, which it invokes against internal 
and external challenges. This monopoly of patriotic symbolism is the 
ideological counterpart of the monopolies of political authority and 
legitimate violence implicit in the principles of state sovereignty. 83 
Since UNTAC, Cambodian human rights NGOs, arguably, have attempted to use 
international intervention to challenge the monopoly of power by the politicised state 
apparatus, even while attempting to forge a state-society relationship based on mutual 
trust and harmonious relationships. Arguably, international material and expertise 
cannot substitute for empowerment of internal constituencies. Patronage of 'civil 
82 H5 
23 Magnusson 49. 
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society' by the international community has arguably encouraged an internationalist 
orientation, resulting in the development of a movement which perceives itself as unable 
to survive without international backing. Yet international backing has proved 
inconsistent and inadequate to constrain abuse of power by officials of state. 
International intervention constrains as well as providing opportunities, and, arguably, 
disempowers local activists by encouraging them to wait for outside aid. Concern to 
maintain international engagement leads to didactic strategies of education in 
international human rights norms, rather than participatory strategies to strengthen and 
empower the grassroots. The Cambodian case suggests that the necessary panopticism 
of modernity cannot be supplied by international'surveillance; the state apparatus is too 
complex an entity and international interests are too fickle and too diverse. 
As long as states exist, the societies that exist around them must formulate the basis of a 
hegemony which excludes abuse; international intervention may aid this process, by 
breaking an abusive hegemony and opening up political opportunities, but it may 
equally distract from it by encouraging long-term dependence on international power. If 
human rights are to be guaranteed, the state apparatus must be subject to rules and 
limitations rendered authoritative by the power resources arising from, and the 
discourses circulating within, the society over which it presides, even while society and 




This dissertation has analysed human rights promotion and human rights abuse as 
political phenomena, avoiding both universalist and cultural relativist assumptions about 
the relationship between rights and human nature. This analysis allows human rights 
discourse to be located as a power resource within the context of a national economy of 
power, permitting examination of how the concept of human rights alters when 
transposed into different power environments, and how particular views of human rights 
may be promoted vis-A-vis rival conceptions. Human rights emerges as a concept 
negotiated between different power clusters, each of whom attempt to mould its content 
to suit their own methods of exercising power. 
Application of this methodology to the case study of Cambodia in the early 1990s 
illuminates the political nature of human rights abuse, and the power resources 
employed in human rights promotion. It has been argued that abuse is endemic in the 
Cambodian political economy of power, as perpetuated by CPP control of the state 
bureaucracy and mi'litary, due to differentiation in all political relationships between 
insiders and outsiders. This differentiation is exacerbated by the existence of political 
competition, and frequently conflated, by all parties, with threats to national security 
represented either by insurgents or hostile neighbours. 
Characteristic of Cambodian politics is the extension of politics into secular spheres, as 
leaders seek to monopolise resources which can be distributed to ensure the loyalty of 
followers. State services, including those connected to human rights, are rendered 
contingent on political allegiance. The widespread nature of violence in Cambodia 
arises from a snowballing process. A combination of pervasive politicisation and 
perception of extreme threat causes violence; this violence perpetuates polarisation and 
a climate of fear, giving rise to more violence. The flames are fanned by the rhetoric of 
national leaders who use perception of threat to boost their own positions as protectors 
of a particular imagining of the nation. 'Me drive to monopolisation inherent in the 
relationship between leaders and followers in political parties ensures that arrival at a 




The image of political leaders as providers of protection leads to a conception of power 
in which the ability to be seen to be effective is highly valued. Power is exercised 
overtly by use of exemplary force. This style of power is incompatible with the style of 
power central to the liberal democratic project: a style in which power is exercised 
silently through the creation of a hegemonic discourse, perpetuated by stable systems of 
power reproduction. 
Interviewees drawn from the Cambodian human rights NGO movement, it has been 
argued, attempted to ameliorate the potential for abuse in society by promoting a 
different form of state-society relationship. These interviewees looked both to 
precedents from Cambodia's past and to liberal democratic rule of law to provide 
blueprints for reform of Cambodia's state-society relationship. Such perceptions reflect 
the position of interviewees, as representatives of a weak and divided urban intellectual 
stratum in society, on the cusp between three different constituencies with three 
different ideological systems. These three constituencies comprise the international 
donor community, the Cambodian government, and the Cambodian 'grassroots'. 
Interviewees used the preconceptions of these groups as power resources supporting 
their efforts to promote a national consensus based upon stable, hierarchical 
relationships which are inclusive of outsiders. 
The consensus envisaged draws heavily on idealised perceptions of Cambodian state- 
society relationships in the past. Such relationships rely on the deference of the 
grassroots and the benevolence of the elite, rather than on political participation within a 
pluralist democratic framework. Interviewees frequently conflated human rights with 
morality, educational accomplishment and Buddhist values, rather than with assertion of 
liberty, equality and popular sovereignty. There is a distinction between the emphasis 
on individual autonomy and choice emphasised in Western concepts of human rights 
and the emphasis on correct behaviour towards others emphasised by the Cambodian 
human rights movement. 
This distinction arguably reflects the absence of hegemonic consensus in Cambodian 
society. In Western liberal democracies, human rights exist in a context of stable 
patterns of domination, legitimating a high concentration of power in the hands of the 
state and the economic elite. In Cambodia, consensus is absent, and the polity is 
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characterised by instability, deep political division and perception of immediate and 
severe threat. In these circumstances, human rights discourse is employed by 
Cambodian human rights NGO workers to promote the stable framework of relations 
necessary to allow individuals to engage in minimum necessary pursuits of subsistence 
agriculture and enterprise. In a harsh economic climate, stability is highly valued, and 
NGO activities reflect this. The political opposition is viewed with relative distrust by 
interviewees drawn from Cambodian human rights NGOs as a result, and it is 
instructive that, following the coup of 1997, human rights NGOs were permitted to 
remain working in Cambodia, while opposition politicians were forced to flee abroad. 
Interviewees drawn from the human rights movement viewed Cambodian politicians as 
self-serving and exploitative, cut off from the reality of the villages, but they also 
perceived a steep power differential between government and citizen. The 'grassroots' 
were perceived as poor, weak and ignorant, at the mercy of government power. This 
perception entailed that Cambodian human rights NGO workers did not attempt to 
mobilise popular power to pursue objectives which conflict with government interest. 
They devoted attention to strengthening contacts with relatively responsive elements 
within government, in an attempt to tap into governmental power resources to provide 
remedy for abuse. Strengthening contacts within government requires a non- 
confrontational stance, a stance which emerges naturally from an ideology which sees 
reform of the attitudes of government and state as the key to reducing politicisation and 
rebuilding hierarchical and benevolent state-society relationships. 
Having ruled out use of the 'grass roots' as a power resource, the NGOs studied pursued 
activities which were aimed at seeking power resources elsewhere, particularly in law, 
religion, and the international arena. The use made of international power resources is 
significant in the context of the emphasis placed on international cosmopolitanism by 
certain western governments and elements of the UN and UNTAC in the early 1990s. 
The evidence presented shows that interviewee expectations of cosmopolitan 
intervention on behalf of human rights far outstripped the political will and capabilities 
of the international community. Members of the NGOs and opposition parties studied 
have consistently called for decisive international action against the government which 
has not been forthcoming. 
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A long history of external intervention in Cambodian affairs has created a perception of 
Cambodia, among these interviewees, as an international ward. Interviewees perceived 
international power, interests and responsibilities as central features in the Cambodian 
political landscape; it was widely assumed by interviewees within the Cambodian rights 
movement that international power is uniformly pro-democratic. Failure by the 
international community to respond decisively to human rights abuse by the Cambodian 
government were viewed by these interviewees with surprise. Evidence presented here 
suggests fin-ther that the international community is ill-equipped to provide the support 
required by these members of the Cambodian human rights movement. Norms of 
sovereignty are too strong to allow the far-reaching intervention interviewees expected, 
and pragmatism and self-interest on the part of outside powers prevents a consistent 
application of human rights principles. This has been evident from the days of UNTAC. 
Use of international power resources is also problematic in that it militates against the 
creation of new power resources within the country. The failure of the NGOs studied to 
protest over big political cases, on the grounds that the international community is better 
placed to intervene, prevents the development of internal human rights safeguards. The 
reason for NGO failure in this regard is the high level of risk involved in testing new 
internal power resources. Unless this risk is taken, internal constituencies will remain 
disempowered. 
The use of international power resources in this way prevents assertion of popular 
sovereignty. Viewed as the successful creation of an authoritative unity out of the 
diversity of people occupying a territory, sovereignty is essential for the development of 
a consensus to underlie the institutionalisation of politics. Without such a consensus, 
the polarisation and politicisation observable in Cambodia cannot be constrained. 
The lack of a coherent view of a sovereign Cambodian political community can be seen 
to underlie the overpoliticisation which constrains pluralism and, frequently, prompts 
human rights abuse within Cambodia. The lack of internal power resources available to 
human rights NGOs attempting to combat human rights abuse is also a symptom of this 
state of affairs. Intervention, even if ostensibly to restore sovereignty, strengthens 
predispositions to resort to international, rather than domestic, power resources, further 
obscuring the nature of the Cambodian political community. International operations 
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such as UNTAC represent major power resources in terms of material and status; these 
are treated like other power resources within the Carnbodian polity, in that political 
parties attempt to monopolise them to strengthen their own legitimacy and deny 
legitimacy to the opposition. Used in this way, international power resources can 
increase politicisation and strengthen the position of those who benefit from it. 
The current international climate of hesitant transition from state sovereignty to 
cosmopolitanism is not conducive to ordered transition towards democracy in nations 
like Cambodia. International intervention and human rights machinery is sufficiently 
well-developed that local victims may be encouraged to wait for international action on 
their behalf. This disempowers, local communities and promotes an imposed vision of 
human rights rather than a vision negotiated democratically through facilitation of 
popular participation at all levels of society. 
International intervention and human rights machinery is not sufficiently well-developed 
to ensure respect for human rights on the part of governments and state personnel. The 
combination of these two characteristics of the current international human rights 
regime may cause inaction on human rights abuse at both international and local level, 
or an uncertainty of division of responsibility which can be exploited by local abusers. 
This, it has been argued, has occurred in Cambodia in the 1990s. 
These findings are significant for international policy makers in suggesting that 
transitions in international regimes may be as traumatic for individuals within states as 
national transitions. Frequently, international relations theory ignores the expectations 
of individuals vis-h-vis the international community. The theoretical response to the 
emergence of transnational and supernational actors has been cautious. The Cambodian 
case study shows that these actors were perceived by Cambodian human rights workers 
as significant players in the internal economy of power in Cambodia, and the reactions 
of the international community were important variables in calculations of risk and 
support made by the individuals and organisations studied. 
It is significant that international power is overestimated, reflecting disparities of 
material wealth which do not necessarily translate into operational ability, as the 
UNTAC experience showed. Any sustainable international-local relationship for 
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promotion of human rights must be based on more realistic local expectations of 
international abilities. Public relations exercises designed to present international 
interventions in a positive light may cause long term damage in raising unrealistic 
expectations. In particular, provisions in the Paris Agreements for further interventions 
on human rights grounds represent ideological flights of rhetoric rather than a 
sustainable basis for intemational-local relations, yet they are taken seriously by the 
Cambodians interviewed for the present study. 
The effect of international intervention into local wars is familiar from the Cold War 
years when superpower patronage inflamed civil conflicts. These findings suggest that 
peacetime intervention can have similar effects upon human rights practices, at least in 
the short term, encouraging opposition activists to make demands while failing to act 
decisively to prevent government repression. In some countries, this may provide a 
catalyst for change and democratisation. In Cambodia, arguably, government repression 
has been effective in the short term. 
The fieldwork on which this research was based took place only three years after 
UNTAC's departure. Since the end of the fieldwork period, the July 1997 coup forced 
many individuals who formed the Cambodian political opposition to leave the country. 
The 1997 coup was in keeping with the trends noted in 1995/6, of repeated probing by 
government to test the political will of the international community to reintervene, and 
repeated failure of the international community to make an effective response in support 
of human, particularly political, rights. 
A question for finther research, given that human rights NGOs are still operating in 
Cambodia, and that elections are planned for 1998, is the extent to which the period of 
unsteady political pluralism in Phnom Penh from 1993 to 1997 has left behind a cultural 
legacy. Crucial to a long term assessment of international intervention is the question of 
whether the violent purge of July 1997 was sufficient to erase any impact this pluralism 
may have had on political attitudes. The effect of the coup on the climate of fear 
constraining NGO and electoral activities will provide an early indication of this. 
Finally, it is a significant limitation of this study that 'grassroots' attitudes inforniing the 
views of Cambodian human rights workers were not studied. Further research is 
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required to ascertain views held in the villages regarding conflict resolution, sovereignty 
and intervention, and appropriate political relationships. This is necessary to establish 
the extent to which grassroots strategies of resistance are formulated in the villages in 
parallel with NGO strategies of resort to government or international power resources to 
gain remedy for abuse. Efforts by the grassroots themselves within the villages to 
formulate and execute strategies of resistance to politicised abuse may in time cause a 
reorientation of the thinking of urban intellectuals, such as those interviewed for this 
study, and provide the impetus for the emergence of a human rights movement which 
asserts its independence from international power resources and is strengthened instead 
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AppendLx POrganisations Studied 
Appendix 1: A. Organisations Studied'. 
Human Rights, Minorities Rights and Public Defenders NGOs. 
Association Khmer Kampuchea Krom 
Founded: 1960s. 1975-80 continued in refugee camps, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. 
1980 re-established in Cambodia. 
President: Dr Liv An. 
Scol2e: 7 provinces. 
International Assistance: none. 
Activities: Monitoring abuse; monitoring legislation2. 
Cambodian Bar Association 
Founded: Oct. 1995. 
President: Say Bory. 
Scgpe: 47 members. 
Material and Professional Assistance: American Bar Association, USAID. 
Activities: Establish professional regulations, code of ethics; represent interests of the 
legal profession 3. 
Cambodian Defenders' Association (CADEAS) 
Founded: 1992, by UNTAC-trained defenders. 
Director: Luy Chanphal. 
Sc2pe: Offices in Phnom Penh, Battambang, Pursat, Koh Kong, Takeo, Kraceh, Svay 
Rieng. 
Material and Professional Assistance: USAID. 
Activities,: Represent accused persons; conduct human rights training seminars 4 
Cambodian Defenders Project. 
Founded: 1994, by International Human Rights Law Group. 
Directors: Linda Kremer, Sok Som Oeun 
Material and Professional Assistance: International Human Rights Law Group, USAID. 
Scope: Offices in Phnom Penh, Battambang, Kompong Cham. Cases defended in all 
provinces. 
5 Activities: Training defenders; defending accused persons 
'This list contains details of the organisations, from which interviewees were selected. Interviewees were 
not necessarily the directors listed; their names are withheld to preserve confidentiality. Where 
information given is taken from interviews, the interview code and date are not given to avoid cross- 
referencing organisations with particular quotations in the text. Organisations surveyed were selected frorn S 
a list of NGOs, dated 24 Oct. 1995, provided by Christophe Peschoux of the UN Centre for Human 
Rights. 
2 Personal interview, Phnom Penh. 
3 Personal interview, Phnom Penh. 
4Pcrsonal interview, Phnom Penh. 
5Personal interview, Phnom Penh. 
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Cambodian Disabled People's Organisation. 
Founded: Sept. 1994, at seminar of 119 disabled people. 
Chai[person: Chea Samnang. 
Sc2pe: 98 founding members from 13 provinces. 
Material and Professional Assistance: Overseas Service Bureau, Disabled People's 
International. 
Activities (12rol2osed): Create support networks of disabled people to promote rights, 
achievements and interests to facilitate fuller'participation and equality in society; 
advocacy, training and research. 6. 
Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC) 
Founded: 1992, by former political prisoners. 
President: Thun Saray. 
Scone: Nationwide. 
Material and Professional Assistance: International donors; UN Centre for Human 
Rights, Human Rights Task Force for Cambodia. 
Activities: Human rights training and education for civilians and government; 
monitoring and investigation, including prisons; some development activities; advocacy 
and monitoring legislatim7. 
Cambodian Human Rights Trainers Organization (CHARTO) 
Founded: 1993. 
Director: Chuon Mom Thol. 
SMe: Phnom Penh and surrounding provinces. 
Material and Professional Assistance: Mar. 
international support. 
Activities: Defending accused persons; human 
Province; chicken-raising development projeCt8. 
1996 faced closure through lack of 
rights education in schools in Kandal 
Cham Khmer Islam Minority Human Rights and Development Association 
Founded: 12 June 1993, by demand of ethnic minority communities. 
President: Sa Mohamatsen. 
Material Assistance: Indonesan embassy, Licadho (see below), Khemera (Cambodian 
women's development organisation). 
Scope: All provinces except Mondolkiri, Ratanakiri, Preah Vihear, Stung Treng, Koh 
Kong. 
Activities: Human rights and democracy education to ethnic minorities; monitoring and 9 
reporting; receiving and investigating complaints . 
6,7rhe Cambodian Disabled People's Organisation (CDPO) Funding Proposal for the Years 1997/8, " 
unpublished proposal, Phnom Penh, n. d. 
7 Personal interview, Phnom Penh. 
BCambodian Human Rights Trainer organization, "The Narrative Report for February 1996", unpublished 
report, Phnom Penh, Apr. 1996. 
9Charn Khmer Islam Minority Human Rights and Development Association, "Report on the Three Months 
from I Jan. to I Apr. 1996, " unpublished report, Phnom P6nh, 18 Apr. 1996. 
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Human Rights and Community Outreach Projects (Outreach) 
Founded: Sept. 1992. 
President: Srey Chan Phallara. 
Scope: Phnom Penh, Kandal, Kompong Speu, Takeo, Svay Rieng, Kompong Cham, 
Kompong Chhnang, Pursat, Battambang. 
Material Assistance: Cambodian Documentation Commission, United Nations Centre 
for Human Rights, CIDSE, GRET. 
Activities: Human rights education for villagers; human rights training for teachers; 
monitoring and reporting abuse; skills training and development projects for womenio. 
Human Rights Vigilance of Cambodia (Vigilance) 
Founded: 199 1, by group of professionals, intellectuals and students. 
President: Phuong Sith. 
Scope: Phnom Penh and II provincial offices. 
Material and Professional Assistance: Asia Foundation, Private Agencies Collaborating 
Together (PACT), Terre des Hommes-Germany, UNICEF-Cambodia, Human Rights 
Task Force on Cambodia, UN Centre for Human Rights Field Office in Cambodia. 
Activities: Human rights education and trainin for civilians and government personnel; 
receiving and investigating complaints; monitoring and reporting abuse, especially 
human trafficking, prostitution, and environmental degradation; advocacy; monitoring 
legislationli. 
Indradevi Women's Association 
Founded: 1992, by group of professors, teachers, doctors, medical staff and housewives. 
President: Dy Ratha. 
Material and Professional Assistance: International Voluntary Service, Save the 
Children Fund (UK), the Cambodian Women Development Association, the Federation 
of Ponleu Khmer, Khmer Institute for Democracy, American Friends Service 
Committee, British Embassy to the Kingdom of Cambodia, State Secretariat of 
Women's Affairs, Asia Foundation, Adhoc (see below). 
Activities: Professional and vocational training to empower women; advocacy on 
children and environmental policies; promotion 
12 
of women's political participation; 
HIV/AIDS education; credit loans to poor widows . 
Khmer Institute of Democracy 
Founded: 1992 by group of Cambodian-Americans. 
Director: Dr. Lao Mong Hay. 
Scope: Phnorn Penh, Kornpong Cham, Battambang. 
Material and Professional Assistance: USAID. 
Activities: Human rights training; advocacy; promotion of related values such as 
tolerance; promotion of civil society13. 
10Human Rights and Development, pub. Human Rights and Community Outreach Projects of Cambodia, 2 
(1994). 
1 'Human Rights Vigilance of Cambodia, "Organisational Background, " unpublished report, Phnom Penh, 
n. d. 
121ndradevi Momen's Association, pamphlet (Phnom Penh: Indradevi Women's Association, n. d. ). 
13 Personal interview, Phnom Penh. 
377 
Appendix POrganisations Studied. 
Khmer Kampuchea Krom Human Rights Association 
Founded: 1993. 
President: Thun Saren. 
Scope: Phnom Penh and five provinces. 
Material and Professional Assistance: Looking for funding. 
14 Activities: Human rights education, monitoring of abuse in minority communities 
Legal Aid of Cambodia 
Founded: Dec. 1995, Khmer initiative which broke away from Cambodian Defenders' 
Project. 
Director: 
Scope: Seven provincial offices. Mobile team sent to remote provinces. 
Material and Professional Assistance: International lawyers working in advisory 
capacity. - 
Activities: Defending accused personsI5. 
Ligue Cambodgienne Pour la Promotion et la Defense des Droits de I'llomme 
(LICADHO) 
Founded: July 1992. 
President: Dr Pung Chiv Kek Galabru. 
Scope: Phnom Penh and 12 provinces. 
Material and Professional Assistance: The Asia Foundation, the European Union, Norad 
Agency, A. C. C. T., UNHCR, The Konrad Adenauer Foundation/KID, Catholic Relief 
Service, the UN Centre for Human Rights, the Human Rights Task Force on Cambodia, 
the Australian Embassy. 
Activities: Human rights training; advocacy; monitoring and reporting abuse; 
monitoring prisons; receiving and investigating complaints; defending accused 
persons16. - 
Urban Sector Group 
Founded: 1993. 
President: Lim Phai. 
Scone: Squatter communities in Phnom Penh. 
Material Assistance: United Nations Development Programme, USAID. 
Activities; Community training and education; advocacy on 
17 
issues of eviction and 
relocation; children's rights training; credit and savings scheme . 
Vietnamese Association 
Founded: 1982; officially recognised 1988. 
President: Nguyen Ngoc Sanh. 
Scove: Vietnamese communities in Phnom Penh. 
14 Personal interview, Phnom Penh. 
"Personal interview, Phnom Penh. 
16 G. de Mareuil (Licadho), "Prison Issues, " unpublished reportý ed. de Mareuil and T. Seaman, Jan. 1995, 
Phnom Penh, 1. 
17 Personal interview, Phnom Penh. 
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Activities: Inform Vietnamese about Khmer law and custom; monitoring and reporting 
abuse against Vietnamese; economic and cultural community supportI8. 
Victims and Contribution Assistance Organisation 
Founded: 1994. 
President: Chea Pyden. 
Scone: Phnom Penh, Kompong Speu, Kompong Chhnang, Takeo, Kandal. 
Material and Professional Assistance: Teaching supplies donated by UNICEF, Khmer 
Insitute for Democracy, Redd Barna, Save the Children Fund. 
Activities: Education for children on children's rights, combined with free English 
lessons; monitoring child trafficking; relief contributions 19. 
Coalitions of NGOs 
Action Committee 
Founded: 1994 
President: Revolving presidency among member organisations. 
Membership: ADHOC, LICADHO, Vigilance, AKKK, KID, Indradevi, KKKHRA, 
Generous Association for Support Democracy. 
Activities: Co-ordinates investigation and advocacy in cases of serious human rights 
abuse 20 . 
Cambodian Human Rights Co-ordination Committee 
Founded: 1994. 
President: Luy Chanphal. 
Membershij2: CADEAS, Charto, Outreach, Vigilance, KKKHRA, Cambodian Institute 
for Human Rights, Ligue Cambodgieme Pour la Defense des Droits de Momme et du 
Citoyen, Cambodian Volunteers for Community Development. 
Activities: Co-ordinates investigation and advocacy in cases of serious human rights 21 
abuse; facilitates information exchange and networking with international donors 
Federation of Ponleu Khmer. 
Founded: 1993. Grew out of Dhammayietra May 1993. 
Secretaly-General: Phuong Sith. 
Material assistance: USAID. 
Activities: Organised public debates on the Constitution in 9 provinces, May-Sept. 
1993; training for NGO members; supports activities to promote democratic processes 
and dialogue between NGOs and government22. 
"Personal interview, Phnom Penh. 
19Personal interview, Phnom Penh. 
20 Personal interview, Phnom Penh. 
2'Personal interview, Phnom Penh. 
22 Personal interview, Phnom Penh. 
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Religious NGOs 
Khmer Buddhist Society in Cambodia. 
Founded: 1992. Formed by Khmer Buddhist Society in USA, organisation of 
Cambodian refugees in Seattle, Wa. 
Executive Director: Ou Bun Long. 
Scove: Nationwide/. 
Material Assistance: KBS/USA, Interchurch Organization for Development 
Cooperation, USAID. 
Activities: Project Rights: human rights training for Buddhist monks, achars, nuns and 
provincial civil government employees including mediation and human rights 
dissemination skills23. 
Coalition for Peace and Reconciliation. 
Founded: 1989 in refugee camps on the Thai border. 
Leader: Most Ven. Samdech Maha Ghosananda. 
Activities: Organises annual Dhammayietra "Walk 
24 Dhammayietra philosophy of non-violence 
Journalists and Writers Assoclatione 
for Peace"; training sessions on 
Association of Independent Journalists. 
Founded: Sept. 1995. Informal grouping semi-independent of the KJA. 
Membershim Pro-Khmer Nation Party newspapers: Samleng Yuvachon Khmer, Wat 
Phnom, Udam Kate Khmer, Moneaksekar Khmer, Sereipheap Thmei. 
Material and Professional Assistance: The Asia Foundation. 
Aims: Participates in KJA activities; provide solidarity to members who have been the 
particular targets of harassmen t26. 
Khmer Journalists Association. 
Founded: 31 Dec. 1992. 
Co-presidents Pin Samkhon and Tat Ly Hok. 
Membershin: 20 media organisations belong including Kampuchea, Khmer Aikeriec, 
Angkor Thmei, AKP press agency, TVK, National Radio, Chinese and Vietnamese 
newspapers. 
Material and Professional Assistance: Asia Foundation. 
23"Project Rights III, " unpublished funding proposal, Khmer Buddhist Society in Cambodia, June 1996, 
Phnom Penh. 
24 Personal interview, Phnom Penh. 
25The Khmer language newspapers surveyed were chosen from a list of 31 newspapers publishing in Feb. 
1995, also provided by Mr Peschoux. All five journalists and writers associations operating in Cambodia 
in 1995 were studied. Mr Mike Fowler of the Asia Foundation and Mr John C. Brown of the Cambodian 
Communications Institute provided names of editors and addresses of newspaper offices. 
26Personal interview, Phnom Penh. 
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Aims and activities: Promotion of professionalism in journalism and improvement of 
the safety and security of Cambodian journalists; promulgation of professional ethics 
27 
code 
Khmer Writers Association 
Founded: 1993. 
President: Yu Bo 
Material and Professional Assistance: Adhoc; Cambodians in Canada, US and Australia; 
in the future, NORWEB. 
Activities: Literacy programmes; training for journalists and newspaper publishers; 
running poetry and story-writing competitions. Planned: Women's and children's rights 
training project for villagers 28 . 
League of Cambodian Journalists. 
Founded: 24 July 1995, breakaway group from Khmer Journalists Association. 
President: Chum Kanal. 
Membership: 32 newspapers, 6 magazines, 4 radio stations, 2 television stations, 7 other 
media organisations. 
Material and Professional Assistance: Asia Foundation. 
Aims and activities: Provision of information and cheap facilities (computer equipment/ 
paper); advocacy to protect journalists' rights; receiving and mediating complaints 
against newspapers; issuing press cards; insurance scheme to benefit families of 
journalists wounded or killed29. 
Neutral Khmer Journalists Association. 
Founded: June 1996, breakaway group from League of Cambodian Journalists. 
President: Khieu Seng Kim. 
Membership: Six founding members. 




Founded: Jan. 1979. 
Editor: Thach Pen. 
Orientation: Founded as organ of KNUFNS. 1980s: organ of KPRP, controlled by 
Ministry of the Interior. 1993- , voice of Royal Goverment of Cambodia. KJA 
member3l. 
27 Personal interview, Phnom Penh. 
2gPersonal interview, Phnom Penh. 
29Personal interview, Phnom Penh. 
30Personal interview, Phnom Penh. 
3'Personal interview, Phnom Penh. 
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KhmerAikeriec 
Founded: 1993 
Editor: Pin Samkhon. 
Orientation: independent. KJA member32. 
Koh Santepheap 
Founded: 1992. First private newspaper in Cambodia since 1975. 
Editor: Tbong Uy Pang. 
Orientation: pro-CPP. LCJ member. 
Human rights issues: Koh Santepheap reporter Chan Dara killed in Kompong Cham, 8 
Dec. 1994, after writing a story which reportedly connected CPAF Gen. Sat Soeun to 
illegal timber exports to Vietnam. Souen arrested and tried for murder but acquitted33. 
Aloneaksek-ar Khmer 
Founded: Aug. 1994. 
Editor: Soth Khemerak. 
Orientation: pro-KNP. AIJ member. 
Human rielits issues: Office attacked on 2 June 
beaten34. 
1995 by students; manager Dam Sithik 
Neak Normsar Thmei 
Founded: 1993. 




Editor-in-Chief- Khem Sambo. 
Orientation: independent. KJA member. 
Phnom Penh Post 
Founded: 1992. 
Publisher and Editor-in-Chief-. Michael Hayes. 
Orientation: independent. 
Human riizhts issues: Hayes threatened with prosecution and possible jail sentence on 
disinformation charges over articles about troop movements; case not pursued after 
support for Hayes expressed by international press, Amnesty International and King 
Sihanouk3s. 
32 Personal interview, Phnom Penh. 
33 Chan Ratana, "Cambodia: Assassinations, Terrorism, Warnings, Judiciary Pursuits... Against Freedoms 
of Press", address, Cambodian Press Forum, Phnom Penh, 31 July 1996. 
34 Personal interview, Phnom Penh. 
35Personal interview, Phnom Penh. 
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Reasmei Kampuchea 
Founded: 1992. 
Editor: Pen Peng, aka Pen Samitthy. 
Orientation: pro-CPP. Owned by Cambodian tycoon Teng Boonma. LCJ member. 
Samleng Avachon Khmer 
Founded: April 1994 
Editor: Ou Sovann. 
Orientation: pro-KNP. AIJ member. 
Human riizhts issues: First editor resigned after receiving anonymous death threats. 
Second editor, Nuon Chan, shot dead, Phnom Penh, 7 Sept. 1994. Third editor, Chan 
Ratana, aka Yirn Sokha, jailed June 1996 on defamation charges; amnestied by King 
after seven days in T3 prison 36 . 
Udam Kate Khmer 
Founded: 1993. 
Orientation: pro-Khmer Nation Party. AIJ member. 
Human rights issues: Publisher Thun Bunly convicted of disinformation Jan. 1995; shot 
dead while awaiting Supreme Court hearing, Phnom Penh, 18 May 199637. 
WatPhnom 
Founded: July 1994. 
Publisher: Ung Sopheap, aka Meas Dararith. 
Orientation: pro-Khmer Nation Party. AIJ member. 
Royal University of Phnom Penh38 
Department of Philosophy 
Dean: Choy Yi Heang. 
Material and Professional Assistance: New Humanities NGO. 
Department of Sociology 
Dean: Doun Sayroeun. 
Material and Professional Assistance: New Humanities NGO. 
Faculty of Law 
Acting Dean: Yuok Ngoy. 
Material and Professional Assistance: French Embassy. 
36 Chan Ratana, "C=bodia: Assassinations, Terrorism, Warnings, Judiciary Pursuits... Against Freedoms 
of Press", address, Cambodian Press Forum, Phnom Penh, 31 July 1996. 
37 Chan Ratana, "Canibodia: Assassinations, Terrorism, Warnings, Judiciary Pursuits... Against Freedoms 
of Press", address, Cambodian Press Forum, Phnom Penh, 31 July 1996. 
38University faculties were chosen on the basis of the relationship between human rights and the subject 
matter taught. Names of deans and location of faculties and departments was given by Sister Luise Arens, 
at the University of Phnom Penh. Students' organisations were selected on the basis of conversations with 
students. 
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Khmer Students' Association 
Founded: 1993. 
President: Iv Bory. 
Membershiv: Students of the University of Phnom Penh. 
Activities: Human rights education; promotion of discussion groups, newslette, within 
university; cultivates international contacts; participated in 1993 electoral training and 
monitoring via Ponleu Khmer". 
National Union of Khmer Students 
President: Meas Saroeun. 
Membershi]2: Students of the University of Phnom Penh and Faculty of Economics and 
Law. 
40 Activities: Provides financial assistance and means of livelihood for poor students 
Religious Leaders4l 
Samdech Preah Sangkarech Tep Vong, Supreme Patriarch of Monks. Honorary 
President of Khmer Buddhist Society in Cambodia. 
Samdech Preah Maha Ghosananda, Supreme Patriarch of Monks. Leader of annual 
Dhammayietra and Coalition for Peace and Reconciliation. 
Ven. Yos Huot. Coalition for Peace and Reconciliation. 
Father Peter Trinh. Maryknoll, Fathers. Roman Catholic priest serving ethnic 
Vietnamese communities in Cambodia. 
Wat Swaay Popet, Phnom Penh. 
Wat Takhmau, Kandal Province. 
Khmer Nation Partyv 
Founded: II November 1995. 
President: Sam Rainsy, former Minister of Finance and Economics, former National 
Assembly representative (Funcinpec). 
39Chan Ratana, "Cambodia: Assassinations, Terrorism, Warnings, Judiciary Pursuits... Against Freedoms 
of Press", address, Cambodian Press Forum, Phnom Penh, 31 July 1996. 
4OPersonal interview, Phnom Penh. 
4 'Religious leaders were chosen as representing the two major political orientations within the monkhood. 
The Ven. Tep Vong is an appointee of the former KPRP regime, former member of KNUFNS and elected 
to National Assembly 1981. Maha Ghosananda and Yos Huot both studied abroad; active in border 
refugee camps, late 1980s. Now associated with Coalition for Peace and Reconciliation and 
Dhammayietra Peace March. Father Peter Trinh is a Maryknoll priest serving Vietnamese Catholic 
communities. 
42The KNP was studied as the only opposition party supporting a significant section of the press and 
conducting activities openly in Phnom Penh and the provinces. 
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Aims: Protection and promotion of human rights and democracy; neutrality of the civil 
service; social justice and rule of law; protection of territorial integrity; protection and 
preservation of natural resources; assistance to the people in the form of land and 
housing; solution to the problem of illegal immigrants; review and amendment of 
improper contracts; elimination of corruption; ending of the fratricidal war between 
Khmer and Khmer; promotion of a free market econoMY43. 
Human Rights Issues 
': 
Declared illegal following launch; threats and intimidation 
against provincial offices reported; two KNP activists reported murdered 1996; 
demonstration subject to grenade attack killing 19 people, 30 Mar. 1997; most activists 
fled following July 1997 coup. 
National Assembly" 
National Assembly Commission for Human Rights and Receiving Complaints 
Founded: 1993. 
President: H. E. Kem. Sokha (BLDP). 
Professional support: UN Centre for Human Rights, Asia Foundation. 
Activities: Receives complaints, directly from the public, through National Assembly 
members, or from NGOs; investigates complaints; questions ministry officials over 
5 
complaints; monitoring of legislation and advocacyý . 
Judiclary46 
Supreme Court 
Phnom Penh Municipal Court 
Kampot Provincial Court 
Royal Govemment of Cambodia 47 
Ministry of Interior: responsible for police, prisons and electoral legislation. 
Ministry of Justice: responsible for court system. 
Ministry of Cults and Religions: responsible for monks, ethnic minorities. 
United Nations 
43 Statutes of the Khmer Nation Party, official transl., 6 Nov. 1995, Phnom Penh, Art. 7. 
44 Mr David Ashley of the UN Centre for Human Rights provided names of members of the National 
Assembly Commission for Human Rights and the Reception of Complaints. Other Assembly members 
interviewed were selected from news coverage of the Assembly's activities. 
45 Personal interview, Phnom Penh. 
46Ms Christie Warren and the Court Training Project assisted in providing information about judges and 
gaining access to the Cambodian courts. 
47These ministries were selected for study because of their jurisdiction over human rights questions. The 
Ministry of Interior has jurisdiction over internal security, police and electoral arrangements. The 
Ministry of Justice has jurisdiction over the courts. The Ministry of Cults and Religions has responsibility 
for monks and for formulating policies regarding Cambodia's ethnic minority peoples. 
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United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia. 
Existed: 1992-1993 
Director, Human Rights Component: Dennis McNamara 
Human Rights Activities: human rights education; general human riýhts oversight 
18 during the transitional period; investigation of abuse and corrective action 
United Nations Centre for Human Rights Field Office in Cambodia 49 
Founded: 1993 
Director: Daniel Premont 
Activities: Training for public officials, police; court monitoring programme with 
training for judges; assistance in drafting legislation; assistance to the National 
Assembly Commission for Human Rights and Reception of Complaints; strengthening 
of human rights NGOs; activities to develop awareness of other important components 
50 of civil society; liaison with NGOs and monitoring of abuse in provinces 
In-Country DonorlTrainer NGOS51 
US Democracv Proiect 
Court Training Project 
Funders: USAID, International Human Rights Law Group. 
Director: Christie Warren. 
Activities: Provision of technical assistance to Cambodian judges52. 
Human Rights Task Force 
Funders: USAID, International Human Rights Law Group 
Co-ordinator: Alex Marcellino. 




Director: John Summers. 
48Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement to the Cambodia Conflict, annex 1, section E. 
49The UN Centre for Human Rights Field Office in Cambodia was created to continue human rights 
promotion in Cambodia after UNTAC's departure. 
50Michael Kirby, "A Continued United Nations Human Rights Presence in Cambodia, " UN Document 
E/CN. 4/1991/73,24 February 1994. 
51The US Democracy Project was selected for study as representative of a style of international human 
rights promotion which seeks to forge contacts between international and local practitioners. In this 
regard, the US Democracy Project took on the mantle of UNTAC in providing technical, material and 
political support. 
52 Personal interview, Phnom Penh. 
53 Personal interview, Phnom Penh. 
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Activities: Provision of training, material and technical assistance to: journalists 
organisations, the National Assembly, human rights NGOs, ministries 54 . 
Intemational DonorlTrainer NGOs 
International Human Rights Law Group 
Based: Washington DC. 
Cambodia Proiect Co-ordinator: Laura McGrew. 
Activities in Cambodia: Supports Human Rights Task Force, Cambodian Defenders' 
Project, Court Training Projece. 
International Human Rights Watchdogs 
Asian Human Rights Commission 
Based: Hongkong. 
Publications about Cambodia: Asian Human Rights Commission. Report of the Fact- 
Finding Mission to Cambodia. Hongkong: Asian Human Rights Commission, 1994. 
Human Rights Watch/Asia. 
Based: Washington DC. 
Publications about Cambodia: 
Human Rights Watch/ Asia. Political Control, Human Rights and ihe UN Mission in 
Cambodia. Washington DC: Human Rights Watch/ Asia, 1992. 
--- "Cambodia: Human Rights Before and After the Elections. " Human Rights 
WatchlAsia Bulletin. 5: 10 (May 1993). 
--- "An Exchange on Human Rights and Peace-Keeping in Cambodia". Human 
Rights WatchlAsia Bulletin. 5: 14 (September 1993). 
Human Rights Watch/Asia and Human Rights Watch Arms Project. Cambodia At War. 
New York: Human Rights Watch/ Asia and Human Rights Watch Arms Project, 
1995. 
54The Asia Foundation, 1994 Annual Report (San Francisco: Asiawatch, 1994), 9. 
"International Human Rights Law Group, "rhe Cambodian Provincial Court Training Project, " 
unpublished report, 9 May 1995, Washington DC. 
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B. Target Groups Selected by UNTAC for Human Rights Education 56 
A. UNTAC 
UNTAC Civil Police 
UNTAC Electoral Staff 
B. Existing Administrative Stuctures (EAS) 
Police of EAS 
Teachers employed by EAS 
Students in universities 
Ministerial officials of EAS 
Other civil servants of EAS 
Political party representatives 
Judges and prosecutors of EAS 
C. Civil Society 
Defenders (including from EAS) 





56Table reproduced from UNTAC Human Rights Component, Final Report, unpublished report, Phnom 
Penh, Sept. 1993,54. Groups selected for study in this research are printed in bold. 
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Appendix 2 
Tables A and B: Disbursements from the UNCHR Trust Fund for a Human 
Rights Education Programme in Cambodia (as of 31 July 1995)1 
A. Assistance to the Cambodian Government 




Advisory services on prison reform and seminar on US$ 16,049 
prisons 
Training and information activities US$ 98,102 
Assistance in reporting obligations US$ 17,400 
Study trip for health officials to Thailand on AIDS US$ 3,388 
prevention strategies 
Provincial network US$ 18,973 US$ 61,726 
Judicial Mentor Programme US$ 23,426 US$151,374 
Total US$ 79,596 US$1159,828 
Grand Total US$239,424 




-, vý, 4 Approved ý47 ý, - I 
Cambodian Institute of Human Rights $ 5,198 Translation into Khmer of the LIN 
Manual on Reporting 
_ Cambodian Institute of Human Rights $46,100 Curriculum project on human rights 
education 
Cambodian Institute of Human Rights $ 3,901 Translation into Khmer of the 
Compilation of International Human 
Riqhts Instruments 
Cambodian Human Riqhts Task Force $65,000 Assistance to Cambodian NGOs 
International Catholic Migration Mission $49,074 Human rights education for women and 
communities (Battambang) 
Enfants du Cambodge $ 800 Trauma relief; compensation to two 
widows whose husbands were killed in 
a DK attack 
CHARTO $20,000 Human Rights Defender Programme 
and provincial training activities 
KKKHRA $10,000 Training and assistance programme for 
minorities 
Parliamentary Organisation for Social $13,427 To support the National Assembly and 
Development to broaden popular participation in the 
leqislative process 
Ponleu Khmer $ 6,000 Production of leaflets and newsletters 
on human rights 
ASCEND $20,000 Production of videos in Khmer on 
Id criminal justice issues, prisons, child 
abuse and the handicapped 
1 Table reproduced from Michael Kirby, "Human Rights Questions: Technical Co-operation in the Field 
of Human Rights, " UN Document A150/68, Sept. 1995,31-33. 
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CADEAS $ 5,000 Human Rights Defenders Proqramme 
Vietnamese Association $ 5,500 Assistance to displaced tnamese 
Urban Sector Group $29,328 To work with urban poor, particularly 
squatters on forced evictions and 
housing rights Issues 
Cambodian Women Development Ass. $15,000 To work with marginalised women, 
particularlv sex workers 
Cambodian Human Rights Information $17,272 To act as a liaison between the 
Organisation Commission on Human Rights of the 
National Assembly and the local and 
International NGOs on human rights 
monitorinq 
Vigilance $10,000 to improve the ability of this large 
human rights organisation's provincial 
offices to provide investigation and 
monitoring services 
Human Rights Task Force $ 8,000 To strengthen the monitoring, 
networking and advocacy work of 
orovincial human rights qroups 
Cambodian Institute of Human Rights $30,000 To print the schools human rights 
curriculum previously prepared and 
distribute to 80,000 Cambodian 
teachers 
Cambodian Human Rights Co- $ 5,000 To help in the establishment of a co- 
ordination Committee ordinating group of nine human rights 
groups and to defray the costs of a 
newsletter 
Children's Rights Project $22,000 To improve the capacity of a Khmer 
NGO to advocate and monitor the 
rlqhts of Cambodian children 
Action Committee $ 5,000 To help establish a committee of six 
NGOs to respond quickly to human 
rights violations 
Vietnamese Association $10,000 To provide skilled technical support in 
the areas of investigation and 
monitoring of human rights abuse 
against the Vietnamese minority - Outreach $10,000 To provide technical assistance to 
improve research and report writing 
skills , 
Licadho $15,000 Medical assistance in prisons 
Licadho $ 3,000 Publication of hygiene booklets 
Charto $ 9,625 Human rights video and production on 
women and children's rights to be 
disseminated to human rights NGOs 
LCDHQ $ 300 Celebration of Human Rights Day 
ADHOC $ 300 Celebration of Human Rights Day 
Licadho $ 300 Celebration of Human Rights Day 
Action Committee $ 500 Celebration of Human Rights Day 
Cambodian Institute $ 1,600 Celebration of Human Rights Day 
Total $442,225 
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A. Ouestions Addressed to All Cambodian Interviewees 
1. What problems need to be addressed as a priority in promoting human rights in 
Cambodia? 
2. What kinds of people are violating human rights in Cambodia? 
3. What kinds of people are suffering most from human rights violations? 
4. The leaders of some South East Asian countries have said that economic 
development is the most important priority for poor countries and that human rights 
and democracy should wait until later. Do you agree with that? 
5. Do you think human rights are a new idea in Cambodia? 
6. Are there any Cambodian customs that n6ed to be changed because they conflict 
with human rights? 
7. Do you think there are any human rights that are not suitable for promotion in 
Cambodia? 
8. How can the international community help to promote human rights in Cambodia? 
B. Additional Ouestions for Human Rights NGOs 
I- What motivates you to work in human rights? 
2. What are the main aims of this organisation? 
3. Do you think you could serve your aims effectively by working for a political party, 
rather than an NGO? 
4. How does your organisation attempt to influence the government on human rights 
issues? 
5. How does the gover=ent react? 
6. Do you feel your organisation or your workers need protection because you promote 
human rights? 
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7. Are there any human rights you do not promote because you think it would cause 
trouble between your NGO and the government? 
C. Additional Ouestions for Religious NGOs/Monks 
1. What motivated you to work in this NGO/ What interested you in human rights? 
2. What are the main aims of this organisation/ your human rights work? 
3. What kind of problems does the Buddhist religion face in Cambodia at the moment? 
4. What kinds of methods does this organisation/ do you use to promote human rights in 
Cambodia? 
5. What do you think are the similarities and differences between human rights and 
Buddhism? 
6. Do you think that by promoting human rights you are bringing Buddhist principles 
into politics? 
7. How does your organisation/monks attempt to influence human rights abusers? 
8. How do they react to these strategies? 
9. Do you feel your organisation or its members/ you need protection because you 
promote human rights? 
1O. Do you think monks can help to protect others because of their special status? 
11. Are there any human rights you do not promote because it would cause trouble 
between your NGO/ the monkhood and the government? 
D. Additional Ouestions for Minority NGOs 
1. What motivates you personally to work in the field of human rights? 
2. What do you see as the main aims of this organisation? 
3. What sort of particular problems do your members face in Cambodia? 
4. Do your members face discrimination? 
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5. Do you think you could serve your aims effectively by working for a political party, 
rather than an NGO? 
6. How does your organisation attempt to influence the government on human rights 
issues? 
7. How does the govemment react to these strategies? 
8. Do you feel your organisation or your workers need protection because you promote 
human rights? 
Are there any cases where you do not get involved because you think it would cause 
trouble between your NGO and the government? 
E. Additional Ouestions for Journalists 
1. What motivated you to become a joumalist? 
2. Who reads your newspaper? 
3. How large is the circulation of this newspaper? 
4. Who funds your newspaper? 
5. What role do you think journalists play in Cambodia? 
6. What are the major problems facing newspapers in Cambodia? 
7. What kind of stories are most popular with the public? 
8. How can journalists' associations help journalists in Cambodia? 
9. Do you ever receive complaints or pressure from the government over the stories you 
print? 
10. Several journalists have been attacked since 1993, and some have been killed. How 
can you protect yourself from that? 
11. Can local human rights NGOs help to protect journalists? 
12. Do you think the press in Cambodia has freedom of speech? 
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F. Additional Questions for Lawyers and Defenders 
1. What motivated you to become a lawyer/defender? 
2. What role do lawyers/defenders have in Cambodia? 
3. What are the problems facing lawyers and defenders working in the Cambodian 
courts? 
4. What difference can a lawyer/defender make to the treatment of prisoners? 
5. Are there any kinds of prisoners you would not like to defend, or any kinds of cases 
you would not like to take? 
6. Do you see your work in the courts as connected with the promotion of human rights 
in Cambodia? 
7. What strategies do you use to promote human rights in the Cambodian courts? 
8. How do the police and judges react? 
9. Are there any cases you would not want to take because it would cause trouble 
between you/ your NGO and the government? 
G. Additional Ouestlons for University Faculty and Students 
I. How long have you been at this university? 
2. How has the university changed since the Royal Government was formed? 
3. What role does the university/ student groups play in the development of Cambodian 
society? 
4. What are the major problems faced by the university/ students? 
5. What can you do to try to solve these problems? 
6. What is the relationship between the university/ student groups and the government? 
7. How can the international community help the university/ students? 
8. Do intellectuals have freedom of expression in C=bodia? 
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H. Additional Ouestions for Khmer Nation Party Officials 
1. What motivated you to set up/join this party? 
2. In what ways does this party differ from other political parties in Cambodia? 
3. What do you think is the most popular part of the party's platform? 
4. Your party has been subject to a number of violent attacks; why do you think your 
party has been targetted? 
5. How can you protect yourselves and your supporters from violence? 
6. Are there any kinds of party activities that you have decided not to do because you 
might be attacked? 
7. Can local human rights NGOs help to protect you? 
8. If your party is elected and takes power, what will be the most urgent priorities for 
promoting respect for human rights? 
9. Do you think there is anything you can do as an opposition party to promote human 
rights in Cambodia? 
1. Additional Questions for National Assembly Members 
1. What motivated you to stand for election to the National Assembly? 
2. What is the role of the National Assembly in Cambodia today? 
3. What problems does the National Assembly face in Cambodia at present? 
4. What is your opinion of the human rights situation in Cambodia at present? 
5. What are your party's policies on human rights? 
6. Do you think these policies are popular with voters? 
7. Do you think the National Assembly has a role to play in promoting human rights in 
Cambodia? 
8. How can local human rights NGOs help to promote human rights? 
9. Do you think the 1998 election will be important for human rights in Cambodia? 
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I O. What do you see as the role of opposition parties in Cambodia? 
J. Additional Questions for the Judiciary 
1. How did you become a judge? 
2. What is the role ofjudges in Cambodia today? 
3. What kinds of problems do judges face in performing their duties? 
4. Where can you find help or support in solving these problems? 
5. Do you think human rights NGOs and public defenders have a role to play in the 
Cambodian court system? 
6. Do you think judges have a role to play in promoting human rights in Cambodia? 
7. Do you think criminals should have the same rights as other people? 
8. How can the international community help judges in Cambodia? 
K. Additional Ouestions for Royal Government of Cambodia 
I- What are the problems the government faces in trýring to promote human rights in 
Cambodia? 
2. Is promotion of human rights a priority for the government at present? 
3. Can human rights NGOs help you to address these problems? 
4. Do you think there is a role for an opposition party to play in promoting human rights 
in Cambodia? 
5. Do you think multi-party elections are important in Cambodia? 
L. Ouestions Addressed to Former UNTAC Human Rights Component 
Employees 
1. What motivated you to work for UNTAC? 
2. What was LTNTAC's role in promoting human rights in Cambodia? 
3. What problems did it face in carrying out that role? 
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4. What successes did UNTAC have in terms of human rights? 
5. To what extent did it fail? 
6. Were human rights a priority issue for UNTAC? 
7. What kinds of human rights problems were the most important for LTNTAC? 
8. What was the relationship between UNTAC and local human rights NGOs? 
9. What kinds of people got involved in human rights NGOs in Cambodia? 
10. Were human rights a new idea to Cambodians? 
11. Did you find any cultural differences in people's attitudes to human rights in 
Cambodia? 
12. Did ordinary Cambodians find any of the human rights you promoted difficult to 
understand or accept? 
13. What kinds of people were violating human rights in Cambodia in UNTAC's time? 
14. What kinds of people were suffering? 
15. How important was the election for human rights in Cambodia? 
16. How do you think the international community can continue to help promote human 
rights in Cambodia? 
M. Ouestions Addressed to Employees of LIN Centre for Human Rightsl 
International NGOs. 
1. What motivated you to work for this organisation? 
2. How would you describe the role of the organisation? 
3. What are the major problems faced by the organisation? 
4. What successes has the organisation had? 
5. How would you describe the relationship between the organisation and local NGOs? 
6. How would you describe your organisation's relationship with govenunent? 
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7. What sort of problems do you think need to be addressed as a priority for promoting 
human rights in Cambodia? 
8. Do you think the international community has a responsibility to promote human 
rights in Cambodia? 
9. To what extent do your organisation's activities constitute an interference in 
Cambodia's intemal affairs? 
I O. Do you think the international community can protect local activists from attack? 
1 1. What are the most effective methods the international community can use to 
influence the Cambodian government? 
12. Do you think human rights are a new idea in Cambodia? 
13 Do you find any cultural differences in the way Cambodians view human rights? 
14. Do you think there are any human rights which are not suitable for promotion in 
Cambodia? 
15. Do you think the Cambodians you deal with find any of the human rights you are 
promoting difficult to understand or accept? 
16. Do you think the 1998 elections are important for human rights in Cambodia? 
17. Do you think international organisations should play a role in that election? 
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